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SUMMARY Of THESIS 
The thesis is an examination and discussion of the responses of British 
governments to developments in labour and socialist organisations between 
1916 and 1926. The first chapter is concerned with the growing recogni-
tion of the increased power of labour under the conditions of modern war. 
Yet governments, it is argued, failed to develop a coherent labour policy 
and often acted in a confused and contradictory manner. The second chap-
ter begins with an analysis of the post war crisis when many politicians 
began to regard revolution as a real possibility. They developed two 
agencies, the Special Branch and the Supply and Transport Organisation in 
order to deal with the situation. It is argued that in its original form 
the latter was not only costly but politically dangerous and ineffective. 
Later developments were not only cheaper but based on a more sophisticated 
understanding of the political strengths of a modern state. The third 
chapter is concerned with the responses of British socialists to the state. 
It includes some discussion of theoretical influences, an examination of 
the attempts of the Communist Party to implement Lenin's teachings on 
state and revolution, and a discussion of the first Labour Government in 
respect of the implications for socialist strategies with regard to the 
state. The final chapter is concerned to argue that while superior orga-
nisation and resources played their part in the Government's victory in 
the General Strike, it was Baldwin's political manoeuvres which were the 
most important element of the campaign. In conclusion there is some dis-
cussion of attempts which have been made to characterise the development 
of the British state in this period. The reality, it is argued, was far 
more prosaic than many accounts would suggest. Politicians achieved the 
stability they sought but they did so not by dramatic innovation but by 
constant politicsl andeavour based on marginal rsadjustmsnt and ths re-
application of traditionsl themss and structurss. 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an examination of the ideas and actions of British 
Governments in the years 1916 to 1926 with respect to questions of 
political order and stability. It includes also some consideration of 
some of those organisations and individuals on the left of British 
politics who, in their various ways sought to bring about changes in 
the political and economic structures of British society. 
These years were originally chosen because, on superficial examination 
they offered the prospect of the discovery of fundamental change and 
the demonstration of significant breaks in historical continuity. These 
were, after all, interesting times. The considerable domestic crises 
could be set in the context of the final and most terrible stages of 
the first modern war, the Bolshevik Revolution and the political disin-
tegration of Central Europe. Gramsci argued that in post-war Europe 
the ruling groups were faced with nothing less than the complete recon-
struction of the bases of their authority. 
Yet for Britain what emerges on closer examination is far less clear 
cut. This may partly be attributed to the cultural and geographical 
separation from continental Europe and to the fact that Britain never 
lost or even came close to losing national territory during the War. 
But one must also take account of the fact that it is much easier to 
identify clear themes before one has tried to come to terms with the 
basic historical records. After contact with such inevitably con-
fusing and often contradictory material, itself a record of mundane 
confusions, mistaken assumptions, ill informed arguments and the 
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necessary ambiguities of the day-to-day business of politics, general 
theories can only be advanced with qualification and a degree of cir-
cumspection. 
Nonetheless it is possible to identify continuing themes and issues 
and it is possible to argue that the period is held together by some-
thing more substantial than chronological sequence. The question of 
political order in this period is dominated by the rise of the mase 
organisations of labour. These were as much at the heart of conserva-
tive anxieties as they were the focus of the hopes of radicals. It is 
the arguments and developments prompted by these organisations which 
form the core of this study. 
It was during the Great War that British governments were first forced 
to recognise that labour questions had become permanently integrated 
into the political agenda. Politicians could no longer deal with 
labour matters on a one off basis at moments of crisis. Vet, to the 
dismay of many, the successful conclueion of hostilities did not mean 
that labour matters could be relegated to their former status. Dis-
agreements about the nature of the problem and about how it might best 
be handled remained the central issue of domestic politics throughout 
the period. 
The first section of the thesis is based on a study of the final two 
years of the Great War. It examines this growing recognition by the 
politicians of the vastly increased significance of labour and offers 
an assessment of various attempts to come to terms with this. The 
chapter seeks to demonstrate that there was in effect no labour policy; 
that actions in the area were frequently contradictory, often counter 
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productive, and that disorder became institutionalised owing to the 
proliferation of overlapping and competing agencies. In the end, it 
would appear that the Government tried almost everything from outright 
repression, through incorporation and deception to generous concession. 
The second section is concerned with developments in ths post-war 
period. It begins with an analysis of the panic of the post-war months 
in which a large section of ths British political elite became convinced 
that revolutionary disorder was a real possibility. In this climate, 
it is argued, it was inevitable that politicians would favour repressive 
measures. In particular they developed two agencies, the Special 
Branch and an organisation to neutralise the effects of large strikes, 
which later came to be known as the Supply and Transport Organisation, 
in order to deal with the crisis which they felt to bs imminent. This 
section contains a detailed analysis of the methods, structures and 
developments of these agencies. The theme of the section is that the 
original responses were not only costly and politically dangerous but 
always liable to be ineffective. Later schemes, as characterised by 
Sir John Anderson's report of 1923, were not only cheaper but were 
based on a far more sophisticated understanding of the real political 
strengths of a modern state. 
The third section is concerned with the responses of British socialists 
to the question of the state. It begins with an outline and discussion 
of the major theoretical influences on socialists and then moves to a 
detailed discussion of two attempts to put theory into practice. 
Firstly there is an examination of the efforts of the Communist Party 
of Great Britain to implement Lenin's teachings on 'State and Revolution' 
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and then an examination of the 1924 Labour Government in respect of 
its implications for socialist strategies with regard to the state. 
The final section is an examination of how the Government handled the 
General Strike. It is argued that the Government's victory was essen-
tially political. While superior organisation and resources played 
their part it was Baldwin's political manoeuvres which underpinned the 
Government's campaign. However accounts which suggest that the operations 
of the state were always smooth and cohesive are misleading. If Baldwin 
was able to stick to a coherent strategy he did so only in the face of 
internal opposition which always threatened to destroy his preparations. 
Within these events, it is argued, it is possible to identify aspects 
of a developing modern liberal state. While more radical solutions to 
the labour problem; authoritarian, paternalistic and corporatist, had 
their advocates within government, tactics in line with traditional 
liberal assumptions were nearly always more attractive to the majority 
if only because they required less readjustment. The pattern that 
emerged then, is not of a state seeking to dominate popular opinion 
but rather of one using limited resources to select and reinforce those 
existing themes which could most readily be turned to advantage. It 
was not a state which sought to take all power to itself but rather one 
which recognised that in society as it was then constructed the main-
tenance of order rested on the activities of a vast range of individuals 
and organisations below and outside the formal political framework. 
Most conservative politicians came to realise that it was better to 
develop an effective alignment with such groups than it was to attempt 
to supercede them. 
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However the state which emerged was in no sense a weak state. 'In 
almost every sense its acceptance of a limited, though central, role 
meant that it was politically stronger than it could otherwise have 
been. Nor should it be imagined that the role of this state was in any 
way marginal or negligible. While, in reality, there was no moment 
when the state was all that stood between the established order and 
social collapse, and no single decision which, had it gone the wrong 
way, would have precipitated mass disorder; while the work was never 
as desperate or difficult as the more histrionic participants felt it 
to be, it was still essential. The work rarely demanded great imagi-
nation and there was always a considerable margin of error but the 
survival of the social order still rested on the ability of the state 
to continually reinforce and support its allies and to discomfort and 
undermine its opponents. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE STATE AND LABOUR IN THE WAR 
During the Great War the activities of government directed towards 
the maintenance of order were conditioned by two special factora. In 
one sense the war offered the state's agents a new opportunity. The 
war produced in many a strengthening of national sentiment and a 
desire for unity and, in more, an aversion to any action which might 
increase the miseries and dangers being feced by British troops in 
action. Politicians could exploit such an atmosphere and use it to 
deter or deflect criticism and to undermine opposition. Yet while 
the champions of order had these new weapons at their dispoeal they 
had to operate in a situation where they were continuously aware 
that the consequences of failurs were certain and terminal. Modern 
states, it was rapidly recognised, are at their most vulnerable when 
at war. Moreover what was at stake was not just the external territory 
or the personnel of the regime. Defeat in wer would be likely to 
precipitate the internal collapse of the regime. Should defeat alone 
prove to be an insufficient stimulus to internal opposition, the 
armies of the victorious enemy would be on hand to offer assistance 
or to complete the operation. As Hannah Arendt has argued, "since 
the snd of the rirst World War we almost automatically expect that 
no government, and no state or form of government, will be strong 
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enough to survive defeat in war". These two factors, a social atmos-
phere ripe for exploitation and an awareness among elite groups of 
the consequences of defeat insvitably came together to produce a 
frenetic level of political activity. Yet political activity was 
not only intensified but it was extended into new areas of social 
and economic activity. As illustrated by Arthur Marwick; even the slowest 
politicians came to realise that the outcome of the Great War would 
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be as dependent upon industrial production as on military strategy. 
Areas of activity which had previously been beyond the scope of the 
state inevitably became politicised. 
In view of the panics and alarms among the politicians in the latter 
part of the war it is interesting-that two well knownworks3 on the 
prewar period should present the outbrsak of war as the bsginning 
of a period of social harmQny. 80th Dangerfield and Halevy have 
argued that the war brought for ths state a wslcome respite from a 
period of political tensions, and induced dissident groups to sink 
their differences in a mood of national reconciliation. While there 
are difficulties in drawing a precise causal relationship between 
the coming of ths war and the onset of social peace; it is apparent 
for instance that the wave of labour unrest was substantially dimi-
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nished before the commencement of hostilities, it may not be mis-
leading to view the war as an essentially unifying influence providing 
the perspective is restricted to 1914. The outbreak of war did 
diminish existing troubles and it was only in the latter half of the 
conflict that war related difficulties became acute. 
Dangerfield's argument is worth some examination here, not so much 
for its view of 1914 as for the anelysis of the political conflicts 
of the prewar years. Dangerfield identified four areas of conflict; 
the women's suffrage question, the Conservative rebellion on Ulster, 
the revolt of the House of Lords against the Libsral Government's 
legislative programme and the high levels of Labour unrest. Such 
issues, had they been as serious es Dengerfield statee, must have 
had some bearing on the activity of the British state to survive 
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the pressures of war. It is therefore worth asking whether they did 
represent aspects of an underlying weakness which could re-emerge 
after the first euphoric months. 
In this respect the conduct of the Unionist Party is the most intruig-
ing issue. To what extent mi'ght the encouragement which certain 
prominent members of the Party gave to armed Ulster men and to their 
followers in the Lords be held to represent a fundamental division 
within traditional ruling groups? Such divisions have often been 
identified as one of the critical preconditions of successful revo-
lutionary activity and Dangerfield's evidence might thus suggest that 
the British state entered the war with a potent, though latent, source 
of weakness at its heart. However later actions by the Unionists and 
their opponents indicate that the prewar conflict, while serious, was 
never fundamental. Both Parties were prepared to make concessions 
where they had previouely appeared intractable and neither considered 
that such differences as they had should be allowsd to compromise 
their attachment to the overriding priority d national defence. Dis-
agreements could be contained within the conventions of 'high politics' 
and, for much of the time, fought out in relative privacy. John 
Stubbs has even suggested that the Unionist Party actually welcomed 
the opportunity the war brought to shelve those issues which they 
felt had left them "tied to a position of blind and unrewarding 
negativismn • 5 
Any fears,that the women's suffrage movement presented a revolutionary 
threat to the state were rapidly dissipated by the conduct of the bulk of 
its adherents on the outbreak of hostilities. Most suffragettes apparently felt 
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that their demands should be subservient to the needs of the nation 
in crisis and dissident activity ceased immediately. The 'labour 
revolt' of the prewar period had also apparently gone the same way 
in the first months of war. The summer of 1914 was by no means the 
high point for strikes but George Askwith noted that the one hundred 
disputes recorded at the Board of Trade at the beginning of August 
had been reduced to twenty by its end. Askwith concluded that 
employers and employees had sunk "their domestic quarrels and united 
in a concerted effort for the welfare and the preservation of the 
nation".5 Instead of the labour crisis which had been widely antici-
pated in the autumn of the year there was comparative industrial 
peace. The mood of crisis, intensified by the Woolwich Arsenal strike 
7 in July, seemed to disappear almost overnight. Halevy was correct 
to underline the Prime Minister's confidence in declaring war "without 
troubling to consult the Cabinet and confident of the silent support 
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of the whole country", but this must call into question his estimate 
of the seriousness of the prewar troubles. If the call to patriotic 
duty could deflect the groups from their attachment to sectional or 
class interest it must cast some light on the nature of that attachment. 
It would be wrong therefore to suggest that the British state entered 
the war weakened by internal divisions. The war itself presented 
serious difficulties but the ability of governments to adapt and 
manoeuvre in order to cope with them was not compromised by previous 
events. 
The peculiar problems of wartime politics did not become fully 
epparent until 1916. It was during this year thet the full, unchanging, 
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horrific novelty of modern war waa revealed to the participants and 
a number of more percaptive civilians. Casualty figures rose to auch 
heights aa to numb normal sensibilities and politicians were driven 
to throw around such notiona as the defence of democracy and promise 
future social reforms in order to inject some meaning into the other-
wise purposeless slaughter into which they had drifted. Attrition 
though was not some subsequent rationalisation of the weakneasea of 
the military imagination but a conscious strategy, expresaing itself 
in a macabre comparative demography: "We should follow the principle 
of the gambler who has the highest purse and force our adversary's 
9 hand and make him go on spending until he is a pauper". Haig, before 
Arras sadly "recognised", "how many must pay the full penalty before 
we can have peace".10 Even if the common soldier or tha ordinary 
civilian ware danied an insight into the subtleties of high strategy 
they could hardly avoid recognising ita consequences. Military parti-
cipants developed a gambler's mathematical fataliam about the likeliehood 
of their survival. The heroic mood of the early months of the war was 
quickly submargad under a recognition of the mechanical, almoat in-
voluntary progreas of hostilities. The outcome waa unlikely to be 
influenced by feat of strategy or some act of heroism. By 1917 the 
conflict seemed to have become less a contest of heroes than a 
struggle between the leaat fit of all nationa. The appropriate 
virtues were patience and endurance rather than dash and imagination. 
One participant recalled that by 1917 the sources of the evident 
weaknesses of the British forces were no longer to be sought on the 
playing fields of Eton but in an industrial system which had allowed 
a few "the joys of making money fast" and had "made half our nation 
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slum dwellers". That war had become a routine of dangers and 
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miseries was widely recognised. Chapman recorded that it came to 
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resemble "an organised industry". This view permeated the home 
front. At the Labour Party Confersnce the President argued "that war 
was never so mechanised, brutalised • • • man lies crushed beneath the 
war machine".13 This war machine was not only composed of the fighting 
men but also of large sections of industry and domestic society which 
were conditioned by the demands of the war. Nations were being 
tested on their ability to maintain a continuous supply of men and 
munitions and the grim recognition of this permeated every section 
of society. 
Yet while the mood of 1914 was dissipated, while war in itself no 
longer held any attractions, it would be wrong to conclude that there 
was any general spread of pacifism or desire for peace at any price. 
It becomes impossible to understand the politics of wartime if one 
fails to take account of the widespread assumption that victory was 
the overriding priority. All other political questions wers suborned 
under this one. All the battles for place and position in high politics 
were conducted, with appropriate gravity and decorum around the issue 
of who was, or was not, the man to win the war. The object wae to 
demonstrate the sort of mental virility that would allow no considera-
tion of principle to stand in the way of a successful prosecution of 
hostilities. Yet the fall of Asquith, it could be argued, was not 
caused by his unwillingness to abandon principle so much as his failure 
to demonstrate sufficient enthusiasm in so doing. Even at the moment 
when Asquith was casting off the final liberal shibboleth and intro-
ducing a measure to extend conscription to married men, opposition 
continued to grow. Hankey tried to explain it by arguing, "the 
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people who want compulsory service don't want Asquith while those 
14 that want Asquith don't want compulsory service". Bonar Law wae 
having difficulty in holding his men in check and Crewe was warning 
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of "a dangerous energy among the Parliamentary Party". The Liberal 
War Committee hac joined Unionist backbanchers in expressing unease 
at Asquith's apparent lack of energy. The atmosphere was made for 
Lloyd George to introduce himeelf as the man who would go to any 
lengths to secure victory. Above all he presented a carefully nur-
tured image of being able to deal with labour. In reality there was 
much that could be set against this. Lloyd George had run into serious 
trouble in Glasgow in December 1915. His attempt to intimidate the 
local engineers had misfired so badly that it had left the "Asquith 
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crowd gloating • • • n and the image tarnished. George Askwith too 
felt Lloyd George's cavalier methods of labour conciliation often 
created more problems than they solved. Yet reason and open discussion 
had an even more minor role in wartime politics than in times of peace. 
Most important were a capacity for intrigue and the ability to project 
'an image of competence and determination in the face of confusion and 
muddle, and in these qualities Lloyd George had a distinct edge. If 
one of the main elements in his rise had been his supposed ability 
to deal with labour his first two years of office were to offer him 
ample opportunity to exercise his talents. 
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Labour Problems 
The attitudes of the British Labour Movement towards the war were, 
from the outset, too complex to admit of any simple generalisation. 
Ralph Miliband ~as surely correct to argue that there could be little 
justification for surprise at the abandonment of the stance of pro-
~ letarian internationalism of the Second International, yet it would 
be equally wrong to assume that the predominant attitude could be 
characterised in terms of patriotism and an unequivocal support for 
18 
the Government's war effort. Royden Harrison has identified four 
distinct bodies of opinion within the War Emergency National Workers 
Committee and euggested that the predominant group might be charecter-
ised as 'sane patriots" in that they accepted the necessity for pro-
secuting the war but offered their support only on condition that 
labour interests were safeguarded. Those passively oppoeed to the 
wer formed a smaller group while those prepared to offer active 
opposition were a very small minority. However within the context of 
the war the equivocations of the majority and the very existence of a 
minority were to have some significance. 
The debatee and votee on two resolutione at the Labour Party Conference 
of 1916 offer clear evidence of the divisions. Macdonald in opposing 
a motion asking for wholehearted support for the war effort was vague, 
even in terme of his own undemanding standards of clarity, and con-
ciliatory to the majority view to the point of saying very little, 
yet it is important to note that he followed James Sexton in full 
patriotic flood, LGerman atrocities' and all. In this context 
Macdonald's efforts were not without significance and demonstrated 
a degree of political, and personal courage. The merest lack of 
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enthusiasm could, in itself, secure a valuable point. In this 
instance the minority position attracted 602,000 votes, but the vote 
must be treated with some caution as it is clear that some delegates 
voted against the resolution because they felt it implied support for 
all Government actions. The 206,000 votes, around ten per cent of 
those cast, in support of a motion condemning the executive for 
taking part in recruiting, are a better indication of anti -war feeling 
although here too the matter is complicated for a number of delegates 
may have been opposed not so much to recruiting itself but the recruit-
ment of men to an occupation that was so poorly paid. However the real 
significance of anti-war feeling among sections of the Independent 
Labour Party is not to be sought in specific votee on issues,much 
lsss in speculations as to whethsr it might have come to dominate 
policy, but simply in the fact that it existed and continued to exist. 
The existence of an anti-war group, as a group of public figures 
prepared to take an unpopular stance and as a section of a broader 
movement, meant that the Government faced some constraint on the way 
in which it dealt with other opponents. Arthur Marwick, for example, 
is right to stress that, "British Governments did at least have the 
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conscience to make provision for conscientious objection" but it "is 
important to recognise that the maintenance of at least the semblance 
of liberal decency on this and other issues was at least as dependent 
on the existence of an active and courageous minority as it was on 
the promptings of conscience. The minority was also to have a longer 
term significancs than anyone could have thought possible in 1916 for 
they were responsible for creating the impreesion that Labour was the 
Party that was not entirely compromised by the war and could take an 
imaginative stand against the 'International Anarchy' in the post-
14 
war world. This factor alone was responsible for attracting a number 
of influential recruits to the Labour ranke. The danger from the 
Government's point of view, though its policies were never sophisti-
cated enough to cope with thie, was that if it failed to maintain 
support for its war aims or if its manpower demands antagonised groups 
of workers thare wera anti-war groups who could serve as a focus for 
discontent. The actions of isolated groups of dissident workers might 
be given a measure of legitimacy or a broader significance by the 
existence of this active minority. 
In making any assessment of the significance of the actions of those 
who opposed the war, of those who remained equivocal or of those 
workers who went on strike in defiance of the Munitions of War Act 
it ie important to stress the political context. Ross McKibbin, as 
part of his 'revisionist' interpretation of the impact of the First 
World War has sought to diminish the significance of wartime opposition: 
"The industrial disputes of the war, for example, were no worse than 
those which occurred immediately before it, and arose out of very tra-
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ditional grievances". Yet this concentration on the purely factual 
aspects of the disputes surely avoids the question of their true 
significance. Any oppositional activity ran the gauntlet of a lsgal 
sanction, social criticism and the attsntions of patriotic mobs 
encouraged and abetted by a govsrnment propaganda unconstrained by 
limitations of taste or truth. To strike in any context requires a 
degree of determination, yet to strike in that context must surely 
hsve required a consciousness which was something more than tradi-
tional. In this sense it is misleading to make too much of the 'craft 
privilege' basis of the engineers' grievances. The significance of 
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their actions is much better indicated by their context, the munitions 
industries in wartime.21 The government saw to it that no striking 
engineer could be unaware of the meaning of his action. 
The Labour movement in general was far happier offering support to 
the Government in general terms than in agreeing to specific con-
cessions. It was at the point where their own interests were directly 
threatened that patriotic workers could be transformed into 'dangerous 
minorities'. At the 1916 Labour Party Conference George Roberts, 
then a junior Minister in the Asquith coalition, could'secura large 
majorities for general resolutions of support by arguing against 
'quibbles' and defining the issue as "wer~ they for or were they 
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against their country in this greet war". Yet the same Conference 
voted overwhelmingly against the Military Service (No 2) Bill and 
only narrowly defeated a subsequent motion to agitate for its repeal. 
Similarly the Conference voted, almost unanimously, for a drastic 
revision of the Munitions of War Act. Successive governments could 
rely on a high level of support on the broad issue of support for 
the war yet they were alwaye liable to face difficulties in gaining 
support for the specific measures necessary to prosecute the war 
effectively •. Therefore governments were forced to continuously 
exploit their considerable resources of authority and their meagre 
stocks of ingenuity in order to use the general mood of support to 
extract specific concessions. 
On the surfece at leaet, the attitudee of trade union leaders seemed 
to promise practical assistance to the Government. The original 
industrial truce, solidified by the Treaeury Agreements and apparently 
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concretisedinthe Munitions of War Act may have appeared the very 
model of patriotic restraint, but there were two difficulties. In 
the first place, the agreements were not universal. Several important 
unions, including the Miners'Federation, which, while not involved in 
munitions directly were nonetheless vital to their production, were 
not included in the agreements. Secondly, and more significantly, 
it was soon made clear to the Government that the agreement of trade 
union leaders did not guarantee the acquiescence of the rank and 
file. As George Askwith, who participated in the discussions, later 
noted, it wae one thing to etrike a bargain in London but quite 
another to "ensure that those arrangements should be respected and 
23 have results in the shops snd yards". By the final year of the war 
labour leaders who co-operated with the Government ran the risk of 
losing their authority over their members. Thus in the first two 
years of war the Government gained a number of concessions but neither 
the system of negotiation that was developed nor the legal constraints 
which were enacted seemed capable of delivering the agreements which 
would be necessary in future. 
Time was alwsys running against the Government. As the war continued 
it became less popular and the demands which the Government were forced 
to make became more severe. Up to a point this was unavoidable for 
nobody could predict the nature and duration of the war and hence it 
was never possible to formulate a final policy on manpower. George 
Barnes complained that "labour agitators~ made insufficient allowance 
"for the difficulties which have beset all in authority through the 
ever changing phases of industrial conditions during the war".24 Yet 
while a certain level of difficulty could be expected the situation 
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was exacerbated by the inability of government to formulate any 
rational policy at all. From the first days of the war the manpower 
situation had drifted into chaos. The Army simply demanded as many 
men aa possible and the Government had allowed indiscriminate recruit-
ing. This had caused serious dislocations in some industries and had 
25 
contributed to the rise in unemployment in the autumn of 1914. Some 
of the skilled men had been prised out of the Army but Hankey recorded 
in 1916 that the country was still baing strangled by the voracious 
demands of the military and no politician was willing, or able, to 
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stand up to them. The inevitable coneequence was the drift towards 
recruiting measure~virtually designed to cause difficulty. The 
withdrawal of the trade card scheme and the introduction of the 'comb 
out' in protected industries had to be undertaken at a time when 
general support for the war was at its lowest point. During the 
last year of war the situation was so serious that the Government 
was forced to break its agreements with the TUC. As late as 
September 1918 the officials of the Ministry of Munitions were still 
emphasising the need for a scheme for "the supply and proper distri-
27 but ion of labour". 
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The Development of the State Machine 
By 1916 it was clear that the effective prosecution of the war 
required a re-examination of the relationship between the state and 
society. While there was no general agreement on how. changes should 
be brought about most politicians and officials had come to realise 
that previous restrictions on state activity would have to be relaxed. 
The transformation which eventually took place can be viewed from a 
number of perspectives; in terms of new functions and responsibilities, 
in terms of the organisational development and growth to cope with 
, 
them, in terms of ths involvement of hitherto excluded groups in the 
state's consultative and regulatory machinery, or in terma of tha 
debate on the desirability and necessity of such changes in terms of 
political principles. 
The predominant voices of the prewar political debate had been those 
which assumed that government activity should be restricted and limited. 
While prewar politics lacked the dogmatic laissez-faire spirit of post-
war administrations it is quite clear that even the reformers defended 
new extensions of state activity as necessary exceptions rather than 
desirable devslopments in themselves. Even within the Labour Party 
collectiviat views were in a minority. 
It was the Liberal Party which exhibited the greatest difficulty in 
coming to terms with the level of state activity necessary for the 
conditions of modern warfare. The restrictions on individual liberty 
rspresented by the issue of conscription were so painful to Asquith 
that evsn after he had accepted its necessity he presented the msssure 
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torturously dressed up as an extension of the voluntary system. As 
late as September 1916 the Prime Minister was still uncomfortable 
over Government involvement in vital industries. When the railway 
unions had claimed a war bonus Asquith supported his Minister who 
had argued, with impeccable Liberal rectitude that the Government 
could not become involved in wage negotiations nor even offer its 
services as an arbitrator: "The General Managers must strike the best 
28 bargain they can." By 1916 however the Liberal Party was no longer 
united and Lloyd George had supporters for his advocacy of a more 
active role for government. The backbench Liberal War Committee sup-
ported a scheme for both military and industrial conscription. 
The Unionist Party experienced far fewer difficulties in adapting to 
the collectivist demands of war. Their backbench War Committee was 
usually ahead of its Liberal counterpart in the degree of state 
activity which it demanded in the~use of a more vigorous prosecution 
of the war. Universal conscription here was in the nature of a starting 
point. The spiritual leader of this agitation was Sir Edward Carson 
whose ideas had a corporatist ring about them and whose scheme of 
"Economic Warfare" promised to project the conflict into the far 
distant future. 
A number of reasons might be suggested as to why the Unionis~exper-
ienced so little difficulty in adjusting their principles to meet the 
new situation. One contemporary in attempting to explain the Party's 
attitude to social reform had claimed that they were not as funda-
mentally opposed to governmental activity ae wae sometimee supposed: 
"modern Conservatism inherits the traditione of Toryism which are 
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favourable to the activity and authority of the State".29 The exple-
nation was no doubt tempting but it seems unlikely that Burkean 
romanticism held much sway over the Party at this time. There was 
a later tradition also associated with an active role for the state 
which may have helped to prepare~he way. Milner and his associates 
had advocated the development of the role of the state as necessary 
for national survival in both economic and military terms. In the 
end it appears most likely that while tradition may have played its 
part in facilitating the changa,the Unionists' conversion is to be 
mainly explained in terms of their perceptions of the dangers facing 
the British state and the Empire. No principle, certainly no principle 
ebout the means of political activity, would be allowed to stand in 
the way of the defence of their country and their place within it. 
It is also necessary to point out that where the rights of individual 
property owners were infringed it was not done without an entirely 
proper regard for the financial intereats of such individuals. The 
owners and shareholders of industries which became immersed in the 
system of war production did not emerge in 191B noticeably poorer for 
the experience. Even so the Unionists had their limits. Where proper 
guerantees were not forthcoming or where traditional interests were 
directly threatened they could prove intransigent. for example they 
managed to effectively stifle attempts to nationalise the drink trade. 
However it is true to suggest that previous party divisions did begin 
to break down during the war and a new dividing line began to form 
around the immediate and overriding issues of the time. Leo Maxse, 
super patriot and publicist, captured the mood in a letter to Lloyd 
George: "Anxious as we are to be quit of the debris which encumbered 
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the late Prime Minister we are hardly less anxious to be rid of the 
uselesa rubbish by which Bonar Law is surrounded. n30Politics was coming 
to be divided on the basis of those who would contemplate any measure 
in pursuit of victory and those who maintained some reservations. 
There isne simple way of describing the changes in the administrative 
machinery of government which took place 31 during the war. Ae res-
ponsibilities were extended vertically and horizontally, quantitatively 
and qualitatively) so new administrative branches had to be established. 
In some areas new mechanisms were created, in others older ones were 
extended. Some existing provisions were edapted and used to great 
effect, some of the ambitious new schemes failed significantly. Some 
areae of governmental activity, for example the labour exchanges, 
developed great strength from small beginnings while others, for 
instance the liquor scheme, were commenced with a great flourish but 
produced precious little. By the end of the war the state had assumed 
wide, if varying, powers over a large part of industry and commerce. 
In the field of munitions and related materials the state had estab-
lished either a direct or strong indirect control over production. 
Over other industries supplying materials associated with the war 
effort the state had considerable influence as the predominant cus-
tamer. The production and distribution of food and fuel, of shipping, 
the mines and the railways, were subject to government control. Even 
many of those industries outside the immediate realm of influence or 
control had to rely upon government for the supply of raw materials. 
The Government also accepted responsibility over wages and rents. 
While these developments were dependent upon prior changes in 
political attitudes, once established they themselves began to 
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influence the politicians' perceptions of reality and poseibility. 
The accumulation of comprehensive and reliable information about 
many aspects of national life and the exteneion of powers of direction 
and regulation encouraged an escalation of expectations about state 
activity. 
However the matter of war collectivism must not pass without some 
qualification. Even within the 'collectivist party' there were 
divisions and many schemes were more impressive in conception than 
in practic~. George Askwith recorded that the war had seen a good 
deal of ambitious talk about the need for the Government to "take 
over" this or that industry: "as if the Government could have possibly 
run the works by themselves without the aid of skilled management by 
persons conversant with each business":2 Inevitably there was often 
less to rtaking over'than met the eye. The middle of a war is no 
time to go in for comprehensive reconstruction so within broad guide-
lines imposed from above industries tended to be left to their own 
devices. Thus the 'control' of the railways involved no change in 
the managers or directors of the companies and the Shipping Controller, 
Sir Joseph Maclay, felt that control should be reetricted to 
"essentially a financial control" and that the impermanence of the 
scheme shoul~.be emphasised by the maintenance of "the incentive of 
~3 
trade profit". His Parliamentary Secretary, Leo Chiozza Money, 
disagreed and submitted a paper which argued that the nationalisation 
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of the industry should be continued after the war. There was clesrly 
a divide in the collectivist camp over the question of whether such 
measures were an unpleasant, if necessary, expedient or if they pointed 
the way to post war reform. However these were essentielly prelimin-
aries of future conflicts and in practice the advocate:s of a limited 
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collectivism had their way. 
A central feature of government expansion was the Ministry of 
Munitions itself. 3~he Ministry was created in 1915 out of the supply 
departments of the War Office. Its growth was rapid and unsystematic 
owing to the pressures of war and the erratic dynamism of Lloyd George, 
its first minister. On creation the Ministry assumed responsibility 
for the Royal factories and gained the same direct control over the 
National factories as they were created. As such the Ministry was 
the employer of around 300,000 industrial workers.36 The Ministry 
exercised varying degrees of influence over other controlled and un-
controlled establishments but in all sections of the munitions 
industries its impact was considerable. Its general powers, some 
exercised in conjunction with other Departments, included allocation 
of raw materials, the direction of labour, control over contracts and 
the fixing of prices and wages. 
In the field of labour regulation the Ministry exercised control 
over the whole munitions area. It is ,possible to identify four aspects 
of this control. There were the quasi legal powers granted under the 
Munitions of War Act and exercised through the Munitions Tribunals, 
there were powers of compulsory arbitration exercised through the 
Local Labour Advisory Board, there was the Welfare Inspectorate and 
there was a large surveillance organisation based on the Chief Infor-
mation Offices in each region. It was quite inevitable that even in 
the best of circumstances such functions would involvs the Ministry 
in dsmarcation disputes with other Departments. The arbitration 
servics would encroach on the preserves of the Labour Department of 
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the Board of Trade and its surveillance services would of necessity 
cut across the work of the Home Office and the Naval Intelligence 
Department. Yet the mood engendered by the war left little oppor-
tunity for the type of negotiation and rationalisation which might 
have reduced conflict, and the 'dynamism' of its first two ministers 
only added fuel to the flames. The officials of the Ministry were 
rarely inhibited by their own inexperience and frequently exhibited 
impatience with conventional procedures. The Labour Section appesrs 
to have felt it had a special mission to blighted industry. At one 
time, in order to counter the influence of the shop stewards' movemant 
they began to encourage the formation of non-revolutionary workshop 
organisations 37apparently not recognising that thie would jeopardise 
the relationship between government and the official trade unions 
which was the foundation of the whole labour policy. This supreme 
confidence is well illustrated by the remarks of the Chief Information 
Officer for Manchester, who argued that the settlement of disputes 
was a relatively easy matter if representatives of employers and 
employees were prepared to meet, "providing that an officer of the 
ministry is preeent". "If he is not such meetings lead to further 
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friction, owing to both sides abusing each other." The Welfare 
Inspectorate frequently succeeded in ant agonising both unions and 
management. 39 The initiatives of the officials could prove embarrassing 
to ministers as when the Labour Oepartment instigated the suppression 
of 'Forward' and left Lloyd George to develop a justifying case after 
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the event. Only one of the ministers, Addison, appears to have made 
any attempt to rationalise the expansion, and the ambition of his officials. 
Under pressure from other ministers he attempted to limit the scope 
of the eurveillance work being undertaken by the Labour Section but 
in this he failed. 
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However according to one interested observer it would be unfair to 
single out the Ministry of Munitions. According to George Askwith 
their mistakes were only an inevitable part of a broader pattern of 
confusion and inconsistency arising out of the opportunism of the 
leading politicians. Instead of offering wise and informed direction 
government became, "a force of disintegration resulting from a msze 
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of authorities". The creation of the Ministry of Labour itself 
Asquith felt owed more to a desire to flatter Labour leaders than a 
desire to promote an efficient conduct of business~2 The new minister, 
Hodge, by encouraging labour leaders to articulate their grievances 
was merely increasing the government's burden. Even worse, Askwith 
argued, was the appointment of Industrial Commissioners in June 1917 
to investigate the causes of growing labour unrest. The Commissions 
were no more than a hasty improvisation. They had to report within 
fourteen days, there were no restrictions on the areas they could 
inveetigate, they had no professional assistance and the different 
commissioners had no opportunity to discuss or co-ordinate their 
findings. 43 Such expedients and the fact that each new department was 
allowed to develop its own structures and ideas for dealing with 
labour led inevitably, argued Askwith, to confusion. Such notable 
blunders as the award of the twelve and a half per cent bonus to 
skilled engineers in 1917 could be traced directly to the intervention 
of a "political chairman who could not have known anything on the 
~ 
subject". 
It must be initially conceded that there was much that was reasonable 
in Aekwith'e criticism of government policy. His descriptive account 
is accurate and it is unquestionable that the labour policy would 
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have been infinitely more effective had it been possible to maintain 
the central control and co-ordination which he advocated. The main 
problem with his assessment is that it relies too much on the benefit 
of hindsight and fails to make adequate allowance for the desperate 
mood in which much of the activity took place. Askwith also failed 
to pay adequate attention to the impact of broader political issues 
on labour matters and as such failadto appreciate that the work of 
officials, systematic and informed though it may have been, would 
have proved ineffective in such a situation. In the best of worlds 
it is undeniably the case that institutions should be developed 
to fulfil specific and limited functions and with proper attention 
to past experience, yet the middle of a war is no time for such 
luxuries. The Government was constantly being faced with new demands 
and difficulties. It was never able to project any long term plan of 
its labour requirements and so it was inevitable that its demands 
would be constantly changing. As such,innovation and improvisation 
were perhaps the only avenues open. 
Askwith clearly failed to take adequate account of how difficult it 
was for the government to secure acceptance for its policies. He was 
aware, as noted above, that bargains struck in London did not guarantee 
action in the workshops but failed to see that this meant that normal 
negotiations between officials and union leaders were no longer an 
adequate baeis for the aettlement of disputes. Askwith failed to 
appreciats that aome qualitative change in the relationship between 
government and labour was rendered necessary by the additional demands 
and restrictions which were required. Even if only for symbolic 
reasons labour matters had to be elevated to the political level and 
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ministers and officials were of necessity involved in a continuous 
round of political activity. Even had it been possible in 1914 for 
the government to outline all of its future manpower requirements it 
would not have been possible to secure their acceptance,for this 
could only be secured by a continuous process of exposition, argument 
and threat. The developing military situation was always an important 
element in the Government's arguments for increaeed demands. In the 
early months· of 1918 labour unrest was felt to be developing to a 
point of crisis. A number of factors made it appear probable that 
resistance to the new manpower proposal would create severe diffi-
It " 45 A th H d d th t th "t t" " t cu 1es. r ur en erson warne a e S1 ua 10n was pregnan 
with disastrous possibilities" and that the country was on "the 
verge of industrial revolution".46 Unofficial organisations seemed 
to have developed to the point where they could offer effective leader-
ship to discontented workers in the munitions industries. At the 
beginning of ~arch the stage was set for battle,yet by the end of the month 
the labour information service of the Ministry of Munitions could 
report that Itthreats of serious resistance to the maQpower programme 
have disappeared". The success of the German Spring offensive on 
the Western front had so transformed the situation that the tresponsibl~ 
officials' of the ASE had been able to convince their members that the 
proposed strike "would raise such a storm among the general public 
.~ 
that the Society would never get over it". The Government had to be 
flexible enough to exploit the political advantage offered by such a 
situation. In this event it not only managed to push through its 
manpower propoeals without opposition but to secure a bonue in that; 
"the Minister's appeal to munitions workers to sacrifice their Easter 
48 
holidays met with a magnificently loyal response lt • Normal negotiating 
procedures could not secure such victoriea. 
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Askwith's criticisms of the appointment of the Commissioners on 
Industrial Unrest again initially appear reasonable. No doubt the 
requirement to report quickly was less than ideal, the terms of 
reference more than a little vague and the sources of evidence some-
what indiscriminate. Clearly a better balanced picture could have 
been drawn by officials if they were given time to collate, monitor 
and analyse the available information, yet such a report might have 
served the purposes of the Government less well than did the actual 
reports in spite of their weaknesses. 
One of Askwith's complaints concerned the breadth of evidence that 
the Commissioners listened to: "Every conceivable ex parte complaint 
and opinion had been invited and heard without check or hindrance to 
misstatement, or explanation of facts or circumstancea.,,49 yet , in a 
sense, this represented the very quality of the inquiry. The type 
of investigation which Aakwith seemed to favour, involving sober and 
informed discussion between officials and union leaders, would have 
been unlikely to carry much authority at the shop floor level. The 
sources of unrest existed below the level of official leadership, 
such representatives being scarcely more in touch with their rank 
and file members than the civil servants they would have been talking 
to. George Barnes, in his summary of the Commissioner Reports, draws 
particular attention to the fact that workers' criticisms were 
levelled against "all in authority", trade union officials as much 
as Cabinet ~inisters. 50 
A further criticism was that the Commissioners only came up with 
information that was generally available anyway. This in itself is 
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only partially true for some information and opinion did surface in 
the reports which was not available elsewhere. for example the Com-
missioners for the North West were able to present a picture of the 
life of munitions workers in Barrow that would introduce a new element 
into debates on the causes of unrest. They specificelly argued that 
such conditione could only have been allowed to continue because of 
official ignorance: "But for the fact that Barrow is in a very iso-
lated position and that it is considered undesirable to inform the 
public through the medium of the press of many of the evil conditions 
of industrial life, we cannot believe that the facts we propose to 
set down could so long have remained actual conditions of domestic 
life in Englend in the twentieth century." 51 The Commissioners drew 
a picture of wretchedly inadequate housing conditions and pointed out 
weaknesses in the existing policy on rent control, in particular its 
failure to protect lodgers. Similarly they illustrated the need for 
a stricter control over the supply and cost of foodstuffs and gave 
specific examples of exploitation. Such a report could scarcely be 
t _1 I . t t 52 I ~t ld b . dismissed as st~e comp a~n s. n any case. wou e na~ve 
assume that the main purpose of- Commissions is to unearth new evidence. In 
the cours~Dr' a hostile response to the appointment of the Commissioners: 
"The general feeling frankly expressed among the workers ~ that if 
more attention were given to the problem of reducing the high cost of 
foodstuffs and less to the formation of commissions, much discontent 
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would be removed ", the labour experts of the ~inistry of ~unitions 
complained that all that the Commissioner 'discovered' had already 
appeared in their own reports. There was a measure of truth in this, 
but they had presented such evidence piecemeal. The quality of the 
Commieaioners' reports was to concentrate grievances and suggestions 
I 
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for reform. The Intelligence Department of the ~inistry of ~unitions 
perhaps recognised this, for after this time they began to include 
some general analysis of the continuing causes of industrial unrest 
in their weekly reports. 
Yet the main weakness of Askwith's criticism of the appointment of 
the Commissioners is that he fails to take account of the political 
significance of the event. While the Commissioners produced little 
new information, though perhaps more than might have been reasonably 
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anticipated, while they produced little deep analysis of the problem, 
and while their findings on the causes of unrest: the high cost and 
poor distribution of food, inadequate supplies of beer, long delays 
in arbitration settlements, continuing difficulties over dilution 
schemes and the grievances of skilled men over the erosion of differ-
entiatials, were no means novel, it would be inadequate to question 
their utility on these grounds alone. Commissions are usually 
appointed to make a political point and these werS no exception. 
During 1917 there was a great deal of concern in Cabinet about indus-
triel unrest. Some argued that it must be related to griauances but 
a number of Unionists related the unrest to the inflUence of 
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'revolutionaries'. There was much debate, frequently instigated by 
Sir Edward Carson, as to the degree of influence which 'agitators' 
had on the labour situation. 56 Labour representatives, while second 
to none in their hostility to such 'agitators', argued that unrest 
developed because the ~orkforce had a number of genuine grievancee. 
Lloyd George clearly favoured this latter line if only for the fact 
that it offered scope for political action. 
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In this context the potential utility of the Commissions becomes 
clearer. It would tend to strengthen the Prime Minister's hand 
against the Unionist hard liners as the Commissioners were more 
likely to relate the unrest to legitimate grievances than to the 
influence of pacifist agitators or 'German gold'. Thus they would 
reinforce those who believed unrest to be remediable by state action. 
More importantly, the appointment of the Commissionewould also serve 
as a demonstration of the Government's concern for the welfare of 
the workforce. This function was reinforced by the composition of 
the Commission, one repreeentative each of labour and capital under 
an independent chairman, and by the fact that the commissioners were 
encouraged to consult a wide range of opinions. That one Commissioner 
could use the report as a vehicle for his view that in order "to 
satisfy the feeling prevalent among the wage earning clasees" it 
would be necessary to make "more drastic demands on the rich,,5Jould 
only reinforce the impression that the Government was prepared to 
consider all views in its solicitude for the workers' interests. The 
vital matter was to maintain some measure of political authority 
when conventional channels were breaking down and official consultation 
no longer appeared to work. Inevitably the danger lay in raising 
expectations which a government composed as this one was,could never 
conceivably satisfy, but there were ways of postponing such matters 
until the immediate crisie wae passed. 
One measure, the award of the twelve and a half per cent bonus to 
skilled men in the munitions industries, which arose out of the 
Commissions on Industrial Unrest, was cited by Askwith aa a parti-
cularly unfortunate result of their activities. As was widely 
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recognised much labour unrest during the war arose out of the 
grievances of skilled men whose wages rose by far less than those 
of unskilled or semi-skilled workers. A number of factors contributed 
to this including the dilution policy, the increased use of national 
wage agreements, the predominance of flat rate agreements and a rapid 
increase in mechanisation. Government intervention had actually 
reinforced the relative improvements in the pay of unskilled workers 
who tended to be paid on a piece rate rather than the day rate of 
the skilled. On 13th September 1915 the Minister of Munitions had 
pledged "to prevent the reduction of piece rates as a consequence of 
the increase in output due to the suspension of restrictions".58 As 
the war progressed the introduction of new processes and machinery 
rendered the old piece rates even more unrealistic but the Ministry 
stood by its original pledge, and the relativs position of the semi-
skilled and unskilled continued to improve. The Commissioners were 
unanimous in their view that the skilled men had a legitimate grievance 
and proposed that "A system should be inaugurated whereby skilled 
supervisors and others on day rates should receive a bonus"~9The then 
Minister of Munitions, Churchill, reacted immediately and appointed 
"a small committee under a political chairman" with the brief, "not 
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of considering whether the plan wae wise or not", but of reporting 
on how the bonus should be paid. They quickly reported the view that 
a twelve and a half per cent bonus should be paid to all skilled 
engineers and foundry workers on time rates in the munitions industries. 
This SCheme, in the event, proved to be a failure. Many observers 
later came to believe that it had caused far more unrest than it had 
cured. The main difficulty was that other groups of workers did not 
33 
understand why they too were not entitled to the bonus. The Infor-
mation Officers of the Ministry of Munitions eventually recorded the 
various complaints. From Manchester it was reported that railwaymen 
had automatically assumed their right to the bonus and had tacked 
1 d h If t t 1 i th 1 d k o 61 twe ve an a a per cen on 0 a cam ey were a rea y ma ~ng. 
From Leeds came reports of ngenAral discontent amongst iron and steel 
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workers who had been excluded n and steel workers in Sheffield had 
gone on strike.63 Particular difficulties were experienced in plants 
whera only a section of the skilled workforce was involved in munitiona 
work. Both ~anchester and Birmingham had seen meetings of excluded 
men who had threatened to striks. Ths ~inistry's Manchester Officer 
warned of severe unrest if the bonus were not extended to all skilled 
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men. Eventually all industrial districts began to experience unrest 
related to the issue: even piece rate workers were insisting that 
they be included in the scheme. The Officials responsible for Walee 
understood the central problem: nThe men do not understand the subtle 
distinctions which differentiate between one class of labour and 
another. n65 The ~inistry was gradually forced to give way. In the 
face of the Sheffield strike they broadened the entitlement to war 
bonuses to include other skilled workers and they were eventually 
driven to introduce a twenty shilling bonus payment in order to 
restore equity between piece and time workers, which, of course, 
defeated tha whole originel purpose of the bonus scheme. The Leeds 
Officer of the ~inistry felt the Government had loet on all counts: 
nThe Government does not get any credit at all for their undue 
generosity, while the men are encoursged in the idea ••• that they 
have only to go on strike to expedite a decision. n66 
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While it is undeniable that the bonus scheme proved unsuccessful 
Askwith's attempt to blame it exclusively on the politicians must be 
questioned. It was only when the difficulties had actually arisen 
that the officials of the Ministry of Munitions began to criticise 
the scheme. Up to that point they had been willing to go along with 
it and, as late as December 1917 regional Officers were anticipating 
that th~ effect of the award would be "to calm much of the growing 
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unrest". In retrospect it seems highly unlikely that any agency, 
no matter how well informed or eXperienced, could have adequately 
dealt with the difficulty. The Government had to make some response 
to the skilled munitions workers but it was inevitable that any sig-
nificant response would be seized upon by other workere as a vehicle 
to progress their own claims. Under the conditions imposed by the 
war the Government was in no position to ride out even a temporary 
disruption of munitions production. Again Askwith was too resdily 
assuming that some well designed administrative scheme could overcome 
what was an essentially intractable political situation. 
Most of Askwith's own time during the war was devoted to the work of 
the Committee on Production; "the ultimate custodian of the Govsrnment's 
duties as conciliator". While ths officials of the Ministry of 
Munitions and the Commissioners on Industrial Unrest complained that 
delays in the settlements arrived at by the Committee were contributing 
to industrial unrest this must be attributed to the huge volume of 
business caused by the introduction of compulsory arbitration, rather 
than the inefficiency of Askwith and his officials. In fact the 
Committee was remarkably successful. Its officials were experienced 
and knowledgeable in labour matters and, as the final report under 
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the Conciliation Act noted, its decisions "were almost universally 
accepted". However this cannot be used to imply that such an approach 
would have been successful in all cases nor that there was no need 
for the Government to deal with labour matters at the general poli-
tical level. The success of the Committee cannot be explained without 
some reference to the political climate in which its work took place, 
nor can it be assumed that because it could deal adequately with some 
matters it could deal with all. 
In dealing with government activities during this period it is impor-
tant not to neglect the question of the development of the machinery 
of government. From the perspective of the present day it is all too 
easy to concentrate on high policy and to assume that network of 
minor and local agencies which has since become an unremarkable feature 
of the modern state. At the beginning of the war the Cabinet had 
few such agencies at its disposal. As a result policies were often 
formulated on the basis of inadequate information and their implemen-
tation was a haphazard affair. In its desire to gain influence in 
areae which it had previously ignored government was drawn on the one 
hand, to act in conjunction with private associations; the machinery 
of the trade unions was used to regulate labour, and District Armament 
Committees, consisting in the main of local employers, played a large 
part in the production of war materials; and~ on the other, to insti-
gate the rapid development of official structures. Such developments 
were often rather erratic and not always of much assistance in 
effective policy making. If the activities of government frequently 
bore the aepect of casting straws on the wind it must be related to 
this gap between the responsibilities which ministers wanted to 
36 
assume and their limited competence. 
Those administrative structures which had already been in existence 
proved to be of great assistance to the Government in its attempts 
to direct national life into the war effort. The Labour Department 
of the Board of Trade and, in particular its newly created network 
of labour exchanges, proved invaluable. 68 As Wolfe pointed out: "The 
fundamental difference between them and other agencies was their 
national character." 69 In the exchanges the government had a ready 
made network of officials with local contacts and some expertise in 
the field of labour regulation. During the war the government used 
this structure as the foundation for its attempts to control the 
use, mobility and conduct of labour. Early in the war the scope of 
the exchanges was broadened to include categories of workers who had 
not been covered by compulsory insurance, for example those in the 
wool and cotton trades, and in April 1915 an order in council under 
the Defence of the Realm Act made it illegal for an employer "to 
obtain labour from a distance of more than ten miles from his factory 
otherwise than through a Board of 70 Trade Labour Exchange". The 
information provided by the local exchanges made it possible for 
other government agencies to place contracts where they would en-
courage the best use of available labour and the most efficient 
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type of industrial development. A Regulation of August 1915 
empowered the exchanges to give priority in the supply of labour to 
firms involved in war work and the 'leaving certificate' scheme of 
the Ministry of Munitions was only made possible by the regulatory 
work of the exchanges. They were used to encourage employers to 
substitute female labour for their male workers and in the intro-
duction of foreign and colonial labour. The exchanges were also 
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used to rectify the mistakes of others as when they were put to the 
task of organising 'release from the colours' for key workers who 
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had been allowed to enlist. As the war progressed the exchanges 
acquired a whole new range of functions. They were involved in the 
provision of industrial training, they issued lists of lodgings, 
gave advice on housing and helped employers to provide hostel accommo-
dation for workers. The exchenges thus provided the essential admini-
strative structure for a number of uncontentious but vital policies. 
The most chaotic administrative growth occurred in the field of labour 
surveillance. A large number of agencies were formed to monitor the 
activities and opinions of workers. In the course of its more general 
weekly reports the Labour Department of the Board of Trade, later the 
Ministry of Labour, offered information on unrest and the activities 
of 'agitators'. In May 1917 the new ministry set up its own Industrial 
Intelligence Department. The Ministry of Munitions also developed an 
Intelligence Branch and produced detailed weekly reports. Also 
watching and reporting on labour unrest were the shipyard Department 
of the Admiralty, the Naval Intelligence Department of the same 
organieation, the Military Intelligence Department of the War Office, 
as well as the Special Branch of Scotland Yard. It is also clear 
from Cabinet records and private papers that many leading politicians were 
also provided with information, some solicited, some not, from all 
manner of private organisations and individuals in industry.73 There 
was a measure of functional division and the situation was rendered 
lees chaotic than it might have been by the fact that a number of 
these organisations drew their agents from a common source: Scotland 
Yard provided officers to serve with Military Intelligence, with 
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Naval Intelligence and with the Ministry of Munitions. 74 Yet there 
remained a good deal of confusion as to who was responsible for what, 
who controlled who, and to what end the various enquiries should be 
directed. Surveillance work raises serious problems at the best of 
times but during the war the issues sometimes became spectacularly 
entangled. At the heart of the confusion was the evident fact that 
the politicians had no clear idea as to what their agents should be 
looking for. 
Cabinst attitudes to labour would appear to have undergone a quali-
tative change during 1917. The increased incidence of labour disputes 
obviously had something to do with this, as did the deepening manpower 
crisis, yet it was the March Revolution in Russia which more than 
anything else predisposed certain ministers to see domestic matters 
in a new light. They were particularly concerned about the way in 
which thie had served to focus and to sustain radical opinion in 
Britain. The Cabinet considered banning the Leeds meeting organised 
by the Unitsd Socialist Council but felt it to be impossible bscause 
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of the wide interest and support it had attracted~ The Prime 
Minister's response to the new wave of agitation, as discussed above, 
was to appoint Commissioners to investigate unrsst in the hope that 
they would suggest practical concessions which would curtail the 
influence of the agitators. "At bottom", he argued, "thers appeared 
to be genuine and legitimate grievances". While there were violent 
anarchists about attempting to exploit the situation the beet way to 
deal with the matter was "to remove the grievances without delay in 
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order to forestall trouble". However other members of Cabinet were 
not convinced that ameliorative action was adequate. Carson conceded 
that tha Commissioners had gone "fully into the causes which have 
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created an atmosphere in which industrial agitation flourishes" but 
argued that it was unrealistic to suppose that "those causes alone 
would have produced the dangerous symptoms which exist in the country 
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without some powerful driving force to make them effective". Carson 
felt it was more profitable to detect and suppress this minority than 
to appease the majority. He was particularly concerned about the pro-
'liferation of organisations attempting to perform the tasks of sur-
veillance. The ~inistry of Labour officials were useful up to a point 
but were "necessarily more clearly associated with the properly 
accredited Trade Union officials, and less in touch with the more 
recent labour organisations". Carson identified, the Union of 
Democratic Control, the Independent Labour Party, the No Conscription 
Fellowship, the Industrial Workers of the World, the Rank and file 
~ovement and the Shop Stewards' ~ovement as "the principle field of 
operations for pacifist propaganda", and it wss in these organisations 
that surveillance was weakest. Carson argued that other departments 
should concentrate on more conventional activities and the Home Office 
should be given the responsibility for co-ordinating information on 
revolutionary and pacifist organisetions. 
The Cabinet substantially accepted Carson's suggestions. They agreed 
"the Home Office should undertake the co-ordination and control of 
the investigation of all pacifist propaganda and of other subjects 
connected therewith • • • and should submit a full report to the War 
Cabinet who would then decide whether periodical rsports should be 
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submitted on the subject". In point of fact the matter was already 
under way in the Homs Offics. The Home Secretary had received one 
report from Scotland Yard which had not been entirely satisfactory, 
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but by November he was able to submit for Cabinet approval a report 
79 prepared by Basil Thomson. The Cabinet was sufficiently impressed 
to sanction the production of further reports at fortnightly intervals 
but thought they should include more detail. 
This side of the rationalisation proved a relatively easy matter. 
Thomson continued to report for the duration of the war though he did 
fail to uncover the conspiracies which Carso" suspectsd were at work. 
However it was a far more diffic~lt matter to persuade other agencies 
to give up their activitiss in what they clearly felt was a most 
interesting area. Addison, during a brief spell as Minister of 
Munitions attempted to introduce some rationalisation. He argued 
that as he had found his Ministry was "not competent to perform its 
duties" in respect of "aliens, sabotage and industrial unrest" such 
"80 functions should be transferred to the Home Office and Scotland Yard. 
The intention was clearly to limit the surveillance activitiss of the 
Ministry of Munitions to more mundane labour issues. Yet this initia-
tive proved to be singularly ineffectual in that the Information 
Officers of the Ministry actually broadened the scope, and increased 
the political content of their reports during 191~ It would appear 
that the officials involved interpreted the criticisms as a challenge, 
and instead of accepting a more limited role, attempted to prove that 
they could quite adequately perform any of those duties which had been 
assigned to Scotland Yard. For example, in September 1918, the labour 
section presented a report of a detailed investigation into the Shop 
Stewards' Movement in Coventry. Similarly the Ministry of Labour was 
resistant to the idea that their field of operations should be circum-
scribed. In 1918 they too submitted to Cabinet a report on the Shop 
81 Stewards1 Movement. 
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SREFFIHr 
UNIVERS:; 
As labour matters were at the heart of wartime politics it was clear 
to most politicians that their activities in the area could not be 
restricted to surveillance and welfare. It was soon realised that the 
critical role of labour would have to be symbolically recognised by 
the inclusion of labour representatives in the Government. Asquith 
began the process tentatively by appointing three Labour Party men to 
junior posts in his coalition. Lloyd George was more thorough and 
included a Labour man in his War Cabinet. Yet while the significance 
of such appointments must be acknowledged it is all too easy to 
exaggerate it. Some historians have argued that they were critical 
in the rise of the Labour Party and Arthur Marwick argued that they 
"made nonsense of the cleim that, good as Labour chaps might be on 
82 the hours of work they were not fit to govern". This suggests that 
the Labour representatives played a full part in the work of these 
governments. The record suggests however that their role was somewhat 
restricted. Positions occupied by Labour men in the Lloyd George 
coalition were Junior Lord of the Treasury, Food Controller, Junior 
Minister at Food Control, Minister of Labour, and Junior Secretary-
ships at the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry 
of National Service. In addition there was Henderson's seat in the 
Cabinet, but apart from this last appointment there is little to sug-
gest that the Labour role went significantly further than "hours of 
work" and similar subjects. Even Henderson's position should not 
pass without question for while he was nominally at the centre of 
affairs with a voice on every issue, he appears to have spant most 
of his time on labour matters; advising the Cabinet, acting for the 
Cabinet in negotiations with labour representatives and acting as 
chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Manpower. Lord Crewe, in 
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informing the King on a specific instance of labour unrest, provided 
an indication of Henderson's function, when nominally Minister of 
Education, in Asquith's Government: "Mr Henderson offered to use his 
beat efforts to enlighten his friends as to the true state of affairs, 
both at an important meeting whicn is being held in London this after-
noon, and by going to Glasgow to confer with the leaders there; and 
the Cabinet felt that the business could not be left in better hands". 83 
Henderson's contribution to the Lloyd George Cabinet waa similarly 
circumscribed. He was indeed used as envoy to the Provisional Govern-
ment in Russia and there was a suggestion that he be kept there as 
Ambassador, yet this was not intended to be his introduction to higher 
affairs but was rather-a piece of astute opportunism on the part of lloyd 
George who, like his French counterpart who sent Albert Thomas, felt 
that a Labour man would put a more effective gloss on the Allied 
cause. When Henderson did attempt to become involved in wider issues 
he was abruptly dismissed. Thomas Jones had it from Sidney Webb 
that Henderson was so embittered by his ineffectiveness in the Govern-
ment that he had vowed never again to serve in a government which did 
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not have a Commons' majority. 
In spite of many claims to the contrary it is alao important to recog-
nise that Labour's representation in the Lloyd George Coalition was 
not greatly 'disproportionate to the number of seats it held in the 
House of Commons. In December 1916 Labour held thirty-nine seats. 
This was 6.7 per cent of the total seats held by the parties in the 
Coalition. Labour's share of Government appointments was around 10 
per cent. If allowance is made for the fact that smaller parties in 
coalitione are usually over represented and that a number of 
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Asquithian Liberals deliberately excluded themselves, the Labour 
85 appointments can be accounted for in purely parliamentary terms. 
Only Henderson's appointment to a small War Cabinet could be thought 
of as generous, but it is difficult to see how it could have been 
avoided. In any case Henderson's position, in practice, bore clear 
limitations. Any particular impact which these Labour appointments 
had may be best explained in terms of public attitudea towards the 
fitness of men from certain social backgrounds to hold high office, 
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even though such appointments were not without precedent. 
Labour permeation was more extensive at the administrative level. As 
the Government attempted to extend its field of operations into the 
labour field it inevitably became dependent upon labour leaders. The 
centralisation of wage bargaining procedures which was undertaken in 
many industries, the administration of the machinery of compulsory 
arbitration alone, served to keep hundreds of trade union officials in 
London for the duration of the war. Labour leaders did not penetrate 
all departments but in addition to the immediate issues of wages, hours, 
welfare and work discipline, a good deal of their energy was devoted 
to the Ministry of Reconstruction. Yet here too labour representation 
tended to be strongest in traditional areas of interest; welfare, 
education, state benefits and the like, rather than more central, and 
critical, areas such as economic planning. It is probable that labour 
men excluded themselvee from areas in which they lacked confidence. 
The Webbs, who served on the committee dealing with the reconstruction 
of government, were convinced that few labour men possessed the neces-
87 
sary talents to play a role in such matters. Thsre is little 
evidence in this of any breaking of the labour stereotype. Moreover 
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labour representatives actually felt their participation to be marginal 
and conditional. Most were sceptical of the motives of those who had 
engineered their elevation. Wardle, soon after to be made Parliamentary 
Secretary at the Board of Trade, warned the Labour Party Conference in 
January 1917 that "the active share on committees and in the actual 
operations of Government which has been accorded to Labour is not so 
much the spontaneous recognition of its sacrifices, as of the necessities 
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of the hour". 
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The Politics of Co-operation 
Central to any explanation of the co-operation between the Government 
and labour leaders during the war must be some appreciation of the 
divisions within the Labour Movement. Had the Movement been united 
on the desirability of pursuing victory at any price there could have 
been little difficulty. Had rank and file dissent been isolated and 
without articulate spokesmen,labour leaders and Government could have 
combined to stifle it. However because divisions and disagreements 
existed at all levels even thoaa leaders who would have dearly loved 
to fall in behind the Government had to act with circumspection. 
rurthermore their path was also complicated by the fluctuations of 
politics in the war years. The maintenance of popular support for the 
labour leaders, as much as for the Government, demanded constant 
attention and activity. 
Labour spokesmen, therefore, offered support, but support with reser-
vations. As the war progressed there was a tendency for the support 
to diminish and the reservations to increase. The reservations were 
expressed in a number of ways. The mcst common and persistent theme 
was to link continued support for the ~r to the provision of adequate 
conditions and benefits for those members of the working population, 
either at the front or in the factories, who were making the greatest 
efforts. Later in the war labour spokesmen introduced other themes; 
the need for equality of sacrifice, the definition of 'War Aims' and 
the question 6f post-war social reform es part of reconstruction, yet 
it was the original welfare issues with which labour spokesmen were 
most comfortable and united. The Party in Parliament, for example, 
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supported the general proposals of the Lloyd George Coalition as 
outlined in its first King's Speech but tabled an amendment to record 
regret that there was no provision for pensions for soldiers who had 
besn discharged because of disaase contracted in the service. -The 
Labour Party President caught the style well in arguing that the 
Party's participation in the new Coalition should not be taken to 
mean "that we are not to have special regard to the interests of Labour 
during this war (nor) that we are to be uncritical as to the means to 
89 be employed in waging it". Throughout the war labour spokesmen con-
tinued to remind the Government and the public of the sacrifices being 
made by 'their people'. They rarely threatened any direct sanction, 
but they often presented their suggestions as preconditions for the 
maintenance of industrial peace. They sought to demonstrate that 
'inequalities of sacrifice' would weaken their members' support for 
the war effort: "Labour is expected, even legally obliged to maintain 
an industrial truce, but shipowners can increase freight age many times 
over, and Government contractors and food monopolists have reaped 
90 huge harvests out of the necessity and dangers of the realm". Most 
spokesmen sought to disassociate themselves from strikes and unrest 
but still use such events to reinforce their arguments. The Govern-
ment was persistently warned that if it failed to come to terms with 
the leaders, "the men in the workshops would deal with it more dras-
91 tically". Granted that consistent and unconditional support for the 
war effort was out of the question this support with qualificatione 
was by no means unacceptable to the Government. It offered no focus 
for those who sought to propagate their fundamental opposition to the 
war and it tended to reinforce the belief that grievances and miseries 
aesociated with the war could be dealt with by minor adjustments and 
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without calling into question the desirability of war itself. It elso 
gave the Government the opportunity to strengthen the position of 
'responsible' leeders by offering appropriate concessions. 
While such a policy was perhapa the best available to the Government 
it created a number of casualties. The Government's effort to retain 
its own credibility in this field became, in practice, a continuous, 
and losing battle to maintain that of the labour leaders who had been 
persuaded to co-operate. The increasing unpopularity of the war and 
the accumulating demande on the working population rendered this all 
the more difficult. Only two of those Labour politicians who joined 
Lloyd George's government survived in Labour politice. Even Henderson, 
one of the survivors, was on one occasion denied a hearing at a Labour 
Party Conference when he attempted to explain the Government's line 
on deportations. Perhaps his survival had more to do with his dis-
missal than anything else for none of the other Labour Ministers 
seemed to be able to maintain any authority within the Labour Movement. 
It was widely ,felt that on entering the Coalition the Lebour men had 
abandoned their former friende. At the 1918 Conference after a year 
of the Coalition Bromley complained that when he had been in govern-
ment departments, "putting the case of serious-minded Trade Unionists 
• the Labour representative had sat dumb, without giving even a 
92 
sympathetic glance". At the same Conference Mr R J Davies gave voice 
to the disillusionment: "Instead of permeating the Departments of the 
capitalist government the capitalist go~ernment had permeated the 
Labour men. The speeches of some of the Labour Ministers were filled 
with militarism and jingoism. Another argument, he noted, .was that if a 
Labour Government were to come it was necessary for Labour Ministers to 
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gain administrative experience, yet "How many of the Labour members of 
~3 this government would be in the Labour Government?" Askwith too 
recognised that many of the union leaders who had worked with the 
Government had done so at the cost of losing their influence with 
. 94 the1r members. 
The reinforcement of the position of the official leaders clearly 
required that the Government should make, and be seen to be making 
concessions in response to their representatione. In a few areas 
attempts were made. The Asquith Government introduced the 'trade 
card' scheme with such considerations in mind. It offered union 
officials the opportunity to administer exceptions and as such 
reinforced their position. Similarly trade union complaints that 
the talents of many skilled men were being wasted in military service 
were met with a scheme whereby union officials were encouraged to 
report all known cases to the Minister of Munitions who would investi-
gate and obtain the release of the men. The scheme was put into 
operation and between September 1917 and May 1918 3,736 cases were 
dealt with. Vet while this provided union officials with something 
to do it represented little in the way of concession for the release 
of these men coincided with the Government's own manpowsr policy. 
On matters of greater SUbstance the Government tended to yield to 
the temptations offered by supplicants without sanctions. 
The trouble with this was that if the Government did ignore the 
promptings of the official leaders it would encourage workers with 
grievances to turn to those who were prepared to act. The Cabinst 
had been aware of this possibility since 1915 and by April 1917 
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Lloyd George was warning his colleagues of "a very considerable and 
95 highly organised labour movement with seditioue tendencies". The 
officials of the Ministry of Labour recognised that the first cas-
ualties of such a movement were likely to be the official leaders: 
"The proposals are directly simed at undermining the preeent Trade 
Union organisation". 96 F~ced with this threat to its "shield of 
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Labour repreeentativss" it was qUite clear what the Government ought 
to do: "The Government should adhere to its policy of recognising 
only the constituted authority of the Trade Unions and that no depu-
tation from the Shop Stewards' Movement should be received except at 
the request of the executive of the union"~8 Officials continued to 
remind ministers of the consequences of weakening: "The responsible 
Trade Union officials • • • are extremely anxious that the Government 
should not in any way prejudice their position by offering any encou-
ragement to any of the Shop Stewards • • • (and) that if this were 
99 done they would be absolutely powerless". In the majority of cases 
this policy was maintained yet there were exceptions. The Commissioners 
on Industrial Unrest for the London area complained that although 
"the Trade Union representatives have by constitutional means endeavored, 
but in vain, to procure settlement of disputes" the Government had 
acceded to unofficial and illegal action and hence "the workpeople 
gained the impression thst if they wish for any improvement in con-
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ditiona they must take the matter into their own hands • It. It 
was easy enough to appreciate the importance of a policy of only 
dealing with official leaders but a more difficult matter to maintain 
it in practice. Even though the official leaders had agreed not to 
exploit the situation created by labour ehortages and the Government's 
need for continuous production labour's potential market advantage 
50 
still existed. Even the high degree of regulation could not entirely 
remove or submerge this fact. The official censorship might help to 
conceal some of the victories secured by unofficial action but some 
were so obvious, as when the Government, in June 1917, gave way to the 
miners' wage demands, or so spectacular, as for example the Hargreaves 
case, that they offered a public demonstration of the contrast between 
official ineffectuality and the potency of well organised rebellion. 
In practice, then, there were occasions when it was not possible for 
the Government to ignore workshop power. Similarly, it was rarely 
able to reinforce the position of official trade union leaders largely 
because its manpower policy was too erratic, too frequently at the 
point of breakdown for it to be able to offer the sort of substantial 
concessions that would have been necessary. Many government officials 
came to feel that the only way to cope with shop floor power was to 
frankly recognise it and to try to direct it into lees militant orga-
nisations. The Commissioners on Industrial Unrest advocated a system 
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of industrial councils and the Ministry of Labour actually set up a 
Joint Council for engineers in the Manchester area. Such schemes 
were subject to the inevitable departmental rivalries. The Ministry 
of Munitions commented dismissively on the council that its "function 
1Q2 
would appear to be limited to the exchanging of views". They thsm-
selves were "actively engaged in considering ths formation of joint 
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district committses and works committees". The Ministry's officials 
did manage to sncourags a meeting of five hundred Shop Stewards in 
Liverpool who "rssolved if possible to form Workshop Committses with 
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limited powers in every firm in ths port". Yet it was soon clear 
that such devices were more likely to exacerbate ths problem than to 
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solve it. An ASE official from Glasgow warned the Ministry's officials 
that if they managed to institute their system of shop committees they 
"would amalgamate and virtually overthrow the unions" and form a 
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"nucleus of industrial unionism". What the officials had failed to 
appreciate was that the threat of workshop organisations to the official 
unions lay not so much in the political opinions of their creators as 
in their structure and functions. 
The uncomfortable truth was that there ~s no policy or structure 
which could provide a once and for all solution to the dilemma. It 
was important in a general sense that the Government should refuse to 
recognise unofficial leaders yet on occasion they would be forced to 
act by the pressure that they could bring to bear. It was important 
to conciliate the official leaders yet it was usually only in the cir-
cumstances created by unofficial and illegal action that the Government 
would be forced to admit that it had anything left to concede. One 
way to draw attention from the dilemma was to attempt to introduce 
issues which had no immediate reeource implications. As the war pro-
grsssed the Government increasingly sought to promote discussion of 
post-war reforms and the question of War Aims. 
Frances Stevenson recorded that when Labour representatives raised 
"awkward questions" when Lloyd George was soliciting their support 
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for the Coalition, "he put them off with chaff". 'Chaff' would appear 
to have been the Prime Minister's favourite currencY,for in meeting a 
Labour Party delegation in March 1917 he ignored their immediate 
concerns and instead criticised their lack of 'audacity' and urged 
them to formulate ambitious schemes for the post-war world. With 
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hindsight much of the work of the Ministry of Reconstruction must be 
seen in the light of concentrating attention on the future and away 
from existing grievances. 
It would be wrong however to suggest that this was an instance of an 
innocent group of labour leaders being led into a consciously created 
trap by manipulative politicians. It was beyond the competence of 
government to create this mood of expectation for the post-war 
period. The enhanced feelings of national community and the belief 
that things could never be the same after the war wers spontsneous 
reactions to widespread suffering and were not, moreover, confined to 
any particular class or political group. In directing attention away 
from present grievance to future opportunity the Prime Minister was 
doing no more than identifying and harneseing a mood that was ripe 
for exploitation. Similarly it is wrong to imply, as did Frances 
Stevenson, that labour leaders were in some way tricked into going 
along with the idea. Many of them were more than willing accomplicee 
for they too had much to gain from any policy which avoided awkward 
questions about the present. It would appear that those labour leaders 
who were moat favourable to the active prosecution of the war were 
also the most vociferous and optimistic about the post-war world. 
James Sexton had taken to the idea as early as January 1916. He 
admitted that "when the boys came home" they would still have the 
same employer to fight but argued that "their claim would be so irre-
sietable that no-one could refuse them their fair share in the products 
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of the country". One scsptical voice drew attention to the uncomfor-
table fact that among employers there had "been little change of 
policy even during the war and it (was) surely expecting too much to 
53 
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look for some miraculous change when war is over". Vet scepticism 
was rare and became rarer as the war progressed. J H Thomas argued 
that there could be no argument against rail nationalisation in peace-
time if government control had been found to be necessary for the 
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system's efficient operation during the war. Smillie moved the 
national is at ion of the mines arguing that "the nation was prepared 
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for a big step forward in this direction". One delegate felt the 
time had come to go even further: "No schemes for the nationalisation 
of industry can be accepted as satisfactory which do not provide for 
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their effective control by the workers in theee industries." The 
Executive. of the Labour Party predicted confidently that the exper-
iences of wartime had opened the doors to peacetime collectivism: 
the "more thoughtful of the population" were now inclined to favourably 
"consider proposals for national reorganisation on lines that were 
popular only in Labour circles before the war". J H Thomas, at the 
Party Conference of June 1918, dismissed the notion that social reform 
could be postponed by financial considerations: "While they used to 
be content when told that any reform costing a few millions a year 
would mean bankruptcy for the state, the most ignorant people now 
understood that if a state could spend eight millions a day in the 
destruction of humanity, they could at least find some millions for 
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the reconstruction of humanity." Most labour leaders were more than 
willing to take the path which the Prime Minister had pointed out to 
them. 
An interesting example of the way in which those in government circles 
drew distinction between immediate and future demands is offered by 
Basil Thomson's report on Pacifism. Thomson had investigated reports 
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that access to the 'Labour Leader' and the 'Daily Herald' had led 
some of the troops in France to become infected with bolshevist ideas. 
Thomson blandly reassured the Cabinet that there was little to worry 
about because "most of the revolutionary talk had been confined to 
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plans for after the war". 
'War Aims' was another aspect of policy which the Government could 
manipulate without cost to its manpower policy, yet this could involve 
other difficulties. Although labour politics during the war normally 
revolvad around immediate issues and proceeded from crisis to crisis 
all smaller questions were affected by the larger question of the 
legitimacy of the war itself. All the arguments which the Government 
would bring to bear against recalcitrant workers ultimately rested 
on the assumption that the winning of the war was a deeirable and 
necessary object. Therefore, for example, arguments about the desi-
rability of a negotiated peace could not be confined to the realms 
of grend strategy for the handling of such an issue could determine 
the degree of co-operation which the Government could secure in labour 
matters. 
Popular views about the desirability of securing a military victory 
were subject to fluctuation during the conflict. While there always 
appears to have been a comfortable majority in agreement with the 
Government on the necessity for securing a military victory there had 
been a considerable decline in enthusiasm by 1917. As the war entered 
its final year the Government were warned that even military victories 
had failed to inspire any general enthusiasm: "All they seem to care 
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about is the return of their own relations." Even that old fav.ourite 
of the propagandists, 'German outrages', had ceased to have the desired 
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effect for, it was reported, it only produced a more urgent desire 
for peace so that the prisoners could be brought home without delay. 
While it was only in the imaginations of the super patriots that 
conscious pacifism made sUbstantial inroad into British opinion, the 
Government was forced to take up the issue of the desirability of 
the war because even a slight weakening of support might cause a 
fatal fall in industrial production or make the workforce unwilling 
to tolerate additional demands. A large element in public debate 
therefore came to centre on the question of 'War Aims'. Even the 
'Daily Herald' was prepared to offer eupport for the war on condition 
that the Government "restate war aime in accordance with what is 
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worth fighting for by the people who have to do the fighting". The 
issue was taken up on the right as well, Carson arguing in Cabinet 
that the success of the pacifists could be directly related to the 
Government's failure to state definite war aims;16 The revolutions 
in Russia rendered the issue even more topical for the first provoked 
discussion as to the conditions under which Russia would continue in 
the war while the second produced the immediate withdrawal and renewed 
interest in a negotiated peace. 
The Labour Party issued its own war aims during 1917. These included 
a repudiation of secret diplomacy and a strong emphasis on the 
importance of a conciliatory settlement once the war was over. The 
Party supported the idea of a League of Natione and suggested that 
African colonies should be handed over to that body. On the issue 
which was critical for the Government, the Party remained sound. 
The "fundamental purpose" of the war was identified as "making the 
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world safe for democracy". This was later reinforced in the 
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memorandum which the Party submitted to the Inter Allied Labour and 
Socialist Conference which warned that "a victory for German imperialism 
118 
would be the defeat and destruction of democracy and liberty in Europ~. 
Lloyd George later recalled how important it had been for the Govern-
ment to respond favourably: "The Macdonald Section of the Labour 
Movement was becoming greater and their agitation was intensifying 
and gaining fresh adherents • It was essential to convince the 
nation that we were not continuing the war merely to gain a vindictive 
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or looting triumph." It was highly significant that Lloyd George, 
when he came to announce his own war aims, should do so to an 
audience of trade union officials. He himself later related the 
matter to the manpower question: "The difficulties of our manpower 
had almost produced a deadlock with the Trade Unions. Without their 
goodwill and co-operation, we could not have secured further recruits 
.1W 
among the exempted." The Prime Minister endorsed many of the Labour 
Partyr s statements. He emphasised that the war was not a war of 
aggression and emphasised the need for a conciliatory settlement. He 
spoke of the restoration of the sanctity of treaties, territorial 
settlements based on the right of self determination and the need 
for some international organisation. The Cabinet had no difficulty 
in agreeing to such ideas providing they presupposed the securing of 
a military victory. The important matter was to retain the support 
of the leaders of labour and, above all, prevent them or their followers 
becoming converted to the view that there was a possibility of peace 
by negotiation. 
While the maintenance of a working alliance with the official leaders 
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of labour was an important part of the Government's policy it did 
not in itself guarantee the results which were required. The alliance 
was the framework within which the Government and its agents could 
work to extract the specific agreements they thought were necessary. 
The maintenance of the alliance required attention and adaptation 
but it was a relatively simple business in comparison with the range 
of measures which were used to secure the detailed compliance of all 
groups of workers. 
Government measurea in the labour field rarely followed any consistent 
pattern. The politicians lurched from crisis to crisis using what 
assistance was immediately available and improvising when necessary. 
As illustrated above, they knew what they should do in respect of 
unofficial union organisations, yet they were frequently forced to 
break their own rules. All attempts to develop some general analysis 
of the problems reflect this same flux and inconsistency. The most 
gsnerally expressed view in Cabinet was a fairly straightforward one: 
"The danger of the situation depsnds not so much on the procsedings of 
the small (by comparison) numbers of workmen holding syndicalist views 
and revolutionary aims, as on thefaarthat the vastly larger body of 
patriots and loyal trade unionists may be deluded by misrepresentation 
of the facts into expressing sympathy with the violent minority.,,121 
Lloyd George was sometimes predisposed to analyse unrest in a similar 
way: "At bottom there appeared to be general and legitimate griev-
ances, but there was a danger of these being exploited by violent 
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anarchists." Up to this point the Commissioners on Industrial Unrest 
were in agreement identifying "a strong feeling of patriotism on the 
part of employers and employsd" and arguing that "feelings of a 
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revolutionary character are not entertained by the bulk of the men".123 
At this level there was little diseent. Sir Edward Carson felt that 
the view was complacent and attention should be drawn to the "powerful 
driving force" which he felt was behind the labour agitation, but there 
was usually sufficient agreement on the policy of removing the majority 
from the influence of the minority by concessions for the following type 
of statement to become accepted policy: "As soon as further evidence was 
forthcoming the Government should endeavour to remove the grievances 
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without delay in order ••• to forestall trouble." The analysis was 
slight and the level of generality high but such an approach did offer 
a starting point. However the idea was not often properly applied and 
Government actions continued to exhibit a lack of consistency. There is 
little evidence of imaginative concessions to remove the "legitimate 
grievances" of the loyal majority and nothing which suggests coercive 
measures were confined to the minority. Actual policy seemed to be to 
ignore grievances which were advanced through legitimate channels and 
to attack all active protest with every means at the state's disposal. 
The policy might have stood a greater chance of success had it been 
poseible to stub out all dissent but in practice it was sometimes neces-
sary to admit defeat and concede victory to the dissidents. 
Those who were supposed to assist the Cabinet to formulate an analysis 
of industrial unrest were frequently unhelpful. Hodge, supposedly an 
expert in labour matters, advised the Cabinet that the 'trade card' 
scheme could be withdrawn without serious consequences. Basil Thomson 
when set to investigate Carson's fear that German money was behind the 
unofficial strikes and the pacifist movement offered only the thread-
bare techniques of the yellow press. E D Moral, for example, was under 
suspicion as "he had published books and articles on abuses 1n the Congo, 
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which were undoubtedly in the German interest, as bringing the 
Belgian Government into public odium". In addition although Morel 
had been publicly accused of working for the Germans on a number of 
occasions, "the public cannot be blamed for believing" it to be true 
as Morel had "never thought fit to vindicate himself".125 
Most officials were reticent about generalisation. They all tended 
to identify a series of complaints, about food, beer, housing and the 
like, but made no attempt to show how they connected with different 
levels of active unrest. The labour officers of the Ministry of 
Munitions thought there was a connection between the military situation 
and the labour situation. Military defeats were said to produce peace 
126 in the factories, but victory was full of dangers. One "recurrence 
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of labour unrest" was directly related to victory on the Italian front 
128 
while the defeat of Austria was said to have increased absenteeism. 
The Government was unlikely to be able to draw any constructive lesson 
from this hypothesis. 
Another frequently made, though equally unconstructive, suggestion 
was that unrest was related to tha high earninga of munitions workers. 
From the South West came the complaint: "There is too much money 
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about and the men want a holiday to spend it." Basil Thomson took 
up this theme. He 'discovered' working men with "their pockets full 
of money" and deprived of "the relaxstions to which they were 
accustomed owing to the curtailment of horse racing and foot-
ball" who were amusing themselves by attending pacifist meetings. 
His suggested remedy waa, "an iseue of premium bonds which would 
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satisfy their creving for exc1tament". Thomson also suggested that 
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the situation could be improved by more effective propaganda and he 
suggested the "Bolshevik Horror" as a suitable subject.131 Later, 
remembering the restricted sensibilities of some of the audience, he 
warned that anti Bolshevik propaganda should not "lay too much stress 
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on the outrages committed on the bourgeoisi~n. 
At one level it is possible to develop a picture of Government making 
an increased accommodation to the needs of working people in order to 
mobilise their support for the war effort. The state expanded its 
organisational capacities in order to cope with new concerns. The 
Government developed a policy for food distribution, the Ministry of 
Munitions introduced works canteens; rents were officially fixed, 
the Government became involved in the paying of wages~9nd pledges 
were made to restrict excess profits made as a result of the suspension 
of normal trade union practices. Similarly one might cite the inclusion 
of labour representatives in government as evidence of an imaginative 
development. Some historians have used these, and the many similar 
innovations to suggest that the politics of the war years rspresent 
some novel departurs; that the state under pressure radically altered 
its relationship with the working population. 
However when the innovations are examined in more detail they appear 
less like concessions to labour than simply the basic requirements 
of running a state in wartime. Food rationing was no more than a 
response to a situation in which market forces had failed to guarantee 
minimum requirements. Works canteens simply enabled men to work more 
efficiently over longer periods of time. The welfare inspectorate 
of the Ministry of Munitions was unaahamedly in pursuit of a docile 
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and productive workforce;~ Rent control wae no more than an inadequate 
response to a chaotic situation which had resulted from Government 
policy in the first place. Attempts to control excess profits were 
remarkable only for their ineffectuality while Government intervention 
in the field of wages was mainly motivated by the desire to prevent 
workers benefiting from the situation of labour shortages. The 
official account makes it quite clear that officials were far more 
concerned to limit the high earning of piece workers than to alleviate 
the difficulties of the rest.134 The one notable intervention on behalf of a 
group of workers, the award of the twelve and a half per cent bonus, 
was a capitulation to pressure rather then a natural development out 
of sxisting policy. The alteration of the relationship between the 
state and labour was in reality insubstantial. The creation of the 
Ministry of Labour, it has been convincingly argued, was little more 
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than a symbolic gesture and if Labour men were in government they 
were seen as hostages to the good behaviour of their followers rather 
than as representatives of an alternative and legitimate point of view. 
Any munitions worker's impression of the state in wartime was far 
more likely to be dominated by the increaeed powers of regulation 
and punishment than by welfare provision. Innovstions in the coercive 
side of govsrnment activity were both extensive and SUbstantial. The 
Munitions of War Act effectively removed the means by which workers 
could defend their interests and· seek to regulate their work environ-
mente It is important to recognise that the powers which the Govern-
ment reserved to itself and its agents were not merely a matter of 
sanctions in reserve to deal with such abnormal and serious occurrsnces 
ae strikes, but represented an attempt to regulate the day to day 
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business of industry. The routine misdemeanours of industry, bad 
timekeeping, absences without medical certificates, even refusals to 
work overtime were brought into the area of legal regulation. For 
a period it was illegal for an employee to exercise that traditional 
freedom of leaving his job without his employer's consent, and for 
most of the war 'voluntary leaving', as it was calle~.was penalised by 
six weeks enforced unemployment. Working people were thus faced with 
a situation in which those who normally exercised disciplinary fun-
ctions over them, works managers, foremen and the like, had had their 
powers enhanced by legal enactment and supported by formal sanctions. 
, 
~ost of their traditional means of defence through collective action 
had been removed. Any strike was unofficial, hence illegal, and would 
encounter not only the cosrcive powers of the state but the opposition 
of the union. It was not even possible to leave or to sven threaten 
to do so. The Military Service Acts also cast a shadow over industrial 
life. Cole argued that conscription more than any other factor was 
responsible for the change in the attitude of working people towards 
the war. These Acts underlined the formal powerlessness of the worker. 
They could be used selectively; men previously exempted were sometimes 
conscripted as a punishment for industrial misconduct. On at least 
two occasions the threat of conscription was ueed as a sanction against 
groups of striking workmen. In addition powers available to the state 
under the Defence of the Realm Regulations rendered almost any political 
protest illegal. The circulation of a Bolshevik pamphlet ensured, 
for one alien, six months ha~d labour and deportation. Proceedings 
were even instituted against a member of ths South Dorset Labour Party 
whose sole offence had bsen to publicly suggest that War Loans and 
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War Bonds were a swindle. No account could legitimately ignore the 
63 
manner in which the coercive powers of the state became embedded into 
the routine procedures of industrial and political life. 
However this was not the full extent of the coercive powers available. 
Those who did undertake strike action rapidly discovered that the 
state had many additional powers and even a capacity for improvisation. 
The most persistent opponents of Government policy were the skilled 
men of the ASE. It has been calculated that they were responsible 
for more than forty per cent of the days lost through strikes in 1916 
and 1917)37 It was always probable that these men would be at the 
centre of conflict for, as skilled men, the industrial practices of 
the war years undermined their status and earning capacity. Moreover 
many of these men worked in the munitions industries. The intro-
duction of dilution was one of the earliest, and most bitter issues 
in contention between the Government and the engineers, yet, as James 
Hinton demonstrates the Cabinet was never predisposed to soft pedal 
the issua. From the first they linked the issue with that of the 
destruction of unofficial organisations, in particular the Clyde 
Workers' Committee, which were attempting to resist its introduction. 
The contest was a deeply unequal one. The Government at all times 
possessed the initiative and the support of powerful allies in the 
engineering employers and the officials of the ASE. The latter 
alliance was particularly important for it tended to isolate the 
engineers from other groupe of workers and to hamper their efforts 
to secure general support within the Labour Movement. When its 
victory in this matter was secured the Government chose to deport 
David Kirkwood and other leaders. The Labour Party was sufficiently 
concerned with this new departure to set up an investigating committee. 
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They recorded their opposition to the deportations but were obviously 
far more concerned with the extent to which Kirkwood and other leaders 
had challenged the official union representatives. The committee con-
ceded that the grievances of the men may have been real but they felt 
that they "had not been properly formulated and placed in the hands 
of their recognised Trade Union officials". The unofficial committee 
had "sought to usurp the functions of the regular Trade Unions" and 
the committee was forced to the "very regrettable" conclusion that 
Kirkwood had repudiated Messrs Henderson and Brownlie as representatives 
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of Labour. Clearly the committse felt the introduction of internal 
deportation to be a relatively minor matter in the face of a challenge 
to official labour leaders. 
The hostility of labour leaders to unofficial action continued to 
play an important role in the Government's ability to prevent or break 
strikes, yet while it hed this and other potent meens at its disposal 
it never managed to eliminate the threet from the engineers. There 
was a further weve of unofficial strikes in the engineering trades in 
the Spring of 1917. What was particularly worrying for the Government 
was thet by this time the engineers seemed to have established some 
sort of national organisation. Delegates from many parts of the 
country attended the Walworth Conference in May of that year. The 
Government end the ASE officials were no~ able to act in unison and 
they both initially refused to meet anyone involved with the Conference. 
Later the union executive did consent to meet a group of unofficial 
delegates but during that meeting received a private message from 
the Government that it was about to make arrests. Accordingly the 
ASE Executive suepended discussions, and the Walworth Conference was 
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raided and arrests made. When they resumed their meeting with the 
executive the unofficial delegates were sufficiently chastened to 
agree to recommend a return to work and to transfer their mandate to 
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that executive. 
The next issue which provoked widsspread unofficial action waa the 
introduction of the 'comb out'. Opposition to this was strong in 
itself but made all the more strong by the fact that it became an 
issue around which accumulatad all the other grievances of the war 
years. A meeting of ten thousand unofficial delegates at the Albert 
Hall in January 1918 expressed general discontent with the Government's 
conduct of the war as well as specifically opposing the withdrawal of 
the trade card scheme. A national ballot revealed that a large majority 
. of ASE members supported the decisions that had been taken at this 
·1~ 
meeting. Even Arthur Henderson seemed to be offering at least a 
passive support in arguing that he felt the Government was acting 
unfairly in withdrawing exemptions from skilled men in protected 
141 trades. Vet, after a halfhearted attempt through the ASE executive 
to ameliorate certain features of the policy, the Government decided 
to bludgeon through its original demands. The engineers were publicly 
denounced and the public informed of the selfish and sectional nature 
of the 'privileges' they were demanding. Naturally the bulk of the 
press took up the cry. The 'Times' asked the unofficial leaders to 
"ponder seriously the wisdom of alienating themselves at this critical 
period not only from their co-workers in the war workshops but from 
142 the nation at home and the nation in arms abroad". In this case 
such efforts were not necessary for, as the Ministry of Munitions 
reported, the success of the German Spring offensive on the Western 
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Front, "paralysed the efforts of the agitators".143Many of those men 
who had been denounced as traitors had offered to forego their 
holidays. 
However once the immediate crisis was over the agitation over the 
'comb out' continued. A group of engineers who struck in July had 
to face the oratorial powers of the Prime Minister as well as the 
coercive powers of the state. First of all Lloyd George sought to 
harness the traditions and beliefs of the Labour Movement to his 
cause by pointing out that not only wss the strike unofficial but it 
was "not in pursuance of a trade dispute". This, of course, had no 
bearing whatsoever on the legality of the dispute, but the Prime 
Minister was striving for something more than dispassionate analysis. 
The strike, he claimed, was "an endeavour to change ths national 
policy essential to the prosecution of the war. Whilst millions of 
their fellow countrymen are hourly facing danger and death for their 
country, the men now on strike have been granted exemption from these 
perils only because their services were considered of more service to 
the state in the workshops than in the army~" Having tried to poli-
tically isolate the strikes, the Prime Minister proceeded to threats: 
"It is now necessary for the Government to declare that all men 
wilfully absent from their work on or after Monday 29th July will be 
deemed to hsve voluntarily placed themselves outside the area of the 
munitiona industries. Their protection certificates will cease to 
have effect from that date and they will become liable to the pro-
visions of the Military Service Act." 144 
That the Government usually managed to get the engineers back to 
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work relatively quickly must not be used to attribute to its agents 
great acumen or political skill. In truth the Government held most 
of the cards. Its opponents were denied even the simple resources 
of organisation, finance and publicity which official union bodies 
can provide. They were so isolated that Government propaganda some-
times had a considerable impact on men working alongside of them. 
The skilled engineers at Parkhead forge had "not only decided to 
forego their holiday but had resolved to contribute one day's pay to 
a charitable fund in order to repudiate the feeling that they were 
indifferent to the sufferings of the soldiers in france"!45 It was 
reported from Manchester that the "general ill will shown by other 
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uniona towards the ASE ••• has caused trouble in the workshops". 
The Government line could never be effectively challenged so it wae 
able to turn every event to its own advantage. Even George Askwith, 
who somewhat eccentrically maintained elsewhere that the war had 
little impact on labour mattere was forced to conclude that the 
defeats in the Spring and Summer of 1918 were responsible for the 
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ensuing industrial peace. 
What is perhaps most remarkable about the continuing conflict between 
the engineering shop stewards and the state is not so much the fact 
that the state was usually victorious in open confrontations but that 
unofficial action wae never finally stamped out. This wae partly due 
to some quite outstanding organisational work by unofficial leaders 
and the nature of the difficultiee which their followers faced, but 
it muet also be related to the aggreeeive stance adopted by the 
Government from the first and its total inability to present and 
maintain a consistent and coherent line of policy on enything but 
the suppression of active opposition. 
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It must not bs imagined however that the Government reserved its 
coercivs powers for the engineers alone. Any group of workers 
attracting displeasure could find thsmselves in a similar situation. 
When Liverpool boilermakers went on strike in December 1916 they were 
immediately attacked by the Ministsrs of Labour and Munitions. The 
leaders of the strike were threatened with arrest and the local police 
forces reinforced so that they could adequately support the intro-
duction of blackleg labour. When the enginemen of ASLEF threatened 
to strike in August 1917 government officials were initially uncertain 
about the legal position. The railways, though controlled, did not 
come under the Munitions of War Act and it might not therefore be 
possible to deal with the enginemen as they had dealt with the 
engineers. However the Home Office discovered that Regulation 42 of 
the Defence of the Realm Act, already used to good effect in an 
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engineering strike in Barrow in March, could be used against the rail-
waymen. The Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Edward Troup, wrote to all 
Chief Constables to draw their attention to Regulation 42, "if any 
person attempts • •• to impsde, delay or restrict the production, 
repair or tranaport of war material or any other work necsssary for 
the prosecution of war, he shall be guilty of an offence under these 
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regulations". He also pointed out that all laws' which applied to 
the conduct of labour disputes in peacetime were null and void. 
They must treat any attempt to bring about a dispute as an illegal 
act: "The Law Officers of the Crown have advised that such an attempt 
is an offence even when the means used • • • is peaceful persuasion • 
. . and the provisions of the Trsde Disputes Act would provide no 
answer to this charge." Picketing was also thereby rendered illegal. 
The Home Office advised the Chief Constables that pickets should be 
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given one werning and t.hen if they persisted be arrested under 
Regulation 55 of OORA. 150The Chief Constabls of Staffordshire was 
not satiefied with this and pointed out that there were conditions, 
albeit very stringent ones, under which legal strikes could take place 
in wartime, and that his legal powers to arrest pickets might be com-
promised by this. The Home Office reply clearly indicated that the 
Government believed that in effect no legel strike could occur and 
that in any case picketing must always be considered illegal. Chief 
Constables should, however, exercise great care in this matter: 
"Except when an immediate arrest is necessary to stop picketing refe-
renee should be made to the Director of Public Prosecutions before 
any arreet is made." 
151 The newepaper cuttings file 1ndicated a prees united in hostility 
against the enginemen. The 'Globe' expressed its "grave concern" 
over the strike but was "greatly encouraged by the prompt action of 
the Government". The 'Daily Mail' felt it was "too incredibly mon-
strous" of the engine men "to threaten to paralyse the fighting arm 
of the country", while the 'Daily Chronicle' attempted to arouse two 
prejudices in one sentence in arguing, "Their own women end children 
would turn on them if any action of theirs prolonged the agonies of 
our breve wounded coming beck from the front and increased the already 
too high prices of food". The'Manchester Guardian',more soberly, 
hoped that the enginemen would "recoil from any such quasi rebellion" 
and argued that in any dispute the people would be on the Government's 
side. The press served the en de of the Government admirably in con-
cent rating on the possibls consequences of the strike and ignoring 
its causes1 52 There was also assistance from the official labour 
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leaders. J H Thomas, General Secretary of the NUR, attacked to 
strike in a much quoted speech as "neither fair fighting nor common 
153 honesty". The efforts of the Government and its allies may have had 
some effect on groups of workers who might otherwise have offered 
support. The Chief Constable of Glamorgan reported that while there 
was "the usual strong disinclination to become a Special Constable 
during timee of labour unrest", he felt certain that the majority of 
the population would "preserve a benevolent neutrality towards the 
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forces of law and order". Tha police however were to be at the dis-
posal of the railway companies. Chief Conetables were instructed to 
"get in touch with the General ~anagers or District Officers of the 
companies whose lines run through your area and ascertain from them 
the places where protection would be most wanted".155 
The measures adopted by the Government in the face of a strike involv-
ing NUR members in the Autumn of 1918 were even more stringent. The 
Chief Constables were under the same instructions as they had been 
in the ASLEr strike but were in addition to be given military assistance: 
"The War Cabinet (had) decided to utilise the Naval and ~ilitary forces 
to assist in the.maintenance of railway services, in the protection 
of railway property and personnel, and in the preservation of law and 
order."15~nstructions to military officers on the conduct of the 
operation contained the chilling note: "Any acts of attempted 
sabotage should be dealt with under the same conditions as if attempted 
by the enemy." 157In addition the Cabinet decided that railwaymen who 
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went on strike would be immediately rendered liable to conscription. 
There was a similar campaign t~ arouse the hostility of the population 
against the strikers which met with some success: "Tonight wounded 
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soldiers entered the ILP rooms, where a large number of strikers had 
met, and with their crutches smashed chairs and other furniture. There 
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wae a general m2lJe and strikers fled the room." Press comment was 
favourabla to such acts of patriotic vandalism and to the Government's 
case in general. The 'Manchester Guardian' felt the Government had 
"no option but to fight the matter out"15~nd the 'Times' cast its 
sober authority behind the view that the strike was "the work of 
pacifiats and conscientious obJectors":61The 'Daily News' took the 
opportunity to criticise the Government for the general lack of candour 
it displayed in its dealings with labour but offered no comfort to 
the railwaymen; "in this matter the Government is emphatically right":62 
The Government's alliance with official labour leaders was again in 
evidence. Clynes struck a useful note in urging: "While sailors and 
soldiers, who are workmen, are winning the war don't let workmen at 
home lose the fight or delay our victory by thoughtlessly interfering 
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with military operations." J H Thomas rushed down to South Wales 
and attempted to exert his authority over the unofficial strike com-
mittee. Thomas was neither impervious to the appeals of melodrama 
nor disposed to play down his own rols: "I think the nation has been 
saved from a grave crisis. I have never seen anything so near blood-
shed before. The soldiers coming in and the fear of the colliers, who 
were unable to get food coming up, and the large numbers of wounded 
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soldiers made it a trying time." The Special Branch was also at 
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work. A list of "principal strike agitators" was preparsd and even 
after the immediats crisis was over the NUR was kept under close sur-
166 . 
veillance. In this 1nstance repression alone was not enough. The 
Government was so concerned with the situation on the railways that 
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they conceded an agreement with the NUR which linked their wages with 
the cost of living. 
Although successive Governments fully realised the importance of 
labour in the prosecution of the war their policies and actions in 
this field bore few traces of novelty or imagination. Most of the 
wartime developments of the state machine were motivated by a desire 
to institute more effective controls over labour than by a wish to 
propitiate the workforce. This principle applied as much to the 
development of the welfare inspectorate for munitions workers as it 
did to the extension of the labour surveillance services of the state. 
A central feature of labour policy was the maintenance of an alliance 
with the official leaders of labour. However this was essentially a 
one way alliance in that labour leaders were expe~ted to represent the 
Government's case to their members rather than vice versa. Labour as 
a whole was expected to be content with this essentially symbolic 
recognition of its new importance. 
The Government was never sufficiently in control of the labour problem 
to be able to contemplate a policy of concessions. Most of the material 
concessions that were granted were capitulations to unofficial pressure. 
For the most part the politicians encouraged labour leaders to develop 
issues which had no immediate resource implications. For their part 
labour leaders were quite willing to go along with a policy which 
directed their followers' attention to the postwar world and away from 
existing difficulties. 
In practice the Government relied heavily on repression. On the one 
hand there were the tight legal and administrative frameworks which 
73 
regulated the day to day existence of munitions workers and the' 
removal of the means of effective protest from the rest of the working 
population. On the other hand there was the battery of measures which 
the government would turn on any group of workers who were moved to 
industrial action. One of the reasons that state activity in thie 
area was so unsophisticated and alternative bourses of action were 
rarely considered was that most ministers appear to have believed whole-
heartedly that the sacrifices they demanded of labour were absolutely 
necessary and that those who questioned them must be motivated by 
pacifist or other treasonable considerations. ror example the Home 
Secretary was moved to defend the censorship of pacifist literature 
thus: "To censor such leaflets would not be an interference with free-
dom of opinion and speech; for they are not expressions of opinion, 
,~ . 
but propaganda intended to influence others." Labour representatives 
became caught up in this mood; Hodge, on one occaeion~arguing that 
there was no harm in suppressing the labour press. Clearly this was 
not an atmosphere conducive to a clear consideration of alternative 
courses of action. That the state did not introduce even more stringent 
controls in this and other areas must be explained on grounds of prac-
ticality rather than an appreciation of the possibility of harmful 
consequences, much less some residual attachment to liberal principle. 
It is reasonable to suggest that there were divisions within the War Cabinet 
ead it i4 possible to identify Lloyd George and Roberts as 'moderates' 
168· . in labour matters. However 1t is also important to recognise that such 
divisions may not have meant a great deal in practice. While the Prime 
. Minister, for instance, wae prepared to speculate that the best way of 
dealing with unrest was to ameliorate the grievances of the majority 
there is no evidence that he was prepared to overcome the difficultiee 
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involved in giving sUbstance to such a policy. In effect the divi-
sions were usually about when, how,and in what degree coercive measures 
should be used. For example in the engineering strikes of May 1917 
169 the issue was whether wholesale arrests should be made immediately or 
selective arrests made when the strike was on the wane. Moderation was 
in practice a belief that coercive policies were most effective when 
applied selectively. 
However, in spite of such efforts it seems probable that many of the 
measures taken by the Govsrnment were counter productive. Although 
their friends were strong and their opponents weak they did contrive 
on a number of occasions to create or reinforce suspicion and hostility. 
The fact that they ran into ae little difficulty as they did cannot be 
related to the wisdom of their policies, the astuteness of their appli-
cation nor even the resources at their disposal, but rather to the 
impact of the war on public opinion. Opponents of government policy 
were always aware of the mass hostility which might be directed against 
them and, for their own part, very few were prepared to push their dis-
sent to a point at which the British troops in the field were fUrther 
endangered. Hence if the Government was able to manipulate smaller 
issues into some relationship with this broader one its success was 
certain. Thus while the war produced difficulties for the state in 
its dealings with labour, and while the consequences of failure were 
considerable, there were also new possibilities. In the political 
climate created by the war the state was able to develop its own defi-
nition of the national interest and the machinery to ensure its 
acceptance. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE POST-WAR CRISIS AND AFTER 
Introduction 
The successful conclusion of the Great War represented a considerable 
victory for the British political elite. The political and economic 
hierarchies of British society emerged from the war virtually unaltered. 
The industrial system which had frequently been characterised as archaic 
and haphazard had withstood the organised might of Germany, the working 
popula~ion had been kept at their uncongenial tasks in the poorest of 
conditions, and a constant supply of men and machines had maintained the 
nightmare of the Western Front. Moreover these feats of mobilisation 
had been achieved with only the most minor and temporary concessions. 
Yet in the first months of the peace the mood of the British elite was 
one of hysterical pessimism. A number of senior politicians, among 
them Churchill, Carson and Auckland Geddes, became convinced that only 
military preparation could save them from internal insurrection; Bonar 
Law believed the hour was come and "All weapons ought to be available 
1 for distribution to the friends of the Government", and even the Prime 
Minister felt it necessary to issue grave warning of instability.2 The 
'responsible' newspapers were filled with sombre warnings and estab-
lishment sages filled their columns with lamentations on the dawn of 
the age of barbarism. Any political difficulty, any sign of prole-
tarian instransigence, was removed from its context, ~parated from 
the analytical discipline of cause and effect, and heralded as an 
augury of disaster. 
There is an almost disturbing disunity among historians as to whether 
such fears were justified. , Halevy argues; "In the spring of 1919 it 
was difficult to resist the impression that England was on the edge of 
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a social revolution." 3 Yet to A J P Taylor the outbreaks of unrest 
which did occur were isolated and ephemeral and subject to removal by 
relatively minor adjustments of policy.4 These disagreements may be 
related to an even deeper division over the basic question of the 
impact of the war on British society in general. For Bentley Gilbert 
the effect of the war, "can scarcely be reported let alone assessed 
and explained. A world died and a new one was born in slightly more 
5 than four years". Yet Havinghurst argues; "viewed in the larger con-
text it may be argued that the general course of British history was 
little affected by the war which was rather a manifestation than a 
6 
cause". Historians concerned with the impact of the war on labour 
have demonstrated similar divisions. Ross McKibbin argues that changes 
which took place within the labour movement and the Labour Party in the 
immediate post-war period were entirely consistent with what had taken 
place before 1914. To those such as GDH Cole and Arthur Marwick who 
have related such changes to a break in tradition and argued for the 
stimulating effect of war conditions on the ambitions and imaginations 
of labour leaders, McKibbin offers the view that the post-war Party 
was not really very different from its pre-war predecessor and that 
evsn the large growth in trade union membership repreeented no novel 
departure: "Everything points to Labour's enduring ante-bellun 
character: continuity of leadership and personnel at all levels, 
effective continuity of policy and, above all, continuity of organi-
sation."? Vet to Walter Kendal the war had precipitated the British 
state into a crisis which "was probably the most serious since the 
8 time of the Chartists". In his view the guardiane of the British 
state were troubled by well founded doubts about the loyalty of its 
police snd armed forces and facing a labour movement "stronger than 
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ever in its history". While the revolutionary socialists of the day 
failed to exploit, or even to fully recognise it, they were in effect 
being offered "the greatest revolutionary opportunity in generations".9 
Contemporary observers on both the left and right were, in the main, 
of the opinion that great changes had taken place and that the future 
was far from certain. William Brace warned that "A wrong tUrn or act 
of folly by people in authority could easily send this country in a 
direction which for a time would make orderly constitutional government 
. imposeible".10 Arthur Henderson argued that the war had represented 
"the final stage in the disintegration and collapse of the civilisation 
which was founded upon the individualist system of capitelist 
11 production • • ." and on another occasion warned that its conculsion 
had left "unrest more widespread and deep seated than ever before in 
the history of industrial England" and the country "on the verge of 
12 industrial revolt". Social disorder and insurrection were thus 
central issues of political discourse though it was, in the end, only 
a very small minority on the left who believed that any good could 
come from such outbursts. Henderson, for all his talk of disintegration 
and collapse was as worried about "sporadic local efforts" and "industrial 
anarchy" as any other conventional politician. 13 Henderson, like many 
other labour leaders was using the language of political rebellion to 
further the cause of gradualism. Revolutionary outbursts were held up 
as the inevitable consequences of the failure to make adequate con-
cessions to labour and its official leaders. 14 Thus the 'New Statesman' 
warned that had the miners' leaders not accepted the offer of a Committee 
of Inquiry in March 1919, "Great Britain would have been nearer a social 
revolution than anyone had previously thought Possible",15 and Gerald 
B7 
Gould was all for revolution, understood as a gradual transfer of 
power to labour, but warned that 8ritain had come close to a revolution 
of a different, undesirable and violent type during the Rail Strike of 
1919. 16 Arthur Gleason, having already predicted that workers' control 
17 
would be the dominant theme of post-war reconstruction returned in 
1920 to find that his prophecy was being fulfilled: "step by step the 
new order is being established". The workers were bringing in the new 
era by using their irresistable industrial power for such purposes as 
ending intervention in Russia and demanding the netionalisation of the 
mines: "As fast as full pressure is brought the opposition gives 
ground. That is why there are not any Jutting flames and bloody futile 
riots, and the theatricalities of orthodox revolutions." The changes 
brought in were nonetheless decisive: "The famous moment of history 
18 has come when a nation ushers in another class to power." Not all 
accounts suggested that things had gone as far as this but many writers 
shared at leaat some of Gleason's assumptions. The Webbs argued that 
the post-war period saw capitalism in a terminal stage of decay. They 
argued that the "most potent" factor was the growing inability of the 
capitalist state to apply the "whip of starvation". Capitalism required 
for its survival the ability to inflict misery on those who refused 
work at the wages offered. This requirement they argued, had been 
fulfilled through the principle of "less eligibility" at the heart of 
the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, but that this measure was incompa-
tible with the universal franchise. No longer would it be possible 
for governments to resist demands for adequate maintenance for the 
unemployed, and thus capitalism had loet an essential part of its 
social machinery. The Webbs too gave expression to the familiar 
argument about unrest and change. They had little sympathy with the 
. 
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idea of violent rebellion, yet as a threat it could serve a purpose: 
"We must face the practical certainty that if the transition from 
capitalism to socialism is not intelligently anticipated, planned and 
guided by the rulers of the people, the people, when the breaking 
strain is reached, will resort to sabotage to force whatever government 
19 
may be left to tackle the job of reconstruction." If anarchic rebel-
lion was not yet stalking Britain as it was Continental Europe there was 
still little cause for complacency. If existing rulers failed to come 
to terms with the new situation others would eventually have to recon-
struct some new order on the debris of Western civilisation. 25 
While the Webbs were concerned with the impact of the extension of the 
suffrage most of those, on both the left and the right, who feared or 
welcomed the prospect of sudden change saw the enlarged trade union 
movement as its principal agent. Superficially, at leaat, this must 
have appeared to be quite reasonable. The unions had doubled their 
size between 1914 and 1920. While ~cKibbin is correct to point out 
that this did not represent a faster rate of growth than the period 
1910-1913 he is surely wrong to underestimate the impact of sheer num-
bers themselves. Not only were the unions larger but they had developed 
and exploited systems of centralised collective bargaining and developed 
21 
potentially powerful alliances for mutual assistance. The years of 
the war had seen the fulfilment of the promise of the 'New Unionism,.22 
In two critical senses the unions had become central to the operations 
of domestic politic9. On the one hand the TUC was dominated by lower 
paid, semi or unskilled workers who, their representatives recognised, 
had more to gain from the activities of the state then any bergains 
they might make in the market place; and on the other, unions had 
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become so large and their members so central to the easential operations 
of society that any strike would almost inevitably involve the govern-
ment. There had also bsen considerable changes in the leadership of 
the unions during and immediately after the war. The new men appeared 
to ride the general wave of labour confidence and were no longer willing 
to confine their political interventions to matters of immediate interest. 
They spoke of using direct action for a range of political ends and 
there was some evidence to support the view that they might carry their 
rank and file members with them. 23 Unofficial union activity had to a 
large extent been eclipsed by the new official militancy but some con-
servatives feared it had left a dangerous residue. 24 Charles McCurdy 
argued that the unrest went well beyond normal industrial matters: 
"Beyond the material causes of discontent thers is e wind of revolution 
blowing across Europe, shaking political institutions in all countries". 
The waves of strikes in Britain, he suggested, might usefully be compared 
to the rise of Bolshevism in Russia and the spread of syndicalist doc-
trines in France. The movement was beyond the control of its more 
moderate leaders: "We may have to wait until the British people have had 
a fuller experience of the suffering which a great strike can inflict 
before we shall realise that methods of violence and anarchy in indus-
trial disputes are just as barbarous and immoral as war itself.,,25 
While it is undeniable that 1919 saw a quite unusual rise in industrial 
militancy; thirty-five million days were lost in strikes as opposed to 
six million in 1918 and sleven and a half million in 1913; it is doubt-
ful whether it was necessary to have recourse to arguments about 'winds 
of revolution' in order to explain the phenomenon. If the high levels 
of industrial unrest were considered in their propar context a more 
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reassuring pattern of causation might be discerned. Ae one contem-
porsry observsr expressed it: "the dismantling of the machine of war 
and the restoration of industry to a peace footing was bound to be 
accompanied by enormous unrest, dislocation, dissatisfaction and hard-
26 
ship." Moreover trade unions had to set about the task of the 
practical restoration of traditional right a and working practices which 
had been suspended for the duration of the war. It was also inevitable 
that some conflict would arise from attempts to deal with the accumu-
lated grievancea of the war years. During the war basic wage rates had 
tended to trail behind prices, especially food prices and it was only 
during 1919 that the 1914 position was again achieved. Additionally it 
is significant that thirty per cent of the days lost were in the ehip-
building and engineering industries where the impact of the wartime 
state had been greatest. Vet not only were there a host of hitherto 
unexpressed grievances within the labour movement but the state of the 
labour market in 1919 afforded labour an excellent opportunity not only 
for dealing with these but for seeking general improvements in pay end 
conditions. The enlerged size of unions hes also to be teken into 
account for it is clear thatatrikes of no greeter length than those of 
1913 would inevitably involve a far greeter number of days loet. If all 
of these factors are set in the context of high expectations, as stimu-
lated and exploited by the government it is clear, at the least that it 
is not inevitably necessary to assume some dramatic shift in working 
class coneciousness in order to explain the visible expressions of 
induetrial unrest. 
This, of course, is not to argue that the government was not faced with 
an unusuelly difficult situation. While it might have been possible to 
explain such events in terms of a quite natural evolution of the labour 
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movement or an unexceptional response to unusually favourable circum-
stances they still had to be dealt with. While labour's new ideals and 
ambitions could, in part at least, be explained by the advent of new 
leaders anxious to separate themselves from an old elite compromised by 
too much contact with the state, the new ideals were not without content 
and did contain implications for post-war politics. 
Walter Kendal, in arguing that the immediate post-war months constitutsd 
27 
"the greatest revolutionary opportunity in generations" takes account 
of the new eituation of labour but also arguss that the government was 
singularly ill prepared to deal with any unrest which might arise. Kendal 
points out that there were a number of occasions on which the government 
felt they were facing a potential uprising but lacked confidence in their 
police and armed forces. The police strikes and the numsrous rscordsd 
incidents of unrest in the Army and Navy are cited by Kendal to show that 
this sense of insecurity was not groundless. Kendal is clearly not 
arguing that Britain was on the brink of a revolution but rather that 
there wae a potential for revolutionary dsvelopments. He suggests a 
number of hypothetical events which, he believes, could have transformed 
such potential into actuality. Had the revolutionary left "won control 
of major sections of the labour movement" or the armed forces; had con-
nections been established between the labour movement and the forces; 
or had either managed to unite with the militants within the police 
forces, the situation could have been very different. The validity of 
Kendal's hypothesis must rest on some assessment of how far any or all 
of thess parties wsre prepared to go and whether there was any posei-
bility of working connections between them. Judgments of this type are 
very difficult to make. Changes in consciousness can be very rapid 
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particularly where state structures and political expectations are 
successfully undermined so conclusions must be tentative, yet it must 
be recognised that there is evidence to suggest that Kendal's projection 
of events is somewhat unrealistic. While there is no reason to suppose 
that the various parties would not have gone the way Kendal suggests had 
a revolutionary situation developed there seems little reason to suppoee 
that any of them could have precipitated that situation or acted as if 
that situation already existed. for example even if the revolutionary 
left had achieved a position of authority within a section of the labour 
movement their ability to direct their members would not have been freed 
from the normal constraints of internal disagreements and resistances 
unless some dramatic breakdown had occurred elsewhere. Similarly, while 
the militant protests from within the police and armed forces were a 
source of justifiable anxiety for most in authority they were clearly 
not, in themselves, subversive acts in that they took place within the 
confines of rules and were directed to limited and aChievable objectives. 
That the police strikers harboured no deeper antagonisms towards the 
state was demonstrated by the manner in which the majority were bought 
off with relatively minor concessions. 28 Had it been felt to be neces-
sary the government could have conceded the demands of the remaining 
minority at a price of no more than future inconvenience. The incidences 
of diseent in the armed forces would also appear to have been provoked 
by failures to deal with genuine and limited grievances. Many of those 
involved were satisfied with Churchill's reforms of demobilisation 
schemea and there is no evidence of the articulation of demands which 
the existing state could not have satisfied had it so wished. Troops 
did, on occasion, display and sing the 'Red flag', but the explanation 
of this offered by David Englander and James Osborne is convincing; 
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that is that it represented the use of a convenient and widely under-
stood symbol to demonstrate a grievance rather than a conversion to a 
style of politics with which the flag was associated. 29 As to the 
broadest significance of dissent in the armed forces it does seem probable 
thst the nature of ths grievances on which it was based would have tended 
to keep soldiers and sailors apart from civilians. Whatever may have 
been the later situation with the return to a professional army and 
navy it would appear that the bulk of the trouble in 1919 centred on the 
demands of tcitizent soldiers and sailors for their return to what they 
saw as the privileged status of civilians. 3D 
Kendal concludes his argument by stating: "A government which in a 
crisis, cannot rely on armed force to back its decisions is a government 
31 
which has already lost half its power." Yet while it is clear that 
there were sections of the armed forces which might have proved un-
reliable had they been deployed to deal with an internal crisis it has 
certainly not been 'demonstrated that all sections were beyond such 
uses. 32 Moreover Kendalts statement tends to imply that armed force was 
the only resource at the government's disposal. A mors illuminating 
epithet might be that a government which relies for its existence on its 
ability to immediately coerce dissent is a government which is already 
in deep trouble. Kendal tends to underestimate the political resources 
at the disposal of the government and consequently its ability to con-
tain, deflect or simply live with the sort of dissent which might 
deetabilise a different type of state. His case howaver is given greater 
credence by the fact that tha government of the day was also disposed to 
take a similarly narrow view of its resources. While the post-war period 
offers evidence of dissent and unrest there are also signs of continuity 
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and stability. However it is analysed the 1918 general election 
represented a formidable victory for conventional politics. The fact 
that the Labour Party gained twenty-two per cent of the popular vote as 
compared to seven per cent at the previous general election might have 
upset a few conservatives but evidence freely available at the time 
indicated that there was no cause for panic. Labour was comfortably set 
on the road to becoming the second party and while this might complicate 
the processes of accumulating and defending wealth and privilege it 
offered no immediate prospect of their termination. Labour's progress 
would take place within the rules of the game. In any case Labour's 
electoral and parliamentary rise could be reassuringly set within a 
pattern of gradual change. 
It is also important to take account of the military victory itself. 
John Stevenson, for example, has argued that the boost to the self 
, 
confidence of the ruling elite that this represented was still a recog-
33 
nisable factor in the politics of the 1930s. Moreover it was not just 
the victory but the way in which it was achievsd that sssmsd to confirm 
and consolidats an impression of stability. In the domestic sphere the 
government had made few concessions to balance their considerable demands 
and on the military side, while it would be wrong to ignore, ths lsvsl 
of punishments thought necessary to keep the armies in the field it was 
undoubtedly the case that the British armies had exhibited far lower 
levels of unrest than comparable forces. 34 
In the end much of the disagreement over 1919 might be seen as a reflec-
tion of different theoretical epproaches to etability as it is disagrse-
ments about fact. Conflicts in this area are inevitable as the question 
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of how order is maintained in a political society is a fundamental one. 
Political scientists heve suggested a number of ways to explain stebility~5 
Political culture, the nature and speed or economic development, political 
institutions have all been tried and, in their various ways found wanting. 
A central difficulty with most of such studiea is that they are better at 
illustrating the circumstancea of stability or instability rather than at 
identifying causes. By means of a comprehensive study of the comparative 
development of political societies Barrington Moore has gone beyond this 
and offered a thorough and convincing explanation of the historical back-
ground of contrasting degrees of stability yet for the present purpoee 
this is only of limited use in that it offers little aesistance in relat-
ing long term social and economic development to questions of immediate 
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political activity. francis Castles has suggested a means whereby both 
the factors identified by the political scientists and longer term deve-
37 lopments might all be made to serve some purpose. Castles argues that 
a model of stability must include two sets of variables. It should 
include not only relevant aspects of social, economic and political orga-
nisation but also some analysis of the beliefs and expectations of the 
various political actors. Thus Castles suggests a political society may 
be defined as stable, "if changes in the nature of social organisation 
38 
are in accord with the dominant image of society". The attraction is 
that this allows for the influence of longer term factors as well as 
defining a field for short term action. Political leaders are not merely 
at the mercy of circumstance. Even when faced with rapid social or 
economic change they may maintain their position by reatructuring the 
expectations of other political actors. The analytical emphasis is thus 
broadened to include a consideration of the state's ability to accommo-
date to change; to manoeuvre, to offer concessions, to persuade and to 
mobilise. 
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This perspective suggests a way in which the strongly conflicting views 
of the political situation in Britain in 1919 might at least be related 
to some common framework. Those who have seen the period only in terms 
of continuity and stability might be seen to have underestimated the 
degree of political adaptation that was necessary to contain pressures 
for change while those who see only dangers might have neglected the 
flexibility of the political system. Thus the Webbs, for example, may 
have been justified in emphasising the importance of the "whip of 
starvation" in the development of industrial capitalism and correct in 
arguing that its application by the structures of the Poor Law Amendment 
Act was incompatible with formal political democracy, yet they were 
clearly, if understandably, mistaken in failing to see that a system of 
relative destitution could be developed to serve the same purpose. The 
growth of the trade unions and the development of the Labour Party un-
doubtedly presented difficulties but it was surely not beyond the capa-
bility of the state to adapt to contain them. In one important sense 
such developments could bs seen as contributing to stability in that by 
providing channels for protest and dissent they minimised the possibility 
of violent outbursts. 
Thus there is a marked tendency in those who see 1919 as the year of revo-
lutionary opportunity to underestimate ability of the state to adapt to 
meet the new circumstances of the post-war world. That this capacity 
existed is strongly supported in Charles Maier's sttidy of post-war Europe 
when he demonstrates that other states achieved a successful restructur-
ing in far less favourable circumetances than those which existed in 
39 Britain. Nonetheless there is still some justification for those who 
viewed the British state as petrified and vulnerable in that a majority 
of the Cabinet of the day were strongly predisposed to the same view. 
97 
They too failed to appreciate the traditional strengths and the broad 
base of the system they nominally controlled. They too demonstrated an 
inability to distinguish between a point of departure and a last ditch. 
At a time when flexibility and imaginstion were required leading poli-
ticians fell victim to what one observer described as "a kind of fatal 
spirit"~O It was, in the end, the British Cabinet which, by this 
atrophy, by the failure to meet essentially political demands with 
political measurss, sustained the spectre of mvolution. The Duke of 
Northumberland caught the spirit of the establishment in arguing: "We 
are now faced with precisely the same position in regard to Labour as 
that with which we were faced before this war with regard to Germany.,,41 
As late as November 13, 1918, Lloyd George had anticipated and actually 
welcomed the new spirit and rising expectations, providing they were 
amenable to 'wise direction,42 but he eoon changed his mind. The Times 
was soon deriding those "many amiable and kindly souls", who had 
"pictured the after war condition of the country as a sort of Utopia".43 
Under pressure from circumstancas, no doubt exacerbated by his Cabinet, 
Lloyd George quickly forgot his earlier notion that social reform could 
provide a cheap insurance againet revolution. The plans of the Ministry 
of Raconstruction were largely forgotten, new ideas for industrial rela-
tions such as the National Industrial Conference never received the 
necessary support and such measures of reform as did seep through, such 
as the Unemployment Insurance Act bore the merks of expediency rather 
than 'wise direction'. The Cabinet viewed the post-war unrest in such a 
way that ameliorative measures were seen ae irrelevant. The forty hours' 
strike in Glasgow wae regarded by the Scottish Secretary as a 'Bolshevik 
uprising'. and the Cabinet assumed that the unrest in the engineering 
trades was the work of Russian agents •. The 'Timee', followed the lead 
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of the Government and described the engineers on strike in Belfast 
and Glasgow as "the unconscious instruments of a planned campaign 
drawn up by 'intellectuals' in the background who desire to emulate 
Lenin and Trotsky ••• "44 The claim for a forty hour week was dis-
missed as a mere pretext; the only consequence of granting such a 
claim would, argued the 'Times' be a demand for a thirty hour week. 
Evidence of the real nature of the dispute was ignored as was Thomas 
Jones' view that the strike movement itself had much to do with a 
"mutiny of the rank and file against the old established leaders".45 
A similar outlook informed the Cabinet's analysis of all labour 
matters. The campaign for the nationalisation of the mines was 
regarded as subversive as were attempts to use the power of the Labour 
movement to influence certain political decisions. Labour unrest was 
assumed to be the product of Bolshevik inspired manipulators rather 
than legitimate grievances, so it was inevitable that the Cabinet 
should turn to repression rather than reform. Russia, as the source 
of propaganda, was to be isolated and the considerable reeources of 
the state were devoted to identifying, and where possible imprisoning, 
or deporting, those who were assumed to be causing the trouble. How-
ever while few people seem to have had any difficulty in expounding 
on the dangers and follies of Bolshevism, nobody had any clear idea 
of what it actually was. At one point the Duke of Northumberland 
announced to an anxious world that it was "a German plot to re-establish 
German military supremacy by undermining the strength of the a11ies".46 
He was clear that the Labour Party was "carrying out Lenin's pro-
gramme of world revolution" and that the demand for nationalisation 
was merely "a certain phase of a great game played by the ememies of 
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47 this country" but his analysis lost some of its coherence, though 
none of its vehemence, in the matter of whether the Labour leeders 
were victims of Russian or of German gold and their precise connsction 
with the Jlnternational Jew'. A 'Times' correepondent attempted to 
clarify matters by suggesting that the Bolshevik lesders were bent 
on using their "clear logical Jewish brains" to undermine christ-
48 ianity. The 'Times' followed the activities of agents with interest 
and in february 1919 reported Soermus the Bolshevik propagandist who 
attracted a crowd by playing a violin, badly according to the corres-
pondent, had been arrested as had a Russian Jsw from Manchester. 
Other propagandists were reported to be dreesing up as soldiers. 
Most were thought to be of foreign origin and were, on occasion, 
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referred to as 'nocturnal agents '. 
Official reports from Russia increased the mood of panic without 
adding much in the way of analysis. The quotation from 'Krasnaya 
Ga%eta' sent by one agent; "Without mercy, without sparing, we will 
kill our enemies in scores of hundreds. Let them be thousands; let 
them drown themselves in their own blood . . • let there be floods 
·50 
of blood of the bourgeois - more blood as much as possibls", was 
scarcely calculated to reassure, nor was the communication from 
General Poole that "commisariats of free love hava been established 
in several towns, and respectable women flogged for refusing to 
51 yield". Theee reports kept returning to the antibourgeois theme, 
for instance the quotation from the journal of the Extraordinary 
Commiseion for combating counter revolution, "We are no longer waging 
war against separate individuals, we are exterminating the bourgeoisie 
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as a class". Bolshevism was evidently connected with starvation, 
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typhus, influenza, syphilis, the nationalisation of women and the 
eating of horse flesh. Some suspected it had all been got up by the 
Germans, others blamed the Jews. There was also the belief that 
Bolshevism was merely nihilistic; concerned only with the dsstruction 
of all organised forms of social and economic life. In all this there 
was little to explain how such a doctrine could catch on in Russia 
let alone exercise any appeal anywhere else. 
To those who rushed to define and defeat Bolshevism in Britain such 
matters scarcely merited consideration. No consideration was given 
to the idea that the unpleasant situation in Russia had somathing to 
do with past and existing circumstances of that country. Revolutions 
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wers effected by "well organised conspiracies" and moved independently 
of the mass of the population. Bolshevism to some was almost an 
abstraction so independent was it of other social and political 
factors. Dr Hagberg Wright, self-appointed expert on Bolshevism, 
saw it as a disease and offered a 'temperature chart' to indicate 
its progress in Britain;4 Sir Basil Thomson took up the medical image 
Bolshevism was "a sort of infectious disesse, spreading rapidly, but 
insidiously, until like a cancer it sats away the fabric of society, 
and the patient ceasee to even wish for his own recovery • • • a 
nation attacked by it, if we may judge from the state of Russia, will 
be reduced to a political and social morass • • • civilisation crumbles 
away and the country returns to its original barbarism,,~5 All the 
experts agreed that all Europe was in danger of contracting this 
disease, "unless proper measures (were) taken to isolate the source 
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of infection". Yet Hagberg Wright warned that Bolshevism was also 
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"a home grown product" and added cryptically that it had been "known 
for meny years in this country under another label":7 
The difficulties of identifying Bolshevism proved no deterrent to 
those who wished to oppose it. The correspondence columns of the 
middle clese newspapers contained many helpful suggeetions and theories 
and many organisations were set up to counteract the menace. On 
rebruary 10 1919 Brigadier General Pege Croft, MP ennounced the for-
metion of the 'Leegue ageinst Bolshevism', "To protect all law 
abiding subjects and oppose Bolshevist methods, objects and effects,,:B 
rounder members included Prebendary Gough, Leo Maxse and Havelock 
Wilson. Sir Edgar ~ones, MP formed the Welsh Democratic League so 
that Bolshevism should be opposed in the principality;9and such 
luminariee as Ryder Haggard and Rudyard Kipling were attracted to 
the service of the 'Liberty League' in its opposition to nthe 
Bolshevist peril".60Among the plethora of organisations arming them-
selves against the mysterious menace of Bolshevism were the Recon-
struction Society, the British Empire Association, the National 
Political League, the Middle Class Union, Comrades of the Great War 
and the Women's ~eague of Empire. Canon Burroughs of Hertford 
College, Oxford, felt secular measures and repression while desirable 
were inadequate on their own; "military measures by themselves would 
be only lancing one abscess • . . whereas the Bolshevik bacillus is 
already in the blood of the whole world". Burroughs recommended a 
'National Christian Crusade': mwe must find a stronger, kinder 
bacillus to fight ,it in the very veins of the world's spiritual life,,~1 
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There are a number of factors which might begin to explain this 
descent into pessimism. At one level it soon became clear that the 
coming of peace would make the practical buainess of domestic govern-
ment a good deal mor~ difficult. The War itself hed provided the 
Government with its most potent sanctions against labour dissidence, 
and while much of the machinery of regulation survived the Armistice 
the popular mood which had allowed it to function at all effectively 
did not. The Cabinet must also have been aware that its difficulties 
would be exacerbated by those high expectations of the peace which 
they themselves had fosterad as an element of policy during the war. 
Such hopes were widely acknowledged. The 'Times' argued, "Our people 
would be made of strange stuff, if after four years of war. 
they were content to come back and settle down as if nothing had 
62 happened". It soon became apparent that there was neither the com-
petence nor the political will to implement the ambitious schemes of 
the Ministry of Reconstruction. The material factors which had under-
pinned the growth of state power; the Government's roles as a dominant 
major customer of industry, as a user of facilities and as guarantor 
of basic supplies, would inevitably decline. Yet the process was acce-
lerated by politicians, comfortable again in their old prejudices. 
Within Whitehall, Treasury control began to stifle administrative 
innovation. 
In accounting for the panic it is also important to attempt to recreate 
the intellectual outlook of those who SUffered from it. Whilst, with 
hindeight, it seems obvioue that the political and economic system 
which the Cabinet were committed to defending could survive with eeee 
the reforms which the Labour Movement were demanding; even the 
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coming of a Labour Government} this was not accepted then. There is 
much evidence to suggest that many Conservativ~ politicians saw 
nationalisation as striking at the very root of everything they were 
in politics to defend. They ected like men in the 'last ditch' because 
that is where they felt they were. 
However the question remains as to why the Cabinet were predisposed 
to inflexibility and how they came to believe that they had no compe-
tence to deal politically with the difficulties that faced them. 
Underneath many statements there may have been an element of guilt; 
a recognition of the huge human cost of the war and of the promises 
of the war years which would inevitably remain unfulfilled. Yet this 
still fails to account for the anticipation of social disintegration. 
Any explanation must take into account the broader psychological 
impact of the Great War. While it is impossible to offer any precise 
. 
interpretation of the impact of casualty figures no account could 
fail to taka account of the individual grief of the millions of 
relatives of the dead nor the broken minds and bodies of so many of 
the survivors. In addition there is the broader impact of mass killing, 
the sffect of living through a period when all previous expectations 
of life, views of human society, and sven human nature itself, were 
turned upside down. It is in this mental context that we must set 
resctions to the considerable changes in inuustrial, political and 
social life. It has been argued with some plausibility that the impact 
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of the war was merely to accelerate changes which were already underway. 
Yet such explanations fail to take account of how the psychological 
impact of such changes was intensified by the way that wer accelerated 
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the speed of change, by the way that it concentrated the processes, 
and, above all, by the way in which new proceeses and institutions 
becama associated with the terrible novelty of modern war. Inevitably 
there can be no instant assimifation of such changee, no rational 
working out of what is sltered and what remaine. If the tone of much 
social and political thinking of the period is apocalyptical it must 
be viewed in the ,context of a mental world when plain material arguments 
about inherent stability and the inevitability of continuity might have 
appeared so out of place as to be sacrilegious. The fashion for idea-
lising the past, and the recourse to myth to interpret the unpalatable 
present can be seen as part of a process of accommodation. It was 
not confined to Conservatives, often inclined to find decay in all 
change, for Beatrice Webb too, recorded-tne "depressed and distrected 
air of the strange medley of soldiers and civilians who throng the 
thoroughfaree of the capital of a victorious empire", and speculated 
as to whether Western civilisation would "flara' up in the flames of 
anarchic rebellion". Her instinctive reaction to the nsw aga was 
similar to that of many Conservatives: "The Bolsheviks grin at us 
from a ruined Russia and their creed, like the plague of influenza 
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seems to be spreading westward from one country to another." In a 
civilisation accommodating itself to the collapse of Russia and of 
Central Europe and the domestic problems of the post-war worl~ prophets 
of doom and decay were at a premium. One popular myth which simplified 
the comclexities of the new world was that of the paesing of an old 
order. Masterman spun the web more sxpertly than most. He wrote of 
a feudal system defeated by stringent taxation, death in battle and 
estate duties: "The old generation passes with its children: the 
best of these children dead, the very type of its method of life, 
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maintained for so long, vanished forever." 65 A 'Times' correspondent 
introduced the same note into a lament on the high volume of land 
sales which, he argued, had already destroyed the traditional pattern 
of rural life. He cautioned the new owners to accept their social 
responsibilities but with more than a hint to the inevitability of 
their failure: "Only let them beware of committing the unpardonable 
crime of not appreciating the wonderful treasure they have acquired. 
Let them really lLve in the old house for the greater part of the year, 
fit up the old nurseries (with all modern improvements if they will) 
but see to it that they are duly occupied by a troop of healthy happy 
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children." While it is difficult to precisely define the social 
organisation of the country existing before 1914 it was clearly many 
decades, if not centuries, removed from these feudal idylls. Moreover 
it was quite misleading to attribute the decline in fortune of rural 
Britain to the war alone. Ryder Haggard provided a detailed analysis 
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of that decline which began well before 1914. Land sales on this 
scale were similarly no novelty. There had been heavy selling between 
1910 and 1913 and the war brought merely an interruption. The motiva-
tions for such sales may also have been a good deal less romantic than 
these contemporary accounts suggest. Instead of this picture of an 
impoverished gentry wrenched rrom ~l1e land by death duties and the 
deaths of heirs there is evidence to suggest that many salee may have 
been occasioned by a most 'unfeudal' desire to maximise return on 
capital by getting out of land and into more profitable and less trouble-
68 
some investments. 
As with all good myths, "the passing of the old order" was not entirely 
unrelated to the situation it purported to describe. It offered a ro-
manticised picture of a part of society and implied its applicability 
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to the whole. What was in reality a period of acceleratad change in a 
long pattern of transition became, to the 'Times', "a social turnover 
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which has changed the statua of classes and their relat~onlt. Few seem 
to have bothered to make any attempt to"relate rural images to the pre-
dominantly urban and industrial reality. The Prime Minister himself 
suffered several bouts of agrarian romanticism and the moet potent 
accounts of the war, which enjoyed their widest circulation in the post 
war years, represented Britain as a series of rural images. Flanders 
mud is contrasted to the peace and greenness of the English countryside, 
officers are Pfox-hunting men'and bereavement itself is seen as Itbugles 
calling from sad shires". The world of the cities, of factory based 
production and the lives of the ur?sn workshop found no place in this 
myth making. One account did at least acknowledge its existence but 
it specifically set the new world in permanent conflict with the 'old 
order'. The 'Times' anonymous expert on revolution resurrected that 
most useful vehicle for myths of various sorts, the two nations theory, 
and adjusted it to the circumstances of the times?O an the one side 
was the 'Labour nation', within the national community but o~ing only 
marginal allegiance to it. It consisted of the organised workers,-
apparently largely employed by the state in the manufacture of war 
supplies. They were supposedly well fed, well educated and conscious 
of the power they could wield. Against them were sst 'Old England': 
the propertied classes, the learned professions, trading and agricul-
tural interests and those wage earners in industries not taken over by 
the state. All social ideologies of the time tended to be structured 
on the basis of who had, or who had not, done well out of the war, so 
here it was, inevitably the 'Labour nation' whose "burdens had been 
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comparatively light" and 'Old England' which had borne the brunt of 
the sacrifice. The factual inaccuraciee of this account are, to a 
large extent, obvious. The point about high weges is quite simply 
wrong and the notion that industrial Britain failed to supply human 
material for the war a cruel travesty. However as a record of a col-
lective state of mind the account may have something to recommend it. 
A significant section of the governing elite did enter the post-war 
world with the belief that a considerable section of the population was 
beyond their authority. Events in Russia were separated from their 
context and whipped up into a myth of Bolshevism as an epidemic. The 
appeals of revolution and ravolt were not seen as being in any way 
related to factors which might be affected by retional political action. 
Revolution was "A ferment of formless aspirstions, a hydra of a hundred 
discontents, its method is destruction, its god is anarchy". Events 
in domestic politics were also seen through the distorting lens of 
fear. Labour attempts to exert influence were sean as attempted 
insurrections, alternative explanations were dismissed out of hand 
and notions of responding to unrest with ameliorative measures rejactad 
as, almost, treasonable. If the developed state machine of the war 
years was not to be turned to the tasks of social reform it was still 
to playa prominent, if more traditional, role in the maintenance of 
order. The Government looked to this enhanced state machine to ensure 
that the power of organised labour should not be used to exert any 
significant influence over domestic policy. Similarly they looked to 
an enhanced Special Branch to investigate and frustrate the plots of 
the subversives. Thus the Cabinet entered the post-war world in a mood 
of deep pessimism convinced that their only available course was to 
10B 
confront organised labour. The measures which they undertook would 
inevitably produce reactions which would only tend to confirm their 
initial gloomy diagnosis. 
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Scctland House: 
Organisation and Methods 
Given the prevailing attitudes of the Cabinet to the political and 
industrial unrest of the post war months, it was perhaps inevitable 
that Basil Thomson should be retained as head of surveillance and 
that his department should be continued and strengthened. This pro-
vides an illustration of the predominating view of the social unrest, 
and the decision guaranteed that the police view, inevitably biased 
towards certain analyses and prescriptions, would be in'stitutionally 
msintained at the centrs of future deliberations. 
In order to appreciate the implicstions of the decision it is useful 
at this stage to examine some central aspects of the history and ethos 
of the Special Branch. It had been formed in the 1880's as a section 
of Scotland Yard's Criminal Investigation Department specifically to 
countersct the activitiss of Irish terrorists. In addition to inves-
tigative functions the Branch was also charged with the protection of 
those who were judged prominent enough to attract the attention of 
assassins. While it retained its interests in Irish ectivities'the 
Branch's brief was broadened to include other fringe political acti-
vists, commonly labelled within the Branch as "anarchists". 
Celebritiee as diverse as ~aletasta and Leain were investigated and 
included within this category. This unsophisticated terminology 
provides an insight into the nature of the Special Branch. They 
were in many respects a 'political police' yet they had none of those 
analytical abilities which latsr came to attach themselves to this 
concept. They made few political distinctions but merely watched 
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and harassed unconventional political figures. Most of their 'clients' 
in the period before the rirst World War appear to have been of foreign 
origin and to have enjoyed little support in domestic politics. This 
inevitably simplified the work of the Branch. In addition to being 
politically isolated the 'politicals' appear to have been geogra-
phically concentrated in the East End of London, the solid core of 
them being composed of Russians, meinly Jews, who had fled from 
Russia after the attempted revolution of 1905. Later popular stereo-
types of Bolsheviks had much to do with this, and the Special Branch 
analysis was heavily conditioned by these early experiences. The 
style is well captured by H Tritch who in commenting on one object 
of his attention argued, "his life showed that curious natural fero-
city against all authority and system which has been the hallmark of 
other notable Jews such as Lenin and Trotskyn. 72 
Memoirs of Special Branch Officers bear an unmistakable air of cloak 
and dagger. The officers clearly entsred what they regarded as an 
underworld of conspiracy with some enjoyment. One officer recalled 
how in the course of his attempt to obtain documentary evidence as 
to the intentions of a group of Ruesian Social Democrats he had hidden 
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in a cupboard and then masqueraded as a waiter. Another officer, no 
stranger to the world of Bulldog Drummond, recalled his sorties into 
the nAnarchist Clubn, in Jubilee Street, where it was apparently 
possible to nmix with the veritable scum of the earthn or to meet 
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nregicides of the deepest dyen. This contains, perhaps, a hint of 
mutual dependencs. Certainly the officers seemed disinclined to view 
their clients' 'villany" in the more prosaic light of political 
analysis. They preferred biologicsl explanations, and not very 
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precise ones at that; thus Brust on Stephen Titus: "The virus of 
anarchy which had long poisoned his brain, was working to a head, 
and all the murderous instincts in the man surged into full flood. n 
Subversive politics and conventional criminality were, in the end, 
part and parcel of the same thing: "Time and again, during my 
detective investigations, I found anarchy and ordinary crime mingled 
" 75 
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~ilitant suffragettes proved an, understandably, unwelcome intrusion 
into the world of the Special Branch when they were added to the case 
load, but the outbreak of war quickly restored the old drama and 
sense of importance. Even normal protection duties could be seen in 
a new light: "Night and day, secret guns, aircraft and submarines 
are watched and guarded: an impenetrable, unavoidable circle is in-
visibly drawn around vital political discussions, facts of which might 
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set the world on fire." The War considerably broadened the functions 
of the Branch. Thomson noted that after 1914, nit was maid of all 
work to every public office • • • from the regulation of carrier 
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pigeons to investigating the strange behaviour of a Swiss waitern. 
The Swiss waiter, inevitably turned out to be a spy of the Central 
Powers. Spiss formsd a large part of tha concerns of the Branch 
during the War. Brust rscalled, in his second attempt at autobio-
graphy, "it was Sir Basil (Thomson) who, at the outbreak of war, 
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turned crack detectives into spy catchersn• The work wae admirably 
suited to the Branch. The world of ~ata Hari enabled them to indulge 
their histrionic impulses to the full and, in this, they were ably 
lsd by their Director. Ths work might be seen as being of the highest 
importance, it"guaranteed excitement but above all, one suspects, it 
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was apolitical and straightforward. Where their work with suffra-
gettes was sensitive their new tasks returned them to the old order 
of a closed activity with the minimum of external complications. It 
was to this organisation, in the midst of its war intensified heroics, 
that Carson had persuaded the cabinet to entrust the matter of the 
surveillance of domestic political unrest. 
Inevitably the Special Branch treated its new clients in the way it 
had been treating existing ones. The utility of its perceptions ·and 
recommendations would be restricted because of the limited analyses 
which its officers had become accustomed to applying. In respect of 
the analyses of domestic unrest two critical omiseions would be esti-
mations of general political support 'agitators' might attract and 
the extent to which unrest was rooted in identifiable circumstances. 
The Special Branch viewed all unrest ae cri.,..inal and regarded agitators 
as being driven by criminal, or otherwise venal, motivations. On 
pacifist societies, Fitch commented: nSome few of them were honest, 
but the majority of them were in receipt of anarchist gold and were 
79 
working for anarchist ends. n Of the men he arrested at the un-
official ASE conference atWalworth: nIt was a striking comment on 
these men that all but one of them were of military age, though in 
that hour of national need they were still to be found at home. nBO 
Fitch's moral outrage was not tempered by any knowledge of the 
Government's manpower policy. Thorneon himself, when first given his 
new task set out on a search for 'German gold' and anarchist conspi-
racies and it is to his credit that he came to put together a mora 
ered1ble account of unrest than that which Carson might have antici-
pated. 
11 :3 
Even if it were to be argued that the use of the Special Branch in 
wartime was a reasonable expendient)the coming of peace must surely 
be viewed as an opportunity to instigate something more sophisticated. 
While, in wartime, it might prove possible to deal with even quite 
widespread dissent as if it were criminal, the political consequences 
of doing so in peacetime could clearly be far more extensive. Never-
thelees the post-war coalition Cabinet took the earliest opportunity 
of strengthening the position of the Special Branch, confirming the 
role of Thomson, and extending his brief to include rationalisation 
of surveillance. Carson again led the way by complaining in Cabinet 
on January 22 1919 that, "no concertsd action was being taken by the 
various departments with regard to combating Bolshevism in this 
country". Thomson recalled that the wartime muddle continued and 
that he was specifically entrusted with the task of rationalising the 
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various faei~itie~ which existed. But why should the Cabinet have 
felt that these functions, which they clearly regarded es crucial 
should remain with Thomeon and the Special Branch? 
If social proximity to the ruling elite is considered an advantage in 
a defender of existing order then Thomeon was supremely qualified for 
his appointment. He was the second son of an Archbishop of York, and 
his mother claimed social connections with both Gladstone and Disraeli 
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and had attracted a biographer for a somewhat unremarkable life. 
Thomson was educated at Eton and' Ballio~ leaving the latter institution 
after two terms, in horror, he later recalled at the prospect of a 
clerkship in the Civil Service. On leaving Balliol Thomson had 
Joined the Colonial Service and in an eventful six years had encountered 
Baden Powell and governed Tonga as its Prime Minister.83 Illness 
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forced him to retire from the Colonial Service in 1893, and between 
then and 1896 he pursued his studies for the Bar, to which he was 
admitted in the latter year. During these three years he also found 
time for a friendship with Lord Northcliffe, a period as guardian to 
two Siamese princes, and the commencement of a prolific literary 
career. In the context of an activ~ life his literary output must 
appear remarkable. Between 1894 and 1939 Thomson publishsd twsnty-
nine full length books as well as contributing a large number of 
articles to newspapers and periodicals. His output included auto-
biography, travellers tales and detective fiction, to which genre 
he is still judged to have made a considerable contribution. 
In 1896 Thomson joined the Prison Service and wae gazetted deputy-
governor of Walton prison. He later served in NertRampton a~d 
Dartmoor prisons. Thsss experiences led Thomson to literary specu-
lation on the subject of criminals. What emerged is the then con-
ventional view of criminals as a class apart, to be relentlessly 
pursued and punished yet regarded with detachment and even, to a 
limited extent, afforded a measure of respect. Certainly Thomson had 
a good deal more sympathy for criminals than for his later political 
quarries. The flavour of the distinction is captured in the plea of 
a Dartmoor Prison Officer which Thomson quoted with approval. The 
officer called on Thomson during the war to ask him to use his 
. influence "to get the good old convicts back. I tell you these 
conchies are a disgrace to the place • • • long-haired, idle young 
men wandering about a reapectable village with their arme around eech 
other's necks. It makes ua sick to look at themn.84 Evidently ae 
late as 1937 Thomeon felt little need to rescue conscientious 
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objectors from crude slander or to raise them to the moral lavel of 
'·good old convicts'. 
During his prison service Thomson had hie first contact with political 
disaenters, for when he was promoted to Secretary of the Prison 
Commission it fell to him to investigate complaints of suffragette 
prisoners. In June 1913, Thomson traneferred from the prieon service 
to Scotland Yard and the Criminal Investigstion Department. Here his 
duties included the surveillance and arrest of spies, in which function 
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he gained a considerable reputation. The spies attracted great 
admiration from Thomson; Lody, a German spy executed in 1914, draws 
the greatest accolade that Thomson could bestow: "He died as one 
would wish all Englishmen to die - quickly and undramatically, sup-
86 ported by the proud consciousness of having done his duty." It was, 
however, another aspect of his work at Scotland Yard that was to have 
most bearing on his future appointment for at this time he also ran 
an Irish Service, concerned with the surveillance of Irish political 
agitators in Britain. 
Thomeon's first contact with labour came in 1916 when he was 
invited by the ~inistry of ~unitions to undartake its intelligence 
work. His brief was to rationalise an existing service which had 
become chaotic with the rapid expansion of the Ministry. 
In a number of senses, then, Thomson must have appeared as a natural 
choice for the work demanded by Carson in 1917 and for the continuation 
of that work in 1919. Thomson's weakness, it might be plausibly 
argued, was a predisposition to simplify both problems and solutions 
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and to reduce political diseent to simple, albeit morally abhorrent, 
criminality. Yet such matters were unlikely to appear as deficiencies 
to the men who appointed Thomson. If his advice now seems heavily 
compromised by his stern and simplistic attitudes to working claas 
political activ.ity this is unlikely to have been aeen as a drewback 
by that Cabinet. If he was inclined to view Bolshevism as an infection 
at one moment and an 'international Jewish movement,,87at another he 
was doing no more than retailing establishment conventional wisdoms. 
88 If he saw the 40 hours' strike in Glasgow aa 'a Bolshevist uprising' 
he was only conferring an opinion which the Scottish Secretary had 
previoualy expressed in Cabinet. If Thomson was to produce an analysis 
of the left wing movement which veered towards the conspiratorial 
and to constantly advocate additional repressive measures he was 
reflecting Cabinet opinion quite as much as he was shaping it. In 
selecting Thomson and the Special Branch for this task the Cabinet 
were ensuring that they got only the advics they wanted, even if it 
is possible to argue that this was not the advice that might have 
been necessary for the wisest decisions. 
Attempts to rationalise surveillance services during the war evidently 
failed. Carson was pressing for co-ordinated action in January 1919 89 
and Thomson later recalled that, "until six months after the Armistice 
there were several independent organisations for furnishing infor-
mation";O Some measures of reorganisation were later achieved. rrom 
May 1st 1919 Thomson acted as Director of Intelligence and the 
operations of his staff were centralised in Scotland House. His 
reports to-Cabinet were made weekly rather than fortnightly. It also 
emerged from a number of sources that at this time he developed a 
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recognised role as adviser on labour and subversive politics, often 
attending the relevant Departmental and Cabinet Committees. Thomson 
was able to develop a close, and amiable, working relationship with 
the Home Secretary, Edward Shortt.91 
Thomson recorded the rumours which inevitably came to surround his 
Department. It comprised, he wrote, "A most admirable and efficient 
little etaff ••• organised at very low cost to the country. The 
revolutionary press tried to spread the belief among its readers that 
enormous sums were being lavished, that I went about with bulging 
pockets corrupting honest working men; whereas, in fsct, all the most 
useful and trustworthy information was furnished gratuitously and the 
corruption was all on the other side".92 If we take first this question 
of size it should prove possible to test his claims. It is as well 
to note at the beginning that the Home Office went to some pains to 
conceal the activities of the Special Branch, and one example will 
illustrate this. In August 1921,MrGilbert, a Member of Parliament who 
took a close and informed interest in Home Office business asked the 
Home Secretary whether any Chief Officers had recently been appointed 
to the Oetective Branch and what the size of that Branch was. Shortt 
replied that no additional Chief Officers had been appointed to "the 
Detective Branch of the Metropolitan Police" and that the current 
strength of the Branch as a whole was 758 men~3This seems straight-
forward enough, yet from the Departmental Minute it becomes clear 
that the Home Secretary was briefed to answer in such a way as to 
svoid revealing informetion about the size of the Special Branch. He 
wae advised to use "the term Detective Branch as meaning the CIO and 
excluding the Special Branch". 94 This might imply some change had 
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taken place at this time; yet it indicates, beyond doubt, a high 
degree of sensitivity on the subject. On another occassion a 
parliamentary request for information was met by a suggestion, from 
the Home Secretary, that the snquirer should consult the Civil Service 
Estimates. Howevsr, as the Home Secretary obviously knew, the Secret 
Service vote was not presented in a revealing way. The description 
of the vote: "to defray the charge of His Majesty's foreign and 
other secret services" clearly precludes the revelation of any useful 
detail. The vote under this head for 1918-19 was one million pounda, 
and for 1919-20, £200,000. The latter figure was, during the course 
of 1919 doubled by a supplementary eatimate. 9S The fluctuation, because 
of its sheer size and its coming at the end of the war, was almost 
certainly substantially connected with foreign intelligence. 
A Home Office Minute of June 1920 givea the best, and cleareat infor-
mation about the size of the Special Branch during these years, and 
on this basis a picture of Thomson's organisation can be constructsd. 
His authorised establishment in 1920 was one detective superintendent, 
one detective chief inspector, twenty-two detective inspectors, sixty-
four detective sergeants and forty-eight detective constables. That 
the functions of this staff comprised both the gathering of information 
and its systematic storage might be deduced from the fact that at 
least two of the inspectors were known as Registrars of Special Recorde. 96 
The maximum authorised wage bill was in the region of £40,000 per 
annum. 
This establishment seems more than the Ladmirable and efficient little 
staff~ofThomson's account, while leas than that suggest ad by several 
radicals. However several qualifications need to be made concerning 
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this information. In the first place it must be asked whether all 
these men were involved in the business of political surveillance? 
It would appear likely that a good proportion were involved in duties 
. 
unrelated or only indirectly related to this work. Available infor-
mation also gives us no indication of the fluctuations in the size 
of the Special Branch. Without this it is impossible to indicate how 
the new political function, acquired in 1916, routinised in 1919, 
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affected these numbers. Thomson's I'staff 1 , directly engaged in poli-
tical surveillance may well have comprised but a section of this 
overall number. There are other problems connected with the assessment 
of the size of this staff. During the war, for instance, several 
members of the Special Branch had been seconded for work with other 
government departments. At least one detective inspector served 
with Naval Intelligence, twelve sergeants with the Ministry of Munitions 
and seventeen other officers with Army Intelligence in France. No 
doubt these were returned to more conventional duties during 1919. 
Also at this time there was an attempt in Scotland Yard to employ 
civilian clerks for duties hitherto performed by police officers. 
If this change had been applied within the Special Branch it would 
have effectively increased the strength of the Branch without affect-
ing the establishment figures. A furthe~ problem in assessing ths 
size of the force engaged in the political police function relatee to 
the question of how far ordinary regional forces were engaged in such 
work. It is clear from the reports prepared by Thomson and his 
successor that the work of the Special Branch was supplemented by 
other police forces. Chief Constables submitted to the Director of 
Intelligence periodical reports of left wing activity in their regions. 
Much of this information was of a type that indicates that it was 
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readily, and publicly available: numbers attending meetings, marches 
and the like. Other information was gathered by cre shorthand writers 
who attended meetings, sometimes with the purpose of gathering infor-
mation with a view to the prosecution of the speakers. Clandestine 
information from the regions was usually supplied, by 'correspondents', 
directly to Thomson, presumably by men who were under his direct 
command. However it was misleading for Thomson to imply that it was 
only his 'efficient little staff' which wae involved in political work. 
Just as Thomson claimed that his opponents' estimates of the size of 
his establishment were exaggerated, so he felt were their suspicions 
as to his methods. As noted above he claimed that his best information 
was fresly offsred. "The great art of acquiring information" he 
wrots, "is to have friends in every grade of society and in as many 
countries as possible". He claimed too, with only limited plausi-
bility, that he.had friends who were communists who gave him information 
because they "disapproved very strongly of the way in which the move-
ment was being exploited,,~8 While it is perhape better to be sceptical 
of such accounts, which were possibly attempts to create a mystique 
of the omnipresent ineider, it must still be clear that a great deal 
of useful information, could be, and was, gathered by straightforward 
routine methode. The personalities of the labour movement transacted 
much of their business, and many of their disputes, in public and much 
of Thomson's 'inside information' could be gained by the mundane 
e~edienceof reading the socialist press. In addition the nationwide 
police forces sent in a constant stream of detail about strikes, 
pickets, marches and all other forms of activity. As he claimed, 
there is evidence that Thomson did interview left wingers. Kenworthy, 
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~alone and Lansbury are all recorded as having been interviewed, yet 
it may be doubted whether such occasions were the friendly events of 
Thomson's account. 
Police shorthand writers bscame such an established feature of socialist 
meetings that speakers frequently made reference to them. Thomson 
recorded many such comments. Lansbury, in warning the Government 
that it was dangerous to arm reservists used in strikes "es they might 
use them in a way not intended by the Government", added with some 
bravedo, that "if the CIO man was present he hoped he would make a 
note of that".gg Usually the recognition of shorthand writers led to 
hostile comment, as when a Labour Alderman in Birmingham "challenged 
a local detective to take down a speech in shorthand and alleged that 
convictions based upon notes ••• were 'caricatures of British 
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'
". This comment illustrates the pOint that the purpose of 
shorthand notee was not restricted to the intelligence function. A 
large percentage of the numerous convictions in the post war years 
were for incitement to unlawful assembly, or for incitement to mutiny, 
and such cases necessitated accurate notes. One organisation, in 
particular, presented the police with severe difficulties in respect· 
of note taking. Members of the outlawed National Union of Police and 
Prison Officers quickly recognised former colleagues and reacted 
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emphatically. 
The more serious claims against the Special Branch concerned the use 
of secret agents and agents provocateur. John ~aclean was the most 
prolific in such accuaatione. Thomson felt that Maclean used such 
ideas to his own advantage in that, "when asked a question he cannot 
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answer he accuses the questioner of being a police spy". Thomson 
claimed a certain type of political agitator had agents provocateur 
'on the brain'. Certainly ~aclean was liberal in his accusations 
and, as Thomson recorded, at the SSP's annual conference in 1920 
"made charges against the leaders of being police spies and cited tha 
money spent on young Rothstein's education at Salliol and hinted that 
hs was an agsnt provocateur of the Government ".103 It appears to have 
become a fairly common tactic in revolutionary circles to denounce 
opponents as agents of the Government. Thomson recorded these 
rumours. Sylvia Pankhurst came under suspicion: "There are whispers 
that she may be in league with the authoritiesll;10~ T ~urphy was 
"denounced as a paid agent of this office,,;10~nd Colonel ~alone became 
both user and victim of the practice:06 At one point the CPGS was 
moved to suspend recruitment for 3 months107 
In the midst of this it is difficult to separate truth from fiction. A 
number of the accusations may have contained a small element of truth. 
On one occasion, when charges were pending against Colonel Malone, 
Thomson recorded, "Yesterday his solicitor called to say that Malone 
was very much averse to going to prison and would be prepared to give 
a verbal undertaking to exercise a restraining influence on the Commu-
i t il 108 n s s • Thomson claimed that the offer was rejected. In the case 
of J T Murphy, Thomson stated, "Murphy has never been paid by this office, 
though he was reporting for, and being paid by an unofficial employers 
agency during the '·'ar".109 H Th Id t h t h Id w ere omson wou appear 0 avs go 0 
of one of the most persistent rumours. His source was probably articlee 
written by Murphy which appeared in the 'Daily Herald' of August 13 and 
August 14, 1919. In these, and later in his autobiography Murphy 
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explained that he had been approached by a "Mr Brown" in Sheffield who 
had offered him five pounds a week for information on left wing indus-
trial activities. He had not repudiated the offer as he wished to 
expose "Mr Brown" and those behind him. 110 In view of Murphy's dedicated 
political career, the hardships he endured and even the manner of his 
eventual estrangement from official 111 communism it sesms more than 
improbable that Thomson's statement could be true. There is one case 
however where it does appear that an activist was paid for information. 
A London activist, W F Watson, prominent in the Londer Workers' 
Committee, "Hands off Russia", the People's Russian Information Bureau, 
and editor of "The Masses", became so compromised in the eyes of his 
colleagues by his contacts with the police that he was moved to publish 
his own account of the events. Watson recorded that he had been 
approached with a view to selling information on a number of occasions 
but that his first clear contact with Scotland Yard was during June 
1918. His contact asked "Do you know of any German gold knocking 
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around Mr Watson?" Watson records that he believed that this was a 
subterfuge. That Watson mentions a search for "German gold" and the 
fact that he believed it to be a cover for other interests argues 
powerfully for the veracity of at least this part of his story, for it 
is known from other sources that it was precisely this task which 
Carson had set Thomson at this time. Thus Watson, seeing little harm 
in the adventure agreed to meet his contact again. At this and sub-
sequent meetings the Special Branch Officer invited Watson to work for 
him, offering him three pounds a week and asking for information about 
the "undercurrents of the movement". In particular he wanted details 
of the People's Russian Information Bureau and was especially inter-
ested in finding out where Bolshevist propaganda was coming from and 
124 
in particular the "Appeal to the Toiling Masses". This part of Watson's 
story also tallies exactly with what is known of the interests of 
Scotland House at this time. Watson claimed that he took the money but 
sent in only "fictitious reports", but led his contact to believe that 
he was endeavouring to get the information he most wanted. However 
while all this was going on Watson was approached quite independently 
by the secretary of "Mr Z" also of Scotland Yard. He was taken to see 
"Mr Z", "a very urbane, soft spoken gentleman", (possibly Basil Thomson 
himself?) and offered three pounds a week and two pounds expenses to 
send information. Watson claimed that he obliged by sending a carbon 
copy of the report he was already submitting to his first contact. How-
ever after a few weeks the two apparently compared notes. His first 
contact declared that Watson had "made him the laughing stock of Scotland 
Yard" and threatened that Watson "would never get on a public platform 
again".113 Watson was arrested on 14 February 1919 under the Defence 
of the Realm Act for a speech which he had made at a 'Hands Off Russia' 
meeting at the Albert Hall on 7 February. On 22 March he was sentenced 
to six months' imprisonment. Robert Young raised the Watson case in 
the House of Commons on 12 July 1919 asking the Home Secretary, Edward 
Shortt, how many others had been offered positions such as that accepted 
by Watson. Shortt replied that the police never offered such appoint-
ments but conceded that payments had been made to Watson which he 
regarded as a normal "criminal" procedure, especially in the circumatances 
of war. 114 Young raised the matter again on 24 July asking the Home 
Secretary what kind of assistance W F Watson had rendered to the police. 
Shortt replied that "Watson gave information from time to time about 
breachees of the law actually committed or planned, such as fomenting 
strikes in munitions works, incitements to disorder etc, and was paid 
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small sums in respect of each piece of information found to be of value 
to the pol iceu.115 Watson by now in the middle of a storm of accusation . ,. -
from his former associates, believed that Young had placed this eecond 
question with the object of discrediting him, though Young denied this. 
On 12 August 1919 J H Thomas blundered into the case. Thomas' ever 
present sense of his own heroism had been stimulated by the case. Watson 
he ~ecalled had "persistently followed me about allover the country 
during the last three years of the war denouncing me in my meetings 
As Watson was now revealed as a government agent Thomas felt he 
had suffered persecution at the hands of the state. Shortt gave what 
was by now his familiar reply that Watson had "volunteered certain pieces 
of definite information and when that information was found to be accurate 
and acted upon he was paid for it".117 Thomson made no reference to the 
incident in his reports although he must have known about it,but a few 
months later he did record, without comment, that on his release from 
Pentonville, Watson had "been accused by the London Workers' Committee 
" 118 of being a government spy • 
While it is impossible to say with any certainty which account, if 
either, is true, it would appear to be the case that Watson's story has 
more to commend it. Some of those who knew Watson came down in his 
favour; the 'Workers Oreadnaught' supported him as did ex Inspector 
Syme, who as an ex CIO man probably knew more than most. Evidence from 
the available reports suggeats that Scotland House did operats a systsm 
of correspondents which would not have been possible if Shortt's state-
ment about polics methods hed been true. Thomson's reticence about ths 
case also tends to support Watson's version rather than Shortt's. In 
addition it is' clear that it is only Watson's account which offers a 
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convincing explanation of his eventual prosecution. If Watson had been 
offering useful information why should the Government have him arrested 
and then destroy any future use he might have. Finally it must be con-
ceded that the Home Office version of the case seems far-fetched on 
psychological grounds. W F Watson was, after all a well respected and 
prominent figure in the unofficial movement. To rise to such a position 
in the circumstances of wartime Britain inevitably required some firm 
sense of purpose and a willingness to sacrifice immediate personal com-
forts. While it is just possible that such a man could be trained to act 
as an agent for the other side it seems highly improbable that he would 
betray his cause and his comrades for the occasional ad hoc payment. 
Watson undoubtedly acted unwisely, though the temptations to play along 
the Special Branch must have been great, and while he apparently did 
tell some of his friends a little of what was going on he would have done 
better to keep them thoroughly informed. 
These cases clearly add something to the picture of the Special Branch. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, they reveal an organisation considerably less 
smooth and efficient than its Director pretended. Watson felt the left 
overestimated the intelligence of the CID men. He argued that they were 
often clumsy, largely ignorant of the nature and strength of the socialist 
movement and frequently inept, as when they failed to intercept a Soviet 
envoy, even though he had it stamped in his passport. Other know inci-
dents such as when CID men were discovered hiding in a cupboard at a 
radical meeting would tend to support Watson's view. 
Watson claimed that Thomson's orgsnisation made no approach to other 
London Worksrs' Committee members until his contact with them ceased and 
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on this and other grounds it seems to have been the case that Scotland 
House sought to gain one "correspondent" in each organisation in which 
they were interested. These cases would indicate that Thomsonts weekly 
reports should be treated with some caution. He clearly seized on the 
flimsiest allegation about Murphy and retained it as hard fact. In this 
matter Thomson was victim of his ideology, in that he held the view that 
revolutionaries as a class tended to be driven by venal motives. This 
view, apparent at other points in his r9ports and writings, led him to 
seize on such insubstantial allegations. The Watson case also indicates 
that while it seems unlikely that Thomson would put material into the 
reports which he knew to be untrue, he did not reveal there everything 
he knew. In such matters as the use of agents it is therefore ae well 
to bear in mind that the fact that a practice is not mentioned does not 
mean, necessarily, that it was not employed. 
The term police agent in this connection contains a multitude of sins, 
and in order to make sense of the reality of police activity it is 
essential to subdivide the term. The Nosivitsky case provides an 
interesting starting point. Noeivitsky was a courier for the 
Comintern who, when arrested by Scotland Yard, was persuaded to 
undertake clandestine work against his former employers. Through 
Nosivitsky Thomson was able to glean much ussful information about 
the Scandanavian link between RUssia and Western Europe. He wae 
able to discover, among other things, that Rothstein was the chief 
Comintern representative in Britain, and"obtain details about fin-
, 
ancial transactions. rurthermors Nosivitsky seems to have been 
largely responsible for the successful arreet of Veldtheim (alias 
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Zacharissen). Thus Scotland Yard might count themselves fortunate 
to have recruited so useful an 'agent'. The general points to emerge 
are that Nosivitsky was initially a genuine member of the organisation 
he served and that he was persuaded to change sides, primarily, 
under threat of some sanctions which Scotland Yard could, quite 
legitimately have brought to bear. Malone, we have seen, apparently 
offered a degree of co-operation under such circumstances. Clearly 
such 'agents' must be separated from those who enter an organisation 
with the specific and sole intention of providing information for 
the police. Agents like this are far more common than the Noeivitsky 
type. Agents again must be separated on the grounds of what they do 
when within an organisation. There are those who seek only information 
and others who, while providing information, also seek to move that 
organisation in a certain direction. This type of agent may again be 
subdivided. Those who seek to persuade others along lines directly 
favourable to their employers and others, the most sinister of all, 
the ideal type, agents provocateurs, who specifically set out to 
persuade their fellow members to commit offences for which they can 
be arrested. 
tor the latter category, the agent provocateur proper, there exists no 
evidence for this period. It seems in a sense unlikely that such agents 
would have besn used, for such activities would appear to have been un-
necessary, let alone impolitic, but the absence of evidence cannot be 
taken as proving anything. for the agent who attempts to move an orga-
nisation along lines directly favourable to the Government there is some 
tentative support. Malone's offer to do something like this was rejected 
but Thomson did report that on one occasion whsn a resolution favourable to 
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industrial unionism"was brought forward at the Vale of Leven and Renton 
branch of the AEU my correspondent arranged that rejection was moved on 
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the grounds that that policy was I'another move to smesh Trade Unionsim'." 
The circumatances of the incident suggest that the 'agent' here was not 
a professional and that he was working on his own initiative yet it 
rsmains that he felt he was serving the state in his secret manner 
and waa so encouraged by the Director of Intelligence. The line 
between obtaining information and influencing an organisation is 
necessarily a fine one. In order to gain admission an 'agent' must 
take part in the affairs of that organisation and as such must take 
part in its decision making. Thomson's reports tend to suggest that 
the bulk of such work was concerned with information alone, and while 
on grounds of general reason this seems likely to have been the case, 
his vagueness about the relationships existing between his agents and 
their organisations leaves room for doubts. 
Much of the evidence in the Reports is inevitably scanty. Thomson 
revealed an 'inside source' in the National Union of Ex-Servicemen. 
The source was sufficiently inconspicuous to receive five shillings 
'unexpectedly' when money was distributed to the members: 20 This man 
was on terms of trust with a Sergeant Major Leatherhead who had been 
nominated as President of the Union. The Sergeant Major had apparantly 
confided to Thomson's 'correspondent' that "the Union was determined 
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to obtain its demands by fair means or foul". The available infor-
mation gave no indication whether the 'correspondent' was a genuine 
member of the organisation, prepared for some reason or other to 
aesist the Special Branch, or whether he was a policeman, or police 
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agant, who had joined for the exprees purpose of securing confidential 
information. In a new organisation such as this Union with its loose 
structure either expedient would have been possible. Some 
'correspondents' are clearly amateur. for instance Thomson's man on 
the Herald: "According to a usually trustworthy source, ~r Lansbury 
has accepted £10,000 from the Khaufat Oelegation, in return for a 
promise to support their cause"~22 No professional agent could be 
'usually trustworthy'. Thomson's references to his sources give 
some indication of their type but are rarely conclusive; for example, 
P-a woman who is in close touch with the Women's Peace Crusade', fa 
working man correspondent', tan unconfirmed report from Birmingham",23 
It is clear, however, that more 'correspondents' were able to conceal 
their true affiliations. That "the leaders of the No Conscription 
fellowship" should tell a correspondent ttthat there would shortly be 
a revolution in England" and warn him "to get in plenty of food as 
it would be difficult to obtain,, 12ts indicatiVe of a degree of mis-
placed trust. The excellent cover of one agent is indicated by the 
following extract: "Communist speeches throughout the country show 
great similarity and this fact is due to the issue of leaflets from 
King Street; a batch of the latest leaflet entitled 'Capitalism or 
Communism - which will you fight for'?" was sent to Leicester and 
125... handed to my correspondent for distribution". .he numerous references 
to Leicester and the volume of detailed information is striking: 
"In Leicester several communists are now making a living by selling 
chocolate at 10P per lb. The chocolate is manufactured by the 
Waretta Chocolate Co, Barton, USA, and is forwarded to Leicester from 
London. The secretary of ona of tha local extremist organisations 
recently had four tons at his home." 12~he detail and the frequency 
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of reports from Leicester must indicate an assiduous agent at the 
heart of left wing politics in the area. Information from Coventry 
also indicates a similar situation there. 
Thomson implied that his 'correspondents' secured the confidence of 
prominent radicals: "One of my correspondents who has bean in close 
touch with W Paul sends the following report of an interview between 
127 Lenin and Paul". Harry Quelch too seems to havs been mistaken in 
his choice of confidant; "Quelch admitted in conversation that his 
party would have been practically non-existent during the past few 
months if it had not been for the Russian Bolshevik money disbursed 
by Rothstein,,~2B One 'correspondent' was claimed to be sufficiently 
in the confidence of Tom ~ann to obtain information "known only to 
thrae persons in the country,,:29 Sylvia Pankhurst's activities and 
ideas were reported in minute detail,13~nd the 'correspondent' in 
touch with the 'Herald' could produce a constant streem of information, 
much of it intimate and trivial.131 General Childs, Thomson's successor 
as Director of Intelligence, in his autobiography, claimed that he 
had never managed to place an agent at the heart of the Communist 
Perty. Whether this was true or not neither Director appears to have 
had any great difficulty in keeping in touch with Communist Party 
affairs. Accurecy and detail and such extracts as, "one of my corres-
pondents has obtained temporary possession of some notes belonging 
to an important member of the Communist Party executive,, 132indicate 
that the suspension of membership recruitment during 1921 was no 
unwise decision. 
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'Correspondents' did not apparently restrict their activities to 
fringe political groups. In February 1919 Thomson reported Arthur 
Hendarson as "being much disappointed at the failure of the Conference 
~3~ in Berne but he says that he cannot confess it publicly"; and simi-
larly in September, "An interesting statement was made by Mr Henderson 
at a private conference of the Parliamentary Committee to which my 
correspondent gained admission,,!34 'Correspondents' were on good 
terma with some Trade Union leaders: '~he measure of communist effort 
in this connection may be gauged from the fact that though Herbert 
Smith has privately expressed great pleasure at tha removal of revo-
lutionary obstructionists from his own area, he was forced to protest 
againet the prosecutions ••• "13~t was probably no more than 
routine that a 'correspondent' should attend a Triple Alliance 
Conference in July 1919, even though it did take place "behind closed 
doors,,:36 While there seems to be no reason, for reasons amplified 
later, to question the general reliability of Thomson's reports, his 
method of obtaining information could be questioned. Though it must 
be the case that some of his 'correspondents' actually did make the 
contacts they claimed it is possible that Thomson dressed up some 
information obtained from mundane sources to increass the appearance 
of competence of his organisation. 
The older traditions of the Special Branch were not entirsly forgotten 
and some unconventional espionsge took place. Officers amted as 
waiteps at a private lunch in Gatti's Restaurant, attended by Ramsay 
137 Macdonald and George Lansbury. On another occasion officsrs were 
discovered in a cupboard at a meeting of the Communist Party. 
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The opening of private mail proved a less dramatic, though far more 
useful source of intelligence. The extent of the practice is diffi-
cult to estimate with accuracy, though the fact that it was extenaively 
practised is beyond doubt. Even if the number of warrants issued to 
sanction the practice of letter opening were known for this period 
the true extent of the business would still remain a mystery for 
then, as now, it was permiseible for several persons to be named a 
single warrant. Thomson was careful not to reveal too much in his 
reports though there is sUfficient evidence on which to draw some 
tentative conclusions. Under the conventions of British government 
there are a variety of rules which apply to different catagorias of 
mail. Foreign mail is, in crude terms, treated as fair game, while 
the opening of internal mail is done with a dagree of circumspection. 
Under the provisions of DORA all foreign cable~ were recorded and 
their contents made available to Scotland Yard. This practice was 
deemed sufficiently· necessary for national security that the Cabinet 
devoted some time to the discussion of a proposal in July 1919 that 
the practice be curtailed. In spite of "preasure from bUsinesa 
interests" complaining about the delays antailed by such censorship 
there were many in the Cabinet who were reluctant to give up the 
device. Eventually the censors gave way, but only when it had been 
explained to them that the Home Secretary had sufficient powers of 
intervention in any case. The detail of the case is interesting as 
it gives a good illustration of the sort of powers British governments 
have sought to obtain for themselves. The Law Officers" opinion was, 
"when, in the opinion of the Secretary of State an emergency has 
arisen in which it ie expedient for the public service that the 
Government should have control over the transmiseion of messages by 
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the company's Telegraphs he may under Section 52 of the Telegraph 
Act 1863 (26 a: 27 Vic c112) by lIIarrant (inter alia) direct and autho-
rise such persons as he thinks fit to assume control of the trans-
mission of msssagss". In responss to a question as to IIIhether the 
pOlller 1II0uld be exercised in. 'normal times' the Lalli Officers replied 
thet the Secretary of State Illes et perfect liberty to designate an 
emergency at any time he chose. Moreover, "In our opinion the dis-
cretion of the Secretary of State is abeolute. That is to say that 
it could not be questioned in a 138 court of lew". The use of such 
powers after the official censorship was ended is indicated by 
Thomson's use of cable IIIhich Robert Williams sent to New YorkJ39 
Thomson certainly used the official censorship IIIhile it lIIas in being, 
for example; "From a number of censored letters from Glasgolll to the 
USA it appears that there is active revolutionary feeling in the 
different shops":40 Yet the cessetion of official censorship brought 
no apparent change in the volume of information Thomson lIIas able to 
obtain from the mail. Evidence in the reports cleerly suggests that 
all prominent communists and those associating lIIith them had their 
letters opened regularly. The reports make· specific reference for 
instance to letters from Kime to oingley~41from Watkins to Campbell~42 
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from Meynell to Macmanus, from Malone to Inkpin. Letters from Page 
145 146 Arnott and Sam Mainwaring are used as sources lIIithout mention of 
recipient. Much of Sylvia Pankhurst's correspondence found its way 
into police files. On one occasion Thomson quoted the fears shs had 
expressed to Phillip Price that the Soviet Union lIIas moving tOlllards 
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capitalism. Her statement to 'a friend in Glasgow'; "1 expect 
148 rsvo~ution soon, don't you?" might just conceivably be considersd 
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useful intelligence though a great deal of the material from her letters 
seems of little general interest. Maybe Thomson overestimated her 
importance because of his earlier contacts with the militant suffra-
gettea or it could be that inertia within the organisation meant that 
letters continued to be recorded even when the individual concerned 
was no longer prominent •. Thomson clearly did make some mistakes. 
Both Commander Kenworthy and Lt Col Malone surely attracted more 
interest than they strictly deserved. Thomson's interest in Kenworthy 
extended to speculation as to his influence over the Hull Junior 
Liberals. Maybe he was drawn to these men because as MP's and 
officers they might, in Thomson's view at least, be expected to offer 
'leadership' to the left wing movement. In practice though Thomson's 
resources were great enough to accommodate such aberrations for if he 
occasionally followed the insignificant, the letters of those at the 
heart of the movement received his full attention. rrom the confi-
dential nature of the material which they sent through the public 
posts it seems likely that many communists were, initially, unaware 
of the incidence of this technique of surveillance. Pollitt, for 
instance, in 1921, wrote of his doubts about Russia and his feeling that 
( ) 149 "there was something terrible going on behind the scenes". The corres-
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pondence of the Manchester business manager of the Oaily Herald was opened 
as was the private mail of the editor~51 That E 0 Morel should have had 
his mail opened is perhaps explained by his activities during the war. 
Charles Trevelyan and Ramsay Macdonald had their letters openad, tha 
latter again perhaps because of wartims activitias, yet the laat 
rscorded incidence waa as late as November 1919. Much trads union 
business was watched through the mails and Thomeon's analyses of 
union politics were assisted by such material as letters from the 
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Secretary of the NUR, and one from Cramp. The latter is interesting 
because Thomson makes it quite clear thet he regerded Cramp ae a 
'moderate'. Within the organisation there was no pretence that the 
practice of letter opening was restricted to subversives or revo-
lutionaries. 
The methods of surveillance, outlined above, were occasionally supple-
mented by raids on the offices of left wing organisations, yet such 
reids wers not primarily conceived of as means of gaining informetion. 
The main purpose of raids and arrests wes to disrupt organisations 
and the seizure of records was meant to assist in this. Thomson 
clesrly saw raids in this light: "Much of the present unrest is due 
to the activity of the Communist Party. The arrest of Albert Inkpin 
and Robert Stewart and the search of Headquarters have, however, 
somewhat checked its activity for the moment.,,15~ raid on the 
Manchester Headquarters of the Red International of Labour Unions 
cams at ths end of two months' comment on the gathering strength of 
that organisation. Information gained from such raids was regarded 
as a bonus and it tended only to confirm what was known already: "A 
number of interesting documents were seized and these bear out in 
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every respect the information already given in my reports." Thomson 
would inevit~bly claim this yet the evidence of his reports and the 
quoted documents show that this was substantially the case. If there 
was one particular advantage in information gained from raids it was 
that material so obtained could be used for propaganda purposes with-
out provoking awkwerd questione as to its origins, yet the two raids 
of May 1921 were obviously primarily motivated by the desire to mini-
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miss the effectiveness of the communists during a period of acute 
industrial unrest, just es later raids and arrests in 1925 sought 
to remove communists from circulation during the Genersl Strike. 
trom the above it is clear that the business of intelligence was 
carried on in a relatively efficient, if unimaginative way. Thomson's 
organisation was neither as innocent, nor as competent as he himself 
claimed, yet it didn't seem to rely on venality to the extent claimed 
by his opponents. While, from the Government's point of view, it wae 
convenient that some of the methods used should remain secret, it 
seems unlikely that they would have provoked general public opposition 
had they become public knowledge; certainly in so far as they were 
applied to self proclaimed revolutionaries. The area of contsntion 
would inevitably have been the secret surveillance of non-revolutionary 
labour organisations. Yet the fact that such work was done can in 
no sense be seen as intelligence personnel stepping beyond lines laid 
down by their political chiefs. If such activity is judged to be 
morally illegitimate or politically foolish the blame must attach 
itself to the Cabinet rather than to Thomson. Also if it is claimed 
that the objects of surveillance were ill chosen and excessive amounts 
of time devoted to unimportant detail this cannot be laid exclusively 
at Thomson's door. Such errors stem from a failure to develop a 
coherent theory of subversive activity and in this respect Thomson 
was no worse than his political mentors. 
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Scotland House: 
.Revolution: Its Diagnosis and its Remedy 
Thomson's attempts to define the 'Bolshevik menace' wera never parti-
cularly impressive. At one point he confided to the Cabinet, "An 
exact translation of the word 'Bolshevik' is, I am told, an 'out and 
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outer'". He later claimed, "there is ••• evidence to show that 
Bolshevism is fast becoming an international Jewish movement " 157 . . . 
and he frequently had recourse to the imagery of disease and contagion 
in which Bolshevism could be seen as "a cancer which eats away the 
heart of society":58 He advised the Cabinet that the reason Britain 
had not been affected was "owing not only to the good sense of the 
people and the stability of their institutions but rather to the diffi-
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culty of sending propagandists while the blockade continued". 
Bolsheviks were "a tiny dsstructive minority" who could "~reak havoc 
•• in a civilised community that takes no thought for self-protection". 
There is no discussion of the circumetances which might facilitate 
their activities and Thomson gave no credence to Bolshevism as an 
alternative political system. On one occasion he argued that it was 
not to be found in Ireland "except in so far as lawlessness" could 
be regarded as such. Bolshevism was merely the product of fertile 
enthusiasms of a group of deranged and impractical intellectuals. 
Its appeal was not based on any credibility it might have as an 
explanation of existing societiee or as a model for a future one, but 
rather on its ability to prey on the lemming-like, anarchic passions 
which might seize populatione from time to time. The only available 
solution was to isolate Soviet Russia; to ensure that anyone who 
broke through the blockade was sent back, and to prosecute and punish 
any British national who attempted to spread the doctrine. 
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Thomson's view was no more extreme or exaggereted than thet of the 
Cabinet he wae advising. Indeed there is eome evidence to the effect 
that by the beginning of 1920 Thomson had achieved a more balanced 
view of the situation than most of the politicians. Hankey cited 
Thomson as one of the saner voices on the subject of industrial unrest;60 
Yet the more moderate counsels which Thomson advanced represented no 
softening of his attitudss towards the Soviet Union or the prophets 
of revolution. To Thomeon they never became anything more than freaks or 
'queer peoplet;61What did alter was his ability to separate out the 
reformers from the 'Bolsheviks', and his perceptions of the ability 
of the British people to resist the temptations of·~narch~'. 
In the earlier reports Thomson showed that he found it difficult to 
understand the world of labour politics and, in particular, to view 
in any realistic perspective the turbulence of the immediate postwar 
period. The Labour Party itself, he viewed in a highly equivocal 
light: if it was not the cancer outright it did at least represent an 
avenue through which Bolshevism might triumph. The fact that the 
Labour Party was the official opposition did not exempt its leaders 
from Thomson's attentions. He later claimed that his Department des-
troyed such recorde when a Labour Government came to power, lest tha 
curiosity of ministers should lead them to ask to see their personal 
files. 
Thomson carefully surveyed the whole field of Labour activity. He 
watched the preparations for tha municipal elections and warned the 
Cabinet that there "was talk of making borough councils Soviets".162 
They should not regard Labour efforts to elect councillors as evidence 
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of a conversion to constitutional action as such activity was merely 
seen, "as a means to an end Labour leaders have realised that 
revolution is doomed unless it is accompanied by a quick re-organisation 
of the means of transport and supply. They are now fully alive to the 
f 11 f · . 1 " 16~. d' t u scope 0 mun~c~pa power. ~e was even r~ven 0 psephological 
speculations: discharged soldiers, he argued, were supporting Labour 
"not so much out of sympathy with the Labour Party but as a protest 
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against the housing situation and high prices". Labour's success in 
the elections found Thomson a little more sanguine, but still suspicious: 
"As a means of educating Labour candidates in responsibility ths 
election of Labour majorities may prove a good thing: the danger lies 
in the fact that so many of the elected men and women are secret ely 
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pledged to smash the whole machine of capitalism". Thomson appears 
to have watched even the day to day activities of the new Labour 
councils. Bermondsey councillors, he informed the Cabinet, were liable 
to incur a supplementary rate of five shillings and sixpence while the 
new council in Glasgow had voted to approach the Government with a 
view to fixing work for the unemployed: 69He noted that even after their 
victories Party activists continued to put in work in the constituencies 
and warned that they ~ere often the only party getting across any 
propaganda. However, of the new councillors, Thomson recorded with 
a degree of surprise: "many of them appear to be quite sensible and 
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moderate". Vat there was little cause for complacency for in his 
summary of the year 1919 he commented: "The numbsr of British born 
persons who desire a revolution is apparently stationary . . . but 
the number who want a revolution by constitutional means is certainly 
increasing, and among them are those who are licking their lips at 
the idea of obtaining control of the Navy, Army and Polics Forces 
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through Parliament as instruments for overturning the present social 
. t' "168 organ~sa ~on • 
If the Labour Party was, at best, suspect, the ILP was clearly beyond 
the pale. The ILP's record during the War had much to do with Thomson's 
attitude here: he had reported that "the ILP are pacifist to a man". 
If the ILP was not actually bolshevist, that doctrine was "affecting 
the Party to a considerable extent". Apparently the Party indulged 
in the same type of clandestine subversion; "I am informed that 
several young artificers, mechanics and shipwrights, who have 
recently joined the Navy are in the pay of the ILP and have Joined 
with a view to spreading unrest in the service":69The laconic note, 
"The ILP has found t~me in other activities for the dismemberment of 
Empire" 1J~milarlY illustrates Thomson's attitude to the Party. He made 
more of the fact that the ILP debated affiliation to the Third Inter-
national than of the outcome of the debate. Thomson's problem here 
was perhaps that he failed to distinguish between political possibility 
and party rhetoric. Inevitably he assumed too much about the Party 
because of their hostility to institutions, which were dear to him, 
for instance the Empire and the Services. 
Thomson's early approach to the trade union movement followed a 
similar pattern. Certainly he felt entitled to survey and report 
on the day to day activities of trade union officials irrespective 
of their political commitment. In the postwar world, he noted, many 
of those leaders in whom he felt most confidence were losing their 
standing: Tillett and Thorne were under attack, and Havelock Wilson 
had become "a joke"~71 He cited an editorial in the Journal of the 
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United Society of Boilermakers as "a sign of the times"; "The 
whole editoriel is purely political and has nothing to do with the 
172 
affairs of the union". He later complained that the ASLEf Journal 
"devotee several pages to matter quite unconnected with the union". 173 
Thomson attempted to use men he regarded as key figures and use their 
activities, and popular reaction to them as indications of popular 
feeling. Thus it was, "a good sign that Mr J H Thomas was able to 
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hold his own at a meeting of the Nine Elme Branch", though such an 
approach had its own difficulties; Thomson had earlisr noted that even 
Mr.Thomas·had been, on occasion forced to don the apparel of subversive-
ness in order to retain his place. He was aware, at least in some 
of the more obvioue cases that appearance wss not everything. Report-
ing Henderson's rather uncharacteristic remarks to the effect thst it 
was doubtful whether full political libsrty could bs achisved without 
a violent convulsion of society, he commsnted, "Mr Henderson is rather 
easily affected by opposition and his mind may have been unconsciously 
affected by popular demonstration againat him at the Women's Trade 
Unionists meeting at Glasgow ••• " 175 
While some of the weaknesses of Thomson's analysis may be explained by 
his lack of sympathy with the structures and attitudes of the post-war 
labour movement they must also be seen in the light of his understand-
ing of the system he felt himself to be defending. Thomson discounted 
the possibility of any change in capitalism. Capital was too sensitive 
to accommodate even the changes which the labour moderatee were now 
demanding. The rigidity of Thomson's visw is well illustrated by his 
attitude to propaganda: "The great need at the moment if for instruc-
tion and unfortunately the only agency is the Labour colleges, which 
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are imparting instruction in false economics".17~homson's plea is 
always for instruction rather than propaganda; his opponents ara not 
aeen ae dealing in alternatives but in falsehoods. His attitude to 
unemployment was considerably influenced by this extreme orthodoxy. 
On unemployment: "The problem is unfortunately insoluble for it is 
177 brought about by worldwide conditions over which we have no control." 
The alleviation of the effects of unemployment was equally beyond the 
scopa of government; charity was admissible but attempts by Labour 
Party guardians to increase rates of relief were caetigated aa 
'ruinous extravagance'. Relief he noted "amounts to more in many 
cases than would be earned by unskilled labour and its demoralising 
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effect needs no emphasis". Thomson was so moved by the issue that he 
suggested, in a rsport to Cabinet, that ratepayers should bs encouraged 
to take action. 
Thomson was never clear what impact unem~loyment was liable to have 
on political stability. Initially he welcomed it; "Unskilled 
workers are beginning to realise that their places can be taken by 
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unemployed men". Yet a vocal section of the unemployed refused to 
accept that the problem was beyond the competence of the government 
and by the end of 1920 Thomson was alarmed; "The real danger of the 
position is that the unemployed may be induced to act, as they did 
in Germany, on the maxim, INothing will be done for you until you 
~ftite and seize all the food shope, clothing shope, factories and 
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workhouses and convert them to your own uses'." Unemployment quickly 
became a central feature of the weekly reports with inevitably the 
main interest in attempts to organiss unemployed men. Thomson was 
particularly concerned at its effect on exservicemen and there are 
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many anticipations of "trouble among the unemployed when the weather 
becomes cold" .18~n the circumstances the decline of the official ex-
servicemen's organisations was not to be lamented: "much ae this is 
to be regretted from some points of view, it is better than the present 
tendency to absorb revolutionary doctrines,,~82 
By the Autumn of 1921 unemployment was judged sufficiently important 
to merit a special report. In it Thomson presented estimates of unem-
ployment broken down by region and the rates of relief being paid by 
guardians. He also offered an estimate of the state of feeling in 
the larger cities: "It is estimated that after deducting the number 
of men who have participated in more than one meeting about 85,000 
unemployed have demonstrated during the last week. Serious as this 
183 total is it yet amounts to lese than 6% of the wholly unemployed." 
Yet communist agitators were "moving rapidly from city to city and 
such 'undesirables' as Mrs Thring, "a woman of loose habits", Were 
i . 18~ turning their attent on to the ~saue. The reports leave the impression 
that while Thomson felt that unemployment represented a danger, he 
was never certain what this danger was; whether it was a fear of 
limited riDting and disorder or whether unemployment would provide an 
opportunity for the revolutionaries. Such confusions led Thomson 
on a number of occasions to spend a great deal of time on apparently 
unimportant individuals: sx-Lisutenant Nicholson wae a case in point. 
In January 1920 Nicholson was reported as being "dangerously active 
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in Reading", when he was preaching revolution to exservicemen. 
Later Thomson reported that he had started a Soldiers', Sailors' and 
Airmen's commune: "It is not known yet whether he has much following 
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but he seems likely to prove a very bad influence". About this time 
Nicholson made his major contribution to revolutionary theory which 
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was a sche~e to finance a 'Red Army' on the proceeds of a sweepstake 
I , 
on the Lincoln. He also attempted to set up a shooting club, "under 
187. 
a patriotic cover". In March he visited Wales but was "less revo-
lutionary than usual";8~ut later in the year there were rumours that 
189 he was dealing in small arms. He later still announced his conversion 
to a policy of assassination 1~ut this proved to be the end of his 
revolutionary career for in the Autumn he publicly renounced his part 
and declared his faith in capitalism. Nicholson undoubtedly needed 
watching yet it seems doubtful whether his wilder ambitions and the 
violence of his language justified his inclusion in a Cabinet report 
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on revolutionary activity. 
Thomson was also inclined to let himeelf be led by revolutionary symbo-
lism. He often appeared to have judged the mood of meetings on the 
basis of whether the 'Red Flag' was sung or not. The Cabinet was informed 
that an audience of around a thousand had sung the anthem at the conclusion 
of a meeting in the Free Trade Hall in Manchester in November 1919,19that 
a meeting of ILP supporters in Scotland had greeted the news of a Labour 
victory in the Spen Valley by election by singing the 'Red Flag , •193 
Commenting on a meeting to be held in the Albert Hall, Thomeon predicted 
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that both the 'Red Flag' and the 'International' would be sung. He 
also felt it worth reporting that a group of Labour councillors had 
joined in the singing of the 'Red Flag' while on a visit to France.195 
He could also draw specific conclusions for such incidents; commenting 
on a delegate meeting of the Triple Alliance he argued, "That the 'Red 
Flag' was sung shows that an undue proportion of the delegates were 
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extremists and not representativee of the bulk of labour". He also 
used such evidence in his attempte to understand the allegiences of 
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individuals: Mr Charles Trevelyan has written to Mr Phillips Price 
an alarming letter in which he mentions that he is bringing up his 
children to sing the 'Red Flag'. It is a very foolish and conceited 
197 document". It could also provide negative evidence; the fact that 
co-operators did not sing the 'Red Flag' was cited as reinforcement 
of Thomson's view of the co-operator as "a cautious person and an 
advocate of practical socialism without disorderly revolution". 
Islington Town Council though was clearly a black spot, for its members 
i ° th th t to 198 T were reported as s ng~ng e an em a mee ~ngs and horns on expresaed 
much concern at the news of a Reserve Naval Batallion at Newport 
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"singing the 'Red Flag' and cheering". Some encouragement was, no 
200 doubt, to be drawn from a report of a red flag being torn up, and 
the fact that a group of men in Edmonton, attempting to fly a red flag; 
had come under physical challenge from a group advocating the merits 
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of the Union Jack. Concern that a 'Red Orchestra' had been formed 
in Coventry to play the 'Red Flag' to the dole queues may seem under-
standable enough, though the extract, "a report, not yet confirmed, 
has reached me that 100,000 red flags have been mad a for distribution 
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in Barrow and Coventry", bears a tinge of panaroia. 
Thomson rarely attempted to generalise, and indeed many of the weak-
nesses of his analysis may ba seen to stem from the necessity to 
produce a raport every week. Yet he did in his report for the year 
1919 attempt lists of factors favourable and detrimental to the cause· 
of revolution. Those factors which ha felt contributed to revolu-
tionary feeling he listed in the following order: first came the 
general concern about high prices exacerbated by the bslief that 
they were caused by profiteering. Second wae the housing shortage 
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and third "class hatred" which Thomson complained was compounded by 
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"roolishostentation on the part of the well to do". rourth were the 
Labour colleges, fifth the influence of "extreme" Trade Union leaders, 
such as ~ann, Smillie, Hodges, Bromley, Hill, Williams and 
Turner. Unemployment was sixth and finally came the Labour press; 
the 'Daily Herald', the 'Worker' and Sylvia Pankhurst's 'Workers' 
Dreadnought' qualifying for special mention. Set againet this list 
was one of "steadying influences". rirst came the continuing popula-
rity of the Royal ramily, mext the popularity of sport with the 
working classes, third the poverty of the would-be revolutionaries and 
fourth the jealousy which existed between trade unionists and their 
leaders. rifth was the ill-feeling which existed between demobilised 
soldiers and "the shirkers" and the finel influence for good was the 
increaee in the amount of money being handled by the working classes. 
Thomson's grasp of the issues at this level is made to appear somewhat 
shaky by his inclusion of a graph purporting to demonstrate fluctu-
ations in revolutionary feeling for the year, where no attempt is made 
to explain on what basis such "feeling" had been quantified. It is 
probable that Thomson lifted the graph from the "researches" of 
Dr Hagberg Wright, . one of that considerable body of experts with 
special insight into problems of revolution~°4rhe graph and the lists 
reveal Thomson's lack of any realistic model of revolutionary activity 
but they do contain some insights. The attachment to the ~onarchy 
and its surrounding paraphernalia was obviously the other side of the 
coin to his concern with the symbolism of revolution. The beneficial 
influence of monarchy was not merely a matter for contemplation for 
the activities of the Royal ramily were seen as a part of a continuous 
battle for the minds of the working classes. Royal visits were 
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watched in minute detail and policemen stationed in the crowds to 
make estimations of reactions. These were collected by Thomson and 
formed the basis of his estimation of the "loyalty" of particular 
cities. The fact that crowds for a visit to Sheffield in May 1919 
were "generally rather apathetic and uninterested" while those in 
Birmingham had been more appreciative was cited as evidence that 
"Sheffield was less loyal than Birmingham";OS A visit to Leicester 
later that summer proved to be "an unqualified success". That the 
Town Clerk's speech had been nearly.inaudible while the King's hed 
been distinctly heard had "provoked many approving comments on this 
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contrast". During the visit city status had been conferred on 
Leicester and this had, it was reported, "enhanced feelings of loyalty". 
Thomson's impression that extremism was making no heedway in Newcastle 
he found "confirmed by the enthusiastic welcome" which Prince Albert 
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Thomson evidently saw the Prince of Wales as the star turn. A visit 
to Wales was "a great personal triumph" in spite of attempts by extra-
mists, who evidsntly shared Thomson's view of the significance of 
such visits, to disrupt proceedings~08 A Leeds "correspondent' was 
quoted to confirm the popularity of the Prince "with the better class 
of workers": "In private conversation they speak of him as a 'sport' 
, t ' " 209A . . t to a b' t h b ht th t and a proper gen • Vl.S1. oX1.ng ma c roug e commen , 
"Yorkshiremen are sportsmen and the Prince's visit to the National 
Sporting Club the other night made a big impression in Yorkshire. 
When the Prince went to Australia Thomson made his feelings clear: 
"Hie Royal Highneeeis popularity will be as great an influence for 
. 210 
stability in Australia as it 1.S in England". That Thomson's feelings 
may have got the better of his analysis might be indicated by the 
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fact that a single report contained both the comment that a Royal 
visit to Belfast had been a singular success and indicated good 
feeling, and also that there had been fierce rioting in that city. 
Thomson clearly felt Royal visits were an active ingredient in the 
meintenance of stability and even, on occasion suggested a visit to 
a difficult area. 
The reports also include many references to the beneficial influence 
of professional sport, and in particular football. The King's visit 
to a game between ~anchester City and Liverpool was warmly welcomed; 
"The interest taken by the King in a game which is nearer the heart 
of the people of the North than any political question has done 
immense good".211 At one point Thomson used ths fact that the Communist 
Party had begun to take an interest in sport as evidence of their 
growing understanding of the psychology of "the working man,~12football 
was seen as an alternative interest to politics; as a comment on the 
relative failure of socialist propaganda he cited the fact that the 
only International working men knew of was that which took placs at 
Wembley between Scotland and England.213 In the difficult year of 1919 
he viewed the new season with considerable relief, "The approaching 
football season is already influencing the minds of workers and 
should greatly reduce the attendance at meetings"~14 He suggested on 
another occasion that a Labour" candidate's failure in an election 
might have been due to the alternative attractions of a football 
match. It wes similarly consoling that ~ay Day 1920 in Leede found 
ten thousand workers at a football match and only two thousand on a 
demonstration~1~00tball had been prominent in Thomeon's discuesions 
of the prepsrations for ~sy Day. Socialist organisers, he suggested 
150 
were worried by the rival attractions of football matches: "Unfortu-
nately no match is advertised for the Chelsea ground on May 1st. If 
an attractive match could be arranged it would blow away a great many 
people from Hyde Park":16 Sport·should be harnessed to longer term 
objectives; he feared that the shorter working day might facilitate 
the work of propagandists unless "the British workingman's love of 
sport", "the healthiest antidote to extremist teaching", could be 
t.uztn&r developed by the provision of additional facilities for 
217 playing games. 
That Britain did not fall victim to the Bolshevik plague in the post-
war period was, according to Thomson, mainly to be explained by the 
hard wen immunity from Russian propaganda. Propaganda was central 
in Thomson's analysis of politics and this is illustrated in the 
reports by his attention to all forms of socialist propaganda, his 
continuous campaign for strict legal penalties to be attached to it, 
and his recording of schemes of counter propaganda with pleas for 
official support for such efforts. 
Thomson made constant reference to socialist newspapers and pamphlets, 
and even found space to complain that William Paul had baen allowed 
to bring lantern slides back from Russia. All radical newspapers, no 
matter how miniscule their circulation were worthy of attention yet 
it was inevitably the 'Caily Herald', in these years an independent 
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socialist paper, which provoked the greatest interest and comment. 
The considerable resources of Scotland Houee were devoted to inveeti-
gating the affairs of the 'Herald' and Thomson spent a lot of time 
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speculating on the effect it had on those who read it. One 
"correspondent" offered the information that those who read the paper 
when on buses took great care that their fellow passengers should not 
identify their rsading mattsr. Another provoked alarm by suggesting 
that the 'Herald' had made working men suspicious of what they read 
in the "capitalist press". Thomson felt the paper had an immediate 
and direct effect. During the industrial actions of April 1921 he 
argued that it "must bear much of the responsibility for the action 
of the Triple Alliance. Deliberate incitement has been evident in 
several articles during the crisis and the paper is a distinct danger 
to social peace"!19On a couple of occasions Thomson was able to 
hamper the progress of the tHerald'. When he discovered that it 
was being sent, along with other newspapers, to the Army in France 
he successfully campaigned for the practice to cease. On another 
occasion he noticed that Victory Loan advertisements had been placed 
in the paper: "It is to be hoped", lectured Thomson, "that Government 
Departments will not prolong the life of this paper".220 It was his 
constant hope and expectation that the 'Her~ld' would suffer financial 
collapse but to his annoyance, it sometimes seemed to enjoy a charmed 
life: "Unfortunately the sporting correspondent had the good fortune 
to spot several winners lately". Once he was moved to suggest a 
scheme whereby it might be taken over and directed to responsible 
purposes. 
An area of propaganda which made Thomson even more uneasy than the 
newspapers wss socialist education. The post-war years abounded with 
attempts to set up socialist education groups, ranging from the sig-
nificant to the trivial and bizarre, but Thomson seems to have covered 
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thea all. The Socialist Sunday Schools ~ovement was watched with a 
closer attention than it merited, the Cabinet being informed of such 
events as when at a 'services in the Trade Hall in Leicester, four 
infants were dedicated to the International Socialist ~ovement321 A 
scheme to set up a troup of 'Red Scouts' in Thornton Heath was also 
faithfully recorded.222 Thomson appears to have felt that there was 
something especially wicked in attempting to convert children. On 
one occasion he warned that school teachers in Southern Wales had been 
giving "impromptu lessons in revolution" and his favourite legislative 
suggestion was for such socialist pedagogues to be singled out for 
• 1 . h t 223 espec1al y severe pun1s men • 
However most of Thomson's entries concerning "Education in Revolution" 
referred to adult education. He followed the activities of the Plebs 
League and reported the formation of the Central Labour College. The 
latter, he warned, had attracted applications well in excess of the 
sixty places it was initially able to offer. Its activities, he noted, 
were "to be based on the recognition of the antagonism of capital and 
labour".224 Six monthe later Thomson returned to the theme and reminded 
his readers that the aims of the College were "frankly revolutionary" 
and that it had been created in the belief that previous schemes of 
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working class education had been too moderate. He pointed out the 
link between the South Wales ~iners Federation and the College and 
was later to relate the militancy of that coalfield to the College's 
influence. Thomson noted with concern the spread of colleges with a 
similar philosophy. During 1919 he reported foundations in Nottingham, 
Scotland, Bradford and in Wallsend, though the latter, while it was 
deemed worthy of the Cabinet's attention was "situated in a disused 
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shop" and only "attended by a few youths between the ages of eighteen 
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and twenty-one". When a college was set up in Sheffield he noticed 
the name of F W Chandler, "the well known extremist", on the list of 
lecturers; "One can imagine", lamented Thomson, "the kind of economics 
and history taught by such a person and how it is likely to work in 
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the minds of uneducated youths". Later the same year he reported, 
"the spread of classes teaching revolution continues". Walton Newbold 
was tutoring eighty-two students in Bury under the auspices of the 
Plebs League, and similar classes had sprung up in Tottenham and 
Coventry.22~o vindicate his deep concern Thomson quoted the 'Socialist', 
"Classes should not be held for the sake of holding them, but for the 
permeation of our unions with revolutionary conceptions". He com-
mented, "It is not suggested that theee classes are a serious menace 
to the stability of society at present but they are certainly sufficient 
reason for the undertaking of sound economic education"}29In again 
drawing the Cabinet's attention, two months later, to the prevalence 
of "pernicious teaching" Thomson suggested that the colleges were 
potentially the "most dangerous revolutionary instruments of the 
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moment". The Central Labour College wae starting a series of outdoor 
classes and Thomson identified this institution and the Labour Rese~rch 
Department as "the fountainhead of the teaching of class hatred". 
Thomson frequently used the opportunity of reports on socialist 
propaganda to outline his own ideas of how a counterblast of "sound 
economic education" might best be propagated. He allowed himself a 
free rein and his advice ranged from advocacy of general propaganda 
to material more suitable for the conventional party political contest, 
ae when he suggeeted that the increase in the price of coal, in 1920, 
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"should, if possible, be attributed to the increase in railwaymen's 
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wages". ~ost of his advice in the matter indicated a frank dissatis-
faction with the Government. few of the efforts made met with his 
approval; "What is really needed" he argued "is a number of working 
men propagandists who could be trusted to expose fallacies in public 
i . "232H houses and at p t head meet1ngs. e regularly appealed to the Govern-
ment to play its part by organising debates or "counter attacking" 
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the 'Daily Herald'. Thomson had a simple faith in his cause and its 
appeal: "The crying need at the moment appears to be education in 
elementary economics, for the judgment of the British working man may 
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always be trusted when he knows the facts". Even the agricultural 
community were not to be spared; he advocated "posters in villages 
with economic facts to set slow minds thinking".235 To underline his 
view of the Government's slowness Thomson added; "I have sent this 
proposal to an unofficial organisation which concerns itself with pro-
paganda of this kind". 
Thomson gave official recognition to any organisation or individual 
who joined the fight from the well-financed Reconstruction Society to 
the lone efforts of a rag and bone man who had successfully heckled 
socialist speakers in Birmingham Bull Ring or of Hackensmidt, a pro-
fessional wrestler, who was "conducting a tour of lectures on the 
evils of Bolshevism"~36 In September 1919 he reported "A movement afoot 
to establish throughout the country Labour Colleges where sound econ-
omics will be taught", adding pointedly, "it deserves avery encourage-
ment, and if funds are forthcoming to found scholarships it will go 
far to counteract the pernicious influence of the existing tLabour 
Colleges,".237 He kept a close, and approving eye on the proliferation 
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of anti-Bolshevik groups: "Several organisations to combat the evil 
238 have been formed". He mentioned the propaganda efforts of the National 
Security Union and praised particularly the National Socialist Party, 
under Thorne, Tillett and Hyndman, which used trained workingmen 
speakers. The Reconstruction Society usually managed to attract large 
and appreciative audiences though they were reported to have encountered 
some opposition in Woolwich?39 He advocated that propaganda should be 
taken into workingmen's clubs and suggested the National Democratic 
Party as a suitable agent. The approach should be robust: "The 
ordinary Labour man (was) less suspicious if those who disagreed with 
him took off their gloves and fought him. He has never failed to 
appreciate an antagonist who uses towards him the pointed language 
. 2~ to which he ~s accustomed from his matee". 
Thomeon regarded the preee, excepting naturally the 'Daily Herald', as 
a consistently reliable ally in the battle for the mind of the working-
man. His reports contain many approving references, as for instance 
to the coverage of 'events' in Russia during 1919, all of which was 
based on official material and photographs issued by the Government. 
In August 1919 there was a liaison meeting at Scotland Yard when re-
porters were given details, and photographs of Russian Agents in 
Britain with information about money smuggling and difficulties of 
241 detection. Thomson frequently advised the Government 
of the use that should be made of the p~ess. Sometimes such advice 
was for ad hoc proposals such as when he suggested that the press 
should be persuaded to campaign for secret ballots in union elections. 
At other times more complex campaigne were undertaken. The Cabinet 
itself cleared the suggestion that materials obtained during the raid 
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of the Russian Trading Delegation could be released to the press 
ss evidence of a 'Bolshevik plot,.242Similarly the expos~e of the 
criminal records of the leaders of the big unemployment march in 1922 
was a carefully orchestrated operation run by the Special Branch and 
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the Home Office. J R Campbell complained that during the Engineering 
dispute of 1922 Scotland Yard has worked up notes for speakers issued 
by the Communist Party, and intercepted by the police, into evidence 
ofa "'plot' as if it were the publicity department of the Employers 
244 federation, and issued it broadcast to the press". This was no more 
than normal practice. There is evidence to suggest that some of 
Thomson's ideas for such publicity ventures were vetoed in the Home 
Affairs Committee of Cabinet, but significantly none to suggest that 
the press ever failed to respond as requested. Yet such amenability 
brought an inevitable problem. Thomson reported incessant attacks on 
the press in Labour circles: "These attacks must not be too lightly 
dismissed. Many correspondents from the North report that the working-
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man has ceased to believe any statements msde in the 'capitalist press'!' 
He suggested that the new scepticism had been caused by the too ready, 
and unanimous, condemnation of the 1919 Railway Strike. However con-
solation might be found: "Thousands read the Sunday papers all of 
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which contain anti Labour propaganda". 
Thomson felt that members of the upper middle classes had an important 
part to play in the battle for the minds of the working classes. While 
the Royal family were, in his opinion, attuning their public activities 
perfectly to this end, the reports contain a number of complaints about 
the 'ostentstious extravagance' of some members of the upper class and 
speculation about the bad effect that this has on working men. "Ocular 
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proof that tha employer class spends money lavishly" was said to have 
exacerbated concern about rising prices in 1919, and in this context, 
at least, the popular press were proving unhelpful as their "reports 
of enormous expenditure on luxuries (were) inflamin9 the mind of 
Labour".24~homson·s view of the importance of the upper middle classes 
in projecting a stable image of society is clearly shown by his deep 
concern over any breaches in solidarity. The attention given to the 
'defections' of Kenworthy, ~alone and Charles Trevelyan, already dis-
cussed, fall within this cate90ry. Even minor cracks in the edifice 
were noted; Commander Grenfell would surely have been surprised, and 
certainly flattered, to know that a letter he wrote to the 'Times', 
critical of colonial policy, had been singled out for the attention of 
249 Cabinet. The announcement by Professor lees-Smith of his conversion 
to Labour was given similar treatment. Even the elite in the making 
did not escape attention: "Both at Oxford and Cambridge there is said 
to be a growing clique among the undergraduates, of persons who profess 
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a kind of academ1c BolsheV1sm • 
A final insight into Thomson's political analysis may be illustrated 
by his belief in the efficacy of repressive measures against subversives. 
In this area too, he felt the Government to be unnecessarily cautious 
and continually recommended stricter le9al measures and more prose-
cutions. To maintain a proper perspective on this view it is necessary 
to remember that these years were in any case marked by a great number 
of raids, arrests and prosecutions. OQRA remained in force until 1920 
and this coupled with contemporary interpretation of more traditional 
statutes ensured that imprisonment was an aver present possibility for 
radical activists. Yet Thomson's answer for many things was nsw 
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legislation. It should, he argued, be made illegal to receive money 
from abroad for propaganda purposes. On the prospectus of the Commu-
nist Party; be commented, "It is a document that would procure for its 
authors heavy sentences of imprisonment in nearly every other country";251 
On continuing communist activity, "Sooner or later legislation will be 
necessary for dealing with the members of an association who are 
preaching violence and civil war. The present procedure for selection 
is antiquated and useless for the purpose, which is to deal with the 
responsible heads of the movement and make them individually respon-
sible to the courts".252 To emphasise the urgency of the matter he 
added "It is easier to deal with dangerous movements in their infancy 
than when they are numerically strong". Thomson, on one occasion 
presented for the Cabinet's perusal some proposals based on legislation 
in force in the United States. Under such legislation "Anyone who 
teachee, aids or advises forcible resistance to or destruction of any 
unit of government" would be liable to imprisonment, "not exceeding 
20 yeers and/or a fine of 50,000 dollars". Similarly "Anyone who 
advocetes attacks on property or persons, either as a general principla 
or in particular instances" would be liable to up to 10 years imprison-
ment and a fine of 30,000 dollars, and any association contemplating 
the use of physical force was declared to be illegal and members of 
such sn association made liable to up to 10 years imprisonmsnt and a 
253 fine of 30,000 dollars. 
It was not be be expected that Thomson would recognise the irony in 
such defencss of "liberty" but it might be reasonable to expect that 
he should snticipate the practical difficulties of such a policy. 
There is no evidence that he even recognised the two most obvious 
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detrimental effects of such a policy; namely that it would, by driving 
communist activity underground, make it more difficult to observe and 
secondly that repression might well glamorise, and increase eupport 
for thosa whom it sought to deter. Thomson did complain that the 
Communist Party's closing of ranks consequent upon the raids and 
arrests of 1921 had made it difficult to obtain information, but he 
drew no inference from this. 
If the purpose of Thomson's reports was just to give the Cabinet a 
week by week account of left wing activities they may, to a degree, be 
judged successful. While they contain unimportant material they do 
encompass most of the important events and personalitiee. Yet if 
Thomson is to be judged as a political adviser, as an interpreter of 
events, he must be seen as far less successful. It is apparent that 
he never developed that coherent and consistent overview neceesary for 
such a task. A central weakness in his analysis, from which a number 
of other weaknesses stemmed, was his failure to come to terms with 
the new importance of organised labour and the Labour Party in the 
poetwar period. Thomeon regarded even-their basic aspirations, limited 
nationalisstions and basic welfare provision, as being outwith the 
framework of legitimate politics and this inevitably led to confusion, 
for if the defence of the state involved fruatrating measures being 
furthered by the official opposition in a perfectly constitutional 
, 
manner he would inevitably enter the field of party politics. 
To Thomson capitalism was an irreducable and irreplacable part of the 
state, and indeed the civilisation, which he was defending. Not only 
did he hold that no alternative economic system could form the basis 
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of a civilised society but he failed to appreciate that capitalism 
could successfully accommodate itself to many of those measures which 
labour leaders advocated. Seeing no possibility of change all that 
was left to Thomson was the propagation of truth and the repression 
of those who refused to accspt it. 
While hs had vivid ideas about the consequences of a British revolution, 
in the earlier reports Thomson exhibited no developed idea of how it 
might occur. Throughout 1919 he laboured with the idea of revolution 
as smeial, collapse, accompanied if- not precipitated by a putsch. After 
1919, while he began to dismiss revolution as an immediate possibility, 
he nevsr gave up the idea that circumstances might develop which could 
endanger the state yet he presented no clear account of those circum-
stances. An insvitable consequence of this failure was to accept 
revolutionaries, even of the Nicholson type, at their own word; to 
pursue those who declared themselves subversive rather than those who 
had some chance of success. 
During the later reports Thomson did, however, begin to advance a more 
coherent view of dangers to the state. This stemmed eventually from 
his appreciation of the power of organised labour and the ways in 
which it could be employed. He never exprssssd the theory as an 
abstraction and he was led to it more by events than through reasoned 
analysis. The note of realism which it brought to his reports was a 
gradual growth and unconnected materials were never eliminated, yet 
it provided him with a valuable yardstick against which to evaluate 
the potential of an organisation. The central danger was thus seen 
as the revolutionary general strike and potential revolutionaries 
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judged on their proximity to and ability to influence the mass of 
organised workers. This analysis offered Thomson an escape from his 
paradoxical pursuit of "dangerous revolutionaries" whom he regarded 
as "villains of comic opera". He could be more specific about the 
danger and hence eliminate those who only aspired to influence. Thue 
he could move away from the world of the putsch and the vagueries of 
"revolution by constitutional means" and concentrate his attentions on 
such groups as the RILU: "It is true that the adherents number, as 
yet,only a small percentage of organised labour, but the important 
fact is that they are, almost without exception, Trade Unionists". 
The organisation was, he concluded "potentially as dangerous as the 
bickering communist groups are negligible". 254 
Thomson had become interested in liaisons between co-operative 
societies and trade unions during December 1919. Agreements on trade 
union·aseof co-operative banking facilities were minutely dissected 
and he made reference to schemes whereby co-operative wholesale so-
cieties had provided, or were prepared to provide, food or credit to 
strikers. In Thomson's melodramatic turn of phrase the scheme was 
that "strikers would be provided with food while the rest of the 
community starve".255In the immediate postwar period Thomson was in-
clined to view all labour organisations with suspicion and the co-
operators were included for no particular reason. Yet as he began to 
calm down the reports on such transactions continued. It was not 
that Thomson regarded co-operators as natural revolutionaries; indeed 
in the normal way of things he regarded them as sensible and moderate 
men. The danger they preeented was not in terms of their opinions 
but rather in terms of the functions they might perform in enhancing 
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the industrial power of labour. They could provide the necessities 
of life and offer independent banking facilities; and thus the 
labour movement might be spared in a strike the disciplines of the 
market and Government interference with their funds. 
Almost inevitably Thomson pushed the idea too far. Attempts to 
utilise the power of labour from "Hands off Russia" and the Councils 
of Action to the Triple Alliance were regarded as threats to political 
order irrespective of their limited aims. Even the formation of a 
General Council for the TUe was viewed with suspicion and referred 
to as a "General Staff for Labour". 
He underestimated the practical difficulties involved in mobilising 
organised workers for political ends and failed to appreciate that 
many of the demands advanced in this way could be easily accommodated 
within the existing political system. It was, of course, in any case, 
highly unlikely that circumstances would arise in which organised 
labour could be used to precipitate the collapse of the state. While 
'sensible and moderate' men could play their part in securing a 
labour victory in a limited campaign they would not continue their 
action to secure a political revolution unless they experienced some 
significant change of consciousness. It was Thomson's, somewhat 
hysterical, contention that a small group of men could manipulate 
the mass organisations of labour independently of the aspirations 
and beliefs of the rank and file. Thus he became a contributor to 
the myth of the General Strike as a subversive act, irrespective of 
the aims of the participants. The myth was later to prove very use-
ful to those who sought to thwart the political aims of organised 
labour. 
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The Downfall of Thomson 
The end of Thomson's career proved to be suitably melodramatic. In 
the Hou~e of Commons on November 7th 1921, Sir Reginald Hall moved the 
adjournment and spoke of the grave danger to the public safety caused 
by the position recently vacated by Sir 8asil Thomson remaining un-
filled. In Thomson's own account; "~r Shortt, the Home Secretary, 
acting on instructions from his chief, ~r Lloyd George, misled the 
House by stating that my retirement was due to disagreement between me 
and General Horwood, the new Commissioner. The real facts were never 
allowed to transpire, and no publication of them was permitted." 
Thomson's version was as follows: "On the last Sunday in October 1921, 
four young Irishmen tramped out to Chequers, entered the grounds and 
chalked up on the summerhouse the words, 'Up Sinn rein'". All of the 
men were arrested. Thomson himself interviewed the men and formed the 
impression that the incident was "in the nature of a skylark" and let 
them go. However when the incident was reported to ~r Lloyd George he, 
"took a very different view of the matter; indeed he was seriously 
shaken. The fact was that among his many conspicuous qualities was an 
exaggerated solicitude for the safety of his own skin". Thomson was 
called to a meeting with the Home Secretary, the Prime ~inister and 
the Commissioner and told that the time had come for him to retire. 
He added one further factor to explain his forced retirement; "It is 
perhaps fair to add that my weekly reports on subversive activitiee 
on the part of certain labour leaders had prejudiced them against me 
as a person who knew too much, and I hsd reason for believing that 
these leaders had brought preseure to bear on the Prime ~inister.n 
It is perhaps wise to treat this last explanation with some scepticism, 
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for labour leaders had so little influence on the Prime ~inister in 
other matters that it seems unlikely that they could have any in this. 
It seems improbable, in any case that an intelligence official should 
be dismissed for knowing too much. For the official explanation there 
seems to be no hard evidence one way or the other. From what is known 
of Thomson's career he appears to have been a popular and respected 
figure with those who worked with him. He certainly also enjoyed a 
comfortable relationship with the Home Secretary. However the main 
factor which seems to pull against the official line is the speed of 
Thomson's dismissal, emphasised by the fact that there was nobody in 
line to succeed him. 
It is possible that the dismissal resulted from dissatisfaction with 
Thomson's work in his capacity as an intelligence chief. This is 
certainly something that both he and the Home Office would have an 
interest in concealing. It is possible to identify a number of weak-
nesses in his reports and it is worth considering the possibility 
that this is why he was replaced. However, most of the weaknesses in 
the reports stemmed from the rigidity of his political outlook. Those 
who appointed him knew of this outlook and indeed shared in it and 
there was no appreciable shift in Cabinet opinion between 1917 and 1921. 
In the field of intelligence where the agents enjoy a unique degree of· 
independence their r.eliability and leyalty are always crucial issues. 
Was it the case that something ceme to light in October 1921 which 
called into question Thomson's integrity? Did he fabricate evidence 
in order to cover incompetence or did he consciously seek to mislead 
the Cabinet out of loyalty to some other cause or country? The fact 
. 
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that there is no immediate evidence to support any of these conJec-
tures is no cause for instantly dismissing them, for it is unlikely 
that such evidence would come to light even if it did exist. Yet 
there is much circumstantial evidence which would strongly euggest 
Thomson's innocence of such charges. His background, his previous 
career and his subsequent actions would all tend to support his in-
tense loyalty. There is something too in his expressed political 
opinions, a consistency coupled with a measure of illogicality, which 
suggests that they were not assumed. On the question of whether he 
distorted information or consciously misled the Cabinet in order to 
increase his own importance, there are a number of points which can 
be made. One has the record of the reports themselves. Not all of 
the material can be checked, but that which can suggests that Thomson 
gave the best and most straightforward account that was available to 
him. If we take his account of the early dsvelopment of the Communist 
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Party and set it against Klugman's version, which was substantially 
based on material in Communist archives, there are many similarities. 
There are naturally differences of emphasis and Thomson, naturally 
enough, failed to see ths thing in a hsroic light, but the same 
debates, disagreements and reconciliations are recorded. Thomson 
made a good deal of the influence of RUssian money when Klugman almost 
played it out of existence, yet subsequent accounts, such as that 
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offered by Kendal would suggest that Thomson's account represented, 
at least, an honest attempt to come to terms with the facts. 
Secondly it may be argued that the nature of the information contained 
in the reports suggests their veracity and Thomeon's complete integrity. 
Three examplee will illustrate this point. rirstly, the case of 
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Jenkins' horse. A communist propagandist called Jenkins conceived 
the idea of using a horse and van to tour the country in the pursuance 
of his art. A van was easily found, but a horse proved more difficult. 
Jenkins sent a letter to headquarters pleading that in view of the 
high cost of hirin9 "It is therefore imperative that a horse be pur-
chased at once". Headquarters replied regretting that they were, 
"unable to supply the horse for a touring van". They suggestsd that 
Jenkins might lesve his van in Barrow, "until the whole matter can be 
thrashsd out at the next divisional council meeting,,?S9 
The next extract concerns the commercial activities of the Leicester 
communists. "In Leicester several communists are now making a living 
by selling chocolate at 10p per lb. The chocolate is made by the 
Waretta Chocolate Compeny, Boston, USA and is forwarded to Leicester 
from London. The secretary of the local extremist organisation recently 
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had four tons at his houss. Further enquiry is being made." And 
finally; "In Coventry the local Unemployed Workers' Committee has 
formed a revolutionary band, consisting of six men, who play the 'Red 
Flag' and the 'International' while the unemployed are drawing their 
relief money. It is known as the 'Red Orchestra' and practices in 
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the ILP rooms." The nature and detail of such reports as this 
suggests their veracity. Their creation would require considerable 
powers of comic invention. 
Another factor which suggests that Thomson's reports were not fabri-
cated is that he was reporting on Britain. Those who read his reports 
might come across the events or the persons on whom he was reporting. 
Frequently the Cabinet must have had access to alternative sources 
on the same subject, as when Eric Geddes went to Yorkshire in 1920 
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to report on the coal strike. The Prime Minister's private correspon-
dence reveals a great number of sources informing him of labour activities 
in industry. A final reason for dismissing ths idea that Thomson may have 
been diemissed for some lack of integrity ia the fact that sven after his 
dismissal, Shortt, who was Thomson's Home Secretary, was prepared to speak 
for him in public on the occasion of his trial on the relatively minor, 
though highly embarrassing charge of having "committed an act 1n violation 
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of public decency". 
There are a few other areas in which Thomson might be judged to have 
been vulnerable. There was his marked tendency to lecture his poli-
tical maaters on their duties which must have annoyed some of them. 
There was also a marked insensitivity on occasion as when, in explain-
ing to a Cabinst led by Lloyd George that Bolsheviks and pacifists 
were merely a modern version of pro-Boers. Also if Thomson's rsports 
are comparsd with those producsd by Gensral Childs, his successor, 
there is an implication, at least, that he indulged himself in the 
Special Branch penchant for melodrama. Childs' reports were much lass 
flamboyant. He spent far less time in pursuing the political mavericks 
and hs was far more specific about his sourcss. In Childs' reports 
hs continuously makes reference to Chisf Constables as a source of 
information. Thomson never mentioned Chief Constablee and it seems 
probable that, aa msntioned abovs, he deliberately created an air of 
mystery about his contacts. Yst thers is nothing in any of this to 
suggest a reason for so sudden a departure. A numbsr of people may 
have been predispossd against him, and it may havs bsan that there 
was some dissatisfaction with the service he provided. However, it 
seems unlikely that the Prime Minister was a regular reader of the 
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reports nor deeply involved in considering Thomson's merits until ths 
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'Summerhouse Incident'. ~n the end it seems most likely that Thomson's 
downfall was a result of the Prime ~inister's "exaggerated solicitude 
for the safety of his own skin". 
The selection of Thomson's successor proved somewhat difficult. The 
poat waa initially offered to Sir Joseph Byrne, who had recently 
rssigned as Commissioner of ths Royal Irish Constabulary. However 
this appointment was not confirmed, apparently because Byrne's record 
in Ireland made him unpopular with a number of leading politicians. 
Eventually the Home Secretary sent for Major General Sir Wyndham Childs 
who proved willing to take the appointment, and generally acceptable. 
Childs' appointment was greeted favourably by the press. The 'Daily 
Mail' ran an article by a 'Brother Officer' who wrote that "the secret 
of his success was that he abominatsd Prussian msthods" and claimed 
that Childs had the ability to become "an expert at anything he takes 
up". The 'Manchester Guardian' divulged that Childs was "no believer 
in red tape", and was, in his spars time "a good actor and a violin 
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At the time of his appointment Childs was temporarily retired from 
the War Office on half pay. His appointment was another example of 
the government's reluctance to promote police officers to senior 
positions in the ~etropolitan force. However while Childs was an 
outsider he had had considersble experience in politicelly sensitive 
employments. Soon after Childs' appOintment as Assistant Commissioner, 
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the Special Branch, which since 1919 had had its own Assistant 
Commissioner, was once more amalgamatad with the reet of the Metro-
politan CID. Therefore from 1st April 1922 Childs was responsible 
for both the Criminal and Special Branches. Although hs had-to 
devote most of his attention to the latter he apparently managed 
admirably and survived until his 'natural' retirement in 192B. His 
police career was then Judged to have proved a 'notable succees,.265 
-Childe, like Thomson, had originally intended to become a barrister, 
but during service with a volunteer regiment during the South African 
War, he had decided to take up the offer of a commission·in the Regular 
Army. His army career was blessed with frequent promotions which he 
attributed to the care he took to ensure that all his actions ware in 
line with Army Laws, and to the influence and friendship of Sir Nevil 
Macready, of whom Childs wrote, "To him lowe everything in my military 
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life". By the end of the South African War Childs wes Provost Marshall 
on-Macready's staff with responsibility for the military police. When 
Macready was called back to the War Office to become Director of 
Personal Services he took Childs with him ae his assistant. 
The Personal Services division wae responsible for some of the War 
Office's most delicate tasks: "Discipline both of officers and msn, 
ceremonial, education, questione of law and the uss of troops in the 
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aid of the civil power". This last function wae to prove particularly 
exacting in the years before the First World War. Childs remembered 
that from 1910 onwarde, "there was alwaye a strike on eomewhere and I 
was either present, or elee assisting to tackle it under the directione 
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of Sir Nevil Macready". In the memory of its Director, Personal 
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Services was the busiest division of the War Office. Macready recorded 
that he originally took the job with some trepidation, being aware 
that "the use of troops under such conditions had not been fortunate 
269 in the past", and that any mistakes were sure to provoke considerab~e 
reaction. Childs shared this awarsness of the political seneitivity 
of the work and if he was later to show a degree of political sophis-
tication it must be remembered that his education had been in the hands 
of eminent teachers. When, for example, Childs and Macreedy were 
preparing to leave for South Wales, during the miners strike of 1910, 
they were briefed for their mission by Haldane and Churchill. Haldane 
was particularly well versed in such matters, as he had sat on the 
Special Commission which had investigated the reatherstone incidents 
of 1893, and formulated conclusions which had subsequently formed the 
accepted guide of conduct for civil and military authorities at times 
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of public disorder. The account Childe left of his conduct in South 
Wales illustrates that he had understood that it was important to avoid 
the impression that they were under the orders of the mine owners. 
Both Macready and Chi~ds later recalled that they had had to resist 
the attempts of the mineowners to manipUlate them. Indeed Childs' 
account contained the clear implication that, in personal terms at 
leaet, he felt a good deal more sympathy for the miners than the owners. 
The owners were prepared to indulge in underhand tactics while the 
strike committees, even those of the Rhonnda, "strongly impregnated 
with the theoriee of Karl Marx", as they were, were "more likely to be 
trustworthy in dealings than the owners and their representatives". 
Childe felt that the contrasts betwsen the army and the strike committee 
had been the "safety valve which enabled us to get through the strike 
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without having to call upon the troope to use their weapons". On the 
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general problem of strikes Childs recorded his belief that strikes 
were a perfectly legitimate tactic and argued that the role of the 
army was merely to aid the civil power in the maintenance of order. 
He displayed also some understanding of, and sympathy for, the economic 
privations suffered by miners and their families, but this did not 
tempt him to suggest any means whereby such privation might be alls-
viated, nor to respond to labour allegatione about the implications 
of the use of troops in industrial disputee. However from his account 
of tha Cambrian strike it is clear that Childs had a degree of uncertainty 
on some political issues and indeed ,8 flexibility of approach thet must 
have marked him as an e~ceptional army officer. 
His career continued to lead him through political minefields, for 
in 1914 Childs and ~acready were made responsible for Army discipline 
with regard to the Ulster crisis. Childs claimed that his insistence 
on strict constitutional propriety earned him the totally 
undeserved reputation at the War Office of being a Nationalist. Even 
the outbreak of war brought no relief from politically sensitive 
issuee for Childs was sent to Franca to take charge of field punish-
, . 
menta. It was charactaristic of Childs that whila he defended the 
use of the death penalty as essential to discipline, the reforms in 
procedure which he introduced actually considersbly lessened its 
incidence. Childs' next appointment was to handle the probleme caused 
by conscientious objectors. Here too his natural prejudice was for 
the hard line. He balieved that such organisations as the No Con-
scription Fellowship should have been dealt with under the Incitement 
to ~utiny Act, yet his desire for the efficient conduct of his office 
led him to establish contact with that organisation. 
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Childs was clearly no sympathiser with the Labour cause. While he 
expressed concern for some of the more obvious hardships suffered by 
some working class people he had no admiration for those who sought 
to alleviate such hardships through radical political change. Yet there 
is evidence to euggest that Childs was somewhat at odds with ~oy~son­
Wicks because of a certain reti~ence over prosecuting communists. 272 
while he was clearly a Conservative his views wera less rigid than 
those of his predecessor. Where Thomson found it difficult to control 
his strident, '~orning Post', opinions, Childs' reports were restrained 
and professional. Similarly where Thomson sought out the bizarre and 
trivial, Childs' reports stuck to the point and lacked 'colour'. 
Where Thomson was inclined to lecture the Cabinet on their deficiencies, 
Childs insinuated gently. However any comparison of the two men's 
reports must be tempered by the realisation that Childs' task was 
considerably easier than that which Thomson had initially facad in 
1919. The panic over the 'Bolshevik Terror' had substantially dimi-
nished, the Triple Alliance in action had proved unimpressive, some 
Conservatives had begun to recognise that the Labour Party sought 
political respectability and the development of the CPGB had consi-
derably clarified matters on the far left. It was therefore relatively 
easy for Childs to discard much of the inconsequential material that 
had so troubled Thomaon. 
The Communist Party was clearly the 'burning question' and the core 
. . • it was impressed on me by the particular of Childs' work; " 
representative of the Government concerned with these matters that 
here lay the most important part of my work". The Communist Perty 
was used as a yardstick ageinst which to evaluate other organisations 
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and difficulties; hence Childs' view of the unemployed: "Disappointed 
and embittered, these men were trained soldiers, and if organised could 
273 prove a distinct menace". Inevitably it wae the National Unemployed 
Workers Committee ~ovement, led by the Communists, which would provide 
this organisation. Yet while the Communist Party was thought to be 
dangeroue the fears it excited in Childe were not thoss common in 
1919. He recalled later that he "never credited Communism with being 
capable of producing worse then industrial unrest and untold misery":74 
and he regarded their more ambitious aspirations such ae ideas for a 
'Red Army', which had so excited Thomson, as being designed to imprees 
Moscow rather than for any bearing they might have on domestic politics. 
However while they were not seen as bearers of revolution the Cqmmunists 
were still taken seriously. Childs felt, as had Thomson, that the 
politicians were unnecessarily lethargic in their use of legal and 
coercive measures: "I spent the seven best years of my life trying to 
induce various governments to allow me to use the full force of the 
law"; "People in this country who want to kick over the ballot box 
should be dealt with in accordance with the law: in other words for 
seditious libel or seditious conspiracy, and it matters not to me what 
this programme may be, it is the method by which they seek to achieve 
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their ends which really matters". The only politician Childs felt who 
would have allowed him, "to strike one overwhelming and final blow 
against the Communist organisation", was Joynson Hicks; "I sincerely 
believe that his enthusiasm a~most exceeded my own, and had he had his 
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way there would be no Communist Party in England today". Childs 
shared Thomson's especial fears about Communist education: "My prin-
cipal fear of the Communists in this country centred round their 
methods of contaminating youth". The Young Communist League " • 
• • 
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sought to teach class hatred in all its branches - atheism and immora-
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lity being a side line". An unsuccessful ettempt by Sir John Butcher 
to introduce private members' legislation on this issue met with Childs' 
full approval. 
The appointment of Childs did not, as far as it can be determined, 
lead to any radical change in the means of surveillance employed. 
Childs claimed that a great deal of what he needed to know could be 
obtained in publicly available documents and while there is some 
truth in this it is clear that his searches went beyond this. He 
claimed that he had found it impossible to place a man in "the inner 
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circle of the Communist Party", but his reports indicate access to 
confidential information: "The secrecy eurrounding fun de was empha-
sised by one of the party members who recently informed my correspon-
dent that the pay of many people was not officially shown on the books 
because if they were examined the expenditure of the party could be 
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shown to exceed its income by a considerable margin". Clearly the 
information, trivial though it might appear, that of 12,020 pennies 
raised to finance the "Young CommUnist", 48 had bean contributed by 
the office staff, was not obtained from publicly available sources. 
The NUWCM appears to have been very easy to infiltrate. Information 
on the activities of one section of the 1922 march was said to come 
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from "a correspondent who is marching with this group". Such extracts 
and the continuous quotation from confidential memoranda and private 
letters provide ample evidence that the methods of surveillance had 
undergone no substantial change. Under Childs the Home Intelligence 
Branch continued much as before. The reports made more specific refe-
rence to sources, contained more direct quotation and lacked their 
former political flamboyance, but they did provide a sound, eomewhat 
unimaginative account of left wing political activity in Britain. 
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Supply and Transport: 
Precursors 
During 1919, while Sir Basil Thomson was developing his intelligence 
department, the Cabinet was makin9 arrangements to deal with the prac-
tical issues of labour unrest. On rebruary 4th 1919 the Cabinet 
decided "that a committee should be appointed to make the necessary 
arrangements for dealing with any situation that might arise from in-
dustrial unrest both at the present moment and in the future,,~81 It 
was to be known as the Industrial Unrest Committee. Its purpose was 
to co-ordinate the activities of the varioua government departments 
and to ensure "the supply of the essentials of life to the community" 
and the maintenance of law and order during strikes and lock outs. A 
list of its original sub-committees: Public Utility Services, Transport, 
Protection, Communications and Electric Works, gives an indication of 
its scope. On one hand the committee may be seen as a simple response 
to, a novel industrial situation. The growth of trade unionism had 
virtually ensured that future strikes would be on such a scale and 
have so great a bearing on the community aa a whola that government 
intervention, of some sort, would be inevitable:82 It would be a mis-
take however to attribute the Cabinet's decision entirely to such 
reasoning. In the mood that existed in government circles at the end 
of " the war simple distinctions between strikes and outright subversion 
were uncommon, and many who sat on the IUC believed that they were 
preparing for a challenge to the state itself. 
Although the first meeting of the IUe concerned itself with issues 
arising from proposed strikes by workers in London transport services 
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and the electricity supply industry, it is clear from subsequent 
discussions that its main purpose was to counter the effects of an 
anticipated strike of miners, which it was feared would be supported 
by sympathetic action of rail and transport workers under the Triple 
Alliance agreement. The coincidence of dates also suggests that it 
was the probability of a miners strike which had prompted its creetion. 
On January 14th the MFGB had met in conference at Southport and for-
mulated a series of ambitious demands, among them the nationalieation 
of the mines. On January 31st miners' representatives had met with 
the Government and protested that no reply had been made to these 
demands. The Government reply wae delayed until February 10th, and 
its offer of a small wage rise and a committee of inquiry was clearly 
well below anything the miners might have anticipated. There was 
clearly every prospect that the IUC would be in operation before it 
had had a chance to properly constitute itself. 
The Prime Minister, however, did not intend to rely entirely on the 
rue. On February 11th, on the eve of the MFGB Special Conference 
called to discuss the Government's reply, he went onto the attack. 
In a belligerent speech reminiscent of many wartime efforts he 
attacked the miners' claims and outlined the dire consequences of 
industrial action. Nonetheless the conference went ahead as planned 
and agreed to ballot the membership with a view to a national strike 
on March 15th. The Government inteneified its propaganda against 
the miners. Horne wrote a letter of protest to Smillie, which was 
published before Smillie received it; advertisements for the 
Governmentts case were placed in newapapers, and friendlycorreepon-
den~s were fed the "facts" about the miners' claim. 
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Meanwhile the IUC was hastily surveying its forces. At a meeting on 
february 6th existing arrangements for the maintenance of transport 
services were under review. A scheme which had envisaged the use of 
privata buses with army drivers was found to be impractical as it 
had been discovered that the army drivers belonged to the same union 
as the regular drivers and would presumably refuse to work in the 
event of a Triple Alliance strike. 8y the next day the committee 
were exhibiting signs of unease; Shortt and Horne demanded legialation 
to declare strikes illegal unless certain procadures had been complied 
with. On the 10th february the committee complained that the propa-
ganda services available to them were inadequate. Even worse, on 
the 12th the committee discovered that the anticipated "protection" 
scheme was unworkable. The General Reserve, on which great reliance 
had been placed, was deemed by the War Office to be unsuitable for 
use in industrial disputes. field Marshall Robertson reminded the 
committee that the force had only been intended for active service 
in the extremity of a German invasion and that 70% of the reserve 
had been forcibly enlisted. Shortt mentioned the government'. in-
tention of forming a Special Constabulary Reserve, but this was 
unlikely to be available in the near future. On the 17th the Home 
Secretary returned to the subject of protsction and felt it necessary 
to outline the principle that ultimate responsibility should always 
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rsmain with the police, even if army units had to be used. At the 
same meeting the committee received depressing news about coal 
stocke. Household supplies were not expected to last out the first 
week of a strike and though, for inetance, the Electricity Companies 
could keep operating for four weeks, industry as a whole had stocks 
sufficient for only two and a half weeks. In view of the state of 
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the emergency services it is reasonable to suppose that the Prime 
Minister's appeal to Smillie, on February 21st, for a postponement of 
the strike, was deeply felt. 
The result of the miners' ballot, six to one in favour of strike 
action, was announced on February 25th, but at this stage the tactic 
of offering a Committee of Inquiry brought some respite for the Govern-
ment for Sankey brought out his interim report on the 26th, and ita 
.largely favourable findings persuaded another MFGB Special Conference 
to poatpone strike action until March 22nd. 
Thue the IUC was enabled to push ahead with its plans at more leisure, 
but it showed no sign of slipping into a conciliatory mood. On March 
14th the committee discussed proposals for a bill to give the Govern-
ment additional powers in the event of a Triple Alliance strike. The 
Scottish Secretary, who had a strong inclination to confuse strikes 
and, insurrections, recommended that the Government take powers to 
shut all banks during strikee so that the Unions could not obtain 
money for strike pay. The Committee accepted the sUbstance of the 
propoaal but recommended that the object should be achieved by the 
impounding of Union funds. In addition they considered proposals to 
arrest strike "ringleaders", to impose a rent moratorium and to stop 
the sale of liquor. That the proposals were ill-considered needs 
little emphasis; the sttempt to ensure that strikere had no money 
would alone do much to exacerbate the situation~84They should be 
viewed in the context of the general panic of the post war months but 
it may be added that they were specifically motivated by the recogni-
tion of the Government's unpreparedness to meet any civil disorder. 
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The respite offered by the miners' leaders' postponement of the strike 
noticee was not used productively. The IUC were informed during March 
that no arrangements had been made for organising volunteers and that 
only between two and three hundred lorries were available. A scheme 
was hastily pushed forward for the suspension of unemployment benefit 
in the event of a large strike and its replacement by a flat rate 
scheme. The Prime Minister has already suggested in Cabinet85that 
in the payment of such benefits a distinction should be drawn between 
those actually on strike and those out of work because of the strike, 
and one member of the IUC proposed that this distinction could be 
effectively drawn if payments of benefit were made through employers. 
The determination of certain members of Cabinet to sUbstantiate their 
predictions of chaos was also in evidence at the Cabinet of March 19th 
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when a move to reduce the proposed rates of benefit was successful. 
However at the next meeting of the IUC a degree of order appeared to 
have been restored. Captain Penney of the Ministry of food reported 
large supplies of food available at the docks, and that 50,000 tons 
had already been transferred to major centres. The Admiralty was to 
be responsible for the distribution of yeast and trawlers were to 
bring fish from Grimsby to London, provided they could get sufficient 
coal. It was also becoming apparent that previous estimates of avai-
lable road transport had been pessimistic as the Army had around 1,000 
lories potentially available. Yet it must be judged that the 
Government were lucky that the miners did not put their organisation 
to the test at this time, and instead voted by a ten to one majority 
on April 9th and 10th to accept what Sankey had apparently offered. 
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In spite of the fact that the emergency arrangements had proved so 
inadequate and that members of the IUC felt that a full scale miners' 
striks was still inevitable the organisation actually deteriorated 
after April. The ~inistry of Food was in turmoil, trying, with a 
depleted staff, to deal with the "unprecedently large stocks of food" 
which it had bought against the 'anticipated crisisJ87 The Road Transport 
Board, responsible for co-ordinating emergency arrangements, was, 
according to its representative on the IUC, uncertain about its future. 
Hia conclusion, "that the organisation needed a good deal of tightening 
up" must appear as understatement for the Board had held no meetings 
and had lost three of its seven membersf88 The Petrol Control Oepart-
ment, which was responsible for recruiting volunteer drivers, had all 
but ceased to exist and the Ministry of Food was complaining that even 
that small number of drivers who were available did not "possess ths 
sxpsrience necessary • to deal with the transport situation if any 
289 emergency arose". Even the petrol stocks were all in the wrong place. 
The core of the problem was that many of the emargency schemes relied 
upon departments of government which were in the process of being dis-
mantled. The inability of the Government to co-ordinate its activities 
must appsar remarkable, particularly as the severe induetrial dielo-
cation was thought to be imminent. 
It was fortuitous for the Government that the first test of its emer-
gency arrangements should have besn a regional strike. On July 17th 
the Yorkshire miners struck on a dispute over piecs rats sdjustments 
made on the introduction of the seven hour day. The IUC wss quickly 
brought into opsration and decrees issued through the Board of Trade 
to reduce coal exports to a minimum. Foodstuffs and coal were givsn 
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rail priority, Railway Companiee, coal agente and Local Authorities 
were instructed to ass amble the largest coal stocks posaible, and all 
shipa carrying coal were diverted to home ports. The emergency 
arrangements very quickly rsn into trouble. The Yorkshire miners had 
withdrawn pump and maintenance men and the IUC decided that naval 
ratinga should be used to fulfil their duties. They asked the 
Admiralty to make available 2,500 men, of whom 250 were immediately 
required. However the Admiralty informed the IUC that men in the home 
ports were not available for this operation as, under a previous in-
struction from the Committee, they were being kept on hand to man the 
electric works in the event of a strike there. An arrangement was 
hastily patched together and by Auguat 6th, 510 naval ratings ware 
engaged on pumping duties in the Yorkshire mines. The Admiralty how-
ever, was still uneaey. The Navy representative on the IUe complained 
that ships were being delayed in port and leave arrangements had been 
disturbed. Moreover the ratings in Yorkshire were felt to be in moral 
danger: "The effect on the men could not be otherwise than injurious 
as they found themselves in contact with men of an unsettled state of 
mind and revolutionary ideas and it was possible that Naval Ratings 
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might absorb some of the ideas themselves". That road transport 
arrangements were inadequate may be inferred from the fact that the 
Local Food Control Committeee were not informed that responsibility 
for transport arrangements had been transferred from the defunct Road 
Transport Board to the Ministry of Food until the strike was a week 
old. An appeal for volunteer drivers was not discussed until July 
25th, and as late as August 6th the Food Controller, G H Roberts, was 
arguing against any such appeal: "as it might be construed as a 
direct challenge to the Transport Workers Association (sic)", whose 
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members were about to vote on the principle of Direct Action. The IUe 
even considered the compulsory registration of horses, though fear of 
a public outcry forced them to discard the idea. If transport arrange-
ments were inadequate, those for protection appear to have been far 
more so. Horne complained on July 26th that the number of troope 
available was "totally inadequate" and 4 batallions were hastily 
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seconded from the Rhine army. 
One aepect of the arrangements was, however, subsequently judged to 
have proved successful and was incorporated into subsequent schemes. 
Eric Geddes was sent to Yorkshire to ensure that the Cabinet was kept 
well informed and to promote and organise local initiatives to combat 
the effects of the strike. Geddas was later to be chairman and most 
active member of the Supply and Transport Committee and his ideae were 
largely formed during this brief period in Yorkshire. In his opinion 
the IUC strategy had two major defects. Firstly its heavy reliance on 
government departments and their local agencies discouraged initiatives 
by employers and local authorities. Secondly Geddes felt the Govern-
mentrs' efforts at publicity had been woefully inadequate. Far too 
little had been done to turn public opinion against the strikers. He 
had found employers in Yorkshire apathetic and unwilling to react 
stron~iy againstthstlnions. The pit owners, he complained had only 
asked for naval ratings at the very last moment having no relish for a 
fight~92 Geddes saw his role in Yorkshire not only in terms of ensuring 
that essential work was carried on but also as instigator of a general 
crusads aimed at stiffening the resistance of local authorities and 
employers. He·persuaded the mine owners to set up headquarters in a 
Leede hotel and called together the mayors of the principal towns in 
the area to discuss the enforcement of restrictions on the use of 
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electricity, water and gas. This, he explained to the Cabinet, must 
293 be recognised "as a factor of both moral and material importance". 
In a letter to the Prime Minister he complained about the inadequate 
propaganda effort, urging as a priority that the Government must "get 
public opinion in this district properly worked up to the gravity of 
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the situation". 
When this dispute was safely over Geddes' views were not forgotten 
for they had a bearing on general strategy. In October 1919 the 
Cabinet discussed a speech made by Arthur Henderson in which he had 
strongly critic;sed the emergency arrangements. He hed ergued "that 
the Government were better situated than they had ever been before, 
eince the War machine could be put into operation against the men and 
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could be used to smash the trade unions and drain their funds". The 
Cabinet must have been aware by then that this monolithic "war machine" 
was a fiction. The existing arrangements guaranteed the Cabinet the 
worst of both worlds for they could not provide the material cover 
considered neceesary, while their mobilisation left the damaging im-
pression of a harsh government using its massive resources against a 
section of the community. Geddee' ideae, in that they traneferred a 
good deal of responsibility to other agencies offered st least a 
partial solution. Yet because they relied on the efforts of volunteers 
snd on the activity of non-governmental agenciee it wae cleer that a 
scheme so organised would require e high degree of prior planning, 
with particular attention to propaganda. It was therefore inevitable 
that during the next major laction' not more than a few of Geddes' 
idess should have been absorbed. 
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For the Railway Strike of the Autumn of 1919 the executive powers of 
the IUC were transferred to a similarly constituted Cabinet Committee 
known as ths Strike Committee. Eric Geddss was appointed Chairman. 
His views were reflected in the decision to appoint six regional in-
telligence commissioners and in the close attention paid to propaganda 
issues and public appeals for sssistance. Yet much of the work of the 
committee was still conditioned by the exaggerated fears which had 
beenthehallmark of the IUC. Its discussions indicated a majority 
still holding embattled attitudes and prepared to purchase immediate 
security at the prics of ant agonising large sections of public opinion. 
The Committee considered a proposal to withold back pay owing to 
those on strike and continued to press the idea in spite of the Lord 
Chancellorts doubts as to the legality of the measure. They also con-
sidered how "the ordinsry amenities of public life might be withdrewn 
from the strikers". Here thsy were restrained by fear of provoking 
opposition from other workers yet they continued to speculate on how 
the railwaymen might be deprived of the necessities of life in spite 
of warnings from their advisers, 8asil Thomson among them, that strikss 
without resources would present a far greater threat to public order. 
A sub-committee was appointed to consider the practicalities of pre-
venting the distribution of strike pay, of freezing Union funds and 
of reducing unemployment benefit. While the Strike Committee recog-
nised that the last measure would provoke "an accusation by the 
industrial classes that the Government was using the present strike 
as an excuse for reducing unemployment pay" it proved to be no deter-
rent. Another tactic was considered which was potentially even more 
provocative. Haig, as Field ~arshall of the Home Forces, suggested 
that as a number of those on strike were nominally part of the tzt 
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army reaerve they could be called to tha colours. The Committee was 
evidently prepared to countenance such a plan for it requested "the 
War Office to take such steps as would enable them to be called up at 
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an eerly date, if this should be considered necessary". 
:,Had the Railway Strike lasted longer it might have led to a spectacular 
confrontation. Even in the short time at its disposal the Cabinet 
managed to create considerable panic. Lloyd George was prepared to 
take the lead, claiming that the strike "had been engineered by a 
small but active body of men who work tireleesly and insidiously to 
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exploit the Labour organisations of this country for subversive e~ds." 
The press reacted on cue. To the lOaily ~ail' the strike was against 
the public: "It is an attempt to starve the country into submission,,:98 
while the 'Times' prepared for battle; "Like the 'war with Germany, 
it must be a fight to the finish":99 A correspondent of the Contemporary 
Review identified the strike as an attempt at revolution. 300 The only 
justification for this view would appear to have come from the statements 
of the more enthusiastic supporters of the railwaymen:01 The Government 
was clearly inclined to the extreme view and moved troops into Crewe, 
Swindon, Derby and Doncaster, "the population of which were largely rail-
waymen (and) where the pr~sence of the military might be advisable. 302 
Liverpool was afforded the benefit of a "large warship" which the Cabinet 
felt, would have "a good moral effect". Troops were also sent to deal with 
trouble which "might arise from the preeence of a hooligen element" but were 
not to be ueed "in any work that might be regarded as strike breaking". 
This was to be entrusted to "volunteers in plain clothes" who were to be 
allowed to run such services as were possible. Yet such volunteers proved 
hard to come by and appeals for special conetables proved to be especially 
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fruitless. The Strike Committee proposed that a "Citizen Guard" should 
be formed. The public were to be advised that the organisation wae not 
military, but it was based on the National Services Organisation and 
army officers were to be seconded to Local Authoritiee to assist in its 
organisation. The scheme bore the marks of a hasty and ill-considered 
expedient and was rapidly discarded at the end of the strike. 
The Governmentts conduct during the Railway Strike showed little im-
provement on previous efforts. The propaganda offensive was more 
intenee than on previous occasions yet its timing and its vehemence 
might well have proved countsr-productive. Instead of a continuous 
steady build up to put the union in the wrong the Government had 
attempted to shock public opinion. Horne had attacked "the ~astardly 
nature" of the strike but his attempt to sUbetantiate this claim by 
arguing that the strike was not against profit making but against a 
Government which was losing money on railway operations was torturous 
and ineffective. Lloyd George had contributed a measure of drama by 
arranging, the day before, that a public meeting he was to have addressed 
should be warned of his lunavoidable t absence occas~oned by the strike 
by means of a tlast minute t telegram~03 The measure of the Governmentts 
failure was the support which the Railwaymen received from other unions 
and the failure of appeals for volunteers. The tactics of Lloyd George 
might have been effective in the heightened atmosphere of war but some-
thing more subtle was necessary for the peace. A contemporary noted, 
"It looks as if the Government planned their course in the hope that 
a strike would taks place, and then use all the forces at their disposal 
to smaeh the NUR, then take similar action in regard to other unions"~04 
While this wae clearly a partisan statement which overestimated the 
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coherence of Government policy as well as the competence of the machi-
nery at the Cabinet's disposal there was little in the Government's 
conduct which could be cited to refute the charge. Not only did such 
conduct antagonise still further those already disposed to be suspicious 
of the Government, but it failed to mobilise those sections of society 
who were potential allies. That Sir Basil Thomson could later conclude 
that the Railway Strike had had a settling effect on the world of 
labour was a measure of the Cabinet's good fortune rather than good 
judgment. 
18B 
The Formation of the STO 
After the Railway Strike the Strike Committee was wound up and its 
functions invested in the nsw Supply and Transport Committee the members 
of which were to be the Minister of Transport, Eric Geddes, as chairman, 
the Home Secretary, the President of the 80ard of Trade, ths Food Can-
troller, the Minister of Labour and the Shipping Controller. The first 
task which the nsw Committee set itself was to examine the conduct of 
its predecessors with a view to determining how it should conduct its 
own affairs. One sub-committee was asked to discover "what activities 
the Government may legitimately undertake during a strike without being 
accused of strike breaking":05 Though the asking of the question prs-
supposed some past uncertainty the sUb-committee's findings broke no 
new ground. They argued, with some justice, that the Government could 
never concede enough to avoid all accusations of 'strike breaking', snd 
that such fears should never be allowed to compromise its overriding 
duty which was "to maintain the life of the community against all 
dangers". Any measures necessary to this end should be taken "regard-
less of its effect on either party to a strike". The sub-committee 
dsfined ths esssntial minimum actions as guarantesing ths transport 
and distribution of food, the maintenance of water supplies, sanitation 
and household coal suppliss,,"ths provision of lighting and of such 
transport and communication facilities as would be necessary to enable 
all such services, and government itself to operate. The organisation 
was also to take responsibility for the protection of all those 
sngsged in the provision of services. Ths sub-committss argued on 
the basis of these proposals: "There is little doubt that public 
opinion would support the Government in maintaining the essentials of 
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life, no matter what the subject of the dispute might be". It was 
assumed that serious political problems would srise if the Government 
went beyond this, and the object of the additional activity "were 
merely the maintenance of the normal business activity of the country". 
Such action might provs necessary for "the preservation of ths state" 
if, f~ instance a situation arose in which eo many people were made 
idle by a dispute that the payment of unemployment money became imposaible. 
Its final conclusion was that government measures should always be 
determined by events. In formulating the idea that government activity 
should be made to fit the situation the sub-committee was clearly im-
proving on the 'strategy' employed during the Railway Strike, and in 
outlining principles of action it was at least suggesting that futurs 
decisions should be disciplined by considerations of cause and effect. 
-Ths most immediate problem facing the supply and Traneport Committes 
was that of the uss of the military in industrial disputes. The 
Admiralty, as noted above, had been very unhappy ebout the use of naval 
ratings in the Yorkshire mines, and the First Lord, W H Long brought 
a new problem to the committee. It had been discovered that while 
ratings were engaged in such duties' they were under no legal obligation 
to obey orders. Unless this law were changed the Navy in future could 
only be used for military duties or when the safety of the realm was 
threatened:06 Ths War Office was, if anything, even more disturbed by 
ite recent forays into industry. Haig was disturbsd by the sheer 
number of troops which had been engaged in the Railway dispute. 
Twenty-three thousand men had been deployed on protection duties and 
thirtsen batallions and three cavalry regiments had been moved to 
positions of readiness. Fifty-nine batallions had been held in reserve 
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at regional commands with fourteen batallions and three cavalry 
regiments at GHQ. The confusion had been considerable and a number 
of ill-considered actions had been undertaken. The second Welsh 
Regiment had been sent to maintain order in Swansea and tha demanda 
of the politicians had necessitated the recall of two companiee of 
the Rhine Army. Haig complained that the Cabinet's fears about the 
inadequacy of the police forces had led them to breach the understand-
ing that the maintenance of the King's peace was ultimately a police 
responsibility. He felt the situation could only get worse. While 
the Army had in the event been able to meet the demands made upon it, 
this would not be possible in the future becauee of demobilisation. 
He suggested the problem must be alleviated by the more economical use 
of troops, by better transport facilities and by the formation of a 
£itizen Guard. Wilson, the CleGS, added a supporting memorandum: "If . . 
all the protection duties anticipated by the various Civil Government 
Departments, in certain eventualitiee, had been demanded it would have 
proved imposeible for the Army in Great Britain, large as it was at 
the time, to have provided the necessary numbers". Existing plans 
required, at full stretch, 265,000 men and only 100,000 were available. 
Wilson argued that the police would have to be responsible for normal 
protection duties in strikes with the Army held "as a laet rssource, 
when tha situation may be getting beyond the control of the civil 
power". Even at this stage the Ministry of Transport would heve to 
be responsible for actually moving the troope. Wilson added, "I am 
advised that such an emergency is to be expected about the New Year" 
and warned that unless the situation was dealt with quickly he could 
not guarantee that the Army would be "in a position to meet the call 
that may be made upon it in the event of aggravated industrial trouble 
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The Cabinet accepted the War Office view and began the search for a 
eUbstitute. Haig's suggestion for a Citizen Guard wae ruled out at 
the Cabinet of October 7th though not without opposition. The Home 
Secretary, in particular, was reluctant to abandon the idea yet he 
eventually conceded that as the idea had proved "not as popular as 
expected in some areas" it was better to concentrate on developing the 
~8 Special Constabulary. Yet here too the situation was far from satis-
factory. The Chief Constable informed the STC in December that 90,000 
men were currently enrolled and 60,000 more could be relied upon in the 
event of a special emergency. When the Protection Sub-Committee inves-
tigated the situation they discovered a further difficulty, for while 
there would be sufficient numbers of special constables in most rural 
and residential districts, "in industrial areas the numbers would 
probably be very small, and in certain areas (eg some Lancashire 
boroughs) whers the whole population are either workers or tradeemen 
dependent on the workers, hardly a single special constable will be 
obtainedn~09An immediate appeal was ruled out on the grounds that it 
would prove ineffective and publicise the Government's weakness. This 
they argued might encourage future etrikers to commit acts of violence. 
The sub-committee even considered the compulsory recruitment of con-
stables but rejected the idea on the grounds that such men were liable 
to prove useless. They finally came to the view that the Government 
would have to rely on volunteers but that the appeal for assistance 
could only be effectively made when an emergency was imminent. Its 
succees would "depend on how far the public appreciated the gravity 
of the situation, and are out of sympathy with the strikers". It is 
interesting that this strategy, which was the basis of all future 
operations, was only accepted as a last resort and in the face of 
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opposition from the Scottish Secretary and the Home Secretary who 
submitted a joint memorandum on the inadequacy of protection services. 
The success of such a strategy would depend on effective propaganda. 
In February 1920 the STC formed a Propaganda Sub-Committee; "to coneider 
an organisation for conducting publicity and propaganda on behalf of the 
Government • • • and to consider the question of issuing propaganda 
before as well as during a crisis,,~10 Arthur Neale, for the Government, 
warned the sub-committee that "the whole subject involved dangerous 
issues and required both secret and most careful handling", and that 
anything they decided must be submitted to Cabinet~11 In discussions of 
propaganda the members of the STC made many references to what was being 
done on the Labour side, which ~8s.frankly viewed as the opposition. 
The Propaganda Sub-Committee warned that "it should be realised that the 
Labour Publicity Headquarters Office at Eccleston Square is fully orga-
nised for any conditions that may arise. It is well staffed; it has 
famous writers at its disposal; its telephone and general communications 
organisation is complete, it welcomes press representatives at any hour 
and goes to endless trouble to supply articles and materials. The press 
are making more and more use of this establishment •• "~12While they 
thought that the Government needed the services of a similar organisation 
the sub-committee were unanimously agreed that Government Departments 
could not produce effective propaganda before a crisis and that the 
decision not to establish a ~inistry of Information, taken in the Spring 
of 1919, had been the correct ona. Propaganda bef~re an emergency would 
have to be handled by a nominally independent agency and the sub-
committee submitted to the Cabinet a long account of the activities of 
organisations already in the field as likely contenders for this role. 
A number of them had already been brought to the Cabinet's attention 
through the reports of Basil Thomson. 
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There were apparently two main bodies engaged in anti-labour propaganda; 
National Propaganda and Industrial Information. In addition there were 
many smaller bodies, some of them working on a regional or sectional 
basis, among them the Reconstruction Society, the Industrial Welfare 
Society, the National Association of Employers and Employed, the 
British Empire Association, the British Commonwealth Union and the 
Comrades of the Great War. Some rationalisation had already been under-
taken; "The two main organisations are in close touch with them and 
in some instances and to some extent exercise control and give financial 
support in return for the use of local 'machinery'". The two larger 
bodies kept their existence secret while many of the smaller organisations 
operated openly. National Propaganda was chaired by Rear Admiral Sir 
Reginald Hall ~P, who had been head of Naval Intelligence during the 
War. The stated aim of that body was "the utter annihilation of false-
hood and universal statement of economic truth", and thereby the dimi-
nution of industrial and social unrest. It attracted considerable 
financial support from firms and private individuals and was well 
organised and fully operational. It distributed leaflets and posters, 
trained and financed speakers to address meetings of working men, and 
co-operated with employars'federstions and others to propagate the 
necessity for increased production and opposition to "all acts against 
constitutional government". It had already 'worked' forty-four indus-
trial centres, held eighty-nine well attended meetings and distributed 
three million leaflets and over three hundred thousand posters. Indus-
trial Information was financed from an unofficial capital fund which 
was administered by 'the Whips'. As with National Propaganda its 
efforts were directed against "economic misstatement, direct action 
and Bolahevism" and in favour of "constitutional government and higher 
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production". However, in contrast, it worked mainly through the 
existing media. Articles were prepared for the newspapers by a perma-
nent staff of twenty-five expert journalists and economiste and 
supplemented by contributions from outsiders. These articles, con-
veniently set in galley proof or stereo were distributed to the London 
and provincial newspapers and periodicals and to Trade Journals. 
Although the organisation had only been formed in October 1919 it had 
developed a circulation of a thousand articles a week. Seven hundred 
provincial papers were accepting articles, six hundred and fifty cartoons 
had been produced and a formidable array of outsiders had been persuaded 
to contribute material, among them Sir Robert Horne, George Robey and 
Mary Pickford. A special 'economic' number of 'Teachers' World' had 
been produced and twenty-five thousand free copies distributed to schools. 
The sub-committee concluded that an adequate amount of propaganda was 
being undertaken on a sound basis. rrom the Government'. point of view 
the situation was ideal. They were relieved of any financial responsi-
bility, the people in charge were 'reliable' and 'responsible', and such 
propaganda had more credibility than anything they might have issued 
themselves. One unsolicited testimonial from Mary Pickford on the mani-
fold benefits of capitalism was surely worth a thousand official pro-
nouncements. 
The only difficulty connected with the decision to rely on private 
bodies for general propaganda was that of preserving secrecy. Arthur 
Neale warned the sub-committee that the greatest care must be taken to 
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conceal the contacts between official and unofficial bodies. 
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If the initial decision of the STC were to be maintained and the role 
of the unofficial organisations restricted to general propaganda,con-
tacts could remain on an informal basis and the problem of meintaining 
sacurity,might not prove too great. Yet if, as was perhaps inevitable 
in view of their resources, the Government should decide that it was 
necessary to use such organisations for particular ends new means of 
concealing the connection would have to be found. In fact the demand 
for an increased role for the unofficial bodies came almost immediately. 
During the miners' strike, in August 1920, the propaganda SUb-committee 
complained that, "it was not practicable to carry out a campaign by 
means of speakers without enlisting the aasistance of certsin unofficial 
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organisations", and asked the STC to reconsider its decision thst such 
bodias could not be directly employad. Within a week a solution was 
found and Mr Dimbleby, an official of the Stationery Office, reported 
that National Propaganda had opened a branch called National Publicity 
which they ran on a °purely business footing" so "there wae no longer 
any objection to engaging the services of the latter body". Some pre-
vious contact was confirmed by his statement that "they were ready" 
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and "they would act quickly and in the right directions". In addition 
it had ceen seen as undesirabla "in view of tha activitiee of the 
Public Accounts Committee" that the charges for intelligence services 
connected with such propaganda work should be met on the Stationery 
Office vote, so Basil Thomson had undertaken to provide resources from 
the Secret Service vote~16 
The use of unofficial bodies allowed the Propaganda Sub-Committee to 
concentrate its energies on plans for crises. It suggested that the 
Government should be prepared to issue preas advertisements, poeters, 
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pamphlets and articlss for inclusion in newspapers. There should 
also be plans for a proper intelligence network and the publication 
and distribution of a government newspaper. The propaganda machine 
in operation would cost £100,000 a week, and this sum did not include 
the services of unofficial organisations nor the payment of official 
staff who would be drawn from various government departments. 
The improved emergency organisation with its increased emphasis on 
propaganda was in action. during the miners~ 'Datum Line~ strike of 
1920. From the origins of the strike, in the miners' claim, to its 
conclusion the Government displayed an unwavering determination to 
present the miners' case in as poor a light as possible. Between the 
special conference of the ~FGB, which recommended strike action, and 
the ballot of the membership the STC mounted its first campaign. Eight 
thousand pounds was found for advertising space in the Sunday news-
papera of 22nd August, and on the 16th, as noted above, the propaganda 
sub-committee began to lobby for permission to use unofficial agencies, 
and this was granted on the 23rd. While there was, by now, wide agree-
ment ae to the necessity for propagande there was considerable debate 
as to the form it should take. One party thought the publicity campaign 
should be restricted to the immediate objectives concerned with the 
current strike while the other thought the opportunity should be taken 
to mount a general crusade against trade unionism as such. The aggre-
sive policy waa strongly forwarded by Sir Basil Thomson who had been 
co-opted onto the sub-committee. He suggested that information he 
had gathered about the situation in Rueeia should be included in the 
propaganda, and that emphasis might be placed on the fact that 
dona~ions which the unions made to the 'Daily Herald' reduced the 
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amount of money available for strike pay. Thomson's advice was 
rejected as it was thought to raise too many 'political problems': 
"Such propaganda would fail to unite other Trede Unions against the 
miners, whereas publicity of a purely economic type as to the generel 
effects of a miners' strike would probably echieve that end"~17Another 
view was that even this type of campaign was excessive. Sir Edward 
Troup, ~erma~ent Secretary at the Home Office, submitted a memorandum 
arguing that -Government propaganda should concentrate on the need for 
volunteers for the emergency and avoid all mention of the merite of 
the dispute which occasioned it •. Troup's advice wae ignored and the 
committee decided to base their activities on an attack on the miners, 
preparing, for example, an account of absenteeism in the mines for use 
as requirsd. 
Yet propaganda was only one aspect of the new strategy. If it was to 
be completely successful it would require all public aspects of govern-
ment activity to be considered in the light of their impact on public 
opinion. In particular it would require that emergency arrangements 
should not leave the impression of a "war machine" in operation against 
civilians. However there were several members of the STC who felt that 
such political niceties were misplaced. The argument came to a head 
at the meeting of August 18th when the mobilisation of the government 
forces was discussed. Those committed to the use of maximum resources, 
irrespective of the political consequences favoured an immediate mobi-
lisation. This, they argued, would make the miners aware of the 
Government's intention to fight. If the Government delayed they would 
never be able to arouse opinion to the extent necessary to ensure the 
enrolment of the severel hundred thoueand volunteers deemed essential. 
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Opponents pointed out that this wes baeed on an unsophisticated view 
of public opinion. It was not necessary to indulge in this type of 
overt activity to demonstrate the seriouaness of the Government and 
besides, such action "would merely throw the miners into the arme of 
other members of the Triple Alliance, and would consolidate the three 
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. unions". The advocates of the more subtle approach were not inclined 
to minimise the dangers of the situation. Like their more strident 
colleagues they felt that the issue went beyond that of miners' wagea: 
"~en's minds were in the balance. What was needed was propaganda 
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showing the suffering that would arise from revolutionary movements". 
They too recognised the problems posed by the existence of several 
thousand bitter unemployed ex servicemen in every major city; "If 
there were trouble of any kind these men would be in it". So while 
they argued their casa on tactical grounds; that it was important not 
to unite trade unions, and on practical grounds; that precipitate 
action might provoke a 'go slow' in the pits and reduce coal stocks, 
they, no less than their opponents, believed that the ultimate ob-
jective was "to form a wall of solid opinion against revolution". 
Their strategy, they felt, was far more likely to achieve this end 
than a policy of immediate and maximum mobilisation. 
The STC's survey of its component parts revealed a better state of 
preparedness than had ever existed before. rive thousand lorries 
were available at short notice, adequate arrangements had been made 
for the transport of foodstuffs by sea, a plan to maintain electricity 
eupplies awaited only the necessary volunteers and the Admiralty had 
sorted out its difficulties. In addition a regional network had 
been established and Civil Commissioners appointed to each area. The 
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idea had developed out of the feeling that Eric Geddes' presence in 
Yorkshire during the strike of 1919 had enabled central government 
to co-ordinate and encourage those local forcee prepared to act against 
the strikers. Junior ~inisters had now been allocated to particular 
regions and were ready to operate at the outbreak of any dispute. In 
addition, by means of this regional organisation local voluntary 
efforts had been channeled into a permanent nationwide structure of 
Voluntary Service Committees. By means of these organisations the 
Government felt able to act without the co-operation of Local Autho-
rities many of which were regarded as unreliable because of their 
Labour majorities. 
On September 22nd, when strike action seemed imminent the Civil 
Commiseioners sent in reports on their respective regions. Chairmen 
had been appointed to all the Volunteer Service Committees and all 
were proving satisfactory. It was estimated that sufficient volunteers 
would come forward in most areas for special police duties and to 
maintain public utilities. The Civil Commissioners judged that opinioM 
wae largely favourable to the Government; there was 'anti miner' 
feeling among other trade unionists and-even Labour Local Authorities 
might, in the main, be expected to support the Government. The 
chances of serious civil disturbances were thought to be low though 
there was a considerable list of exceptions to the rule. Trouble 
might be expected in Dundee, on the Clyde and in certain mining 
districts in the North East of England. In the Potteries raids on 
coal dumps ware anticipated. Luton was singled out ae a potential 
black spot and disorder might occur in Varmouth and Lowestoft if the 
coal boats stopped working. There were 'dangerous minorities' in 
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Gillingham, Gravesend, Tilbury, Sheerness, Chatham and Dover. Even 
Bristol contained an unruly element and the Commissioner for the South 
West requested naval and military assistance to be sent there. In 
North Wales Wrexham was regarded as a troublesome district, but it was 
inevitably the mining valleys of the South where the greatest diffi-
culties existed. The Civil Commissioner, Sir A Griffith Boscawen, 
believed that owing to the hostility of the population and the intract-
ability of the local Authorities this area would have to be left to 
manage its own affairs. 
While the Commissioners were largely confident of their ability to 
maintain services in most regions they did request a number of final 
improvements. They asked for powers to comandeer offices and accommo-
dation for their volunteers and asked for speakers to put across the 
Government case. They s~ggested that coal etocke should be removed 
from the mining valleys, and ae few as possible kept on ships. The 
Commissioners also recommended that they should be given full sxecutive 
authority in order to increase their ability to co-ordinate arrangements 
and that they should b~ empowered to form regional executive committees 
so that they could operate independently of central goverament when 
the ·need arose. 
In the event the strike wae neither prolonged nor bitter and the 
reports which the Civil Commiesioners submitted to Cabinet indicated 
that most of the arrangements worked satisfactorily. Although a police 
charge proved necessary in Tonypandy and there was rioting in Hamilton 
Burghs and fife the fears of disturbances had, for the most part, been 
misplaced. - The Commissioners had been free to concentrate on how 
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best the strike might be won. Within the organisation it was assumed 
without question that the object of the exerc~se was to defeat the 
miners. The Chief Assistant to the Commissioner for the North ~idlands 
addressed himself to the question of how quickly the victory might be 
achieved. "The miners", he warned, had "certain means apart from their 
wages, eg houses, invested funds, motor bicycles and other articles 
which could be pawned, eg pianos, fur coats etc etc. If determined 
to push the strike to a successful end qua the miners these matters 
must be taken into account.,,3200ther Commissioners advocated that 
Local Authorities should give priority in coal supply to firms producing 
food, beer, and newspapers and to places of public entertainment. 
Every effort should also be made to maintain supplies to railway owned 
workshops in view of the possibility of NUR support for the miners. 
The Commissioners were understandably sensitive about political criti-
cism of volunteer labour. Robert Williams remsrks, that "he and his 
Exscutive colleagues look upon the policy of enrolment of volunteers, 
especially from the middle classes and the White Guard of the com-
munity as one that would be more provocative than the use of troops,,~21 
appear to have caused some concern. 
At the end of the strike the STC felt thst the main weakness rsmained 
in the field of protection. The Protection Sub-Committes reiterated 
its dissatisfaction with "the means availsbls for the suppresion of 
widespread disturbance", and the ~inistry of ~unitione complained 
that it would have had insufficient cover had farce been used against 
its operations~ The Scottish Office too, while conceding that the 
police forces available had been adequate in the circumstances, warned 
that they would not have proved so had the dispute continued longer or 
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322 been more bitterly contested. The main difficulty with the enrolment 
of volunteers had been the "multiplicity of recruiting agencies". 
Locel Authorities had been involved in the business of recruitment 
except where Civil Commissioners "were of opinion that the Locel 
Authority could not safely be approached or that it would be useless 
323 to do so". In a large number of cases Civil Commissioners had 
decided to recruit on their own authority and this had resulted in 
some confusion. While recognising that a problem existed the STC was 
not able to offer any solution. 
The conduct of this, the Datum Line strike, undoubtedly represented a 
considerable improvement on what had gone before. At the most basic 
level the organisation itself had fUnctioned largely as it was supposed 
to have done. Perhaps more importantly those involved in the operation 
appear to have acquired a greater political sensitivity. The greater 
reliance on volunteer and private organisations, the additional attention 
to publicity and the Government's careful manoeuvring made for a more 
sophisticated operation. The replacement of DORA by the Emergency Powers 
Act, also made a cosmetic contribution to laying the ghost of the "war 
machine". The Civil Commissioners' organisation too had ensured that 
the Government's wish for vigorous, though politically sensitive, 
activity had penetrated to the regions. Immediately after the strike 
another element of political sophisticstion wss introduced into the 
emergency arrangements. Two sets of mobilisation plans ware introduced 
one to operate in the event of a coal strike alone and the other, the 
'Zero List', in a full Triple Alliance Strike. 324In addition protection 
arrangements were improved by the formation of a 'Defence Force'. This 
was to operate in much the same way as the Special Constabulary though 
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recruitment would be more centralised and lists of potential recruits 
drawn up in advance of an emergency. Thus as the major Triple 
Alliance strike threatened in 1921 the Government had at its disposal 
an organisation which was adequate for both its publicly declared 
purpoee of maintaining those services essential to the life of the 
community and its private determination, to defeat the miners and 
weaken the power of organised labour. The most serious threat to the 
effectiveness of the organisation wae represented by those within the 
Government camp who through exaggerated fsars of labour wsre frequently 
led to demand that the state should act haetily and without thought 
for the political repercussions. 
All the deliberations of the STC in the early months of 1921 were 
conditioned by one significant date. On ~arch 31s~ the Government 
was due to relinquish control of the mining industry. A prolonged 
and bitter dispute between the union and the coal owners was all but 
inevitable for decontrol would raise a number of contentious issues. 
Government control had involved national wage bargaining and the ~FG8 
wae strongly committed to its maintenance while the owners were equally 
strongly opposed. Also, under the pressure of wartime demand and in 
the absence of foreign supplies the Government had abandoned normal 
commercial considerations and expanded capacity even to the extent of 
re-opening redundant pite. This too would prove a fertile source of 
conflict between the union and the owners. Even the issue of wages, 
viewed at the simpleat level was complicated by the Sankey award and 
the war bonuses. ~oreover the archaic organisation of the industry 
made solutione to any of these difficulties seem even more remote; 
and the miners were liable to be even more intransigent than they 
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might have otherwise been after the charade of the Sankey Inquiry 
• 
The broad nature of the dispute and the fact that it involved the 
queetion of Government responsibility indicated that any industrial 
action might involve the other unions of the Triple Alliance. The 
Government could have been about to faes its severest test. 
In the event little needed to be added to the existing emergency 
arrangements. The main improvement was the formation of the 'Defence 
rorce'. Confidential lists of those prepared to volunteer for these 
duties were drawn up well i~ advance of the conflict. In January the 
STC received sanction for building a further ten wireless stations to 
improve its communications network. Previously disparitiee had arisen 
when the dismantling of Government Departments had removed essential 
parts of the emergency services. The anticipated Triple Alliance 
strike brought permission for the STC to temporarily prsserve a number 
of offices. In February the Supply Department wae ordered to continue 
ite existing services and the Minse Department, an inevitable victim 
of decontrol, was given permission to maintain a skeleton service 
against an emergency. The STO was mainly occupied, in the interval 
between the Datum Line Strike and March 31st in consolidation and main-
tenance of existing schemes. 
In March the conflict took its, seemingly, inevitable course. The 
owners posted district terma which involved up to fifty per cent wage 
reductione for some miners. Recognising that little could be gained 
from the owners the MrG8 argued that the Government should maintain 
its responsibility and continue to subsidise the industry. Horne, on 
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behalf of the Government refused to countenence any such suggestion 
and the lockout began on March 31st. The Government immediately 
. declared an emergency, under the EPA, and on April 4th began to move 
troops into the coalfields. The War Office and the Admiralty can-
celled all leave and on April 6the Government turned the London parks 
over to the STO for the supply and protection services. On April 8th 
military reservists were called up and formal enrolments in the 
'Defence Force' begun. The latter operation proceeded particularly 
smoothly because of the lists of likely volunteers which already 
existed in the localities. The Propaganda Sub-Committee was also 
quickly off the mark. In their view, "undoubtedly the ordinary 
newscopy of the press is the greatest force in moulding public opinion", 
and Lobby Correspondents were afforded tha special attention of 
"advisers". For the greater part the press retailed the Government's 
case with missionary zaal but to supplement this advertisements, two 
appealing for voluntaers, for the Defence Force and another containing 
the Prime Minister's speech on Direct Action, were placed. For those 
who avoided the newspapers,posters containing appeals for recruits; 
"How Can I Help the Nation?" and "Help to Keep the Peace", and pamphlets 
putting the Government case were issued~26The Reconstruction Society 
wae also employed to furthar the cause. An office wae even set up in , 
Wales to translate the message into the vernacular. The STC decided 
that racing too, could serve the propaganda campaign and they decided 
to suspend it, partly to save resources, but largely "to bring home 
to the public the seriousnees of the situation,,~27 They even considered 
the poseibility of posting propaganda to miners' wives. One week into 
the cosl strike the pit ponies were called to the Government's aid. 
The Government used imaginary dangers to the ponies to prejudice the 
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issue of the msintenance men. Inevitably in such a lock out the main-
tenance men were not working and when the Government raised the iseue 
with the ~fG8 they refused to let them return except on these conditions 
in force up to ~arch 31st. It is possible that the pit ponies did have 
have the desired effect for on April 9th the leaders of the other Triple 
Alliance unions urged the ~iners' union to allow the maintenance men 
to return to work. Thue the first act of the Triple Alliance was to 
effectively weaken the miners' position. 
~ost of the discussions within the STC during the early days of the 
dispute were on the probable involvement of other unions. On April 7th, 
anticipating the Triple Alliance conference of the next day, the mood 
was gloomy: "Generally speaking things were as bad as they could be". 
They advocated that nothing provocative should be done and that, in 
particular, the Railway Companies should be persuaded not to stop the 
guaranteed week until the emergency was over. The Committee's dis-
cussions of the likely involvement of the rail unions was informed by 
a 'confidential' ASLEf circular which discussed restricted working as 
opposed to a total stoppage. They still felt however that strikes by 
the NUR and TWU should be anticipated but argued for "no overt prepa-
ration for fear· of pracipitating such actionn~29 However, in secrecy, 
Naval personnel were brought up from Portsmouth to be ready to man 
the electricity stations, the AA and RAC were warned to prepare their 
members for volunteer driving work and a preliminary warning on the 
requisitioning of vehicles was issued. Strike books, containing detailed 
instructions were held at banks, and the managers were requested to 
remain on duty over the weekend in case it should prove necessary to 
mobilise the full organisation. 
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On the same day, April 8th, that the STO was inching towards full 
mobilisation the Triple Alliance took the decision to strike in 
support of the miners at midnight on April 12th. However on April 11th 
the Prime Minister, anticipating that s postponement would result 
from the negotiations he was holding with Triple Alliance leaders, 
told the STC not to expect the strike at midnight. In the interim 
the Committee discussed whether it was better to allow the press to 
report disturbances in mining districts or persuade them to avoid 
reference to any such occurrences~3DrMe negotiations with the Triple 
Alliance broke down on April 12th and April 15th was fixed as the 
new date for the commencement of the strike. On April 14th the STO 
was given the final go ahead: "All preparations should be presssd 
on with immediately on the assumption that there would bs a Triple 
Alliance strike on Friday April 15th at 10 pm" .331 
The next stage of mobilisation took place very smoothly. Vehicles 
wers commandeered, Hyds Park and Regent's Park were closed and prepared 
for their new function, volunteers to operate the London Underground 
were put on the alert and three columns of advertising space waa re-
sarved in the evening papers of April 15th to ensure the full circu-
lation of the Prime Minister's speech to the Triple Alliance. The 
Minister of Education wae instructed to appeal to Universities and 
Technical Colleges to postpone the opening of the Summer Term, "in 
order to enable students to volunteer for essential services,,:32 
After the officials had been asked to leave the STC discussed "what 
steps should be taken to cut off the funds of the Trade Unions and 
Co-operative Societies and to increase the difficulties of the Unions 
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and Societies by restrictions through the banks on advances to those 
bodies":J~hey also considered reports in the prese that school 
children in mining areas were being given additional meals by sympa-
thetic education authorities. There was some feeling that even this 
small assistance should be stopped though the committee as a whole 
decided not to do anything about it. They also found time to consider 
their own immediate safety; "Reference was made to the fact that at 
the preeent moment considerable road repairing wae being done in 
Whitehall and large dumps of wood blocks, which would form convenient 
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missiles in the event of a disturbance, had been created". Arrsngements 
were made to have these removed. 
By the 16th April the STC had accommodated to the calling off of the 
Triple Alliance action and the 'Action List' arrangements were being 
cancelled. There was, however, no relaxation in those measures dir-
ected against the mining lock out. ~uch of the volunteer labour could 
be demobilised and a circular latter, in the name of the Prime Minister 
was eent to volunteers praising their 'zeal' and 'public spirit'. The 
STC proposed 'special recognition' for the chairmen of the Volunteer 
Service Committees in return for their many months of secret work. All 
that remained was to finish off the miners' resistance. 
The only real issue which arose in April was that of importing coal. 
It was decided at Cabinet level that the inadequacy of stocks made this 
desirable. On April 29th the STC learnt that dockers who were members 
of the TWU, had, in several ports, refused to unload imported coal. 
Ths Committee saw such action as "part of the policy of the Communist 
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Party" and advocated a tough response; "The Government should announce 
that if they were supported by the nation they were confident that 
they could maintain the vital services of the country. It was felt 
thst such an announcement would bring home to the people the seriousness 
of the situation and the necessity for supporting the Government." 
While they were determined to use force if necsssary to land the coal, 
the Committee urged that no action be taken for a few days; "The 
interval would be ueed for working up public opinion in favour of the 
Government and for organising machinery both at the ports and pit 
heads."33The fact that stocks were down to an estimated two and a half 
weeks' supply was to be kept from the public. 
The situation was serious enough for the STC to meet again in the 
evening and the suggestion to commandeer American coal bound for 
Italy in British vessels was coneidered. By ~ay 6th the Committee 
was getting news that some parts of the Triple Alliance were working 
at grassroots level even if it had collapsed at the top, for railway-
men were refusing to operate coal trains which had evaded the dockers'. 
boycott. On ~ay 9th they were warned that any attempt to use volun-
teers to move import~d coal in Glasgow would be met by a strike of 
both dockers and railwaymen. The unions were prepsred to allow in 
supplies which were neceesary to maintain essential services but the 
STC was adamant that railwaymen and dockers should not be allowed to 
discriminate batween coal for commercial purposee and that for public 
utilities. However care should be taken, where resistance was anti-
cipated, that "the issue was joined not in regard to consignments of 
commercial coal but in regard to coal for public utility purposes". 336 
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By ~ay ,10th the immediate crisis was over as enough imported coal was 
getting through. Eric Geddes put it down to disagreements between 
the NUR and the TWU and the difficultiee the Union Leaders hed in 
persuading all their members to undertake the necsssary action. While 
it kept the situation under daily review the STC again diemantled the 
edditional machinery. 
As it transpired this part of the emergency operation hed worked rather 
too' well, for demand for coal fell as a result of abnormally warm 
weether, the receseion in industry and the enthueiasm of Local Autho-
rities and others in providing substitute fuels:31 By June 8th the 
Government had imported more coal than it could use. The STC were 
caught between political expediency and parsimony. The cement 
companies wanted the coal but if they sold it to them immediately thay 
would be seen to be publicly engaging in strike breaking. Yet if they 
held on to the coal until the miners returned to work they stood to lose 
half a million pounds when the market price fell. Parsimony won and 
the coal was sold. The STC suggested, rather lamely, that "the supply 
of cement works might be regarded as • • • a matter of public impor-
tance"~38 
One striking feature of Government activities during the emergency was 
the degree to which they were prepared to intervene in areas which 
they would normally have felt to be beyond their legitimate competence. 
The London and North Eastern railway approached the Government before 
it took disciplinary action against a guard who had refused to work a 
blacked coal train. Similarly the Caledonian Railway submitted 
relevant disciplinary cases for the Government's opinion. ror the 
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most part such government interference in the private sector was done 
with the co-operation of companies, as in theee cases, but where oppo-
sition was encountered the Government was prepared to overrule it. 
On April 2nd, for example, the STC aaked tha Managing Director of an 
oil installation at Thameshaven to allow a detachment of naval person-
nel to be stationed at his premises on protection duties. The Committee 
suggeeted that if he was worried about the effect this would have on 
his workers he could say that "the Naval Party came merely to protect 
33~ 
them from outrage by Sinn rein or others". The Managing Director 
refuaed to accept the services of the Navy on the grounds that tha 
small number of policemen already at his disposal were quite adequate 
and any additional show of force would persuade his men to Join the 
strike. The Protection Sub-Committee refused to accept this. They 
conceded that Thameshaven was "away from any populous place" and as 
such in no danger from a "casual mob", but argued that "it could eaeily 
be taken by an organised attack". They offered no suggestion as to 
where such an attack might originate, but considered it sufficiently 
likely to recommend that the STC should overrule the Managing Director. 
The Petroleum Department advised that volunteer labour could easily 
keep the installation going in the event of a strike by employees, 
and the Naval rorce wae dispatched. The Managing Director continued 
to protest but the Government ignored him. In such matters they would 
tolerate no opposition. 
In the matter of propaganda the Government received maesive eupport 
from private. organisations without the neceseity of coercion. While 
L 5 Amery felt that the Publicity Committee's greatest achievement in 
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this area had been to ensure that government departments all spoke 
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with one voice, and while over £55,000 had been spent on direct pro-
pagBnda~41t seems probable that the bulk of reasonably credible 
publicity wae secured t~rough the active co-operation of private or-
ganisations. Theatre and Cinema managers had co-operated in the 
distribution of pamphlets, and tha Women's Guild of Empire hed also done 
much useful work in this area. The Cinematograph Exhibitors Association 
. had co-operated loyally by making the necessary arrangements for film 
propaganda, though the scheme had never been ueed. The Publicity 
Sub-Committee had iseued briefs for speakars and writers two or three 
timee a week, "bearing no indication of their official origin", and 
these had been distributed through the good, and discreet, offices 
of the Central Unionist Association, the Coalition Liberal Association, 
the British Commonwealth Union, the National Political League and the 
~iddle Class Union. I It was though, the popular newspapers which had 
proved the Government's greatest asset. ~r Dimbleby, an official at 
the Board of Trade who had been heavily involved in propaganda work 
before, had sat up an office for journalists; "reporters gladly 
availed themselves of the telephonic and other facilities offered". 
Communiques had been issued daily and the sub-committee waa highly 
satisfied with the way in which the preas had used them. ~r ~cCulloch 
had been sent to Scotland and had performed similar officea and mat 
with similar success. Amery falt that "the altersd attitudes of the 
Scottish papers no doubt had a very beneficial effect on the conduct 
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of the Scottish miners". The lessons of the Labour Research Department 
had been fully assimilated and had inevitably produced better results 
than that organisation could ever hope to achieve for while the LRO 
was working in a hostile atmosphere the press was, for-the most part, 
quite willing to mova in directions which the Government suggested. 
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Once the threat of a Triple Alliance strike had disappeared and coal 
supplies been guaranteed the Government had little to worry about. 
Indeed by June 3rd the Cabinet was contemplating dismantling more parts 
of the emergency machinery. The food Organisation requested permission 
to demobilise and sell off its stocks. The Navy wanted to rsturn to 
normal duties and the Communicatione and Road Transport Sub-Committees 
wanted to sell off their materials. Army and Navy units were withdrawn 
on June 21st. On July 1st the dispute was all but over and the 
Secretary of the ~ines was authorised to dismantle the last remnants 
of the ~ines Department which had been retained for the crisis. On 
July 4th the. miners returned to work and the Government wae left to 
congratulate itself on having extricated itself from its responsibilities 
towards the mining industry with the very minimu~ concessions. In 
the end the miners had been forced to accept the (10m subsidy to 
cushion the wage cuts which they had rejected on two previous occasions. 
The Government's campaign had been well organised and had attracted 
considerable support 'and it had also been considerably assisted by the 
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slump in industry and the fine weather. 
In the months following the defeat of the miners the emergency organi-
sation began to fall apart. This was partly a rsflection of the new 
industrial situation and partly a desirs to reduce the responsibilities 
of central government: "The sooner the duty of operating all emergency 
servicee was thrown on the Local Authorities and other bodies normally 
responsible, the sooner would wartime centralised methods be abolished 
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and Government be rid of the expense arising from such methods." On 
November 29th the Home Affairs Committee of the Cabinet mat to survey 
345 
what was left of the STO and to decide what should be preserved. 
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Before the Committee were papers by Geddes, who had retired as Chief 
Civil Commander on September 15th, Amery, recently appointed to that 
post, and Baldwin, President of the Board of Trade. Geddes' paper 
drew attention to the cost of previous operations. Even without in-
cluding the expenses of the War Office and the coat of the 'Defence 
force' the emergency arrangements had cost the Government in excess of 
a million and a quarter pounds. He estimated that the normal running 
costs of the organisation, if no strike occurred, at £55,000. While 
this waa a reduction on his estimate of January of 1921 of £97,000, 
caused by the dismantling of the rood Orgsnisation, he still felt it 
was much too high. Geddee felt that it was possible to maintain an 
adequate organisation for a negligible annual outlay. He argued that 
it was now possible to reduce the role of central government: "The 
war had created in the people a habit of looking to the Government for 
direction and initiative in every department of life and the Government 
was the only body which possessed sufficient strength to oppoae the 
great industrial organisations. This state. of things had now passed. 
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Private initiative had once more asaarted itself." Baldwin's paper 
pursued a similar theme: "Traders and consumers alike have become so 
accustomed during the last two years to regard the maintenance of food 
and other essential services as a normal function of government, that 
private enterprise can hardly be expected to reassert itself adequately 
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unless the necessity is made absolutely clear." The improved indus-
trial situation meant that a change to lass centralised methods 
brought no dangers. Geddes reinforced this idea, pointing out that 
while in the immediate post war period government action had been 
necessary for "the maintenance of order and decent living", "the power 
of the Trade Unions had visibly diminished, principally from economic 
causes, and the general strike had failed". 
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It was Baldwin who outlined for the Home Affairs Committee the 
implications of the decision they had to take. The choice they made 
"must depend to a large extent upon the risks which the Government were 
prepared to take. By spending a certain sum of money the Government 
could be ready in an emergency after a lapse of' so many days. If a 
smaller sum wara spent the lapse would be longer". "If, however, 
nothing were done at all and there was a sudden general strike, it 
might be impossible for the Government to improvise a system in time 
to cope with the general dislocation that might ensue." 
It was inevitable that the Committee should decide to dismantle the 
greater part of the STO for it was already falling apart. They 
abolished entirely the remaining parts of the rood Department of the 
Boaro of Trade, which had been the most costly part of the operation, 
and all other parts of the STO which had involved any substantial 
expenditure. However they did respond to Baldwin's warning and agreed 
that the bare nucleus of an emergency organisation, based on officials 
in the relevant Departments, might be maintained, though they stipulated 
that tha total cost of the operation must not exceed £2,000 per annum. 
One part of the STO which everyone wanted maintained was the Voluntary 
Service Committee structure organised under the Civil Commissioners 
and the Supply Department. In spite of its cheapness this was "one of 
the moat elaborate sections of the Supply and Transport Organisation". 
There were around ninety such Committees who took responsibility for 
recruiting labour and carrying on basic services. Geddes argued that 
if the Committee decided to abandon this organisation it would take a 
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long time to recreate it. The Chairmen of such Committses provided 
for the Government "a useful body of trustworthy personnel throughout 
the country and can be employed to sound local opinion, and approach 
Local Authorities unofficially. They can even supersede Local Autho-
rities of doubtful lOyalty".34'he new Chief Civil Commisaioner supported 
Geddes' view and the Home Affairs Committee readily asssnted to the 
retention of this part of the STD. 
The only note of dissention was struck by the Scottish Secretary, 
Robert Munro, who submitted a separate paper. He questioned the 
analysis of the industrial situation which was at the base of the new 
proposals: "Can the risk of industrial troubles on a national scale 
(formented possibly by communistic or other political activities) be 
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rsgarded as negligible if one looks beyond the next few months?" He 
conceded that the economic situation precluded immediate large scale 
industrial action but an improvement in trade could alter matters very 
rapidly. Munro warned that extremists were always at work and in many 
areas of Scotland the Local Authorities were unreliable. 
Nevertheless the reconstruction of the STO went ahead on the linee 
approved by the HAC. The main burden of activity was shifted to trade 
or voluntary associations and the Local Authorities. The Government's 
own organisation "would only be brought into being on the outbreak of 
an emergency, and then only to the extent necessitated by ths natura 
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of the emergency". At central level the organisation was to be kept 
in being by a Supply and Transport Sub Committee meeting every six 
months. Under this there were to be additional sub-committees to daal 
with aepects of policy, but these would meet only when required. The 
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work was to be largely carried out by officials and it was emphasised 
that "work on emergency queations should be recognised ae part of the 
ordinary duties of a Government Department". There was to be one 
officer in each Department "to whom reference could be made on any 
queetions concerning the emergency scheme". Any finance not obtained 
thro~gh the normal departmental vote should be under the Home Offica. 
Thus, as had been the wish of the Treasury, the Special Services vote 
was discontinued. Overall responeibility for the organisation was 
transferred to the Home Secretary and it was he who was to decide 
when the industrial situation required a fuller mobilisation. The 
cost of the new scheme was estimated et £1,750 in a normsl yesr. 
The absence of documentary evidence to the contrary suggests that in 
the following months very little was done to maintain the organisation. 
A paper from the Cabinet Secretary in ~arch 1923 suggested that many 
aspects had been allowed to fall into abeyance~S1 It was proposed that 
the organisation be transferred completely to the Home Office, that 
the Home Secretary rather than the Chief Civil Commissioner act as 
representative on the Cabinet Committee, and that the whole STO should 
be investigated by a standing sub committee of civil servants under 
the chairmanship of the Permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office. 
Amery questioned the exclusion of the Chief Civil Commissioner from 
the mein committee. He pointed out that the Commissioner was head of 
the voluntary organisation and the proposal for reorganisation ignored 
the important part that this played. However the inter-departmental 
sub committee was given permisaion to inveatigate, andSir~ohn Anderson 
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appointed chairman. 
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Anderson's report confirmed that little had been done since 1921. 
Even the minimal schemes proposed in November 1921 had relied on 
Government machinery which had subsequently been abolished and there 
were now no "effective plans on a sufficiently comprehensive scale rr : 53 
Anderson's starting point was that soma organisation was neceesary to 
cope with emergencies of the type envisaged by the Emergency Powers 
Act. He agreed that no new machinery should be created and that as 
far as possible departments should deal with thoae matters which came 
within their sphere of influence. The Civil Commissioners and the 
Voluntear Service Committees under their chairman, "specially sslected 
gentlemen of local standing and influence", should be retainad. This 
part of the STO was in being in any case and only two new appointments 
would be necessary. Executive functions connected with local organi-
sation should, Anderson argued, be transferred to the Civil Commissioners 
and they should be allowed a staff officer, a general inspector of the 
~inistry of Health, to assist them. Responsibility for postal services 
coal suppliee and protection should however, be retained by central 
government, except in the event of ~ communication breakdown during 
an emergency. 
The post of Chief Civil Commissioner should be retained and filled by 
a politician of Cabinet rank. There should be an ad hoc Cabinet 
committee but the main responsibility for co-ordination should fall 
on a standing sub committee to be staffed by Officials. Subject sub 
committees would be created for emergencies and their chairmen, under 
the Chief Civil Commissioner, would then take control. Anderson felt 
thst the coat of the organisation to central government should not exceed 
£1,750 in a normal year. 
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Anderson's final concern was that of the question of confidentiality. 
He notsd that in 1919 and 1920, "not only the detail of Government 
plans but avan the existence of tha special government organisation 
was kept largely secret". Anderson argued that the reorganisation of 
the STO and its increased reliance on outsiders precluded secrecy on 
the previous scale. Yet while "there waa something to be said for 
allowing the existence of a government plan to become known, discloeure 
of details should be avoided so far ae possible and that in so far as 
people have to be taken into confidence they should be told only what 
is essential to enable them to perform their functions". On July 11th 
the Home Secretary appointed a committee to give effect to Anderson's 
reco~~endations amd on July 17th, J C C Davidson waa appointsd Chief 
Civil Commisaioner. 
Any assessment of government policy with ragard to organised labour 
must avoid simple implications ~bout cauae and effect. Between 1919 and 
1923 Governments did pursue policies' which they hoped would produce a 
more docile workforce and, in fact, the labour situation did become a 
good deal calmer during these years. However it is clear that the change 
wae basically brought about by factors outwith the Government's control. 
It would be unrealistic to deal with the impact of st~ta agencies 
without making prior reference to the developing pattern of labour 
politics and changes in the general economic situation. These years 
saw, for inetance, rapidly rising unemployment and a series of events 
which illustrated and exacerbated the difficulties of collective actions 
by labour organisations. State action must be assesssd within the possibil-
ities set by such developments; in terms of its potential to exploit or 
destroy the advantages offered by circumstances. Thus, for example, 
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while one must recognise the effectiveness of LLoyd George's improvisations 
in 1919, one must see them in the 'context of a labour movement whose 
innocence and good nature led them to welcome an opportunity to argue 
their case before the Sankey Commission. 
At the beginning of the period the State's attempts at intervention 
were undeniably inept. The Cabinet never developed a belanced view of 
the eisuation and they adopted measures which were wildly inappropriate. 
They ran the risk of creating that situation which they were most 
anxioua to avoid. lain Maclean is correct in arguing that it was the 
Government, in its hysterical use of the 'war machine', which gave the 
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'rorty Hours' strike in Glasgow its subversive flavour. By 1923 the 
State had developed its agencies and its thinking sufficiently to avoid 
such gross errors. The surveillance services had begun to confine 
their activities and speculations within recognisable bounds and the 
Supply and Transport Organisation was structured to avoid the more obvious 
provocations. It is not, however, possible to identify any continuous 
procees of argument by which these changes came about; no gredual dawning 
realisations nor no conversions. Yet by the end of this time a number of 
individuals had managed to leave their stamp on the organisation. The 
calmer atmosphere after 1921 must have done something to stifle the 
chorus demanding aggressive activity, and tha fact that their plans 
mede only small demands on public expenditure must have told in favour 
of those advocating a more sophist~cated approech. Yet t~eir victory 
did not remain unchallsnged, for in the changed atmosphara of 1925 
voices would again ba raised in favour of campaigna of the old type. 
However they did not prevail, for by then the new epproach wes embeddad 
into the system. In 1923 the STO was in physical terms no mora than 
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embryonic but its reality and strength as an institution waa in a 
network of contacts and, perhaps more importantly, a series of common 
understandings shared by a number of influential individuals. 
Their ideas did not involve any diminution of the reeponsibilities of 
the State. The State was still seen as ~aving a crucial role to play 
in industrial disputes. Also the activities of ths Scate ware still to 
be structured in a way that weakened the union side in the course of 
guaranteeing servicee to the community as a whole. The new plans. represented 
a change of method rather than purpose. 
It is important to emphasise the limited nature of such changes and to 
question those accounts which havs identified in post war politics some 
restructuring of the relationship between state and society. Charles 
Maier argues: "Total war meant social tranaformation, the centralisation 
of power, equalisation of income, the concession of new rights to the 
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working classes". Yet while such a view would have had much appeal 
at the time, ths rsality was much less clear cut. For example in the 
matter of personal incomee if one compares 1913/4 and 1922/24 there is 
undoubtedly evidence of change and moreover, it is reasonable to assume 
that much of that change was set in motion by the war, yet the alterations 
were neither of the magnitude nor of the nature to Justify Maier's claims, 
nor do they confirm the impressions of those who lived through the period. 
If one compares the average earninge of particular groups of workers 
with other groups a rather complicated pattern emerges. While the larn-
ings of higher professionals were subject to a small comparative decline 
those of managers and ad~inistrators rose by a higher amount. Earnings 
of lower professionals rose slightly while those of foremen and supar-
visory workers rose more steeply. Clerks suffered a small comparative 
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decline, almost exactly in line with that experienced by skilled 
workers. Semi-skilled workers suffered a smaller decline while un-
skilled workers experienced a very small rise in their comparative 
position. In complete contrast to the conventional wiedom of the period 
these years saw a distinct and significant move in earnings in favour 
I . t I k 356 of non-manua as aga1ns manua wor ers. While such figures may 
conceal some fluctuation over time and 'within categories they must 
effectively dispose of the notion that some significant "equalisation 
of income" waa underway. 
Available evidence about changes in the distribution of personal wealth 
suggeets a similar conclusion. One set of figures, comparing 1911/13 
with 1924/30 does show a small decline in the aggregate personal wealth 
owned by the top one per cent yet offers no evidence for any general redis-
tribution as the shares of the top ten per cent and the bottom ninety 
357 per cent remained virtually static. 
It might be objected that such figures fail to register real changes 
which were taking place. Might it not be that the real improvements 
in the material conditions of the working population are not so much to 
be found in details of personal income and wealth but rather in those 
things owned and administered by the state on their behalf or in the 
growing commitment of the state to improve standards of living and 
provide a network of security through general social_..r.eforms.'Z This is 
inevitably a more complicated area to deal with. If one takes, for 
example, provision for unemployment there is certainly some evidence 
of change. During the War the Government decided, through the 1916 
Act to extend unemployment insurance to all workers. Yet there was 
resistance from both employers and workers and even by the end of the 
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War no more than a quarter of the working population wae registered 
under the scheme. The War had also seen the introduction of the "out 
of work donation", a scheme whereby the state made contributions on 
behalf of men in the forces so that they would be entitled to six months' 
insurance money if they became unemployed after their military service. 
It was this scheme that was extended to meet the circumstances of the 
post war years. Clearly by this expedient large numbers of men and 
women were spared recourse to the Poor Law, yet it is doubtful if it 
is reasonable to see in this evidence of "social transformation" or 
"the concession of new rights to the working class". As Bentley Gilbert 
argued, "The Government did not proceed to unemployment insurance in 
deliberate and calculated steps, but was driven to it at the end of 
1920 by the fear of what would happen when the unemployment donation 
d d" 358 en e • The Unemployment Insurance Act of 1920 cannot be taken ae 
evidence of any fundamental change in outlook. If it seemed to go 
further than previous Acts it was only largely because the circumetancee 
which prompted its passage were more complicated and were believed to 
hold more menace for the established social order. The very weaknesses 
of the 1920 Act seemed to confirm that it was a grudging response to 
necessity rather than the willing acceptance of some nsw principle. 359 
Indeed it is difficult to find in any part of post war social policy 
the sort of evidence which Maier's. thesis would require. There is 
little reason to question Abrams' conclusions about the nature and 
extent of the failure of such policies in this period. 360 Richard 
Titmuas in his essay 'War and Social Policy' drew attention to "the 
problem of distinguishing between policies related to peacetime neede 
and policies concerned only with the immediate war situation".361 
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This distinction may seem particularly apt for this period, for it 
would appear that while governments were prepared to consider inno-
vat ions during the War, they wished to return to what they regarded as 
normalcy as soon as the hostilities were over. The whole direction 
and impetus of social thinking was away from the use of the state for 
income redistribution or improved social welfare provision. 
As hae been illustrated in thia chapter much was made at the time of 
the growth and increased ambitions of the leaders of trade unions. 
This might seem to offer support for Maier's point about "the concession 
of new rights to the working classes". Contemporary obeervers of all 
political persuasions simply assumed that some large transfer of power 
either had, or was about to take place. Individuals as various as the 
Duke of Northumberland and Robert Williams of the Transport Workers 
Federation expected this new power of the unions to enable them to make 
critical interventions in national politics. 362 Much of this chapter 
has been about how csrtain politicians discovered that it was possible 
to defeat such initiatives at the national political level. Yet at the 
local level it might appear that union power was even more illusory. 
While employers, even the more intelligent ones such as Theodore Taylor 
simply assumed that the exercise of union power on wage rates was 
363 pricing British products out of world markets there was little 
evidence of the ability of unions to even maintain their members' 
earnings. Evidence of the actual conditions of working people in this 
period is not comprehensive and frequently subjective yet it is suffi-
cient to, at least cast doubt on the more optimistic estimatee. The 
conclusions drawn by Bowley and Hogg in their study of pre and poet 
war living standards are sufficiently equivocal to call into question 
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Whitling Williams' characterisation of the post war organised worker 
as "Full up and Fed Up".364 Si 1 i ' bJ ti nc a r s more su ec ve study of life 
in a mining community, Secretar's investigations of life south of the 
Thames and Margaret Pollock's studies of actual work experiences must 
suggest some major gulf between popular estimates of union power and 
the conditions of the ordinary working union member. 365 
Only in the formal political field can it be said that the post war 
period saw a clear and unequivocal "conceesion of new rights to ths 
working classes". While political historians have tended to underplay 
its significance, recent reeearch and arguments have now identified the 
Representation of the People Act of 1918 rather than the Reform Act of 
1867 as "the decisive act", that point at which the working classes 
became an effective rather than a theoretical majority of the electorat~~6 
Yet while the importance of the Act should be recognised the significance 
of its actual passage should not be overemphasised. It was, in the cir-
cumstances the minimum which the Government could get away with. Thus 
it must be concluded that there is little evidence to support the view 
that the post war period saw an attempt by the British elite to-defend 
its long term interests by schemes of social reconstruction or by the 
concession of new rights to working men and women. On the contrary, 
most leading politicians seem to have been determined to reverse or at 
least minimise what had been conceded during the war. They sought to 
maintain stability not by broadening the scope or increasing the 
functions of the state but by developing and modernising its capacities 
to fulfil its limited traditional functions. 
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It has bsen suggested in a recent study that modern states exhibit 
three characteristic tendencies in respect of their activities in the 
maintenance of civil order. Firstly there is a development towards a 
more rational and specialised use of coercive powers: "Legitimate 
I 
coercion becomes less diffuse, pervasive and visible, and a more con-
367 
trolled and specialised aspect of rule". Secondly, the organisational 
complexity of the modern state provides the opportunity for a continuous 
redistribution of functions between different agencies in order to 
eecure the optimum balance at any given time. Thirdly, in modern indus-
trial societies there is a blurring of the distinction between state and 
society and the state therefore hae the opportunity to enrol non-govern-
mental bodies in its efforts. 
The evidence presented here offers some support for these generalisations. 
There is evidence of a developing sophistication in the deployment of 
coercive powers. While certain politiciane were tempted, in the uneasy 
post war months, to abandon previously agreed rules as to limitations 
on the use of force and the strict division between the use of the 
368 police and the use of the military, the forces of moderation did 
regain the initiative, and the state again began to marshall the massive 
coercive powers at its disposal with attention to these details. There 
is also evidence to suggest that serious consideration was given to 
the distribution of functions within the state machine. Sensitive 
functions were increasingly being distributed to local government or 
local agencies of central government. The police forces are an inter-
eeting case in point, for they illustrate the complexity of the process. 
While every -effort was made to reinforce the appearance of the absence 
of central control over local forces, much thought and activity was 
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dedicated to minimising the practical effect of such independence. For 
example a circular was iasued by the Home Office which sought to ensure 
a degree of uniformity in prosecutione for seditious speeches;369during 
serious strikes Chief Conetables had strict instructions as to types of 
picketing which were to be permitted and which not and under what con-
di i th t · t 370 tons ey were 0 ~n ervene. When things went wrong or matters 
got out of hand the Home Secretary and the Cabinet could evade responsi-
371 bility by emphasising the independence of their local agents. The 
process of the distribution of functions was motivated by three main 
considerations: the need to guarantee the efficient operation of the 
service, the desire to create the appearance of a wide distribution of 
responsibility and, finally, the requirement that all functions should 
be effectively and readily subject to central control. 
There are also clear indications of the blurring of the line between 
stete and society in this period. This might indeed be seen as the 
central theme of the arguments advanced by Geddes, Baldwin, and Anderson. 
In this context it becomes necessary to challenge certain judgments 
which have been made about the political abilities of these participants. 
Ralph Desmarais, for example, singles out Geddes as part of a generation 
of businessmen turned politicians who "lacked even the feeling for 
public opinion that the politician neede for survival". He argues that 
what separated these "new administrators" from the traditional elite 
wae that to them "considerations of efficiency were more important than 
style, honour or any British tradition".372 This is on the one hand 
a somewhat oversanguine view of the pre war elite whose record in 
industrial disputea was often conspicuously short on style and honour 
and on the other a misunderstanding of the political skills of such 
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men as Geddes and Anderson. Geddes certainly challenged eXisting 
assumptions about what the state could, or could not do, but he wae by 
no means apolitical. It wae his recognition of the strengths of the 
modern state which enabled him to taks s tougher line than many of his 
colleagues, and the distribution of functions which he sdvocsted wss not 
only cheapep and more efficient but far more effective politically. 
What Geddes and Anderson hsd recognised wss that the msin strength of 
the modern state was not in the forces it dirsctly controllsd, not in 
its physical capacity to issue propaganda nor in yards full of rusting 
lorries and stores of deteriorating foodstuffs. ror propaganda it waa 
far better to rsly on the host of private organisations which were more 
than willing to be of service. Moreover, the bulk of the Press was 
eager to assist and issue a barrsge of criticism and insults at the 
opponents of the Govsrnment. All the state had to do was co-ordinate 
such forces, snd increasingly during this period they came to do this. 
Wal Hannington recalled the almost unanimous hostility which greeted the 
hunger marchers in November 1922. He had probably anticipated the 
accusations which were levelled against the marchers' leaders yet he 
might have been surprised if he had known the extent to which the cam-
paign was instigated, orchestrated and later, monitored, from within 
the Home Office. 373 Representatives of the "responsible" press had 
been summoned and in suitably melodramatic fashion, shown the Special 
Branch reports on the previous convictiona and communist connections of 
some of the leaders of the march. The press responded dutifully with 
C • " 374 "Ri t M onsp~racy , 0 ongers Working for their tales of, "A Communist 
375 Salariss", "Misleading the 
.. ~6 
Unsmployed", and, inevitably, "A Red 
Plot".377 
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Similarly other resources necessary to mount a campaign against 
organised labour were already in existence in abundance and within the 
control of companies and individuals who would see themselves as the 
natural allies of the state in any dispute with labour. There were 
innumerable "gentlemen of local standing and influence" who would always 
view unpaid service in such a cause as part of their patriotic duty. 
Similarly there were countless other individuals who as supporters of 
'law and order' or as antagonists of organised labour could be relied 
upon to offer their services at a moment's notice. Moreover a state, 
shielded by its natural allies, could present its anti strike measures 
as acts of communal self defence and thus hope to diffuse and deflect 
the hoatility of strikers and their supporters. The old methods assumed 
an embattled ancien regime facing a hostile mass. The new plana recog-
nised and exploited the more complex social and political structure of 
modern industrial society and the broader legitimate base of the modern 
state. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
BRITISH SOCIALISM AND THE STATE 
The task of explaining the reactions of British socialists to the 
state might initially appear. to be a .simple one. Different schools 
of thought have left plenty of matsrial apparently addressed directly 
to this central question. Moreover the differencee of opinion on the 
issue seem attractively precise: at one end the Communists and syndi-
calists viewing the state as no more than the expreesion of the 
antsgonisms of class society and, as such, a barrier to be removed; 
at the other, various species of revisioniat, regarding the state as 
bsing susceptible to rational reform by political action. 
However the actual business of comparison is subjsct to two types of 
difficulty. The first concerns the extsnt to which it is possible to 
dafine the concept of the state in isolation from other aspects of 
political theory. Where conventional political thought hsd developed 
clear ideas about the role and functions of the state and had placed 
it at the centre of reality and aspiration, socialists have always 
seen the state, in some degree, in a dynamic perspective and in 
relation to other social forces, and analysed it in terms of its pro-
pensity to facilitate or retard social change. for this reason 
socialists' definitions of the state have been more concerned with 
the question of whose intereet the state serves or how it might be 
changed, rather than with delineating functions or describing insti-
tutions. This msans, inevitably, that dirsct comparisons betwesn 
different socialist groups can prove meaningless unless one goes beyond 
simple definition to an illustration of the role which the state plays 
within the broader political theory. 
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The second type of difficulty concerns the relationship between 
theories of the state and political practice. This is not simply a 
matter of identifying an obvious gap between thought and action but of 
illustrating the complex relationship between political thinking and 
political activity. This inevitably involves going beyond the expla-
nation of the relationship offered by the socialists themselves. 
Socialists can present their socialism as rational theory leeding to 
a plan of action capable of direct realisation. As a model for 
explaining socialist activity in hiatorical terms this is inadequate. 
Here, it is suggested that theories of the state should be set in the 
context of expectations, modifications and rationalisations generatsd 
by political activity. Specifically it is suggested thet the tendency 
of many socialists to universalise their theoriee of the state may 
conceal, not only real differences between actual states, but also 
differences in understanding generated by national experience. Whils 
one must take account of theory as expressed it is also important to 
attempt to deduce theory from political behaviour. An examination of 
political activity can reveal an understanding of the state, the state 
as something encountered, which is at variancs with definitions which 
are officially subscribed to. It is thus necsssary to remain awars 
of the potential distortions involved in placing too much reliance on 
official theory. At the simplest level it may well be than men do 
not know, or misunderstand, the doctrines to which they are nominally 
committed. Also there may be considerable differences of interpre-
tation even within an apparently cohssive organisation. Yet, most 
importantly, there is that sense in which theory and definitions 
become inseparably intertwined with political activity itself. Theory 
may serve as a guide to political action but it can also provide s 
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context within which conflicts over position and intereet are pursued. 
It might even be argued that theoretical iasues only become fully arti-
culated when they become part of active political conflict. 
Thus, in order to understand the approach of socialist thinkers to the 
state it is necessary to examine their statements on this issue in the 
context of their general political theory and also to set such views 
within the specific historical circumstances in which they were deve-
loped. This chapter, thsrefore, after an examination of the main 
contemporary debates on the nature of the state in capitalist socisty, 
concludes by examining the activities of two parties which sought to 
promote political change along socialiat lines. firstly, an exami-
nation of the attempt by the Communist Party to apply Lenin's theory, 
and then an assessment of the First Labour Government in respect of 
its implications for a socialist theory of political action. 
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Theories of State and Revolution 
While 1917 represents a clear and unequivocal break in the continuity 
of socialist theory and practice and though it is clear that divisions 
among socialist were, after that date, more explicit and more bitterly 
expreesed it would be wrong to assume that the state socialist tradi-
tions went entirely unchallenged before 1917. It is always a difficult 
matter to assess the impact of theoretical works on activists. While 
one can find out which works were in circulation it is not possible to 
know exactly what was understood by what wae being read. Moreover, as 
Parris has pointed out in a different context, a writer's influence 
may extend well beyond those who have actually read his books. 1 However 
on the basis of the evidence that is available it would appear that 
Karl Kautsky and Daniel de Leon were the two most influsntial inter-
preters of marxism in the revolutionary socialist parties. While 
Kautsky, as will be discussed later, came to be characterised by Lenin 
as a reviser of marxism, he saw himself, and was widely regarded before 
1917, as an orthodox interpreter of Marx and Engele. Kauteky did not 
believe that orthodoxy demanded obeisance to the letter of the masters' 
texts but he clearly felt that his theoretical accommodations to poli-
tical and economic developments did not involve an abandonment of the 
revolutionary tradition. Kautsky is particularly interesting in 
respect of his analysis of the development of the capitalist state 
and the implications for socialist transition. He placed great 
emphaeis on the development of the state since Marx's time. The 
modern centralised state, he argued, had developed to a point where 
it had enormous economic and military power. In politicel terms too 
there had been changes, most notably the introduction of mass elections. 
Kautsky argued that such developments had great significence for those 
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who wished to create a socialist society but he believed that the 
state socialists had drawn the wrong conclusions. Specifically they 
were mistaken in their belief that such changes meant that socialism 
could now emerge gradually and piecemeal. Whatever had happsned to 
the form of the state, Kautsky felt its purposss must inevitably remain 
the same: "Like all previous systems of government the modern state 
is pre-eminently an instrument intended to guard the intersst of the 
2 
ruling class." Socialist change was thus necessarily dependent on 
revolution: "Those who repudiate political revolution as the principal 
means of social transformation . . • are social reformere.,,3 Rave-
lution was necessary but there wae no need to be dogmatic about its 
form for it might "assume many forms according to the circumstances 
under which it takes place. It is by no means neceesary that it be 
4 
accompanied with violence and bloodshed". for authsnticity ravolution 
rsquirsd only "the conquest of governmental power by a hitherto 
15 
oppreesed class". Once this step was taken the rest would follow: 
"Such a class is compelled to complete its political emancipation by 
its social emancipation.,,6 Even the frame of surrounding events was 
entirely orthodox: the seizure of power would come about as a result 
of class polarisation caused by crises of overproduction and mass 
unemployment. The characteristics remained the same "never yet was 
any revolution accomplished without vigorous action on the part of 
those who suffered 7 most". Where Kautsky parted company with a number 
of revolutionaries, though not necessarily with the spirit and letter 
of Marx and Engels, was in his ability to express s sincere enthusiasm 
for trade union and other reforming activitiee within the context of 
existing capitalist societies. "It would", argued Kautsky, "be a 
profound error to imagine that such rsforms could delay the social 
8 revolution". The result of activities designed to relieve immediate 
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miseries would be not only the acquisition of experience of the work-
ings of national and municipal government but also the "attaintment of 
that intellectual maturity which the proletariat needs if it is to 
supplant the bourgeoisie as the ruling class".9 Political democ~acy 
far from being a distraction or simply a means of making propaganda is 
seen as "indispensable as a means of ripening the proletariat for the 
social revolution". 10 Leszek Kalakowski argues that while Kautsky's 
attempt to reconcile the objectives of reform and revolution was 
appealing to many socialists and was vital to the unity of the German 
Social Democrats it was more successful in terms of s theoretical for-
mula than it was in "social and psychological reality".11 Whether this 
was inevitably the case may be a matter for argument but it is clear 
that the particular circumstances of the war years created a reality in 
which Kautsky's formula failed to achieve ite political objectives. 
Vet, ae it will be argued later the eclipee of Kautsky's ideas could 
still be regarded as unjustified and, indeed, unfortunate. Whatever 
their weaknesses Kautsky's formulations on state and socialist tran-
sition were based on an appreciation of the actual political situation 
which confronted socialists in Western Europe. 
The assessment of de Leon's contribution to the debate on the state is 
a more difficult matter. In the British context de Leon can only be 
discerned as if through two distorting filters. De Leon was misunder-
stood by some of his followers and misrepresented by his opponents. 
De Leon's British disciples tended to apply his ideas in a piecemeal 
way. Some displayed a tendency to over personalise his political ideas. 
Where de Leon criticised labour leaders and socialist intellectuals on 
the basis of the role they fulfill~d his British followers indulged 
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themselves in denunciations of those who filled the roles. De Leon had 
little or no opportunity to explain himself to his followers let alone 
any machinery to impose an orthodoxy. The often misplaced enthusiasms 
of his followers could only exacerbate sn opposition which, given the 
neture of the basic political message, was already inevitable. 
On the strength of what filters through about de Leon and his followers 
it is difficult to see how they could have exercised any appeal at all. 
Their most pressing causes would appear to have been opposition to 
existing trade unions and, at the least, a deep ambivalencs towards all 
existing forms of political action. The prevailing adJectivss are un-
compromising, fanatical, disciplinarian and sectarian. To Holton, de 
Leon was an important publicist, though unoriginal and sectsrian. 12 
To Kendal the Socialist Labour Party was a schismatic sect imbusd with 
a narrow-minded calvinism which bequeathed to the Communist Party many 
of its more unattractive traits. 13 To Pierson de Leon's British 
followers failed to appreciate the dialectical element in Marx and 
displayed an over idealistic insistence on theory and understsnding. 14 
Cole and Postgate conceded that the SLP wielded an influence out of all 
proportion to its numbers but on the strength of what else they say 
about the Party it remains impoasible to see why this should have been 
15 
so. 
It is possible to cast some initial doubt on the reliability of this 
account of the SLP. A memoir suggests that Party life may not have 
been as fanatical and cheerless as moat historians have suggested. 16 
While such Judgments have a strong subjective element, it does appear 
that the Party newspaper, the 'Socialist' was too eclectic and livsly, 
indeed too interesting, to suggest that it was the product of men 
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whose attachment to politics was confinsd to ssctarian bigotry. Even 
comparison with other socialist groups of a similar size would tend to 
suggsst that the SLP could have possessed no monopoly on narrow minded-
ness. The history of Hyndman's rsign over the SOF and his imposition 
of a mechanical marxism might even reflect some comparative credit on 
the SLP. 
Historical judgments tend to be so negative that it is scarcely aur-
priaing that the key to understanding the positive side of de Leon's 
appeal should come rather in a personal memoir. Frank BUdgen explained 
the core of the matter: "What gave all believers faith in de Leon's 
interpretation of marxist theory was that it showed a way ahead unob-
structed by a dictatorship of the proletariat", "De Leon's interpretation 
made of democracy the ally of revolution", "The emancipation of the 
17 
working clase muet be the work of the working class itself". The 
sttscks on crsft unions and the 'labour lieutenants of capitalism' 
appear in a more positive light when industrial unions ars identified 
as the necessary means of socialist transformation. To Budgen, "it 
seemed eminsntly reasonable to advocate • . . that the defensive 
organisation of labour should fit it alao for its supposed creative 
18 
social role". There wss no need for a political dictatorship as the 
unions would come to express "the needs, the hopes, the aspiratione and 
the will of the working class".19 The socialist intellectual a8 guardian, 
guide and repository of trust of the working class during the revolutionary 
process was declared obsolete. Even the intellectual's role as propa-
gandist and persuader was curtailed for to de Leon the work of conversion 
was not a matter of education or propaganda but would be accomplished 
by the productive process itself. It was capitalism thst crested'the 
converts, "in the mire and mill it teaches one lesson everlastingly, 
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without ceasing, and it prepares their minds for our gospel to which 
they hearken year by year more willingly and in greater numbers".20 
Socialists might facilitate the process but they could not supplant it. 
Suggestions that ds Leon snd his followers wers especially equivocsl 
about political action are difficult to understand. Naturally enough, 
as a marxist, de Leon did deny politics an autonomous role in human 
affairs but there is nO svidence to suggest that he wae in favour of 
ignoring the political process. On a number of occasions he specifi-
cally advocated using all such political opportunities as the modern 
state afforded. Theoretically he believed that political action was 
an essential element in socialist activity: "Without political orga-
nisation, the Labour movemsnt cannot triumph; without economic orga-
nisstion the dsy of its political triumph would be the day of its 
dsfeat.,,21 A clause in the constitution of the American SLP affirmed 
the necessity of practical political action snd when syndicalist 
elemsnts sought to delete it de Leon campaigned for ita retention. 
While there were those in the British SLP who felt ths attractions of 
syndicalism and while thers were others who underestimated the importance 
that de Leon attached to politics most would appear to have understood 
ths point. Pierson quotee the advice of the SLP to the electorate not 
to vote in the 1906 election as evidence of the anti political drift, 
yet it is one thing to advise against voting in a particular election 
but quite another to dismiss the significance of elections in general. 
Budgen'e recollection of Party arguments suggests that this ie the 
distinction which may have besn drawn: "What about universal suffrage, 
free speech, right of association? Thoae things are civilisation not 
capitalism _If "Who's denying it? Voting for a capitalist gang at West-
minster is where we draw the line.,,22 
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Kendal argues that there are strong similarities between the British 
SLP and the Communist Party of Great Britain, into which a majority 
of its members eventually transferred. He cites the SLP's rigid 
insistence on discipline, its possession of a glorious messianic 
vision of the future and contransting penchant for squalid internal 
heresy hunting and denunciation, and its reliance for theoretical 
inspiration and guidance on the works of a foreigner as characteristics 
which the two parties had in common. Moreover Kendal alao argues that 
all Leon'a ideas were in certain key reapects aimilar to those of Lenin. 23 
While the first points contain an element of truth it is necessary to 
advance a number of qualifications. Of the socialist groups of the 
time tha SLP had no corner in bitter factional infighting and on this 
criterion alone it might be equally justifiable to tracs the ancestry 
of the CPGB in the SDr/BSP line. It is also relevant that Leninist 
parties which had no antecedents in de Leonist parties exhibited these 
traits to no less a degree. The point about foreign influences is 
interesting but it too may be slightly misleading in that ths influence 
of de Leon over the SLP is not directly comparable to thet of Lenin 
over the CPGB. De Leon's influence wae almost exclusively intellectual 
while that of Lenin was reinforcad by the highly effective authority 
structure of the Communist International. Vet the most serioue diffi-
culty with the comparison of the SLP and the CPGB concerns Kendal'e 
suggestion that there are strong theoretical similarities between de 
Leon's views and the political activities of the Bolsheviks. As James 
Voung has pointed out this argument did in effect become a political 
question: "The heritage of Western marxism was an obstacle preventing 
the immediate acceptance of Leninist ideas • • • "24 The political 
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views of de Leon, clearly an important element in that tradition, thus 
became a target for denigration or misrepresentation. In reality there 
is an unbridgable gulf between de Leon and Lenin. In terms of his 
views of the nature of the working class in capitalist society, his 
opposition to the conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
his attitude to the role of socialist intellectuals and perhaps above 
all, in his insistence that a socialist revolution could only bs created 
by socialist workers de Leon is clearly removed from the theoretical 
world of Lenin and the practice of the Bolshevik Revolution. 
The SLP was clearly overwhelmed by the events of 1917. Some of those 
who left attempted to make theoretical accommodations. Of theee some 
demonstrated a degree of confusion about their new faith, others that 
they had no deep understanding of the one they had recently abandoned. 
Vet there is evidence that those who remained with the SLP continued 
to view developments from a standpoint which was distinctively de 
Leonist. In criticising the CPGB in 1921 for predicting, in line with 
Comintern orthodoxy, that civil war was about to break out in Britain, 
a writer in the 'Socialist' attacked the idea that there was "a dic-
tatorship of the capitalist class" and went on to ettack the classical 
Leninist formula: "No dictatorship of the proletariat can solve the 
social problem because the dictatorship of the proletariat is an impos-
sibi~ity in these days • •• The capitalist class rules; the capitalist 
system exists by ths consent of the vast majority • • • the proletariat 
can replace the capitalist system and abolish capitalist class rule as 
soon as it is so minded and organises for itself the requisite social 
power that is as soon as it organises itself as the producing claes.,,26 
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It would be too much to argue that Kautsky and de Leon were major 
influences on British socialist thought in the pre 1917 period. The 
main state socialist tradition went on its way largely untroubled by 
the problems to which they addressed themselves. They were not ever 
the major theoretical sources for those who found themselves in oppo-
sition to the mainstream tradition. Ths fact that, as foreigners, 
their theories were influenced by different national experiences also 
limited their influence. The British Labour movement never exhibitsd 
that critical tension between reform and revolution which was the 
ensrgising source of Kautsky's writinga and de Leon's advocacy of dual 
unionism was clearly more directly appropriats to the USA than to 
Britain where existing unions were far less developed. While it would 
be wrong to push this argument too far: for example the followers of 
de Leon were able to achieve remarkable feats of industrial organisation 
for their numbers; it was clearly the case that these ideas would have 
required a creative r~orking and application if they were to achieve 
anything SUbstantial in the British context. Both traditions were to 
be denied such development as they were effectively eclipsed by the 
events of 1917. Yet it is certa~nly open to question whether they 
perished for their own merits, or lack of them. 80th in their different 
ways, attempted to come to terms with the problems of the capitalist 
state and socialist transition as experienced in the West. The new and 
overwhelming popularity of Leninism with revolutionary socialists might 
in retrospect be argued to have mors to do with the magnetism of suc-
cess than its actual political relevancs. 
Lenin's view of the state in capitalist society was very straight-
forward and up to a point, an uncontentious interpretation of marxist 
ideas. In the "State and Revolution" he sets out to demonstrate the 
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complete inadequacy of the revisionist view of the state. The etate 
could not in any way, he argued, be regarded as an institution for 
the reconciliation of classes for it was itsslf the product of class 
antagonisms. If the state is "the product of the irreconciliable 
character of class antagonisms", if it is a force standing above civil 
society and "separating itself gradually from it",27 it inevitably 
followe that it is only through the destruction of the state machine 
that society can be set on course for a socialist society. When the 
capitalist state has been destroyed a new state will be required, but 
this state, while being inevitably coercive, will be a dictatorship of 
the majority which will go about the businese of social reconstruction 
and will, in particular, abolish private property. During this period 
of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat there would be no army but the 
people themselves would take on the role of en ermed militia. All 
officials of the new state would be elected and subject to dismissal 
by the working class. This state, when it had performed its historical 
function, would wither away. "State and Revolution" is remarkable, as 
hae been pointed out, in that it contains no mention of the role of the 
Party in all of this. Lenin's ideas on the role and organisation of 
the revolutionary party are usually considered to represent his moat 
significant contribution to marxist theory. In a later lecture Lenin 
appeared to aseume that there was no difficulty in the Party aseuming 
the role which he had assigned to the working class in "State and 
Revolution"~28 This inevitably raisee the question of the connection 
betwesn Lenin's theory and his practice of revolution. Clearly the 
Dictatorship of the Proletariat in practice contained less than a 
shadow of the democratic elemente prescribed in theory. While the 
importance of the particular circumstances of the Bolshevik Revolution 
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must not be overlooked it must appear, not only in the light of 
Lenin's actions but in his defence of them, that the democratic 
slements within the Dictatorship period were not a critical element 
in the overall theory of revolution. What remains as clear and indi-
visibls is the dismissal of any notion that the institutions of 
cspitslist society could be adapted to socialist purposss. Thsss 
institutions reflected only the political antagonisms of capitalism 
which arose exclusively from property relationships. The central terms 
of revolution were the destruction of the bourgeois state and the abo-
lition of private property. In effect theee acts are so overwhelmingly 
necessary that the question of how they are accomplished is a secondary 
question. If, in practice, the form of the Dictatorship was not of 
primary importance, arguments about the political structure of post 
revolutionary society were, to Lenin, a matter of indifference. As the 
political antagonisms of capitalist society had all arisen out of pro-
perty relationship the abolition of private property was both s 
necessary and a sufficient act of revolution. Political structures had 
only existed for the management of political antagonisms and hence 
would be unnecessary in a socialist society. The only political oppo-
sition which could arise would be based on the restoration of private 
property and it was clearly out of the question to provide a structure 
for its exprsssion. Miliband's criticism of Lsnin for failing to allow 
for some political structure for post capitalist society, no matter how 
sensible it may appear to many modern observers particularly, perhaps, 
in the light of Soviet experience, is in Lenin's own tsrms, meaningleS8~9 
Civil society, to Lenin, was to be libereted by the abolition of privats 
property. When it had besn it could only requira administrative machi-
nery for there would be no antagonistic conflicts to be suppressed. 
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Lenin's British followers had less trouble with his interpretation of 
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat than they did with his more imme-
diate injunctions as to party structures and activities. Lenin was 
soon aware that his version of "what is to be done" went against the 
grain of the revolutionary traditions in Britain. J T Murphy later 
recalled that he had to go to considerable lengths to alter the per-
ceptions of British communists: "We had got to learn that the 
Communist Party was the General Staff of a class marching to civil war, 
that it ~ to be disciplined, a party organised on military lines, 
30 
ready for every emergency." William Gallacher and Sylvia Pankhurst 
had similarly to be coached out of their 'infantile disorders,.31 Yet 
even when the British communists had been brought to appreciate the 
need for a new type of party they still had to be taught that its 
purpose, as they tended to assume, was not to progress immediately or 
directly to revolution. Many British socialists misunderstood Lenin 
on this point. H J Stenning, for example, gave voice to the widely 
. 32 held assumption that Bolshevism was a "recrudescence of Blanquism". 
Whatsver the nature of Bolshevik practice Lenin made his theoretical 
objections to Blanquism clear enough: "Without an alteration in the 
views of the majority of the working class, revolution is impoeeible • 
"33 
• • 
A well organised conspiracy could never, on its own, destroy 
a capitalist state: "To be successful revolution must rely not upon 
34 conspiracy, and not upon a party, but upon an advanced class." 
Insurrsction, then, would only prove successful at the appropriate 
historical juncture, that "crucial moment in the history of the growing 
revolution when the activity of the advanced ranks of the people is st 
its height • • • "35 The bUsiness of revolutionaries was to prepare 
for this day, to be ready to exploit the situation when it srose. To 
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this end they should enter working class organisations in order to 
gain influence over those who were to be the instruments of successful 
rsvolution. Lenin's criticisms of the previous activities of the revo-
lutionary Left in Britain highlighted its sectarianism and its tendsncy 
to base activity and propaganda on theoretical issues. The conversion 
of the masses required revolutionaries to involvs themselves in day to 
day struggles. Any change in outlook would come through "the political 
experience of the masses and never by propaganda alone".36 What rscon-
ciled this with the creation of military style parties was Lsnin's 
assumption that the circumstances suitable for rsvolution would not be 
long delayed. 
Given his immense political success and his practical genius it was 
inevitable that Lenin's ideas should exert a major influence over the 
socialists of his generation. Beyond this his ideaa had the msrit of a 
valid internal logic and he was usually more consistent and thorough 
than his socialist opponents. Yst for all this there must remain some 
doubt about the relevance of his thought for the socialist movements 
of Western Europe at this time. Even as he saw it himself much of what 
he predicted depended upon the development of a revolutionary situation 
in Europe in the foreseeable future. Yet after the immediate post war 
months most of the would-be revolutionaries of the West faced, not the 
equivalents of the tottering threadbare state of Tsarist Russia, but 
formidable, broadly based, modern industrial states, capable of man-
oeuvre and adaptation. Lenin's followers might organise themselvss 
sfficiently, they might entsr parliamsnts, permeate other working class 
parties and trade uniona, yet they were offered no hope of undermining 
the state, or any other meaningful progress until the existing society 
itself began to crumble. 
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At this point it is useful to reintroduce Kautsky into the debate as 
he became after 1917 the most formidable marxist opponent of Lenin in 
the European Labour movement. If Lenin's theory of state and revolution 
owed little to the traditions of the Western European Socialist movement, 
Kauteky's clearly reflected them. His concern with political democracy 
itself might be argued to owe more to the experience of the SPD than to 
the logical development of his revolutionary socialism, but while there 
is some justice in Lenin's identification of inconsistencies in his 
thought, it does not undermine all that Kautsky has to offer on this 
37 
subject. He is interesting because he is attempting to explain, or 
discover, a position which is explicitly socialist while, at the same 
time resistant to the fashion for Bolshevism. In effect, Kautsky is 
attempting to retain some element of the values and experiencee of the 
Western European labour movement at a time when many socialist intellec-
tuals seemed determined to abandon all previous ideas and adopt the 
Rueeian model. While this in itself might render Kautsky'e work intel-
lectually intereeting, there is also much which is analytically 
important. If for nothing else, Kautsky deservee recognition for hie 
early prsdiction of the dangers of dictatorship in Ruesia and the 
possible consequences, and for his understanding of the political 
beliefs which actually influenced tha working class movements of Europe. 
The works may lack theoretical perfection and might even be argued to 
have failed in the central objective of outlining a probable road to 
socialism, but along the way they offer much in the way of political 
38 
understanding. 
Central then to Kautsky's later works is this experience of the working 
claee movements of the Western, politically developed, part of Europe. 
The influence is, on the one hand, implicit, in that Kausky's concerns 
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and priorities are clearly born of this common experience, and also 
explicit, in that he believes real political progrees to be dependent 
on taking into account certain features of this development. 39 
Kautsky then, was not primarily concerned with criticieing what had 
happened in Ruseia, but in arguing that it was not applicable in the 
West. While the methods of the Bolshevike may have been almost ine-
vitable in the conditions there, they were undesirable and impracticable 
in countries which had enjoyed some measure of political democracy. A 
single statement of this nature removed Kautsky from ths Communists 
twics over, for in Lenin's terms such a position was not only tactically 
incorrect but "utopian", in that it represented a desire to make choices 
which were not actually available in the real world. This utopianism, 
as contrasted with Leninist determinism, was apparently deeply rooted 
in Western socialists, and it was this aspect of their thought that 
even those who committed themselves to the Bolshevik methods found most 
difficult to discard. 
Kautsky argued that there were grave practical dangers in telling the 
workers that political democracy was a "useless ornament". Its achieve-
ment represented a major advance and the workers should be persuaded to 
defend it "tooth and nail". The value of political democracy to Kautsky, 
lay in the dependency of the democratic state on public opinion. He did 
not dispute that the ambitions of the Ruling Class remained the same 
under political democracy. The underlying class position was the same. 
What did change was the means at the disposal of the two sides in the 
class struggle. It would inevitably require political effort and poli-
tical will: "But if the proletariat in a democratic state grows until 
it is numerous and strong enough to conquer political power by making 
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use of the libsrties which sxist, then it would be a tesk of greet 
difficulty for the capitalist dictatorship to manipulate the force 
40 
necessary for the suppression of democracy." The attempt to uee 
. 
force would open up divisions in the ruling class of a democratic 
country. Where democratic rights had been long established and had 
become deeply ingrained in the culture of a country, and hence its 
labour movement, the forms of transition to a socialist socisty would 
be bound to be different to those in a country where a repressive auto-
41 
cracy had been in power. 
KautskY conceded that the idea that a minority could hasten a revo-
lution was attractive and superficially plausible, yet he argued that 
unless some element of democracy was very quickly re-established after 
the seizure of power the situation would decline into simple deepotism. 42 
He reiterated his often expressed view that Marx had meant the dictator-
ship of the proletariat to refer to the idea that the ends of the new 
society should not be questioned rather than to the form of rule that 
should be adopted. The Russian Bolsheviks had adapted Marx to suit 
their own political environment. The neceesity for conspiratorial 
politics under the Tsa~ist autocracy had fostered autocrstic habits in 
the leaders of the socialist movement, and the absence of a democratic 
trsdition had meant that there wers few within the movement who had 
the necessary skills or the desire to challenge the leaders. 
The differencee between Kautsky's ideas and those of the Bolsheviks 
were made very clear in Kautsky's list of conditions for the successful 
. li 43 achievement of SOC1a sm. rirst he argued that as every conscious 
action presupposes a will, the will to achieve socialism must be the 
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first condition of its accomplishment. Secondly, socialism could only 
gain its necessary support where there was large scale industry, as, 
when the predominant mode of production is small scale, workers only 
aspire to their own small property. The third factor concerns the 
strength to achieve socialism: those who want it must be stronger than 
those who wish to resist them. The fourth factor is the capacity of 
the proletariat. It must be able not only to seize power but to hold 
it and to make use of it. The most important factor to Kautsky remained 
this question of the maturity of the proletariat. 
Kautskyts outline provides a very useful example of the methods of 
thought which effectively separated many Western socialists from the 
Bolsheviks. The move to socialism was not, in the end, regarded as an 
acceptance of necessity nor even as some desperate last throw. The 
socialists of the West were encouraged by their circumstances to believe 
that they might exercise some degree of control over the historical pro-
cess and to see the possibilities 'as a range of choices. 
This outlook might be seen as stemming from an experience of a parti-
cular sort of state. To Kautsky~he state was, "the greatest power 
within modern society • • • that at times acquiree an ascendency over 
44 the classes which are socially and economically dominant". In this 
situation all classes make attempts to come to terms with snd to use 
the power of the state. Those concessiana which the lsbour movement h 
had drawn from the state, freedom of the press and the right of parlia-
mentary consultation for example, were real and important and should 
be defended as the basis for future claime. Kautsky also argued that 
under these conditione it was a mistake to regard the ruling clsss sa 
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if it were a monolithic force, agreed on all matters. In this group, 
he argued, there would be those who wanted to use coercive power 
against the working class yet there would be other sections who, when 
faced with the new power of the workers would want only "to keep it in 
45 good humour by concessions". 
Kautsky's works in general did not attract the same serious considera-
tion after 1917 as they had before. Opponents were often content to 
dismiss them very lightly. Postgate for instance, was content to 
46 demonstrate that Kautsky was not a "marxist". This and other criti-
cisms of a similar type, failed to come to terms with the qualities 
which Kautskyts work did possess. While it might be judged to have 
failed in its grander aims it did offer a number of ideae which bore 
far more relevance to the immediate political struggles of Western 
Europe than the more consistent and purer schemes of his opponents. He 
recognised for instance, that the extension of the political franchise 
changed the structure of potential political action and that this was 
bound to have major implications for the conduct of labour politics. 
~oreover he recognised that the conflict between the state and the 
working class was unlikely to exprsss itself in stark physical conflict. 
The modern state set on its broad legitimate base had a range of tact-
ical devices at its disposal before it needed to resort to force. 
Again it must be stressed that it is difficult to assese with any 
degree of accuracy the influence which the works of Lenin and Kautsky 
had on the ideas of socialists in Britain. Lenin is a special case and 
his influence must be dealt with at greater length in the context of 
the development of the Communist Party, though it has been suggested 
that even though this Party was, to s large sxtent, his own creation, 
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even his most faithful followers in Britain failed to glean the full 
meaning he intended. In dealing with the influence of Kauteky after 
1917 we are on even more difficult ground. Even where it can be shown 
that British socialists were influenced by ideas similar to those of 
Kautsky'e it is impoesible to say whether this may be attributed to 
any particular thinker or whether they merely reflect a similarity of 
outlook between British and German socialists consequent upon certain 
aspects of common experience. The 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' 
was published by the ILP press in translation in 1920 and its translator 
propagated Kautskyts ideas in newspapers and journala. Some of this was 
probably quite widely absorbed for if one follows debates in the ILP, 
at this time the major socialist body in Britain, during the next few 
years the ideas of Kautsky, along with those of Lenin, do form major 
points of reference. 
It has frequently been argued that British socialists, in contrast to 
their continental counterparts, have remained relatively indifferent to 
questions of political theory. In respect of this period and on this 
issue this can be no more than partly true. While it is possible to 
identify a reluctance to ascend to abstraction, the issues which gene-
rated conflict also generated a great deal of theoretical debate. The 
arguments about state and society in Britain cluster around two main 
axes: the first, the debate between liberals and state socialists on 
the question of how increasing state activity might infringe upon or 
promote the liberties of the citizen, and the second, between the state 
and socialists and revolutionary socialists, as to whether political 
activities within the framework of the existing state offered any 
poesibility of direct progression towards a socialist society. 
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While we shell here be more concerned with the second debate it is 
important not to lose sight of the first for it substantially con-
ditioned much of what took place later. The debate between liberals 
and state socialists was so central to the tradition of politics in 
Britain that other socialists with a different point of view always 
appeared as outsiders attempting to break in. Bruce Glasier's 
objection to the would-be revolutionariee; "It was not the State that 
compelled children to act as chimney sweepers, or to go down the minas 
or into the factories for sixteen hours a day. It was the State 
(capitalist though it was) that abolished these customs", so closely 
mirrored the mainstream tradition of the British left that it could 
appear as little more than plain common ssnse. Rslatively sophisticsted 
replies to such claims and their related assumptions could be, and wers 
made; William Paul for instance had argued that the Factory Acts were 
the result of conflict between landlords and industrialists and that, 
"the granting of reforms like the Education Acts, made the workers more 
48 
efficient producers", but this was swimming against a strong tide of 
opinion which had come to associate the idea of the state with the 
defence of the weak against the more obvioua misaries of liberal 
society. While alternative views were vigorously canvassed it could 
reaeonably be argued that it was only after 1917 that the native tra-
dition of state socialism was put to any real test. As late as 1913 
Philip Snowden could doubt the reelity of a substantial division within 
the ranks: "The distinction between the Revolutionary and Evolutionary 
socialist is more in name than reality. The title of Revolutionary 
Socialiet is aesumed by many young men because it seeme to denote a 
very robust and energetic type of the article • • • This was going 
too far but it did contain an element of truth. The idea of revolutionary 
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transformation had been kept alive in the small parties and syndicalism 
50 had briefly broken up the surface of respectability but accounts of 
socialist activity in the years before the First World War can betray 
a senee of innocent ecumenism. Some socialists appear to have been 
able to handle their arguments and divisione in a epirit of friendly 
51 
rivalry born of an assumption about some commonality of purpose. 
There were those who consciously set themselves outside the mainstream 
but an examination of the ideas of some of the rebels reveals disagree-
ments which were a good deal less fundamental than they were thought to 
be at the time. If, for example, one examines the opinions of Victor 
Grayson, popularly regarded as the socialist 'wild man' of his day, 
Snowden's view might be thought to have some foundation. It is in 
fact quite remarkable how much Grayson relied on the tradition of demo-
cratic radicalism for his method of social transformation. 52 His 
differences with other state socialists would appear to have been over 
the speed of the progress that was possible and desirable and the degree 
of moral outrage which it was useful to exhibit, rather than to any 
systematic disagreement about avenues of political action. For 
example, while Grayson drew attention to the appaling p~verty which 
existed in the midst of national wealth, he saw such poverty as being 
"the result of improper government". Grayson clearly regarded himaelf 
as an uncompromising socialist and set his measures in the context of 
a programme of social transformation. He conceded that such a programme 
could not be achieved overnight but believed that it was neceesery to 
tell the poor that "tinkering with capitalism will have very little 
53 
effect on their poverty". Yet, in the end Grayson's socialism was, 
"only a matter of insisting that wealth shall be properly distributed 
by the organised action of the State expressing its wiehes by laws and 
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regulations".54 Grayson argued against the Labour Party as it existed 
and advocated the formation of a new, specifically socialist organisation, 
yet the strategy of this party would still be parliamentary. It would 
be more uncompromising, its members would make parliamentary demonstra-
tions on behalf of the poor and, if necessary, risk being debarred from 
the flonr of the House of Commons, but the ultimate aim of the party 
would still be to secure a majority at a general election snd institute 
a government of "scientists and administrators (and) • • • the most 
55 
careful students of sociology". 
Because the central beliefs of the state socialists had not been sub-
jected to sustained criticism within the socialist movement the spokesmen 
of the tradition were mainly concerned to argue a case against liberal 
critics and those within the labour movement who were not socialists. 
They did on occasion take time to explain their differences with conti-
nental socialists, but such explanations tended to bs superficial and 
not a little patronising: the continental socialists, they argued, had 
had to develop their ideas in a hostile situation where practical 
advances were not possible. Hence, in contrast to Britain, where 
reforms and concessions could be obtained, the continentals had devel-
oped the habit of impractical speculation. As Macdonald argued, "The 
eyee of a party in an irresponsible legislature like the Reichstag are 
fixsd upon ths horizon, those of parties in a responsibls legislsture 
56 like our own House of Commons are fixed at their feet". 
On the central question of the nature of the state and its relationship 
to socialist transformstion thsre was broad agreement. Works in the 
tradition continually return to the same themes. All writers emphasise 
the fact that socialism, far from representing an upheaval in society, 
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was actually a natural devalopment rooted in existing traditions. 
Glasier used Millts definition of socialism as his own. The continuity 
in ideas was part of the evolutionary development of society itself. 
To Snowden, "the attainment of the Socialist Commonwealth" would come 
about by no more than, "the further development of forces which are 
57 
now operating in society". This process of social development was 
cumulative; socialists were "trying to bring about reforms which cumu-
latively will establish the Social Revolution".58 To Glasier, the 
reforms introduced in the nineteenth century were the beginnings of a 
59 process which socialists would complete. The fact that the process 
of social development was seen as evolutionary did not, as it could 
have, undermine the state socialists' belief in the importance of 
political activity. Macdonald sought to deal with this problem by 
arguing that while the evolutionary principle meant that socialism was 
inevitable it was so, "not because men are exploited or becsuse the 
fabric of capitalism must collapse under its own weight but because men 
60 
are rational". Political action was the practical expression of this 
rationality and it would ensure and hasten progress. The state was not 
seen as some outside fares but as part of the development of society. 
It recorded and expressed previous advances and could be the instrument 
of future progress. Glasier brushed aside the views of the revolution-
ary socialists: "The affirmation that the state is a capitaliet insti-
tution is untrue." While the "State always is for the time being very 
largely the instrument of the self interest of the dominant person, 
faction or class in the community", this wae neither permanently nor 
exclusively the case. In the end, "The State is and will be what the 
general voice and consent of the community wish it to be".61 Macdonald 
had earlier made the same point in arguing that where a measure of 
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political democracy existed, "If the masses of the ordinary people are 
agreed upon any policy, neither rich electors, privileged peers, nor 
reigning houses could stand in their way".62 
However it is not correct to see the state socialists as no more than 
advanced liberals. While they had few fixed ideas about the nature of 
the future socialist society and didn't believe in socialism as some 
finite and finished state of society, they believed that the object of 
their political activity was the control of economic power and the re-
structuring of the material basis of society. Yst in their understand-
ing of the means whereby this situation was to be brought ebout the 
British state socialists differed little from the radical liberals. 
They agreed with Kautsky that the widening of the franchise was important, 
but where Kautsky believed that political democracy provided a situation 
which socialists would have to come to terms with, to take the opportu-
nities it offered until the possibility of revolutionary change 
presented itself, the British state socialists believed that political 
democracy in itself provided the opportunity for the advance to a 
socialist society. It was only necessary to persuade a sufficient 
number of voters to elect, and then continue to support, a government 
committed to the reconstruction of society. Naturally, it was accepted 
thet the process would take some time and, as with all political pro-
cesses, be subject to reverses, but in eesence it was agreed that the 
political machinery alresdy on hand was sufficient to mansge the trans-
ition to socialism. The British state socialist tradition thu8 
encompassed an almost innocent view of the suprsmacy of the democratic 
elements within the state. 
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Thus it is clear that though there had always been a tradition of 
opposition to the mainstream of state socialism it was only after 1917 
that the idea of revolution began to play a major role in socialist 
debate. In 1917 William Paul published his "The State, its Origins 
and Functions" and while Psul at that time was no Leninist, his work 
attracted a broad intersst more becauee of events in Russia than on 
its own intrinsic merits. It is also interesting as the first work by 
a British marxist to deal specifically with the problem of the state. 
Paul was a member of the SLP and, up to a point, his work reflected a 
de Leonist approach yet parts of the analysis owed something to the 
inhospitable climate in which British revolutionaries lived. Paul's 
attack on the state socialists contained a distinctively personel 
element. They were, he argued, ambitious middle class men, an "intel-
lectual proletariat,,63 who had perverted the labour movement and 
directed it to their own ends. They saw in the development of the 
state an opportunity to secure occupations for themselves and their 
children: "Small wonder that the middle class looks upon the state as 
a glorified institution, as something destined to save the world.,,64 
Their plans and schemes such as Nationalisation and Municipelisation 
had nothing to offer: "Theee things are no more 'steps' in the direction 
of socialism than is the general centralisation and concentration of 
capital. ,,65 Paul would admit of no qualification of his view of the 
state as a tyrannical instrument of the capitalist class. In the nine-
teenth century, "While it was officially opposed to state intervention 
the capitalist class was always eager to use the state against the 
66 
workers", and all new forms of state activity were, he argued, 
directed to precisely the same end. Far from offering a new opportunity 
to the working class movement the extension of state power during the 
276 
War offered only the prospect of "a social dee pot ism organised from 
above". Tha new capitalist state would be manned by "armies of 
official bureaucrats, who will only be able to maintain their poets 
by tyrannising and limiting the power of the workers".67 Paul con-
temptuouslY dismissed the "reforms" welcomed by the state socialists. 
They were no more than devices designed to make the worker more pro-
ductive. Similarly the granting of political democracy was meaningless: 
the Press was controlled by the capitalists who could use it to mani-
pu1ate the worksrs' votes. 
Not all British revolutionariee adopted as purs sn anti-state line as 
Paul. John Maclean, for example, argued that the purists were doing 
a great deal of harm to the people they claimed to represent. While 
Maclssn held a conventional marxist view of the relationship between 
state and society: "Britain is under the dictstorship of the bourgeoisie, 
the robbed ruled by the police, soldiers snd sailors of the robbsrs. II68 
and emphasised the coercive policy of the state: "If the wage workers 
in big numbers demand shorter hours, the batons sre used as on Friday, 
31st January in Glasgow; or bayonets as in liverpool as in August 1919, 
or soldisrs and sailors are used as scabs as in the Yorkshire mines.,,69, 
he felt that revolutionaries could not simply ignore the state. In 
working with the Glasgow unemployed, Macleen worked on the principle 
that it was important "to exhaust every constitutional method" bsfore 
considering anything e1se. 70 Socialists who wished to assist the un-
employed should act cautiously and consider the broader consequences of 
their actions rather than simply demonstrating revolutionary intransi-
gence: "To rush a work just now would mean split heads and a defeat 
for the labour candidates. To use the misfortunes of the unemployed 
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to increase those misfortunes is pitiable, but at the same time to 
defeat labour is positively criminal. A labour Town Council will 
respond to our pressures more readily than a bourgeois one.,,71 
Maclean, at least, felt it was never enough to condemn those who dis-
agreed with him, and sought to develop a strategy for pursuing definite 
political ends through changing and unpropitious circumstances. 
Yet, in the end it is necessary to keep in mind that it wee not the 
nuances and details of theory and practice which accounted for the 
increased appeal of revolutionary ideas among socialists but the fact 
of revolution in Russia. If one examines the activities of the IlP 
in this period it is clear that while many of its members felt the new 
sppeal of revolution there was some confusion as to what it entailed 
and what implications it had for the previously held beliefs associated 
with state socialism. Gerald Gould, an intellectual member of the IlP 
attempted to come to terms with the problem in a book which attracted 
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some interest in the Party. Gould was clearly excited by the events 
in Russia and by what he saw as the prospects of revolution in Britain 
but his attempts to reconcile this with the tradition of state socialism 
are no more than an attempt to have it both ways at once. He declared, 
for example, his belief in an "evolutionary revolution" which was 
"msrsly what was happsning". "Human society, liks the human body 
renews itsslf periodically, and becomee a different thing. We cannot 
73 prsvent that." Yet Gould also held a different conception of revo-
lution as an event which could occur almost overnight. Thus: "Never 
have we been so near to revolution in the crude violent sense as during 
the Railway Strike of last year." It was not that Gould felt that the 
railwaymen had been seeking a revolution, nor that he himself felt a 
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revolution on such a basis would have been desirable: "A revolution 
precipitated in that way would have no merits whatsoever to compensats 
for its disasters.,,74 In the end Gould retreated to that ground where 
the majority of British socialists seemed most comfortable. "We have 
got to realise that the issue is a moral one." While revolution was 
inevitable the tasks of education and persuasion remained vital ones: 
"We can accept the redistribution, and have a peaceful revolution. We 
can, by illegitimate and violent means resist the redistribution, and 
75 have a bloody revolution." In the end Gould's prescriptione ars 
little more than a restatement of the main themes of British state 
socialism with the added warning that if reforms were too long delayed 
civil disorder could occur. 
If Gould's analysis indicated a degree of confueion, it is quite clear 
from other sources that he was not alone in the ILP during this period. 
During 1920 and 1921 the central dilemma of the Party was over the 
relevance of the RUesian experience to British socialists, and specifi-
cally whether they should leave the Second and affiliate with the Third 
International. This debate illustrated in some detail the main analyses 
and disagreements on the question of the state and on the possible 
courses of political action open to socialists. 
Kautsky's ideas were presented in the columns of the 'Labour Leader' 
by his translator, H J Stenning. Stenning recognised that in the post-
war period revolutionary socialism was challenging established beliefs: 
"The old glamour of Marxism, as a system of thought which explains all 
past development and solves all present problems, exercisee its fasci-
nation with renewed strength. Properly speaking, what we sse now is a 
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recrudescence of Blanquism, the notion of a resolute and instructsd 
minority eeizing power at a time of social ferment, and forcibly 
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carrying through a socialist programme." It naturally followed from 
this that Bolshevism had nothing to offer to British socialists. Indeed 
stenning felt that the post-war unrest should not be regarded aa 
progress: "Rather it suggests that the class struggle has relapsed to 
s crude and primitive form." Stenning's viaw that: "If the masses 
lack the intellectual conviction and the moral energy to turn them 
(circumstances) to their own account 1 can discover no remedy short of 
infusing into the people the requisite interest and initiative.,,77 
must have attracted some support, though the analysis of the situation 
in Russia excited criticism. One correspondent complained: "I am 
struck by the unreality of his premises and grave obscurity as to his 
facts. He simply takes for granted that the Bolsheviks represent a 
78 minority and govern by force and suppression of free epeech." A good 
deal of early support for the Bolsheviks was based on similar grounds. 
A quite justifiable suspicion of some sources of information on the 
situation in Russia led to a suspicion of all sources of information. 
The fact therefore that a man supported the Bolsheviks could not be 
taken to mean that he understood the implicatione of that support, or 
that he favoured, in the British context, a policy significantly dif-
ferent from that advocated by Stenning. few ILP members would have 
been content to work for a simple breakdown of capitalism. Macdonald 
had earlier complained that this marxist notion contained "no real 
79 guarantee that change is progrese". There ia no reason to suppose 
that in terms of British politics at least, the bulk of the ILP member-
ship had changed their minds. They still believed that real change 
depended upon education and persuasion. Thers were however rieing 
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doubts about previously held views of the state. While few members 
took an outright Leninist position there were considerable doubts 
expressed as to whether it could be regarded merely as a neutral in-
strument. One correspondent of the 'Labour Leader' asksd what the 
State would do when a Labour Government was formed and it attempted 
to introduce socialist legislation. There would be, he argued, a 
revolt of the House of Lords, the Law, the Church, the Army and the 
89 Navy. This correspondent was clearly unconvinced by the Kautsky 
argument that a democratic state would have difficulties in sabotaging 
the work of an elected government. He suggested that the programme 
could only be got through by recourse to referenda, or by the insti-
tution of soviets, or perhaps by eyndicalism. Methodological pluralism 
could go no further. 
Thus it is as well to remember that while Laninism had a distinct if 
limited effect on the ILP the debate on the Internationals took place 
at a time when the issues were not particularly well defined. A great 
deal of early support for the Third International, here ae elsewhere, 
was attributable to an understandable awe at the succeas of the 
Bolsheviks rather than a full appreciation and acceptsnce of Lenin's 
doctrines or the organisational principles of the Comintern. 
In January 1920, the Scottish ILP, "amid scenes of great enthusiasm", 
voted by 158 votes to 28 to affiliate to the Third International. 
"There followed a demonstration of enthusiasm such as had never before 
been equalled in a Scottish ILP Conference • .,B1 This vote injected 
eome urgency into the debate on the relative merits of the two Inter-
nationals and the relevance of the Russian experience for British 
socialists. On January 29 Wallhead wrote an article for the 
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'Labour Leader' which exprassed what wss eventually to become the line 
of the majority of the Party. He argued that while dictatorship might 
prove to be a temporary necessity, it was wrong to present it as a 
central and necessary part of socialist policy, and that it must never 
be made an alternative to basing the revolution on broad numbers. 
G 0 H Cole argued that there was no need for British socialists to 
restrict the debate to a c~oice between Soviets or a Parliament. 82 He 
was not completely satisfied with the parliamentary system but neither 
did he think that the Soviet would form the future unit of government 
in Britain. He concluded by suggesting that the existing locsl govern-
ment institutions provided a far better model for the governing of a 
future socialist society. Cole was open to the accusation that he was 
confusing administration with the question of political power, but ha 
was not alone in wanting to avoid the main issus. One can detect in 
Clifford Allen's contribution a desire to be free of the whole businesa 
of politics: "We distrust the old Parliamentarianism, and are chisfly 
concerned with political action as one of the means of overturning the 
capitalist order of society.,,83 Not that Allen was advocating violence: 
Russian methods "would tarnish our social ideals". The revolution 
. 
would have to meet force, but it was on no account to prepare for it. 
Allsn's socialist ideals did not include political democracy as under-
stood by ths state socialists. On this point he was emphatic: 
"Democracy is meaningless until economic equality is established." 
There was no need for democratic machinery in the short term when it 
wae clear that, "The whole community will benefit by the removal of the 
terrible havoc now wrought by the class struggle". The Soviet was 
besically to be understood as government by the working claes organi-
sations, and the dictatorship of the proletariat was just another way 
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of describing government by the majority of the nation. This was 
written at a time when Allen must have known, providing he read the 
journals he wrote for, of the suppression of the other socialist partiea 
in Russia. Macdonald took issue with Allen: "I do not bslieve that 
'Dictatorship' of any sort can be made to square with Mr Allen's former 
claim for 'Liberty of Conscisnce,.,,84 Macdonald made the point that he 
and many others in the ILP kept returning to, that if socialism did not 
involve the changing of opinione it would only be a surface phenomenon 
and would never achieve its central objective, which wae to change the 
social structure. 
The actual debate at the ILP'e 1920 Conference only rarely achieved 
such clarity. Mr Wyndham Albery, in supporting affiliation to the 
Comintern missed the point in arguing, "It is to be hoped that the 
Moecow International will agree to a reformation of the International 
without conditions which tske awsy the independence of the affiliated 
organisations". 85 Mr Herron captured the tone to be adopted by many 
future apologists of the USSR in viewing the business ae some gigantic 
exercise in applied social philosophy: "The Russian statesmen have 
made concrete the theories of the philoeophers ••• (the Conference) 
ought to give weight to an experiment that had succeeded." Strangely, 
he felt it would be inconsistent for the ILP to press for the diplomatic 
recognition of the USSR while at the same time refueing to affiliate 
with the Comintern. He felt that too much had been made of Bolshevik 
absolutism. Lenin and Litvinoff had been described a8 "absolutely 
doctrinaire", yet Mr Herron felt that they "could be converted"; "He 
was convinced that if they joined an International of that character, 
they could make their point of view known, and the communists would not 
seek to impose on them something that was absolutely foreign to their 
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nature." Mr Herron was supported by Mr Pickles who thought the 
mattsr wss relatively simple: "Surely if they were anything ae 
socialists they were communists?" Democracy was irrelevant aa it did 
not dsscribe ths existing situation nor offer anything for ths future: 
"We had had a dictatorship ever since the institution of privste pro-
perty." Walton Newbold, predictsbly, drew a lasson from history. It 
was not, he argued, a matter of wanting to fight, but "Just aa the 
Barons or the Parliament in the seventeenth century, they hsd no choice. 
They had to fight". Newbold addsd thst he felt it would be possible 
for the ILP to affiliate with the Comintern and to remain within ths 
Labour Party. 
Those delegates who were opposed to affilistion to the Third Inter-
national tended to base their case on what they saw to bs the realities 
of the British situation. Macdonald argued that they were not faced 
with the situation that the Russians had been faced with and anyone who 
thought that the state was about to collapse was dealing in "nursery 
politics". Mr Benson rsgistsrsd his concsrn at ths way many dslsgates 
spoke of violence. "Was there", he asked, "some mystical virtue about 
the rifle which broght men who were on the wrong sida of the bsllot box 
to the right side of the barricade?" Snowden made a principled attack 
on violence in his Chairman's address and spoka of his moral anger 
against those who wished to exploit misery to producs violence. 
It was clear however from the voting that the Russians and thsir 
International were fsr more populsr on this occasion than they ever 
were subsequently. The Conference voted for disaffiliation from the 
Second International by 520 to 144 votes. The vote on affiliation to 
the Third wes not a direct one, for Fenner Brockway had made a highly 
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pertinent contribution to the debate in suggesting that before they 
voted to affiliate they should attempt to find out what the conditions 
were. Therefore the vote was betwsen those who favoured immediats 
application to the Comintern, irrespective of the conditions, and those 
who favoured further investigation and the postponment of the decision. 
The latter course of action was passed by a majority of 472 to 206, 
which represented, considering the alternatives, a very large minority. 
Wallhead was sent to Moscow to find out more about the Comintern. In 
view of the degree of confusion in the Party as to the nature of that 
organisation further investigation could scarcely fail to be ueeful. 
In the interim the debate rolled on in the columns of the 'Labour 
Leader'. Fairchild, a former member of the 8SP, in commenting on 
recent unity proposals which had come from the Communists argued: "The 
Communists are tired of the effort to give knowledge to the slowly 
moving mass. They ask us to believe they have found a royal road."B6 
This to Fairchild, was "The revival of government by aristrocracy". 
He argued that this was too dangerous: "There is no ground for the 
view that men from the working class can be entrusted safely with a 
power which it is dangerous to give to the wealthy. Power has a cor-
rupting influence." To replace the old state with tha dictatorship of 
the proletariat did not overcome the problsm. There was no shortcut to 
be had by limiting political democracy. The only way was to build up 
political and economic rights at the same time. 
The Special Labour Conference in August 1920 on intervention in Russia 
provided a boost to the radical wing of the ILP and their view of 
political action. The Councils of Action movement was established to 
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co-ordinate labour opposition to the Government's plans for military 
involvement. The issue proved a popular one, perhaps more from a 
sense of war weariness and disillusionment rather than from a wide 
support for tha Soviet state, but leaders such ss J H Thomas were 
forced along with an action they regarded as "Momentous" and "A 
challenge to the whole Constitution of the country". The limited 
nature of the objectives of the plane for direct action indicated that 
this was not the breakthrough that the revolutionaries had been waiting 
for, but it was encouraging for them in that it indicated that the mase 
movement was not inevitably the property of the right. 
On September 3 Arthur Ponsonby reported that the ILP had received the 
conditions of affiliation of the Third Intsrnational and as these were 
"Directly contrary to the letter and spirit of the ILP constitution 
their decision on the subject (became) perfectly eaey".87 This wae too 
optimistic for there was bound to be, at least, minority opposition. 
The recently published draft constitution of the ILP indicated that 
there was some desire, or necessity to fudge ths divide between them-
selves and the revolutionaries. One aim, for instance, was expressed 
as "the capture- of local and national government bodies, with a view 
to the development of administration on socialist lines and the destruc-
tion of the machinery of the capitalist state".88 
The Conference of 1921 however offered no prospect of ambiguity on the 
iss us of Comintern affiliation. Mr Palin opened the debate with what 
was becoming the traditional Party view, arguing that while he wished 
to express his support for what the Ruesians were doing in their own 
country, he did not think civil war wss "relevant" to the political 
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situation at home. Mr Paton emphasised the degree of control which 
the Comintern demanded over member organisations. They rsserved to 
themselves the right to expel members and to determine policies and 
activitiee. The Comintern would turn them into an illegal insurrsction-
ary movement. Supporters of the Comintern attsmpted in vain to avoid 
the obvious implications of the Theses. Helsn Crswford pointed out 
that the ILP had been involved in illegal work during the ~ar; Mr 
Norman argued that the choice was only between "a dictatorship of the 
English plutocracy or the working class". Saklatvala made what was 
perhape the most intelligent speech in favour of affiliation. He 
admitted that the rules and structure of the Comintern were incompatible 
with the previously agreed aims and nature of the ILP, but he argued 
that the immense strength of international capitalism demanded that 
sort of organisation on the labour side if it were to be effectively 
combetted. However it can have come ae no great surprise that the ILP, 
in full possession of the facts about Comintern affiliation, should 
reject the proposal by 521 votes to 97. 
Even after this vote and the conaequent defection of some of the sub-
stantial minority it could not be argued that the ILP wae once again 
clearly committed to mainstream state socialism. Some continued as 
before, others felt themselves to be revolutionaries. There was, how-
ever, a fair degree of working unity on the queetion of activity. 
Almost all members were agreed that there was something to be gained 
from working within the existing political system and that the deval-
opment of a socialist society would require majority support thus 
making necessary a continuous effort in the field of propeganda and 
education. Beyond this Party unity was fostered by a degree of 
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vagueness in ths formulation of policy and a practical toleration of 
diverse and conflicting views. What also may have kept the more radical 
mambers within the ILP was a recognition that the smallsr organisations 
had a poor record in terms of effective politics. In this they pro-
bably agreed with Macdonald who had bluntly pointed out that the 
choice was not between reform and rsvolution or any such grand formu-
lation, but between mainstream electoral politics, with all its 
attendant dangers and compromises, and the minority pursuits of the 
political fringes. 
Viewed from one perspective the British socialist tradition can appear 
diverse and divided. For example there are differences of style and 
substance between the Fabian tradition and the evangelical style of 
politics, fostered by Robert Blatchford and continued in this period 
by such leaders as George Lansbury, that can appear almost unbridgable. 
Vet on questions of political methods, those steps which might be taken 
immediately, there were possibilities for unity. Most of the diverse 
traditions could unite on the idea that it was possible to make real 
progress by becoming involved in the work of socialist propaganda and 
by operating within the existing political system. This idea, essen-
tially a continuation of the radical liberal tradition, hsld a number 
of drawbacks for socialists. It inevitably tended to encourage its 
adherents to overestimate the power of elected government both within 
the state machine and the society as a whole, and it failed to offsr 
any understanding of the way in which the state was locked into the 
existing hierarchical order of society. Its great advantage was that 
in offering a prospect of immediate fruitful action, it could units a 
variety of people of varying persuasions into a coherent political 
force. 
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There also remained the alternative political tradition, albeit an 
infinitely weaker one, which defined itself in conscious opposition to 
the state socialist mainstream. The main analytical strength of this 
tradition was its ability to recognise the inherent biases in the 
composition and structure of the state. However it failed to develop 
any sophisticated model of the operation of stata power and, partly as 
a result of this, failed to discover any meane of becoming involved, on 
any permanent basis, in political or industrial organisations, and even 
on occasion made a virtue of that extreme theoretical purity which is 
only possible in isolation. While, in this period, the success of the 
Bolsheviks in Russia brought a number of proponents of this position 
into the limelight, it muet not be forgotten that these too were good 
years for the state socialist tradition. The socialists had succeeded 
in committing the Labour Party to a programme of socialist policies and 
the Party seemed firmly on the road to office. 
It was into this situation that the CPGB sought to introduce and apply 
Lenin's idsas on the stats and socialist transformation. Their task 
would inevitably be difficult for not only did the ideas bear littls 
relation to the mainstrsam, but -they would also attract considerable 
opposition within the minority revolutionary parties. 
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The State, the Revolution and the Communist Party 
The Communist Party of Great Britain was brought into being specifi-
cally to apply Lenin's doctrine of revolutionary politics. As such, 
its failure to make any significant impsct must offer some insight 
into the t~eory and practics of socialist politics in Britain. 
Before proceeding to the main argument it may be necesssry to exsmine 
this question of the Party's failure. A number of spokesmen for the 
Party have challenged the view that the history of the CPGB should 
be so characterised. Monty Johnstone, writing in the 1960s, argued that 
the Party had "played a part in left wing politics in Britain out of 
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all proportion to its membership and electoral support". Apologists 
for the Party's record can legitimately point to the influence which 
has been maintained in a number of trade unions, the Party's work on 
the fringes of the movement with, for instance, unemployed workers 
and to the fact that many of those who subsequently rose to positions 
of authority passed through the CPGB on their way. While these points 
are reasonable it is also fair to point out that Communists have often 
failed to make a distinctive impact in those unions which they nomi-
nally controlled and also)that having once been a member of the Party 
has only rarely been seen to have exerted a lasting influence on an 
individual. William Gallacher, writing in 1940, a good but prscarious 
year for the Party, argued that vis-~-vis the Labour Party "the 
balance sheet of these twenty yesrs is on the side of the Communist 
Psrty. There could in fact be no greater condemnation of the Labour 
leadership • 91 than the prssent war". This though, was no more 
than a claim for moral or theoretical superiority and was reminiscent 
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of that innefectual left tradition of British politics that the 
Communist Party had set out to improve upon. A mora realistic eeti-
mate of tha Party's success was offered by another foundar member: 
"After twenty years the CP was no more than a sect and further sway 
from its objective than when it started its travail in 1920,~2 Yet 
in fairness it was a sect that was stil~ in existence, when so many 
similar formations had perished in the British political climate. 
Given a certain reading of tha political culture and the volatility 
of other left wing groupings the fact of survival itself might be 
eeen ae a considerable achievement. 
Yet ultimately this claim to have achieved a partial success will not 
do for it fails to take account of the mood in which the CPGB was 
formed. The instigators of the Party sought to mould history, or 
even at the very least convert what thay regarded as the progressive 
sections of the working class movement. In this contsxt the tenacious 
and peripheral survival of tha Party cannot be viewed as anything but 
a bitter failure. 
Three major elements have formed the baais of the various explanations 
offered for the failure of the CPGB. The first lays greatest emphasis 
on the activities of the opponents of the party, whether agents of the 
Labour Party or the State, the second relates the failure to theoretical 
weakneesee of the Party's own laadership while the third seeks to place 
the Party's failure in the context of a generally antagonistic and un-
rewarding political environment. While few accounts deal excluaively 
in terms of one set of factors there is a marked tendency for the Party's 
official spokesmen ,to atress the first type of explanation and opponents 
on the revolutionary left to deal primarily with tha sacond. 
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The first part of this examination is concerned with the activities of 
the State with respect to the Communist Party and in particular with 
the question of how much such activities might have hampered the Party's 
development. The basis of these activities was the analysis and infor-
mation offered by the Special Branch. While neither of the Directors of 
Intelligence in the period with which we are dealing believed that the 
Party was ever on the brink d a major political breakthrough they both 
devoted considerable attention to it. To Childs they were his 'main 
taek'. While he never believed they could achieve what they sought he 
"never underestimated their ability to create untold misery and havoc,,?3 
The darkest suspicions of Party members about Special Branch attempts to 
open mail and infiltrate organisationa seem to have been amply Juetified?4 
Klugman's claim that, "scores of plain clothes polics haunted Party meet-
inge and Party offices, and began to follow around Party activists and 
members of their families. Letters between Communists and addressed to 
Communists were opened wholesale, correspondence delayed, telephones 
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tapped, provocateurs from time to time inserted into the movement" can 
be substantially supported. So great was the police interest in the 
Party that the Intelligence Reports offer an exceptionally detailed 
account of its esrly history. While such reports inevitably reflect 
the particular preconceptions and obsessions of those who wrote them the 
account of the Party which they offer does not differ materially from 
those offered by others with different sources, snd alternative political 
perspectives. Childs, as Director of Intelligence, quickly identified 
those areas in which the CPGB repreaented a break in the tradition of the 
revolutionary left; the idea of a Party impatient with the traditions 
of argument and discussion, organised with military discipline, s Party 
sesn ae part of a broader international movement, and a Party deter-
mined to contest elections and to seek affiliation with official 
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Labour organisations. All these aspects of the CPGB, together with 
the opposition of such individuals as Sylvia Pankhurst, are pro-
fussly exsmined and illustrated within Childs' Reports. For example 
in the case of the campaign for Labour Party affiliation, every 
stsge of the operation was monitored. As well as collecting infor-
mation on the Party's attempt to e1sct members and sympathissrs to the 
96 Labour Party Conference, Childs waa also able to identify undertones 
of internal opposition. He quoted a letter from Fred Peet who com-
plained that it had been difficult to get the Party's prees to eupport 
ths line of the leadsrship on Labour Party affiliation. When the 
articles did appear they drove him to despair: "The whole idea eeeme 
to be missed, or am I very dense? Two of them are very good articles 
in their place, but to write two slashing attacks on the Labour Party 
appears to be the height of folly. It makes one feel like going in 
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for gardening." Childs reported the defeat of the Communist Party's 
initiative at the Edinburgh Conferencs but noted that the United 
Front policy was to be continued, the Executive instructing branchea: 
"It is therefore hsnceforwsrd the duty of members of the Communist 
Party to apply for membership of the individual sections of their 
reepective Labour parties.,,9~hile the Party press was made to re-
f1ect more accurately the intentions of the political leadership 
Childe continued to record problems associated with the 'United 
Front'. At the Party Congress of Octobsr 1922, "ths resolution on 
ths Labour Party and the Unitsd Front provoked thres hours' discus8ion,~9 
Evsn in ~arch 1923, the Committee wae still attempting to instil into 
the British Party the trus meaning of the policy. The aim was: "to 
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show how weak the Labour Party is". The problem was however not 
merely to persuade their own members, but to persuade the Labour Psrty 
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to accept help. Childs recorded during the General Election campaign 
of 1923: "It is reported from many areas that the communists have 
endeavoured to give effect to the 'United Front' policy by supporting 
Labour candidates: in several casee the help was unwelcome and in 
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others definitely refused." Philips Price, standing as Labour can-
didate for Gloucester 'confided' to Palme Dutt that he had had to 
deny his Party membership; "A statement that I am a member of the 
Communist Party would very adversely affect my position here. The 
very most that the Trade Union people here will stand is communist 
sympathies • • • they dislike the idea that I should be bound to the 
discipline of a body which is outside the Labour and Socialist 
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organisation of Gloucester." Ch~ds continued to report efforts by 
communists to influence local Labour Partiee. During 1924, for 
example, he noted that communists were attempting to fill vacancies 
on the Parliamentary Panel of the Workers' Union with their own can-
103 didates and that the Executive had seen fit to issue new orders for 
Party members on how they should operate in Local Labour Parties, 
including injunctions to "cultivate a spirit of comradeship" and to 
"always be better informed than an opponent: 
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Do not talk unless you 
know your subject." Perhaps with an eye to the susceptibilities of 
a Labour Prime Minister Childs also began, during 1924, to note where 
local Labour Parties had adopted communists as prospective candidates. 
Childe continued to draw two general themes from the 'United Front' 
policy; firstly, that it was often ineptly carried out and resulted 
in contradictions: "The Communist Party has on the one hand passed 
a resolution advocating the secession of the "class conscious rsvo-
lutionaries" from the ILP to the CP and on the other circulated draft 
resolutions intended to further the Party's application for affiliation 
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to the ILP", and secondly that the policy continued to run counter 
to the instincts of many British revolutionariss. As late as 1924 
the Congrsss of ths CPGB was still sxplaining ths basic aims of the 
106 policy to its own members. Childs argued that it was only through 
the authority of the Comintern: and their British representatives 
that the policy was maintained. 
Opinions insvitably differ as to the accuracy of this analysis. 
Klugman and Johnstone for instancs play down the ineptitude of 
the application of the policy and Johstone specifically denies that 
Palme Dutt acted in such matters as the sffsctive representative of 
the Comintern line. Other accounts suggest that Childs' interpreta-
tion may not have been too far out of line. Murphy offers support 
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for the ineptitude thesis and is supported by Macfarlane who argues 
that from the first the 'United Front' provoked diviaion and that 
even the supporters of the policy spoke of it publicly in such terms 
that could only offer ammunition to those in the Labour Party who 
wanted to resist it. Macfarlane also suggests that the contradictions 
in ths policy did not all originats at the British end: "The CPGB 
was told on ths ons hand to exert pressure to compsl the Labour 
Government to fight the capitalist class and on the othsr to convince 
the working class through its own experience of the futility and 
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treachery of ths Labour leaders." Support for the inept application 
of the policy by the CPG8 can also be found in the proceedings of 
the Executive Committee of the Comintern who at the conference on 
Britain, in Moscow in July 1923 castigated their actions as "inade-
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quate and aimless". Such accounta cannot be held to prove Childs 
was corrsct but they do indicate that his interpretation was, at 
least reasonable. 
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A major source of conflict within the CPGB during its early years 
concerned what was termed the process of 'Bolshsvisation'. Here 
too Childs offsred a grsat deal of detail and an interpretation. 
The process he believed originated in the dissatisfaction of the 
Comintern Executive. The CPGB had originally been conetituted on 
traditional principles and it was only in the years immediately 
following its creation that the Comintern principles came to be 
properly applied. Childs saw that the procsss involved ths abandon-
ment of sectarian impulses and the adoption of the working practices 
and ethos of a Leninist party. Habits of federal organisation and 
open discussion were to be curtailed under the principle of democratic 
centralism. Childs reported that though Macmanus had attempted to 
persuade the Comintern that "the Party hed a very greet political 
influence and that it was a centralieed end disciplinsd party", they 
had insisted on a complete reorganiaation. The device they hit upon 
wae a Commission to investigate Party activities and recommend changes. 
The members of this Commission and their supporters came to exercise, 
according to Childs, an almost monolithic authority throughout the 
Party. They succeeded in persuading a special conference to accept 
their activities and recommendations: "The conference provided yet 
another proof of the dictatorship of officials". Knowledge and 
education were apparently playing a large part in this: "My informant 
reports thst during the discussion of the 'mass party' the delegates 
displayed acute ignorance of ths terms used and for an hour the pro-
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ceedings were quite beyond them." The Commission's first report, 
delivered in the summer of 1922, was predictably critical of the 
Party's activities. It pointed to the dwindling and inconstant 
membership, the exaggerated size of the paid staff and an overall 
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lack of organisation. The Party was still too federal and repre-
sentative in character with inadequate facilities for training and 
propaganda. It lacked central direction: "We are not yet a party. 
Wa are still only scattered individuals struggling here and there up 
and down the country." The new structure muat be hierarchical and 
f~nctional and discussions on policy should only take place at the 
top. They lIIould have to break with "the old socialiat traditiona of 
"ineffectiveness" and create "an efficient machine of the claas 
struggle" rather than "some propagandist socisty or revolutionary 
club". Finally the Commission acknowledged its intellectual debt, 
"our guide • exists in the principles laid down in the theses 
111 and ba~ed on the experience of the international movement". 
Childa saw the Victory of the Commission aa the Victory of the Comin-
tern. While the Commission and some subeequent commentators have 
argued that Comintern offered only general principlee, Childa argued 
that the practice of the Communist Party indicated that it gave a 
good deal more. He pointed out that the Comintarn was striving to 
avoid the impression of pulling the strings but waa sacratly concerned 
thst it might lose some of its ability to contrQl member parties when 
112 it had to cut its allocations of money. 
Childe offered some insight on how the leedership sought to gain the 
accaptance of the new style of Party. Inkpin explained to the 
Scottish organiser before the Annual Congresa in 1922 that, "We have 
got to educate the membership". Branches must send their delegates 
to London with a "practically free hand-. They must dispel "ol~ 
fsshioned ideas as to Party Congressee composed of delegates with 
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minute and binding instructionshs td how they should vote on every 
113 
paragraph". This Congress accepted the .Commission's recommendations, 
though the Bridgeton branch did secede, and the Party proceeded to 
reorganise itself. The new idea of Party training involved the 
communists separating themselves from other labour organisations: 
"The Labour College classes, even when they are not actually hostile 
or indifferent to the Party do not provide for these needs • • • we 
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cannot allow members to be trained under alien influences." New 
training syllabuses included instructions on how to undsrmine the. 
State, "How a Trade Union branch nucleus works" and "How to eet up 
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a District Committee". 
The reorganisation of the Party provoked a good deal of 1"ternal oppo-
sition. ~hilds reported that rank and file communista in Liverpool 
were co~plaining that they would no longer have any influence over Party 
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affaire. He quoted one Glasgow dissident at length: "It is simply 
a case of money talking. The party is in the grip of Moscow and 
nobody in the Executive, least of all the paid officials at Head-
quarters, has sufficient backbone to tsll the Mr Brown, of the Third, 
that they are not going to obey the dictates of the Comintern, when 
it means walking over a precipiQe with one's eyes open. I also 
object to these so called representative meetings in Glaegow when-
ever it suits the representatives of Moscow to put in an appearance. 
If the agents of the Comintern have anything to put before the Party 
let them face the branches instead of heving these semi-theatrical, 
semi-secret gatherings which overpower the average rank and file~ 
preeent because of the appearance of the mystery man from the Third." 117 
Such feelings were probably widespread for the Executive constantly 
29B 
complained that branches were meintaining too much independence and 
failing to send sufficient information about their activities to the 
centre. In May 1923 a new scheme was introduced whereby branches had 
to file a monthly report giving details of all activities and the 
extent to which its members had penetreted Trade Unions, Co-operative 
Societies and Labour Parties. Yet the conflicts continued. 
Saklatvala was reported as having ignored a summons to Moecow and to 
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have refused financial assistance, in July there was conflict in 
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the CPGB delegation in Moscow, in September Postgate resigned and 
dieputes continued between headquarters and the districts. By 
November Childs felt that the Party's programme of activities had 
all but collapsed and there was reported conflict at the top between 
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Macmanus en the one hand and Gallacher and Dutt on the other. Zinoviev 
121 
had come to regard the CPGB as "the Achilles heel of the International". 
The Special Branch laid great emphasis on the finencial connection 
between the Comintern and the CPGB. During 1922, Childs reported, 
the amount of money sent from Moscow had been cut. One British Communist 
spparently felt that this was not necessarily a bad thing. The 
Russians he felt had been sending more money th~n was good for the 
Party. "We then sat up top heavy machinery, poured money into 
literature and various branches, set up a heavy list of paid officials, 
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out of all proportion to membership dues." Money continued to come 
from Moscow but it was in smaller amounts and tended to be related 
to specific projects. The bulk of the money wae in future to go to 
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the RILU. An indication of the new relationehip was the following 
intercepted message from the Comintern to' the Executive of the CPGB: 
"Pleaee submit before us a detailed estimate of the funds required 
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to carry out satisfactory printed agitation and propaganda,among the 
124 
tranaport workers, metal workers and miners." 
While Childs may have placed too much emphasis on the prscise ·con-
nection between finance and control there can be little rssson to 
doubt the factual accuracy of his accounts of financial trsnsactions 
and the disputes within the CPGB over the report of the Commiesion. 
Childs' sources were excellent and there wae no need, in reports 
written for this purpose to make propaganda. The precise point about 
whether or not Pelme Dutt, who substantially wrote the reports of 
the Commission was or was not Moscow's nominee is unimportant. Whet 
is important is that he clesrly set out to instigate a reorganisation 
of the CPGB on Comintern principles. Childs' account of this event 
can be substantiated from a number of sources. Bell latsr recorded 
what he believed to be the reasons for the extent of the adverse 
reaction provoked by the Commission. He pointed to "On the one hand 
an ideological unpreparednesa on the part of many members for such 
novel and drastic changes and on the other a certain passivity and 
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bureaucratic formalism in operating these decisions". Postgate later 
. 
recorded his own objsctions to a Communist Psrty organised on such 
lines. Murphy recalled that "ths attempt to 'Bolshsviss' ths 
socialists who formed the Communist Party" caused so much dissension 
that its membsrship was reduced by almost eighty per cent in two' 
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years. Murphy also latsr tended to support Childs' view of the 
importance of finance in arguing, "had the Communist Party not 
received big financial shots in the arm it would • • • have probably 
gone out of existence in within a year or two of formation"~2B It 
must therefore be allowed that Child~analysis here, as on the policy 
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of the 'United Front' represented a reasonable attempt to come to 
terms with the reality of communist politice. 
To what extent then, could it be claimed that the activities of the 
State hampered the activities of the CPGB? Clearly if good intelli-
gence is the best preparation for action the State was very well 
prepared. Childs' analysis of where the Communists stood to make 
most progress and causs most disruption, namely in trade unions and 
among the organised unemployed, coincided with their own view, so 
all he had to do was intercept their own information and reprint it. 
It is doubtful thoug~whether the discovery of the facts of communist 
life did much to upset the Party. The nature of the connection with 
Moscow was always treated as a secret yet it was not the State so 
much as former friends who were the source of public information. 
Sylvia Pankhurst was quoted as saying that, "it was quite true that 
Russian money had been spent in this country on communist propaganda: 
the Third International sent sums of money to communists in all parts 
of the world; in her opinion it was not such a tsrrible thing as 
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people seemed to think". 
The major direct attempts of the State to hamper the activities of 
the CPGB were through the arrest of its officials and raids on head-
quarters and the seizure of documents. The arrests and seiZUres 
tended to be sporadic, for while the police wanted to operate a more 
rigoroue policy against the Party, which they regarded as an illegal 
organisation, successive governments wisely reetrained them. While 
such erreste and seizuree as did take place could disrupt the Party 
temporerily it is extremely doubtful whether this could account 
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for its overall failure. The State could cast the Party in a 
criminal light and could aid and abet the newspapers in their cam-
paigns against communists. Yet those who were liable to be influenced 
by euch matters would be unliksly to become supporters in any case. 
In the section of the community to which the Party was appealing the 
detrimental effects of arrests in an organisational sense would pro-
bably be more than compensated for by sympathy and a recognition that 
arrests wsre evidence of seriousness of purpose. The arrests of 1925 
sctually herslded the best period of recruitment that the Party had 
ever seen. 
We may now consider that body of argument which suggests that the 
ePGB was responsible for its own failure in that it adopted the wrong 
organisational structure. Criticisms of the Party on such grounds 
have as long a history as the Party itself. Many on the left of 
Britiah politics, even, as is illustrated above, some of those who 
joined the ePGB were uneasy with its structure, its line on Parliament 
and its willingnsss to affiliate with other labour organisations. 
Sylvia Pankhurst quickly withdrew from the negotiations to form the 
Party and began to voice her objectional "I told the comrades that 
if we were before the barricadea, if we were in the throes of revo-
lution; qr even somewhers near it, I couid approve a rigidity of 
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discipline which is out of place here and now." It will be most 
uaeful to examine the validity of these types of criticism through 
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the medium of a recent and systematic statement of similar arguments. 
Hinton and Hyman are primarily concerned with the industrial policy 
of the CPGe between 1924 and 1925. In its internal policy during 
this period the Party was offering "no countenancs to the revolutionary 
302 
optimism of those who hold we are on the eve of immediste revolutionary 
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struggles W, in contrast to its aspirations of its first months. By 
1924 it was emphasising firmly, if not entirely consistently, ita com-
mittment to the 'United Front' and restraining its attacka on the 
left within the Labour Movement. Hinton and Hyman suggest that the 
British Party went further along this road of 'right opportunism' 
than the Comintern requirsd and they were reprimanded for relaxing 
Party control over members who were elected to union office8. Evidence 
of 'right opportunism' is also detected in the Communist Party'e 
conduct during the General Strike. J T Murphy was unwilling to recog-
nise "the revolutionary possibilitiss of the Strike" and in adopting 
this view failed to take the opportunity to demonstrate the inade-
quaciss of the left of the official Movement. Hinton and Hymen do 
not, however, base their criticism of Murphy on a fundamentally differ-
ent view of the political circumstances of the General Strike: "It 
is only in the most abstract sense that 1926 can be described aa a 
moment of revolutionary opportunity. Not only did the "established 
institutions of the Labour Movement (exert) a profound influence over 
the working class", but "the possibilities of effective and independent 
rank and file organisation (had been) largely destroyed". Thus 
Hinton and Hyman are not suggesting that the Communists, in adopting 
different tactics would have experienced rapid growth of support or 
influsnce, but rather that by avoiding contact with the official left they 
would have established themselvss as an independent 'rsvolutionary 
cadre" offering criticism from without in ths beet British revolu-
tionary tradition. 
The difficulty of this type of criticism is thst in arguing for a 
different etrategy for the CPGB it actually ends up suggesting that 
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it should have been an entirely different type of party. Many of 
those who joined the Party did ao in order to break out of what they 
regarded as the impotence of revolutionary purity. Lenin's leeeon 
rested on the idea that in order to begin to influence the working 
claes it was necessary to become involved in the organisations in 
which they were grouped. The fact that in the course of increasing 
its contact with the Labour Movement the British Party was led into 
'right opportunism' must be,related to the strength of the movement 
and its traditions rather than ideological weakness on the part of 
the communists. They believed, rightly or wrongly, in involvement 
and this could not be achievsd if they, for sxample, attacked the 
official left after the defeat at the General Strike. 
The Hinton and Hyman argument ultimately comes to reet on the fact 
that the Communist Party, in failing to achieve ite broader purposes, 
also dissipated the "rich theoretical gains" of the British revolu-
tionary movement, and, by implication that some other formation could 
have preserved these. Vet it was surely doubts sbout this movemsnt which 
persuaded so many of the British revolutionsries to Join the 
Communist Psrty in the first place. Parties such as the SLP could 
advance an articulate analysis of the opsrstions of Stats power and 
could offer cogsnt criticisms of Stats socialism, yet none of ita 
theorists could offer a practical anewer to the question of how the 
next step wes to be taken. The Shop Stewards Movement had offered a 
lively challenge to the official unions and the State alike but it 
had never found any balance between spontaneity and permanent orga-
nisstion and had, moreover only been effective in the circumstances 
of a war which had cast its sntibureaucrstic traditions snd its 
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pursuit of differential interest in an unusually subvsrsive light. The 
revolutionary tradition would inevitably hsve had to discover a new 
form if it wss to survive. Men and women cams to ths CPGB because 
it eeemed to offer a greater opportunity of breaking the bonds of 
ineffectuality than the organisstions to which they had hitherto 
belonged. The industrial strategy of the CPGB, "to create a more 
numerous opposition trade union movement" and to create communist 
groups in unions "aa a point of cryatallisation round which the 
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opposition elements will concentrate" was not doomed becauss it was 
'right opportuniat' nor because it betrayed an existing vigorous 
tradition but becauee it rapidly came up against the official Labour 
Movement. The particular character of that movement, with its 
insistencs on organisational loyalty coupled with an sffectivs. tole-
ration of a wids range of opinions presented ths communists with a 
problem which they were to find insoluble. 
Any complete answer to the question of why the CPGB failed demands 
some further definition of what would have constituted success. A 
comparison of the origins of the British Party with soms of its conti-
nental counterparts might suggest a new measure of euccsss and fsilurs. 
In Gsrmsny, rrance and Italy parties of the Third International 
failsd to achieve a dominance but did manage to establish themselves 
as permansnt and substantial presences in thsir repsectivs labour 
movements. Thus it is possible to idantify a line of Party devel-
opment which falls short of revolutionary euccees yet which might 
still be defined as fruitful activity. In thie senee the succees 
of Communist Parties becomss amsnabls to that typs of analysis which 
might bs applisd to more convsntional politicsl orgsnisations. 
~5 
While one must recognise their special position as parties of pro-
grammatic change seeking to attract rationally convinced and dediceted 
adherents with the object of producing fundamental social change, it 
ia clear that some European Communist Parties also came to fulfil a 
more limited and conventional role within the framework of existing 
societies. Thus it is not enough to explein the 'failure' of the 
CPGB solely in terms of the sbsence of a revolutionary opportunity. 
One must also ask why its growth was so restricted. 
The immediate fields of action of the Third International partie. 
were their respective labour movements and here too international 
comparisons can prove interesting. If we look first at rrance it is 
in the very origins of the Communist Party (pcr) that an immediate 
and striking contrast with the CPGB occurs. The pcr was formed on 
the basis of a large breakaway group from the Socialist Party (SrIO) 
which itself at its 1920 conference in Tours. had voted in a proportion 
of more than thraa to one to affiliate with the Comintern. In 1921 
the newly formed pcr could claim a membership twice as large as that 
of the party it had just left. While membership was in decline over 
the next decade its membership in relation to other competing groups 
was always substantial and it maintained a considerable prasence in 
the totality of labour organisations. Thus while the CPGB was formed 
from groups on the fringes of a strong official movement the per was 
formed in the heart of rrench labour and socialist organiaation •• 
The Comintern policy of participation in elections produced, in the 
1924 election, in marked contrast to Britain, 26 Assembly seats 
the basis of nine per cent of the popular vote. It has been claimed 
that the pcr was merely building on ground which had already been won; 
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that they were not starting afresh but 'bolshevising' a Communism 
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already in existence. Jaures had espoused a 'revolutionary legalism' 
and the tradition of syndicalism provided soma parallel with the 
industrial cell organisation advocated by the communists. Yet perhaps 
more important than the actual ideas in circulation was the fact of 
division itself. - As James Joll argues the Socialist Movement became 
135 more deeply divided after 1914 than it had been before. Many of thoss 
who votes for the Third International did so in ignorance of the 
principles of that organisation indicsting that there wes a consider-
able body of opinion ready for any change of direction. Communism' 
in france thus thrived in a situation where labour and socialist 
organisations were divided, small and relatively uneuccessful. It 
was, however, founded at the centre of these movements and quickly 
developed a level of support which allowed it to survive the deprada-
tions of the period of '801shevisation'. 
If divisions in existing socialist organisations are saen as one of the con-
ditions of success for a communist party, Italy can easily be idantified 
as fertile ground. Italian socialiem had elwaye been faction ridden 
often on geographical as well as political lines. Its history was 
more or less the rise and fall of factions with little evidence of 
reconciliation or merger. Immediately bsfore the Great War, the 
Libyan War had produced an acrimonious split which had involved dia-
putes over whether aesembly members should be independent or under 
the control of the Party Directorate, and whether the Party was to 
be reformiet or revolutionary. The Great Wsr, if anything, despened 
the divisions and one historian has argued that, by 1919, the Party 
leadership wae reduced to the necessity of totel indecisiveness in 
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136.. order to meintain even a semblance of unity. 'While the Party waa 
nominally opposed to Parliamentary action they had neither the plans 
nor the organisation for anything else. As early as 1919 the Party 
leadership had decided to affiliate to the Comintern. While this 
decision was reveraed at the Leghorn Conference it was still a sub-
stantial minority which broke away from the main party at Livorno in 
1921. Two of the issues which were cited as reasons for the split; 
the need to expel reformists and the necessity of preparing for re-
volutionary struggle represented almost traditional features of 
Italian socialist politics. All this took place only months before 
the march on Rome so most of the early history of the PCI was in the 
context of the strictures of the fascist state. One historian 
has claimed of the first two decades of the Party that, "it exieted 
as a largely ineffectual and wholly dependent outpost of the Intsr-
1·37 
national Communist Movement". While it is true that Comintern did 
control the PCI and that, inevitably it failed to exercise any 
influence over domestic politics, such a view fails to relate the 
pre Second World War activity of the Party with its postwar prosperity. 
While the Party was being "squeezed between the fascist police and 
138 
the demands of the Comintern officials" it was, as a focus for oppo-
sition, establishing a base on which it could later build. 80lshevik 
discipline and the fact of being part of an international movement 
wers assets in this context. Again the contrast with the CPGB and 
the British Labour Movement is most marked. 
The German case would initially appear to be quite different. In 
contraet to its french and Italian counterparts the SPD wae a more 
substantial and prestigious party. However its unity was much more 
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fragila than appearances suggested. The Drigins Df the Party lay in 
the jDining Df tWD quite different types Df socialist organisation 
under the impetus of antisDcialist legislation and an unrepresentative 
" 
legislature. The subsequenthistDry Df the SPO demDnstrated divisiDns 
Dn fundamentel questions, all pertinent to Lenin's arguments. The 
Party was divided on whether it should pursus national or intsrnatiDnal 
objectives, on whether they should seek to establish a parliamentary 
demDcracy o~ establish class rule and Dn whether they Dwed any 
lDyalty to the existing state Dr whsther they should deetrDY it. 
Unity had been maintained by preaching one thing and practising 
anDther. While leaders wers nominally pursuing fundamental socialist 
Dbjectives as outlined in the ErrOrt prDgramme, in practice they 
were cDntent to work towards the demDcratisatiDn of the existing stats 
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machine. The divisions within the SPO were opened up and exacerbated 
by the War, the defea~and the tenure of pDwer of the SOP leaders in 
the poetwar state. Thus the KPO was bDrn out of division at the 
heart Df the sDcialist mDvement. Moreover it was created at a tims 
Df defeat and under conditiDns Df considerable internal instability. 
Having survived its early persecutions the KPO successfully exploited 
the opportunities affDrded it by the political and economic diffi-
cultiee Df Weimar Germany. 
Thue it is argued that the failure Df the CPGB must be explained in 
terms of its relatiDnships within the British LabDur MDvement. The 
nature Df this movement made it inevitable that the CDmmunist Party 
should seek affiliation with the Labour Party, but at the same tims 
rendered it equally inevitable that it wDuld be rejected. A single 
theme underlay the negDtiatiDns between the CDmmunist and labDur 
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Party Executives and that was the question of organisational loyalty. 
Henderson pointed out that the Labour Party was not a monolithic organ-
isation and would tolerate a wide degree of disagreement over policy. Yet 
ths oommunists were unacoeptable allies because they could only say 
to ths Labour Party "our object is to diametrically and fundamentally 
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oppose what you have built up". It was argued by A J Cook and 
subsequently by many others that in excluding the communists the 
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Labour Party was depriving itself of its own left wing. Yet, se 
Jo~~tt pointed out at the meeting of the Executives this wae not 
really the case for the communists were members of another organisation 
which demanded total loyalty from its members. The motion put forward 
at the 1921 Conference that the Communist Party be admitted "on the 
condition that the constitution of the Labour Party is accepted and 
the rules of the Communist Party are in conformity with the samaIl, 
was, argued Jowett, simply not relevant as the rules of the Comintern 
illustrated that this could never be the case. While it is true 
that the CPGB handled its negotiatione with the Labour Party with 
consumate ineptitude this did not materially affect the issue. The 
Communist Party had everything to gain from a~filiation and the 
Labour Party had everything to lose. Communists could as individuals 
attract extensive support in local labour Partiee and even .influence a 
substantial number of constitutionary partiee to court their own 
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expulsion but they could never overcome the organisational barrier 
to their own affiliation, I and 'affi-liation was, as Lenin~ recognised, a 
precondition of their own success. 
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Labour and the State 
The short life of the rirst Labour Govarnment must assume a spacial 
importanca in any discussion of British socialist reactions to pro-
blems of state and revolution. The only grounds on which ths 
significance of this experiencs might be minimised; that is that 
the lack of a parliamentary majority effectively altered the character 
and achievement of the administration; has been effectively dsalt 
with by Miliband and others. The actions and attitudes of the leading 
Labour ministers may be taken to reasonably reflect their political 
belisfs. 
No contemporary could legitimately claim that the moderate intentions 
of the Labour Cabinet had taken them by surprise. Communists had 
predicted the 'failure' of a Labour Government well in advance of its 
creation and all that they subsequently added were dates and names. 
The communist analysis was not particularly impreesive, bsing littls 
more than an illustration that the Labour Party was not a party of 
progremme, was, in fact, engaged in the business of mainatream elac-
toral politics and as such valued electoral succsss more highly than 
doctrinal purity; that it was after all, the Labour Party, and not 
tha Communist Party. Unremarkable as this analysis was it remains in 
advance of that offered by those who have failed to take thia into 
account in their analysis of Labour actions. 
While the communists were not disposed to overestimate the socialist 
intentions of the Labour Government they still claimed to find some 
significance in its advent. Page Arnot found in the Labour Government 
a sign of, "the awakening of the working class and the beginning of 
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the end of capitalist politics in Great Britain". It 1s difficult 
to tell whether thi.9 and other similar comments should be taken to 
represent analysis or were merely confidence boosting rhetoric, for 
if the communist press was inclined to view the rise of Labour as a 
naw step on the road to the rapidly approaching cepitalist cataclysm, 
it W8S at this time so disposed to view many events. What ho~ver is 
clear is the considerable impact which the experience of a Labour 
Government did have on other sections of socialist opinion. The 
effect was greatest on those who were attached to the Labour Party, 
and on those who had maintained the fondest illueions about the 
immediate compatibility of fundamental socialism end electoral and 
parliamentary politics. The disillusionment and doubt expressed by 
some socialists over the following few years are directly traceable 
to this experience of office. One ILP intellectual captured the mood 
well: "A decade ago, when a man said he was a socialist, you knew 
clearly where he stood. There were differences - often of importance -
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as to method and speed, but all were agreed as to the end." Perhaps 
the ILP had always contained such conflicts which only the absence 
of office had minimised or contained, for doctrinal confusions and 
generous enthusiasms are most comfortable when furthest from power. 
r G Stone's description of the ILP's attempt to muddle its way through 
the ideological minefield has a ring of truth: "The ILP seams to be 
s8ying 'surely there is something between rsformism and communism? 
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God knows what, but whatever it is, we are for it." The vagueness 
extended to personalities as well as ideas. Lyman has convincingly 
argued that the rhetoricsl vagueness of Macdonald, his ability to be 
something to most men, had proved his strongest qualification for 
31,2 
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leadership. The relationship between euch a leader and his followers 
is bound to be less comfortable in office than in opposition. In 
opposition there was little to go on and one might interpret as one 
wanted. It was true that a close examination of Macdonald's work 
would provoke unease in a fundamentalist breaat; Macdonald made his 
attachment to principles incompatible with doctrinal programmatic 
socialism clear enough, yet so long as there was no record of office, 
when the implications of such beliefs would be demonstrated, it was 
possible to live comfortably with such differences. The evident pain 
of a number of Labour Party socialists after 1924 was, one suspects, 
based not so much on a sense of betrayal, which may after all contain 
elements of personal and political comfort, but on being forced to 
question their own comfortable and established notions. Those 
'minor' disagreements about methods and speed would have to be rethought 
and the results were bound to be more restrictive than the previous 
carelesa formulations. The dreary and painful bUsiness of attempting 
to reconcile the promised land of socialism with the machinery and 
muddle of secular democracy proved too much for some. Jossph Clayton 
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was one who felt impelled to announce his retreat. To Clayton this 
Government represented the defeat of forty years of hope and endeavour. 
The end had come with, "the discovery, forty years later, that only 
the name remained, that socialism was no longer a cause, a new order 
of society to be set up, but a programme of social reform • • • the 
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socialist movement had come to a standstill". What, one must wonder, 
had Clayton been expecting? He had been upset by Macdonald's state-
ment that socialism would not come in fifty years, yet if this 
socialism was the same discrete, untarnished, apolitical entity of 
Clayton's imagination Macdonald would surely have represented the 
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position better had he dismissed the project out of hand. Clayton 
could find no refuge in communism. The British communiets he dis-
missed as ineffectual, which Judgment must appear, in the light of 
his own aspirations, a little harsh. Clayton may be an extreme 
example, but he might serve as representative of a procese that, in 
varying degrees, was widespread among Labour Party socialists. After 
1924 the debate about ends and means would have to ba more realistic 
if the left wing of the movement were not to retreat into empty 
rhetoric. 
Too much of the debate on the first Labour Government has centred on 
the legislative record. This is partly to be explained by the fact 
that legislation assumes a large importance in British radical politics, 
and also because legislative proposals and the arguments about them 
become public property far more readily than do administrative 
decisions. Vet the mejor business of governments is not legislation, 
ana it is usually the case that even effective legislation depends 
more upon its time within the executive machine than on its public 
stages. The reactions of the Labour ministers to the processes of 
state power are far better revealed in the administrative record than 
in their public activities. 
The concentrstion here will be on the exercise of power in areas 
which had previously provsd controversial in the Labour Movement, and 
in particular the areas which had been held to reveal a tendency of 
the state to favour capital over labour. While there was some agree-
ment within the movement that the state had revealed such a bias 
there was fundamental disagreement as to why thie should be eo. For 
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the revolutionary left the answer lay in the very nature of capitalist 
society and the relationship of the state to that society, while for 
the rest of the movement, the vast majority, the answer lay in the 
nature of the political commitments of those who had previously held 
governmental office. The clear implication, indeed the raison d'Ctre 
of official Labour politics was that the state machine could be given 
a significant change of direction by a Labour government. Thus the 
conduct of the Labour ministers would inevitably have implications 
for all future discussions on the nature of the state in Britain. 
Discussion of the conduct of the Labour Government has tended to 
begin with the debate about political strategy. Miliband quotes 
Snowden as arguing that it was open to the Labour government either 
to "propose some bold Socialist measures", which would lead to defeat 
in Parliament and fight an election on that baeis, or alternatively 
pursue limited objectives and demonstrate that the Cabinet wae "not 
149 
under the domination of the wild men". While there wers those in 
the Party who advocated the first course of action; Clifford Allen 
for instance saw the first task of government as appointing "economists 
to draw up the order in which various industries should be nation-
alised",150 Snowden's remarks are misleading as an explanation of the 
actual decision for there is no evidsnce that those in a position to 
materially affect the outcome seriously considered the radical alter-
native, nor that they were put under any presaure to do so. Sidney 
Webb himself was of the opinion that the Labour Party may have besn 
afforded the opportunity of office by its opponents in the hope or 
expectation of "a Labour Government being formed of such weakness 
and outrageous character as to be straightaway condemned by public 
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opinion". According to Miliband tha strategy of prudencs was decided 
"privately and secretly, at a meeting at Sidney Webb's house attended 
152 
by Macdonald, Snowden, Thomaa, Henderson and Webb himsslf". Vet 
Wabb claimed the matter was also discussed at meetings between the 
Parliamentary leadership, the Nstional Executive and the General 
Council of the TUC, where the Parliamentary laaderst view of the 
importance of accepting the responsibilities of governing was accepted. 
To centre the argument about the Government on this iseue is to confuee 
the debate. The whole logic of Labour Party politics demanded that 
the responsibilities of office should be accepted. What was really 
at issue was how these 'responsibilities' might be interpreted. 
Special Branch surveillance of labour organisations had besn the 
aspect of state activity which had excited the darkest suspicions 
within the Labour Movement. The encounter bstwsen ths Labour Govern-
ment and the Director of Intelligence would inevitably raise a 
number of delicate queetiona for while the Special Branch were by 
1924 concentrating their activities on the communists, their filss 
contained references to members of this Cabinet. A subsequsnt, some-
what speculative version of the encounter put the matter in dramatic 
terms "The moral that Labour can draw from this account ia that 
Macdonald, having omitted or failed to destroy the 'Secret Service', 
the latter quickly maatered and, in ths end, destroysd him".15~hs 
rsslity was more proaaic, but no les8 interesting. 
Before the formation of a Labour Government Childe had diatributed 
his weekly report to all members of the Cabinet. When governments 
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had changed previously the practice had continued undisturbed. 
Evidently Childs felt that Labour was something different for he 
ceased to circulate the reports and instead, sent a single copy to 
the Prime ~inister with an attached note~54 In the note he pointed 
out that he had marked the most important passages in the report and 
sought the Prime ~inister's view as to whether he wanted the circu-
lation to Cabinet ~inisters to be discontinued. At this stage 
~acdonald was clearly unimpressed by the Special Branch and replisd 
155 in a somewhat flippant manner. He thought, "littls of the news 
contained in it was likely to be unfamiliar to members of the Govern-
ment or, indeed anyone who reads 'Workers Weekly' and similar pepers". 
The report, ~acdonald argued might be mada more "entertaining and 
attractive" if it were expanded to include "other political acti-
vities of an extreme nature" such as the fascisti. ~aybe, ~acdonald 
asked, Childs could investigate the "influences behind the 'Patriot' 
or the secret history of the Crusaders ~ovement": "The sources of 
'~orning Post' funds might give an exhilirating flavour to the docu-
ment and by enlarging its scope convert it into s complete and 
r 
finished work of art." Childs chose to ignore its ironical tone 
and sent a stiff, and very litersl, reply in which he pointed out, 
"I hsve never deemed it proper to investigste the activities of any 
organisation if it appeared that their activities, slthough sxtreme, 
were directed towards the achievement of their aime through the 
medium of the ballot box". The Communists he felt were "within the 
reach of the law" and, he complained, he had investigated the faecisti 
who, while nominally loyal, did envisage the uee of violent methods. 
As for the 'Patriot' and the '~orning Post', he had not 'sscertained' 
that they advocated revolutionery activitiee. Ae to the future of 
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his service: "The question as to whether or not a weekly report on 
revolutionary movements is to continue is one upon which the 
156 
Commissioner will no doubt receive instructions from the Home Secretary." 
The Reports were never circulated to Cabinet Ministers as they had 
been previously but Macdonald continued to receive a weekly copy. 
It is interesting that in spite of Macdonaldts initial scepticism 
the actual collection of material never became an issue. The only 
question on which the Prime Minister was invited to offer an opinion 
was that of circulation. 
There is evidence that Childs began to tailor his material to suit 
his new readers and used a blue crayon to point up matters of parti-
cular interest to a Labour Prime Ministsr. This was done, not by 
including information on right wing groups, but by concentrating on 
the activities of the Communists within the official Labour Movement, 
and in truth, the Special Branch could offer much that was of 
interest to a Labour Prime Minister. Some parts of Macdonald's 
copies of the reports are marked in ordinary pencil which perhaps 
indicates some growing interest. One passage which apeaks of a 
"secret communication" is so marked, which might indicate that the 
Prime Minister had begun to realise that Childs had more to offer 
than could be found in the 'Workers Weekly'. 
Childs reported the general campaigns of the Communist Party against 
the Labour Government: "A mors hostile attitude on the part of the 
Communist Party towards the Government is becoming manifest in the 
~57 
public actions and speeches of the communiete." He quoted such 
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material as Zinoviev on the "Lessons of Macdonaldism"; "the 
158 
government is accused of acting as s tool of the bourgeoisl~" , and 
the draft programme of the CPGB: "The governing classes can no 
longer hold their sway over the masses without the sid of the reformist 
159 
Labour leaders and social democrats." Vet psrhsps of more interest 
were the details of the specific campaigns of the Communists to 
enter the Labour Party end the Trade Unions. Childs kspt the Prime 
Minister in touch with attempts to implement the resolution; "The 
Communist Party considers it its duty to enter into the ranks of the 
Labour Party in order to strengthen the militant and fighting elements 
160 
of the Labour Movement." The Communists' preparations for the Labour 
161 Party Conference were reported in detail: even the arguments which 
the Party members were to use were included, aa wae the secret docu-
ment, "How to obtain recruits from the Labour Party" which gave the 
tactics in minute detail: "cultivata a spirit of co~redeship", "try 
1p2 
to get the Labour Party'as a body to act in association with you". 
There was information on contacts which had already been established: 
"rive members are engaged in officially directing work for the Labour 
Party and seeing that it is kept on Communist lines", and news of a 
communist campaign to get their own candidates onto the Parliamentary 
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Panel of the Workers Union. Alfred M Wall, who was an active 
communist, was reported to have been adopted as prospective parlia-
mentary candidate by the Streatham Labour Party and attempts were being 
made to get Albert Taylor, another Communist, adopted for Roesendale. 
Childs also hed interesting material to offer on communist activities 
within the unions and in particular their attempts to causs or 
prolong strikes. It is probable that it was a panic over strikes 
which changed the attitude of Cabinet Ministers to those aepecte of 
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the state machine of which they had previously been critical. 
Henderson, who on occasion was panicked into believing that Labour 
was iM the same position ~s~the Kerensky cabinet, ~as an easy 
convert for the Special Branch. He never allowad Childs to cir-
culate his reports to all Cabinet Ministers but he felt that his 
colleagues should not be denied the benefit of the material available, 
and to this end prepared an edited account of the Special Branch file 
on communist activities. 
Henderson's report on the Communist Party is interesting for a number 
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of rsasons. It provides an insight into his analysis of the communist 
operations and its likely impact on the Labour Movement, snd it eleo 
illustr~tes how a particular circumstance was used by the Labour 
Cabinet to justify and to continue an aspect of state activity about 
which they, or some of them, had expressed serious ressrvations. The 
report wss clearly conceived in part as an educative document. Hsnderson 
bsgan with an account of the formation of ths CPGB and an outline of 
its objsctivss. He emphasised that the ECCI of the Comintern, which 
was in effect the Soviet Government, exercised complete control over 
the CPGB, end that one of the objectives of the organisation was "the 
annihilation of the entire bourgeois government apparatus, from top 
to bottom, parliamentary, judicial, military, bureaucratic, administra-
tive, municipal etc". The main object of the report was to explain 
recent communist activity directed at the unemployed and the official 
trade unions and to warn that communists did not believe in holding 
to legal methods; sven their participation in representative insti-
tutiona was only devoted to the end of intensifying the class struggle. 
All the points made were supported by reference to documents, some of 
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which were clearly intended to be confidential. Henderson rendered 
detailed accounts of the money sent to the CPGB from Moscow, noting 
that the ECCI had instructed the CPGB to spend 30 per cant of its 
grant on propaganda, and showing how the salaries of some officisls 
of the RILU were paid by Moscow, in one instance quoting a letter 
from the acting secretary of the RILU to the British Bureau: 
"Tom Mann being an old and experienced fighter on the 
labour front and Chairman of the British Burssu of the Red 
International of Labour Unions deserves adequate pay for 
hia services. Our funds are unfortunately extremely 
limited • • • however he is to continue to rsceive £25 per 
month for the bureau." 
The same letter revealed that 'Comrade Gallacher' was also receiving 
a regular monthly salary of £25. 
Henderson paid some attention to the membership position of the party, 
reporting that leaders of the party were expreesinq anxieties about 
the number of people leaving. for these and other reasons the ECCI 
and the Party Commission were intimating deep dissatisfaction with the 
CPGB. 
Yet Henderson's greatest concern was with the activities of the 
communists within the unions. He quotsd in detail their tactical in-
structions on conducting a union branch and warned that communiat 
sctivity was liable to be particularly intensive during strikes ae 
the Comintern had advocated mobilisation in ftfull force, eapecially 
in terms of strikes, lock-outs and other mass dismissals of the 
workers". Henderson then looked at how these injunctions had bean 
put into practice. The Agricultural workers' strike of 1923 had 
aroused some interest in the Comintern but no effective action by 
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the CPGB. Communists had been active in the dockers' strike of the 
late summer of that year and had made themselves responsible for the 
bu11etine published by the unofficial strike committee. They had 
also involved themselves in the Dock and Railway strikes of 1924, and 
Henderson noted that Inkpin, secretary of the Central Committee of 
the CPGB had issued a confidential circular which spoke of the need 
for sabotage to render ineffective government attempts to maintain an 
alternative transport service during a proposed Tramway etrike. The 
objectivee of such activity, Henderson warned, were to prolong the 
strikee and, where possible, to weaken the hold of the union executives. 
from hie report it is clear that Henderson found little to object to 
in the activities of the Intelligence Department. Meetings were still 
being monitored, organisations infiltrated and mail opened but all had 
apparently been rendered acceptable by being directed against communists, 
and communists he regarded as being beyond the political pale. It 
was apparently justifiable to interfere with the political liberties 
of those who directed their activities to such noxioue ende as the 
undermining of official trade union leaders. 
In sxamining the broader field of Cabinet actione with regard to in-
duet rial disputes it is difficult to determine whether the communiets 
were a pretext or a cause of ministers using aepects of state machinery 
of which they had previously disapproved. One of the early acts of 
the Cabinet was to set up an Industrial Unrest Committee with ths 
terme of reference: "To enquire into the facts in regard to recent 
strikee, with e view to aecertaining whether any appreciable percentege 
of the unfortunate aspects of these strikes wee due to Communist 
. 
322 
165 
activity." While nobody took the Communist Party seriously in broad 
political terms e number of members of the Cabinet came to share 
Henderson's anxiety about the ability of the communists to cause 
trouble within the union movement. Added to the general concern which 
any government might feel about such matters were the deep defensive 
feelings of an organisation for its home base. At one of the meetings 
of the IUC Clynes was at pains to draw the distinction between Communists 
and opposition groups within the Labour Party, arguing that "members of 
the Labour Party would not have intervened in disputes for the express 
purpoee of making trouble between the workers and their union".166 
Henderson pointed out that the Cabinet could make further use of the 
resources of the state in this battle and recommended that they should 
discuss the matter with the "Heads of the Metropolitan Police". Wabb 
clearly felt that the discussion was getting out of hand and stressed 
the need "to distinguish betwein incitement to criminsl actions 
and inciting men to strike, which, however deplorable, was not, in 
itself, criminal and moreover, did not constitute action which it was 
possible for any government to suppress". In Webb's view the only dif-
ference between the communiste and those who had led the strikes in 1912 
.was the foreign money. Wheatley supported Webb, arguing that though the 
communists were agents of Moscow and while their objective wae to subvert 
the capitalist system, the influence they could have wae vary small. 
The Committee's findings were reassuring. They argued that " • . . 
while the Communist Party have undoubtedly intervened in recent in-
duetrial disputes with a view to their prolongation and extension 
and have done their best to persuade the workere to reject the advice 
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of the Trede Unions concerned there is little evidence (save perhaps 
in one or two cases) that the Communists themselves have actually 
initiated a dispute". The Committee also warned that the importance 
of the communists had been "grossly exaggerated", and that the public 
pronouncements of Labour leaders had done much to encourage such 
exaggerations. The Committee advised the Government not to take 
legal meaaures against communists for the time being though they 
acknowledged that "In certain circumstancee it might become imperative 
for the Government to initiate such proceedings". The Committee 
advised against the Government's becoming involved in counter propa-
ganda as it felt that this would merely serve to advertise the CPGB. 
In this there is a great similarity between the conduct of this 
Government and previous administrations. However one final recommen-
dation made by the committee does show that there was one additional 
avenue open to Labour governments. The committee advised that "steps 
should be taken to convey informally and confidentially to responsible 
Trade Union leaders the information possessed by tha Government as to 
the real object of the Communists and the manner in which their 
167 
activitiee are being fostered and encouraged from abroad".. This re-
commendation was later accepted by the Cabinet. 
The Labour Government was detsrmined from the first to take an 
active part in industrial dieputee, believing it had special abilities 
in this area. When a dock strike threatened early in 1924 the Cabinet 
inatructed the Minister of Labour "to watch the situation carefully" 
and "either see the Chairman of the Port of London Authority himself 
. . • or request the Prime Minister to see him with a view to doing 
168' 
everything poseible to avoid a deadlock". On rebruary 12th the 
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Minister of Labour reported to the Cabinet that as negotiations had 
broken down he had convened a meeting between the parti... Ae the 
prospects of a dock strike became clearer the government was pressed 
to publicly define its attitudes. A Parliamentary question was set 
for the Prime Minister asking, "Whether he will give an assurance 
that promises of full maintenance to people engaged in industrial 
169 
disputes will nat be sanctioned". The Cabinet agreed that Macdonald 
should reply that payment would only ba mads according to existing 
statutss and court rulings. 'Ths Cabinet also stuck to precedant by 
setting up an Emergency Committse "for the purpose of enquiring into 
170 
the emergency organisation". At the first meeting of this Committee 
171 
Sir John Anderson spake to his paper, discussed above, which he had 
preparsd for the previous administration. While Anderson's proposals 
were a good deal lees provocative than earlier Supply and Transport 
schemes it is perhaps somewhat surprising that the Emergency Committe. 
so readily· decided "to recommand ths Cabinet to adopt the schema which, 
172 
if adopted, involved the immediate appointment of a CCC". The usa of 
this scheme involved the use of regulations under the Emergency 
Act, 1920. While Miliband overstates the case in claiming that this 
173 
Act was "bitterly resented" by the whole Labour movement; the Labour 
opposition in Parliament had at the time concentrated on criticisms 
of the timing and style of the Act rather than its SUbstance and only 
43 Labour MP's had voted against it; thers ware probably grounds for 
expecting more caution than the Cabinet actually demonstrated. Tha 
Labour men did recommend some changes; "Tha Emergency Regulations 
(under the EPA) should be based on the corresponding regulations 
iasued in previous emergencies of the same nature but that the Law 
Officers should have full discretion to delete from them all object-
ionable, vindictive or inapplicable clauses, and should add a claus a 
325 
to deal with profiteering. "The recruiting poster for volunteers to 
man the emergency services was to be modified to include the slogan 
"No 81acklegging Involved". The Committse bslieved that there was no 
longer any need for elaborate secrecy and hinted at a broader under-
standing of the government's role in disputes by euggesting "that the 
opportunity should be taken when any announcement wae mede to deel 
with wider aspects of the problem of induetrial unreet.,,174 However 
there is no evidence that this last suggestion wae given sUbstance. 
J C Wedgwood was appointed Chief Civil Commiseioner and seemed to taka 
to his task with enthusiasm. The concern which J C C Davidson felt 
on handing over his pet organisation to a Labour Cabinet has been re-
corded as has Wedgwood's reply to the effect that he had done nothing 
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about it. rar from doing the things Davideon feared a Labour repre-
sentative might have done, Wedgwood had actually mobilised the organ-
ieation. Wedgwood believed that all that the STD required was a change 
in its public image and that this could be achieved by eesentially 
cosmetic alterations. He felt that secrecy could be relaxed. It had, 
he argued, only been "due .to the supposition that a considerable party 
in the state might be in opposition to the actions of government. 
Whether this supposition was well or ill founded, it is obvioualy 
incorrect with a Labour Government in office".176 Wedgwood felt any 
residual unease his colleagues might be feeling could be discounted: 
"There is nothing to be ashamed of in action which will tend to prsserve 
the essential servicee and the life of the people." All matters could 
be publicised in future except, obviously, the proceedings of Cabinet 
and its committees and details of air mail and transport schemes 
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which were vulnerable to sabotage and only for use in the event of 
'dislocation'. More use in the future should be made of Local 
Authorities. The arrival of a Labour administration meant "that there 
is less ground for presupposing disloyalty on the part of Local Author-
177 ities in the future". 
The Dock Strike was settled in rebruary without Government intervention, 
but when a transport strike was threatened in March the full parapher-
nalia of the counter strike measures were mobilised. The Cabinet decided 
at its meeting of March 25th to proclaim a state of emsrgency under the 
EPA. The Emergency Committee immediately made arrangements to supply 
charabancs as an alternative means of transport. In a memorandum the Chief 
Civil Commissioner conceded that little in practice had been changed: "The 
late government had made, and had put into operation during 1921, 
elaborate arrangements for dealing with national emergencies of this 
character. Though unsatisfactory these arrangements must be continued 
178 for the moment:" Ten Civil Commissioners were appointed to go to the 
regions and food, transport and recruiting agencies were made ready 
to operate. As under Anderson's scheme, Wedgwood recommended that 
primary responsibility for obtaining labour for dock and transport 
work would rest with the appropriate associations and government 
would not be directly involved in recruiting "except when it has been 
shown to be absolutely necessary for the carrying out of essential 
servicee". The Chief Civil Commissioner reported that protection and 
publicity arrangements wers underway but it had been decidad in res-
pect of the latter that "it would not be desirable that any propaganda 
or anything but facts should be issued". Where all previous schemes 
had been co-ordinated by the Home Office Wedgwood argued that 
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responsibilities should now devolve to individual departments: "The 
practice in the past had only arisen because Governments anticipated 
factions in opposition to their emergency measures and feared dis-
cuss ion in the ~buse." If nothing else had changed, the absence of 
a Labour opposition ensured a smoother ride for such measures. In 
the event of a transport strike the Cabinet eventually decided 
"sfter a long discussion, that the Government should confine its 
activities to providing means for the transportation of Government 
employees". Beyond this they were prepared to smploy special con-
stables and "to offer adequate protection to any bus, tube or tram 
service that found themselves able to run and to make a general 
appeal to the motor driving public to render any assistance in their 
179 
power". 
When, in the June, the Cabinet was faced with the possibility of 
strikes on the Great Western Railway and by Electric Power workers 
its responses were similar. In the latter case it was again attach-
ment to precedent rather than innovation that was the main motivation. 
The Cabinet immediately authorised the Minister of Labour to make a 
statement "if he thought fit, to say that if society were subjected 
to this sort of strike it would be paralysed. If asked whether the 
Government would protect people remaining at work, and others who 
wished to keep the public services going, he should reply in the 
180 
affirmative". The Minister was asked to strese "that the Government 
regarded it as its first duty to maintain law and order". The firet 
Lord was instructed to have naval ratings ready to run the power 
etations. The only doubts which the Government had about this scheme 
was, ae under previous governments, whether the naval ratings could 
328 
be put into the power stations without the issuing of an emergency 
proclamation. The Cabinet record of discussion of industrial disputes 
supports Sidney Webb's recollection that the mobilisation of the 
emergency services was undertaken "without hesitation and without a 
181 
dissident voice". 
There can be little doubt that the Labour Cabinet was at ite most 
unimaginative in its conduct of strikee. Given the overall political 
complexion of the Party nobody could have seriously anticipated any 
radical break with tradition but the manner in which the Cabinet was 
panicked requires some explanation. The administrative machine was 
finely attuned to reminding ministers of the dislocations created by 
strikes. Each anticipated major strike would produce reports from a 
range of departments; at a minimum, the Home Office, the Bosrd of 
Trade, the Scottish Office and the Ministries of Labour, Transport 
and Agriculture, outlining political difficulties and the particular 
reeponsibilities of government. These would range from the maintenance 
of order, or the elsctricity supply to special arrangements for the 
transport of fish. Many of the matters were apparently technical yet 
failure in any of them might adversely affect the Government'8~pu-
tation. While inexperienced ministers might have prepared themselves 
on matters of policy they can have had no prior warning of iseues 
such as this. The Prime Minister's papers lsave an impression of a 
man at the centre of a network conatantly rsminding him of his ree-
ponsibilities, and warning him of the conssquences of failure. It 
might be a msmorandum from a civil servant reminding him of a hitherto 
unknown Prime Ministerial function or a letter from the king reminding 
him of the numerous problems which would be created by a Dock Strike~82 
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While there undoubtedly were other ways of dealing with strikes, such 
alternatives needsd more time, and the immediecy of such problems wee 
constantly bsing brought home to ministers. It was this type of 
pressure which predisposed Labour ministsrs to accept without queetion 
the readily available conventional solutione to the difficultiee 
created by strikes. 
One final issue which may be used to illuminete the beheviour of the 
Labour ~inisters is that of the police strikers. As a result of the 
second police strike in 1919, 2,300 men had been dismissed. The fact 
that their strike had been called in support of a campaign to form a 
union affiliated with the TUC made their cause a popular one in the 
Labour movement. Moreover many of the ex-policemen had become active 
members of the movement and resolutions demanding their reinstatement 
were a regular feature of Labour Conferences. Henderson, inevitsbly, 
had to take up the issue but quickly ceme to the conclusion that he 
1~ 
would do nothing. His reasons, as outlined to Cabinet, are interesting. 
The first police strike, of 1918, Henderson argued had been justifiable 
beceuse it was in the neture of an industrial dispute. The demands 
concerned wages and conditions as well as the recognition of an 
independent union (The National Union of Police and Prison Officers). 
The Government offered concessions on pay snd conditions but only 
allowed a representative organisation on condition that there was no 
right to strike and no affiliation with other Labour organisatione. 
While a Police Bill was being prepared NUPPO had cslled a second 
striks with the aim of forcing the Government to concede "full and 
frank recognition of the union". It had been the 2,300 men who Joined 
this strike who had been dismissed. In this matter it is Henderson's 
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reaeoning rather t~an the actual decision which ie interesting. Ha 
based his refusal to reinstate the men on the grounds that the 1919 
strike did not constitute a normal industrial disputs: "It will be 
seen how entirsly different the circumstances of the 1919 strike were 
from any industrial dispute • The sudden withdrawal from duty 
with the avowed object of forcing the hand of tha Government on a 
matter then before Parliament must be regarded aa a breach of disci-
pline and of the obligations of the Police to the public as would in 
184 
any circumstances have merited dismissal." Clearly the reasoning 
here is inadequate. Was it so automatic that any strike "forcing the 
hand of government" could not be seen an an industrial disputa, espe-
cially where the Government was, as employer, directly responsible 
for those terms and conditions of employment which were in dispute? 
This wae clearly not an interpretation, as was made explicit later, 
which could-be acceptable within the broad traditions of the Labour 
Movement. Anderson's biographer records that Anderson, as Permanent 
Under Secretary at the Home Office, dismissed out of hand Henderson's 
185 
initial enquiry as to whether anything could be done for those men. 
The official view was clsarly that it was not desirable for the 
police to have a trade union and that affiliation with other labour 
organisations was thought to be particularly undesirable. Henderson's 
inability, or unwillingness, to do battle with his officials is 
revealed in his lifeless repetition of highly conservative views 
preeented as if they were argument. He pointed out that the Police 
Union had caused "bad discipline"; ."To a great extent the force has 
now regained its morale, and I am assured that the dismissal of those 
who took part in the strike of 1919 undoubtadly contributed very 
materially to this result." He concluded: "I could not assume the 
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responsibility of suggesting, or even countenancing, the reinstate-
ment of the dismissed strikers without seriously compromising my 
186 
position." Henderson's biographer, who took a favourable view of his 
tenure of office, recognised this issus as one on which he might 
have been expected to take action, yet: "A bommittee sat up to report 
into the police strike revealed legal difficulties not appreciated 
187 
before the party came into office." If this had been the case 
Henderson did not mention it to his Cabinet colleagues and the 
balance of evidence would suggest that this abandonment of the cause 
originated in political timidity rather than legal necessity. 
Henderson's failure to do anything for the dismissed strikers attracted 
a good deal of unfavourable comment at the subsequent Labour Party 
188 
conference. If the Home Office had been able to convert Henderson 
he could do nothing with the Conference and a resolution demanding 
their reinstatement was passed unanimously. Mr H Oaweon Large of the 
St Pancras Labour Party, for example, complainad: "The attitude 
taken by the late Labour Government struck a very severe blow at thoee 
who were getting the support of thase splendid fighters either for 
Trads Unionism or the Political Movement." The debate demonstrated 
that a number of paople within the Party saw the quastion in the 
broader context of the nature of the powers available to the state. 
Mr 8lackwell of Wsst Ham pointed out, "They were deeply indebted to 
the police strikers for what they knew about this Secret Service 
Department". Mr Colyer of the Holborn Labour Party moved, "That this 
confsrence protests against the use of members of the secret service 
for spying upon, and if possible, corrupting working class orgsnisa-
tions • • • and declarss that it will be ons of the first duties of 
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a Labour Home Secretary to put an end to this discreditable system of 
spying, and to give full publicity to all documents and alleged 
records accumulated by the Secret Service under the present eystem." 
The police strikers had done their work well for the Conference was 
well informed about the activitiee of Special Branch Officers. 
Comment -was made on the fact that CID men had been found under the 
platform at a CPGB meeting, and on the opening of mail. Mr R Bishop 
brought up the case of the dinner at which Mr Wheatley had been 
present where the waiters were "carefully disguised members of the 
Secret Service". He added: "The Labour Movement apparently could not 
repudiate anything of that kind because they found people like 
Mr Henderson attending dinners given by the eIO at which these eleuths 
were present." 
Henderson's contribution to the debate suggested some Justifiable 
uneaee. He admitted that the incident concerning the Secret Service 
waiters had taken place but said that the Government had issued an 
order that it was not to be repeated. He added: "They were defin-
itely opposed to the very vicious system of spying upon people in the 
way indicated", but this was at best, ambiguoue. Henderson avoided 
any practical commitment when he resisted the demand that the next 
Labour Government should publish the relevant documents. He argued 
that this could not be done, "without committing them to publish all 
the documents no matter what they were, and that might have been in 
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the archivas for a very long time". This surely would render documents 
more amenable to publication. Yet Henderson's whole statement is, at 
best, misleading, for it is clear from the ineide record that he had 
little difficulty in accepting both the principle and practice of such 
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activities. There are perhaps two main factors in explaining thie 
acceptance. On the one hand Henderson's, and the Government's, 
willingness to accept the conventional definitions of responsible 
action suggested by their civil servents, and On the other the fact 
that much of such activity was at this time directed against the 
communists and their sympathisers, who were regarded aa troublesome 
and illegitimats competitors on Labour's home ground. 
Interpretations of the conduct of the Labour Administration inevitably 
assume some general understanding of the nature of ths Labour Psrty. 
A number of stUdies have, by beginning with too narrow a view of the 
objectives of the Party, come to conclusions of only limited intereet. 
There is nothing very surprising in erguing that the Government failed 
if the judgement is based in the belief that the sole, or even main 
aim of the Party was the pursuit of socialism, defined ae an achievable, 
finite and readily recognisable state of society. That there wae e 
relationship between the Labour Party and socialism is undeniable but 
that relationship was too smbiguous, too clouded by internsl disegree-
ment, to form an adequate basis for judging anything. 
In some dismissive accounts of the Labour Government the historical 
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experience itself seems essentially unimportant. Coatea doesn't 
assume that the Labour Party is socialist, but believes that the pri-
oritiee which it should have set itself could only heve been echieved 
had it adopted a certain kind of socialism. On thia basis the con-
duct of a particular administration can be aBen ae no more then the 
inevitable progress to some predetermined failure. What cen such an 
account make of those who thought of the Labour Government as only a 
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limited failure, or even a limited success? Henderson's biogrepher, 
for example felt there was much to be said in its favour: "It lasted 
for but nine months, yet as a demonstration of capacity to hendle the 
higher tasks of statesmanship, and to cope with the problsms of large 
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scale administration, it was undoubtedly a success." It is surely 
more revealing, rather than immediately dismissing such a statement as 
mistaken or malign, to attempt to recreate the belief system and the 
interpretation of circumstances on which it was mads. If, instead 
of criticising the Labour Administration in terms of the objectives 
and beliefs of other parties, one evaluates it in terms of its own, 
one produces a far more interesting and in the end, more telling 
cricicism. 
It ie however difficult to define the objectives and beliefs of the 
Labour Party. Membership was not dependent on accepting any doctrine 
about the means or ends of political activity, and such statements es 
to doctrine or structure that did exist were open to the competitive 
internal politics of the Perty. It is possible to make a beginning 
by suggesting four understandings of party purpose. In the simplest, 
and perhaps most fundamental sense Labour was the party of an organised 
sectional interest, the party of the trade uniona. This interpretation 
reflected the organisational and financial base of the Party which 
wes granted full recognition in the constitution of 1918. In another 
ssnse, and as emphasised by another section of the party, Labour was 
the party of clase interest, the working class party, furthering the 
intereets of thoee who earned, or failed to earn a living by their 
labour. In a third sense, Labour was a party of and for the whole 
community. This theme was very much in evidence in the rhetoric of 
1918 Conference and was regarded by the leadership of the 
335 
Parliamentary Party as a necessary element in the Party's electoral 
appeal. finally, Labour was a socialist party with the objective of 
creating a new society dedicated to human equality and based upon 
the popular control of the means of production. Beyond the sketch 
offered in Clause four there was of course little agreement on the 
nature of this socialism nor on how it might be achieved, even amongst 
those who felt that this was or should be the overriding objective of 
the Party. Such a description of party purposes should not be taken 
to imply that individuals may necessarily be defined as having be-
longed exclusively to one group or another. Even this variety of 
purposes was in practice much complicated by questions of interpreta-
tion. Again most party members would, when emphasising one of these 
definitions of purpose, argue that the others were not incompatible 
with it.. Parliamentary leaders concentrated on the need to serve the 
whole community but argued that this was not to neglect the interssts 
of the working class; trads union leadars pursued the interests of 
their union members but implied that these were synonymous with those 
of tha working class, and indeed the whole community. Socialists 
could argue that the pursuit of socialism could produce a society 
where such conflicts of interest would be meaningless. Yet in terms 
of the politics of the first Labour Government such a scheme is useful 
as it emphasises that contemporary judgments can only be undsrstood 
against a plurality of objsctives and conflicting definitions. 
Whils it is unrewarding to debate whether or not the Labour Party's 
leaders should havs formed sn Administration it is useful to consider 
their interpretstion of the role of government in the light of the 
variously interpreted purpoees of the party. That the Home 
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Secretary passed on secretly gathered information on the activities 
of communists within trade unions to trade union leaders might suggest 
that a Labour Cabinet would use its special relationship with organissd 
labour to add a new dimension to government. Yet if there is evidence 
of co-operation here there is little anywhere else. ror the most part 
it would appear that Labour ministers contented themselves with e 
rigid, conservative interpretation of the rights and duties of ministers. 
When, in March 1924, the Government was preparing a ractory 8ill, the 
TUe General Council asked to be informed of the contents of the measure 
before it was placed before Parliament. In his reply Hendereon made 
a virtue of rigid adherence to precedent, arguing that this type of 
coneultation would not be "in accordance with the usual prsctice of 
Departments": "The Government's business is ••• to be open to 
receive and examine suggestions from any quarter, and when they have 
considered all the materials at their disposal, to present thsir pro-
posals to Parliament." The lesson in constitutional priorities was 
concludsd with the observation that "no other course of action is 
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open for any Government". 
The emphasis on the conventional nature of the Government was, if 
anything, even more apparent in tha conduct during strikas. Inevitably 
the acceptance of the reeponsibilities of governing meant that a 
Labour Cabinet had to eneure that emergency services were maintained 
during industrial disputes but as the activities of previous govern-
ments had always aroused justifiable suspicione of partisanahip, it 
might have been expected that a Labour Government might attempt to 
deviee a echeme which was less disadvsntageous to organised labour. 
A joint meeting of the ruc General Council and the National Executive 
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Committee called in response to the use of the EPA in the Treneport 
Strike suggested that if services had to be kept going this should be 
done by the regular employees at the wages and conditions asked for 
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until a committee of enquiry hed reported. Yet far from giving 
serious consideration to this or any other alternative propoael the 
Cabinet seemed determined, indeed eager, to commit itself to actions 
even more rigid than the Conservative predecessors. Ben Tillet voiced 
his complaints about the Ministers at the 1924 Conference: "When he 
met their Labour Minister, or the under Minister, he found that they 
were in fesr and trembling, and some were saying that if the man were 
brought out on strike it would lead to bloodshed. In the whole couree 
of his life, after having dealt with a good many governmenta, he had 
never heard from Tory or Liberals the same menacing tonee snd the 
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same expressions of fear." Beatrice Webb recorded a similar panic 
in the Cabinet where Henderson wss illustrating their plight by rafe-
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rence to Kerensky'e Government. The situstion arose because of the 
Cabinet's interpretation of its role and the way it chose to handle 
its special relationship with organised labour. Inatead of using this 
rslationship it sought to restrict it, almost to deny it. In seeking 
to prove itself a government of 'the whole community', the Labour 
Ministers sought to demonstrate that labour had no hold over them. 
~oreover they apparently felt that they would be held reeponsible 
for the conduct of all labour organisationa. Thus the Cabinet was in 
a eituation where it thought its public standing depended on ite 
ability to deliver a docile workforce while at the same time being 
ssen not to offer it any concessions. This isolatsd the Government 
from a potential source of support and left it at the marcy of the 
administrative machine and the aridities of precedent. 
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In another area of traditional Labour concern there was a similar 
pattern of inactivity in deference to traditional patterns of govern-
ment. A subsequent critic, in claiming that: "Thers was too 
much smug respectability in the Labour Party to deal with the un-
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employment problem", ~as offering no more than a partial explanation. 
Labour-did respond better to the employed, paid up worker rather than 
the unemployed, but tne Cabinet's inactivity went deeper. Macdonald's 
reply to subsequent criticism illustrates the matter rather well: "It 
wae", he protested, "not enough to put themselves in the position of 
the unemployed • • • they hsd to put themselves in the position of 
the Minister of Labour who was responsible for the constructive legis-
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lation that was going to settle the problem:" Of course it all 
depended on how one was to interpret the role of Minister. Labour's 
record seemed to imply that one must fulfil roles sccording to precedent, 
and this bore some implication for the possibility of producing change. 
The record on unemployment had been negligible; Thomas Jones recorded, 
"It was rat~er disappointing to find Sidney Webb, the author of pam-
phlets innumerable on the cure of unemployment regardless of cost, 
nOIll, ss Chairman of the Unemployment Conimittee, reduced to prescribing 
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a revival of trade as the ons remedy left to us". Even allowing for 
the triumphsnt negstivity of the professionel administrator this was 
a fair characterisation of the situetion of the Labour Government. 
Only in the minds of sentimental radicals do effective measures flow 
directly from party manifesto to ststute book, so Lsbour would ine-
vitsbly have to place some reliance on the administrative machine. 
Yet professional administrators unless facsd with plausible and sophist-
icated alternatives will inevitably adhere to existing patterns of 
thought and activity. As it was the Labour ministers appear to have 
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been so ill prepared, to have thought so little about the actual 
pressures of office, that they seemed to rely on the machine for 
political survival and hence adopted its values and 'solutions'. 
That a Labour Government would be influenced was inevitable. Labour 
politics was not iconoclaatic and as a government they could not be 
immune to the Parliamentary view of its competence nor the polished 
conservatism and administrative sophistication of the professional 
administrators. To enter without clear ideas was to invite the machine 
to run the politicians~ which· function it was admirably equipped 
.to·FJerform. Ministers could be expertly briefed to act as champions 
for their respective departments in the internal battle for prestige 
and resources and the Government could be given th~ glaze of informed 
competence in its public appearances. The only price was the aban-
donment of the possibility of a collective radical purpose. 
Labour politics offered no developed understanding of the role of 
government and the state. It was one thing to believe that one could 
change a social and economic system by capturing the political executive 
but quite another to explain how that political executive might be 
transformed. There was no appreciation of the difficulties which 
would be encountered, let alone suggestions as to how they might be 
overcome. If Labour politics had a tradition of political statics, 
it was painfully short on dynamics. There is no evidence of debate 
on how to create the political situation in which such rational 
schemes might be applied; no thought on how initial political 
supports might be chsnnelled and sustained through the difficult 
business of change. The political methodology was a rag bag of 
liberal constitutionalism and radical populism, overestimating the 
• 
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power of Parliament and the popular will, and ignoring the power of 
the state machinery and the inbuilt biases in its structures snd 
methods. Even party radicals, while they suspscted that the machine 
wae not neutral, failed to see the full implications of the problem. 
The machine could neither be ignored nor instantly demoted for an 
elscted Labour government could not function without its expertise 
and information. The unrecognised problem was how this need could 
be prevented from developing into total dependence. Bevin's waa a 
telling indictment and his suggestion that Labour must never again 
take office when in a minority reasonable enough, but it did again 
~99 put too much stress on the legislature and legislation. 
It is important to bear in mind that none of the criticisms offered at the 
time had any effect in that in 1929 largely the eame Cabinet took office 
on very similar terms. There are a number of features of Labour 
politics which render it difficult to draw rational leasons from past 
mistakes and to formulate new approachee. The fact that Labour is an 
electoral party enjoying and depending upon mass support removes it 
from the ideological freedoms open to the smaller sects. While it is 
often misleading to draw'precise conclusions about the connection 
between policies and electoral support it is necessary to remember 
that for the Labour Party discussions on the rights and wronge of 
policy must be clouded by additional considerations of popularity. 
When in office a Labour Government, mindful of the need to maintain 
electoral support, must often make bargains and compromises to main-
tain an economic equilibrium, which ideally it might not countenancs. 
There ie the connected point that Labour, as a large party with a 
wide membership inevitably came to reflect something of the diversity 
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of the society around it. Finally Labour is an open party. Doctrines, 
positions and policies are the subject of open competition. This too, 
tends against a precise discussion of means and ends or s properly 
dispaseionate examination of past failures. Decisions and policies, 
party history itself becomes distorted by' the cpmpetition for power. 
Yet even granting all of this there doee remein the problem of ex-
plaining how Labour ministers menaged to avoid serious criticism. 
Part of the enswer must be sought in the historical circumstances of 
the Government. While subsequent accounts concentrate on policy and 
doctrine most contemporary reactions were in terms of the persona-
lities and class origins of the ministers. The question of Labour's 
'fitness to rule' was not seen in terme of its ideae but in terms of 
the backgFounds of its leaders. All of thoss involved in politics 
at this time had had their expectations of politics substantielly 
formed in the years before the First World War, and in that world the 
working man who achieved high office was regerded as something unusual. 
In popular terms the Labour Government was far more 'important as a 
symbol of social change than as e politicsl instrument. While today 
we inevitably approech 1924 as the beginning of an sre it might be 
more valuable to see it as the end of one: as the fulfilment of the 
Victorian dream, as the final arrival of 'Rochdale Man', proving at 
last his fitness for full admission to political society. If critics 
were restrained it mey have been that they were with Clynes, "marvel-
ling at the strange turn of fortune's wheel that had brought Macdonald, 
the starveling clerk, Thomas the engine driver, Henderson the foundry 
~OO 
labourer and Clynee, the mill hand, to this pinnacle ••• " 
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In addition, in accounting for this absence of effective criticism 
one must take account of how the particular nature of the Party's 
socialism failed to lend itself to the creation of an alternative 
strategy on which to base such criticism. It might seem that socialism 
played so small a part in the conduct of the government as to scarcely 
merit consideration. On the basis of present day understandings of 
the term it would perhaps be enough to record that socialism, as such, 
nor any SUbstantial measure associated with it appeared in the mani-
201 festo of 1923, and leave it at that. Yet this would be to ignore the 
complexities and ambiguities of Labour politics, for if there was no 
reference to socialism in the manifesto there was clear evidence of 
its existence in other areas of Party life. Aepirations to social 
equality and fundamental change were abiding themes of party rhetoric 
and there had been the recent clear commitment to a programme of major 
social reconstruction. How could the Government ignore these factore 
and indeed, evade any substantial criticism for so dOing? Part of the 
answer must lie in the internal Party dynamics, already discussed, but 
a fuller explanation must take account of contemporary understanding 
of the meaning of socialism itself. 
The traditions of the British left are frequently categorised as 
piecemeal and reformist, but this is only partially true. Behind the 
day to day campaigns for amelioration there exist broader social criti-
cisms, and aspirations towards more ambitious alternatives. These ideas 
can be difficult to recognise for later generations for they are drawn 
within prevailing intellectual assumptions. Socialist ideas, in this 
period, were expressed in terms conditioned by Victorian moral assum-
ptions and evolutionary views of society. Such views did not precluds 
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their holders from taking part in more mundane political activities, 
though there was obviously a broad gulf between such aspirations and 
immediate action. Many of the socialists of this period quoted Mill 
as their mentor and in Mill's writings this division between immediate 
practice and the eventual harmonious society is quite explicit. Mill 
was at pains to separate his advocacy of reforming measures, intended 
to promote better life chances for the disadvantaged, from socialism, 
a morally ordered society of the future well beyond such mundane 
measures. The thousands who were influenced by Blatchford's vision 
of a future moral order were not persuaded by it to abandon their 
efforts for immediate improvement. Eve~ the fabian. Society which came 
to be associated with a particularly practical style of politics, had 
a history of attachment to imprecise utopia~ aspirations •. ,' It is 
in this context that the contradictions of a Party identified with 
the cause of Socialism, a Labour Government not even attempting 
socialist measures and a left, unable to mount a systematic criticism 
must be understood. It is here too thetan' answer to Pimlottts question 
as to how radical populism and strict constitutionalism can co-exist 
.~~ 
on the Labour left will be found. ~acdonald accepted much of the 
liberal representative view of the state in that he thought little 
stood between elected governments and the implementation of their 
programme. Yet he never believed that socialism could be brought 
about by the election of one, or even successive, Labour Governments. 
The socialist society could only come on the basis of a community 
which was morally developed to the point where it waa irrevocably 
committed to the creation of a new order. If Macdonald was imprecise 
about the connection between the goal of socialism and immediate 
political activity he was only reflecting the mainstream tradition 
of British 90cialist politics. 
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It was .then, a tradition which had little practical advice to offer an 
elected government. It had nothing to offer on how a rational poli-
tical purpoee might be sustained in the face of the demande of 
electoral politics, it had no suggestions of how cumulative reforms 
might be extended into a pattern of qualitative social change and 
it had no plan for how a social democratic government might summon 
other social forces to its aid in order to creste changes within the 
existing state machine. While the history of the First Labour Govern-
ment illustrates a good deal about labour politics it is much lesa 
revaaling on socialist thaories of the state. On the issuas raised 
by Lenin and Kautsky of whether socialism can be brought about through 
the uee of existing state machinery it had nothing to offer. The 
theory of social democratic transformation cannot be held to have 
-been disproved by the conduct of thie Government for, quite simply, 
it was never tried. 
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CHAPTER rOUR 
THE GENERAL STRIKE 
The outcome of the General Strike was substantially determined in 
tha months precading its occurrence. Anyone in possesaion of the 
sppropriate facts on May 1st 1926 would not hsvs found it difficult 
to pradict the defeat of the TUC. While the Government's victory 
owed something to those advantages which any government inevitably 
enjoys in an ordared political community and to the particular rein-
forcemant of such advantages afforded by the British political culture 
such long term considerations should not draw attention from the 
activities of the Cabinet in the months immediately preceding the 
Strike. A proper explanation of the csre and comprehsnsivene •• of 
the Government's victory must rest on an understanding of the way in 
which the Cabinet exploited and developed the natural a •• ets which 
they initially possessed. 
"Red rriday" and the Royal Commission 
The first act in the Government's campaign wae the announcement of 
July 31st 1925 that they would subsidise the coal industry for a 
nine month period so thet an inquiry could,take placs into the pos.i-
bilities of reorganisation. The Labour movement welcomed this as a 
victory for union solidarity: The Triple Allianca had pressuri.ad 
the Government into postponing the decontrol of the mines and, for 
the time being, miners' wage levels wers to ba maintained. Vet it 
was on this concession, its only concession of ths whole csmpaign, 
that the Government wae to mount the political action which culminated 
in its victory in the May of the following yaar. 
Any explanation of why the Government won the Gensral Strike muat 
therefore begin with an explenation of why they chose to offer a subsidy 
rather than to face a miners' strike, and probable sympathetic 
actions, in August 1925. Baldwin himself explained to his biographer 
that the subsidy was granted becausa the Government wasn't ready to 
face a strike~ This statement is, however, ambiguoue. Thos. who 
favour an explanation of the Government'e victory in terma of thair 
material and organisational superiority have eeized upon it aa indi-
cating that the subsidy was granted to buy time for matarial prepa-
rationa. In this interpretation the Government is .aan sa poatponing 
what they felt to be an inevitable conflict until such time aa they 
2 
were better ready to defeat it. Such an interpretation ie inadaquata 
on three grounds. It impliea, wrongly, that political victorie. ara 
won by the mere accumulation of superior material resources; it 
assumee a unity and a competence among the policy makers which they 
did not possess, and it ignores the available evidence about the 
state of the Government's preparedness. Even Baldwin's own public 
statement on the matter at the time indicated wider reason. for the 
granting of the subsidy, for as well as mentioning the affect which a 
strike might have on other "industries he pointed out that no one had 
thought out the consequences of such a strike and warned that "the 
community" would have to think about protecting itself against Coercion 
4 by "a minority". In reality, the Cabinet only came to its decision 
about the subsidy after considerable argument. No other queetion during 
the whole period provoked enything like this level of disagreament. 
Lord Salisbury was moved to argue: "The moral base of the Governmant 
seems to ma to have dropped out." In his view not only had the Cabinet 
given way before the threat of force and condoned the breaking of con-
trecta, but had, "actually agreed to pay a large sum for tha arrangament"~ 
The Cabinet ~inute suggests that Salisbury was not isolated in his 
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opposition for the unusual step was taken of recording the fact that 
the decision was not unanimous. Even the form in which the decision 
was recorded suggests that an acute conflict had taken place: "That, 
as between a national strike and the payment of a.aistance to the 
mining industry, the latter course was the least disadvantageoue."S 
from-ather sources it is clear that the main protagoniats were Bridgman 
and Joynson Hicks who supported Salisbury in arguing sgainst the subsidy, 
and Baldwin, Chamberlain and Churchill who supported the award on poli-
7 tical grounds. Thus while it is correct to view the deciaion to grant a 
subsidy as the key to a series of subsequent decision. which f.cilitated 
the winning of the conflict, it is not correct to view it aa part of a 
well planned and expertly executed operation run by an all-competent and 
cohesive executive. 
The question of the state of the Government's organisation is a good 
deal more difficult to assess than many accounts have suggested. It 
is quite easy, however, to cast doubt on the simpler view that the 
Government felt itself to be entirely unprepared. At the Cabinet of 
July 30th 1925 it was decided that: "The arrangements for securing 
the continuance of the public services during a strike of this char-
acter were examined and found to be ready and complete a8 far aa 
8 
circumatances permitted." There were disagreements about thia but 
they appear to have been related to the broader dabate. Judgments 
as to ths adequacy of the emergency arrsngements varied according 
to the protagonists' ideas as to the form the conflict might take. 
Thoae who took the view that a general strike muat result in serioua 
civil disorder inevitably required a good deal more of the emergency 
arrangements than those who took a more optimistic view. Thus Cunliff. 
35B 
Lister "said roundly that the Supply and Transport Organisation was 
9 
not ready", while Amery, who had a great deal of experience in euch 
matters later recalled "the emergsncy arrangements had long been in 
10 
working order and only needed perfecting". It wae ineviteble of course 
that Joynson Hicks would require much of the STO for he wished the Cabinet 
to proceed, "upon the assumption that on the next occaeion w. shall deal 
not with a mere economic strike but with an attempt at political revo-
lution, such aa forcing the nationalisation of the mines, by holding tha 
11 country up to ransom and undoubtedly by sabotage and looting". Joyneon 
Hicks gave every appearance of baing the only man, outside the Party 
itself, to believe that the Communist Party would have a substantial 
influence over the conduct of the Strike: "I want the moet complete 
dossiers of every Communist leader and I want to be able to put my hand 
at any moment of crisis upon every leader and every Communiat head-
12 quarters". The Home Secretary's views provoked Robart Cecil to 
challenge the Prime Ministar: "Do you really think the Communist danger 
13 is serious?", but Joyson Hicks wae not alone in his opinions. If the 
Cabinet could not agree on the nature of tha challenge they were axpact-
ing they would never agree on which measures were needed to contain it. 
An additional complication was created by the fact that a number of 
ministers appear to have been entirely ignorant of the prinCiples on 
which the STO was supposed to work. One minister arguad: "While the 
orgsnisation was complete it was only a Skeleton and could not be put 
14 into operation until volunteers had come forward." Yat that this 
was so did not repreaent unreadiness for this was how the whole thing 
wss supposed to work. It was a central principIa of the reformed STO 
that Government should not be expected to provide alternative services 
from its own resources. Essential services and supplies were to ba 
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provided by the normal operators aasisted by volunteer labour and 
under the protection of the police. Other protection services ware to 
be kept in the background for as long as possible to avoid provoking 
adverse public reaction. The activitiee of Government were to be 
largaly confined to planning, co-ordination and encouragement; to 
maintaining the organisational framework and handling the political 
strategy. The key to the reformed 5TO waa not the materials or man 
directly available to the state, but the state'. ability to organise, 
direct and draw on the resources of the community. Propaganda and 
publicity were clearly far more crucial to such an operation than 
fleets of lorries or troops of soldiers. The succese of the propaganda 
efforts would rest primarily on the Government's handling of the dispute 
itself. 
This inevitably makee the assessment of the state of the STO in 
August 1925 a more complex matter. While the organisation had not 
been fully operational since 1921, parts of the machinery had, aa 
explained above, been prepared for action in the interim. The in-
coming Conservative government, in 1924, lost no time in railing 
the issue and as early as November 26th, the Home Secrstary pr.sented 
a memorandum on the subject to his Cabinet colleagues. The Cabinet 
agreed to the reorganisation of the STO on the line. proposed by 
Sir John Anderson to the previoua Conservative administration, and 
appointed a new Supply and Transport Committee. While this Committee 
continued to meet at regular intervals until the General Strika th~ 
bulk of the work was carried out, as before, by officials. The 
Poetmaster General, Sir William Mitchell Thompeon, was appointed 
Chief Civil Commissioner in October 1924, though it appears that 
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J C C Davidson was the most active politician in this area. Davidson 
was appointed Deputy Commissioner in May 1925 but he was a constant 
attender at STC meetings before this. The amount of energy Davidson 
put into this work and his close connection with the Prime Minister 
are indications of the importance that was being attached to the 
emergency arrangements. 
The Chief Civil Commissioner's report to Cabinet of July 14th 1925 
offered evidence of a considerable amount of activity. Tha machinery 
h~d been overhauled and elaborated in a number of ways. The code 
of Emergency Regulations to be introduced under the EPA had b.en 
revised and a series of plans devised so that a range of possible 
responses was available for different situations. The Board of Trade 
had appointed a full complement of divisional food offices and 
advisers to work with the regional organisations of ths Civil Com-
missioners. It had also prepared its panel of representative. from 
the principal food trader and all the divisional food offices had 
been visited and inspected by central government representatives in 
the six weeks prior to July 14th. The road transport arrangements 
were apparently satisfactory. Committees of haulage contractors 
were ready to operate in all eleven divisional areas and 'suitable' 
persons had been appointed as chairmen and conveners of the local 
committaes which were to pool all available private vehiclee whan 
the emergency occurred. The schemee prepared by the Mines' 
Department were ·practically complete". In common with other aspects 
of the operation theee relied to a large extent on the co-operation 
of private induetry though the Local Authorities were to bear ulti-
mate responsibility for the conservation and distribution of local 
supplies. The old scheme to man the London power stations with 
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naval ratings was still in existence and ready to function at short 
notice as were various arrangements to facilitate o'ficial communi-
cations including a Post Office scheme to maintain telephone and 
telegraph services, a plan for a wirelese link, and a plan for the 
RAF to make air mail deliveries. At thie atage the only reccomendation 
which the Chief Civil Commissioner made waa for the .etabliahment of 
a small permanent nucleus of staff in London to have reeponaibility 
for food and road transport arrangements. 
When the immediate threat of a coal strike had been averted, on August 
1at, the Chief Civil Commissioner was asked for a further report on the 
emergency arrangements. This report, presented on Auguat 6th,16 again 
perhaps with a mind to those ministers who had failed to understand the 
underlying principles of the STO, had a detailed account of the principle 
of voluntary help on which the orgsnisation was baaad. The co-ordi-
nating role of the STC sub-committee was outlined as wae the idea 
that this unit would split into five parts on the outbreak of an 
emergency, to take responsibility for areae defined ae Food, Fuel 
and Transport; Protection; Communication; Finance; and Publicity. 
Details were also given of the regional Civil Commissioners' 
organisations: "ror the co-ordination of local service. and the 
local operation of national services and to stimulate neceeaary 
local activity": and of the Volunteer Service Committeea, 88 of 
which were then in existence. 
The organisation as outlined by this rsport repre.ent. little change 
from whst had besn ~lanned and developed over the previoua four 
years. Of most interest are the conatant emphaeee on the dependency 
of the schemes on privata industry and on the enlarged role to be 
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filled by the Local Authorities. The memorandum to food officers, 
appended to the report illustrates the former point for 1n it the 
officers ere urged that even if requisitioning of vehicles proved 
necessary, such vehicles were to remain under the commercial direction 
of the owners who were to receive payment directly from the enterprise 
17 
on whoae behalf the vehicle was being used. Circular 535, the 
Government's instructions to Local Authorities also made this point: 
"It is not intended that the Government should substitute new 
machinery for that ordinarily existing to maet the e •• enti.l needs 
of the community." The circular make. constant refarence to the 
maintenance of normality. The Chief Civil Commissioners hsd been 
considerably upset when one of the 5TO schemse based on co-op.ration 
with private industry had run into difficulties. A committ •• of 
representatives of the London milk trade had "unexpectadly p •••• d a 
resolution which in effect (demanded) thst the Governm.nt shall 
take both financial and executive control" during the emerg.ncy. 
This was sufficiently at odds with Government thinking for the 
President of the Board of Trade to be' urg.d to meet lIIi th the commit tea, 
"in an endeavour to induce the Trade to take a more enterprising view 
18 
of their responsibilities". In the event the Government had to 
ac~ept some financial' responsibility for this schame but such resis-
tance was rare. As testified to in many reports and comm.nt. 
private industry enthusiastically provided the services required 
and submitted to Government dir.ction. In April 1926 the Home 
Secretary commended "the helpful attitude of trade organi •• tions,,19 
many of which were taking appropriate steps on their own initiative. 
It lIIas even felt that private initiative should be allowed to run 
the coal importation schema, the Chairman of the STC reporting that 
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his committee felt, "that consumers of coal should bs stimulated 
to the utmost to import coal on their own account instead of relying 
20 
on Government importations". While the Government would recruit 
volunteers and supply forcee to protsct the operations private 
industry was to be persuaded to act in sa near a normal mannsr aa 
possible. This aggressive determination to forcs indUstry to act 
on its own account was prompted by a number of factors. Clearly 
the Government didn't have the material, nor the administrative 
reeources to run an ambitious emergency organisation itself and 
there was also the matter of cost. The coal schems itaelf we. pre-
ceded by a chorus of complaint in Cabinet, led by Lane rox, about 
the high cost to the Government of coal importaf1 Other reaaone wer. 
connecteq with the public presentation of the Government's activiti ••• 
The less the Government was seen to be included in the provision of 
servicee tre more easily it could preserve ita 'impartiality' and 
its claim that in weakening the effectiveness of ths strike it was 
doing no more than fulfilling its inevitable responaibilitie. 8a a 
government. The more its organisation appeared to rely on private 
and popular initiative ths easier could the Government escape rea-
ponsibility. 
The part of this report concerning 'protection' ia also worthy of 
note in that this was an area which had always raised the gr.at.et 
22 
anxieties 1n the past. Had the strike begun on Auguat 1at 1925 
schames would have been available for the augmentation of the regular 
police forces. One involved the rs-enlietmenf of retirad police 
officers end enother the dsployment of the 100,000 spacial con.tabl.s 
already registered in England and Walss. Such men ware to ba u •• d 
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on routine police duties thus releaeing regular forc.. for more 
sensitive work. The two immediate queetions which posed the great.st 
difficulty were those concerning tha timing of the appesl for special 
constables and where, and in what guiea, the military wer. to be 
ueed to augment the police forces. The Committ.e offered no recom-
mendation on the former problem, noting, ae alwaye, that the difficulty 
was the problem of regional variation. While a call for special 
constables· ·would bring out hordes of volunteers in the Hom. Counti •• , 
recruits would not be svailable in sufficient numbers in the indu.-
trial areaa where they ware really neaded. Thare wae aleo the 
additional problem that if recruiting was begun too esrly volunteer. 
in the industrial arsas would be subjected to social pressurs before 
the emergency. On the question of the uss of troops the Ccmmitte • 
. . 
resurrected the notion of a Defence force, last h.ard of, and dis-
missed, in 1921, and were comforted to note that the number of r.gular 
troops available was five timee that of 1921. Vet in this the 
Committee was running against the official view as it had develop.d 
in the intervening period. The Army Council was opposed to the use 
of army units as a matter of cours~feeling that it was unn.ces.arily 
provocative. Ths Chief Constables ware also opposad to the u.a of 
regular troops who,they argued ware untrained in police dutiee, and 
they felt that the recruitment of a Defence force, inevitably 
untrained snd poorly disciplined, presented real dangers. Th. 
official view, which prsvailad, waa that any volunteers .hould b. 
attached to the regular police forcas and that troops should only 
b.·u •• d where it was f.lt to b. absolut.ly n.c •••• ry. Th. Committ •• 
debated whether troops should ba moved to centre. close to thoa. 
araas in which trouble was expected bafors the strike began, yet 
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decided against this as they were advised that such movemants could 
not be carried out secretly and therefore might produce an adverse 
effect in that "they might be regarded in some areas as provocative". 
Tha tradition of sending warships to ports, "where disturbancee are 
threatened" was to be maintained but the Committee felt, "sny euch 
movement must also be considered in relation to the efflct on lecsl 
23 
feeling". This report, like the one of July 14th presents a picture 
of overall competence, and in some instancss, notably publicity snd 
communications, schemes ready to operata at a momlnt'. notice. The 
only element of unpreparedness was repressnted by thos. 8chemea 
which, of their nature, could not be staffed until volunteers came 
forwerd, and such volunteers could not come forward until, in the 
Judgment of the Cabinet, the time was opportune to i.aue an appeal. 
Even without the help of the OMS it seems highly probable that no matter 
how ineptly the Gov~rnment handled the political case it would have 
enough uncritical supporters to maintain basic emsrgency services, though 
this survey inevitably re-9mpha~ised the importance of the be.t possible 
presentation of the Government's case. 
No single answer can adequately explain why the Government choae to 
grant the subsidy rather than face a miners' strike in 1925. It ia 
important to emphasise the differencee within the Cabinet. Soma ministers 
remained entirely opposed to the idea on principle, others falt that 
while a subsidy was undesirable in itself it was better to postpone the 
strike. A few ministers may hava hoped that by avoiding the strike in 
Auguet they might be averting it altogether. Davidson fllt this wae 
the casa: "Many members of the Cabinet think that the struggle is 
inevitable and must come sooner or later - the Prime Ministar do.s not 
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share this view.,,24 Margaret Morrie suggeets that both Baldwin and 
Steel Maitland were looking for a compromise eolution. 25 The latter 
certainly understood the inherent frailty of union alliances and 
believed that some advantage might be gained if the parties were given 
time to develop their differencee. 26 The Prime Minister had also been 
advieed by Sir David Shackleton, who had been the Ministry of Labour's 
official observer at the 1925 Conference of the TUC, to treat TUC 
pledges to the miners with some caution: "I gathered that Labour opinion 
was not so enthusiastic about the recent decision aa would appear from 
27 the Labour press." Shackleton also predicted that the General Council 
would move to the right in the near future. What doee become clear is 
that there is little reason to suppose that the state of the emergency 
arrangements was an important factor in any of these calculations. It 
seems'most probable that the majority were motivated by the suspicion 
that sufficient political advantage would accrue from the subsidy to 
sustain the blow to principle which it repreeented. It was prudent to 
accede to the Prime Minister's view that "he needed more time to enable 
the public to understand the constitutional issus involved,,28 and to 
accept "the cost of teaching democracy". 29 
367 
Red rriday to the General Strike 
There were a number of developments in the STO between 'Red rriday' 
and the beginning of the General Strike, bu~ these must not be taken 
as-evidence of unpreparedness. The nature of the decisions taken in 
the interim period make this quite clear. 
Joynson-Hicks, sensing that his hour wae come, want swiftly into 
action. Within a week of Red rriday he had circulated a paper recom-
mending a partial activation of emergency schemee. Evan the Hams 
Secretary could see that immediate action, if it became public 
knowledge, might considerably prejudice the Government's protestatione 
of 'good faith over the inquiry, but he etill felt: "That the time had 
come when it was necessary to risk a certain amount of publicity in 
30 
regard to the Supply and Transport arrangements". He proposed that 
a permanent headquarters be immediately eet up in each Civil 
Commissioner's region so that all schemes could be put into a state 
of readiness. A number of permanant officials should be appointed, 
nominally as Assistant Poor Law Commissioners, to work on emergency 
schemes. Joynson-Hicks also sought authority to gradually increase 
the Special Constabulary. By the end of August he informed the Prime 
Minister; "I have had consultations with the Spacial Constabulary 
31 people and have authorised them quietly to recruit." In September 
32 he began to agitate for the prosecution of communists. In October 
the Home Secretary reported improvements in the protection arrangement. 
and related these to the relaxation of .ecracy.33 At the sama time the 
Minister of Health, Neville Chamberlain, waa encouraging Local Authorities 
to take a more ambitious view of their reeponaibilitiea. The duti.s of 
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Local Authoritiee in emergencies were outlined in Circular 636, but 
Chamberlain recognised the sensitivity of the i.aue and ask.d the Cabinet 
whether he should circulate it before the pending local elactions~4 In 
view of previous doubts and suspicions surrounding the involvament 
of Local Authorities in STO matters it might .eem remarkable that 
Chamberlain was given leave for immediate circulation. The Cabinet 
felt that while adverse comment might be enticipated from lome Local 
Authorities the impact of such comments would be negligible in the 
new political climate. Thue, while it is clear that improvements 1n 
the emergency arrangements did take placa aftar 'Red rriday' they 
must be regarded as a partial mobilisation. They do not indicat. 
that more could, or should, have been done before August 1st 1925, 
but rather that the Cabinet had a freer hand after that data. The 
Cabinet recognised that its increased measure of freedom was based 
'on the fact that the trade unions had' "announced publicly in advance 
that they wera prepared to use every effort to stop transport and to 
paralyse the community in connection with a Strike in anothar trade,,~5 
rrequent reports on the progress of the STO during the period of the 
subsidy confirm the pattern of decreesing secrecy and increaaing 
mobilieation. So much was done that even Joyneon-Hick. confirmed, 
in rebruary 1926; "... there is very little remaining to be done 
36 before the actual occurrence of an emergency". rortnightly meetings 
between representatives of relevant departments were taking place, 
the Civil Commissioners had visited their regions and had had the 
opportunity to familiarise themaelves with arrangements, and maetinga 
between divisional staffs and Volunteer Service Committe •• had been 
held. Home Office officials had briefed the Chie' Assistanta and 
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Chief Conetables had been advised of whet the Hom. Office requir.d 
of them. One interesting development was that the Government had 
arranged that 450 lorries should be at its direct dispoeal in the 
period May 1st to September 30th 1926. While this arrangement may 
have been reassuring to certain ministers,previoua plan., andinde.d 
subsequent practice, indicate that this wa. no more than a luxury. 
The Government also had time to a •• ess the r.action of Local 
Authorities to circular 536. Opposition had b •• n .xpr •••• d in .r •• s 
of South Yorkshire and South Welee and Joynson-Hicks complained that 
in the North Division, "the circular' appears to have b •• n regarded 
37 generally from a political point of view". The Cabinetts view w •• 
that such opposition was unlikely to prove more than an irritant. A 
number of minor difficulties were also dealt with; for instanc. the 
~uestion of insurance liability for property borrowed by tha Gov.rnm.nt 
was investigated, minor amendments were made to the emergency regu-
lations and the Civil Commissioners' organisation found time to 
arrange for the supply of equipment and offica furniture. Evidently 
much of what was done at this tim. might have safely been left undone 
or at-. least postponed until the outbr.ak of the .mergency •. Ste.l 
Maitland protested as early as November 1925 that the whole thing 
was getting out of hand: "It may b. true (h. didn't believ. it to 
be so) that in July laet we had not sufficiently develop.d the system 
and the staffs of the emergency organiaation. But we should not now 
run to the opposite extreme of attempta at over elaboration in 
3B 
advance." 
The arguments over what might be done during the period of the subeidy 
inevitably ran over into the matter of the recruitm.nt of volunt.ers. 
This part of the operetion was closely r.lated to thet of public 
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support. The problem had been defined as persuading a sufficient 
number of volunteers to come forward at the outset of the emergency, 
without issuing appeals before the emergency began. It had been 
seen as important to avoid provocations to the labour side until 
they were fully committed. In eddition the Government had always 
felt it necessary to stress that volunteering was a matter of "aiding 
the community'rather than strike break1ng. 39 Such tactics were falt to 
be necessary not so much for the fact that they would fscilitate re-
cruiting, for it could be assumed that few of those who came forward 
would have scruples about strike breaking, but rather for their 
broader political impact. It was hoped that they would attract the 
support of the broad public and, at least, limit the inevitable 
opposition from organised labour. 
Initially it appears the Cabinet felt the recruiting situation remained 
the same after August 1st as before and that no official recruiting 
could, or indeed needed to be undertaken. The Home Secretary waa 
casting approving glancss at varioua unofficial organisations which 
were collecting supporters and defending them in public dabate with 
Ramsay Macdonald. He reported to the Cabinet on what wae happening: 
"Various unofficial organisationa had been formed for this purpoee, 
including the OMS, the Chambers of Commerce, the rascisti and the 
Crusaders, and it was understood that the persons who volunteered 
under these unofficial organisations would, in case of emergency, be 
st the disposal of the government. ,,40 While the political build up 
was evidently aesisting the Government there were some ministers who 
wished to 90 further. Eustace Percy argued: "There is no longer 
the slightest need for privacy or secrecy in our preparations." He 
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felt that the formula agreed in August, to go aheed "without shunning 
publicity but without seeking it" was no longer relevant. Tha only 
question was whether such matters should be, "left in the hands of 
the OMS, the Press and so forth, or whether it should ba takan up 
and directed by the Government itaelf". The latter course he felt 
41 
to be "not only desirable, but eesential". Steal Maitland brought 
some realism into the debate, pointing out that it was danglrous to 
become too optimistic about the degree of support which the Government 
enjoyed. The public, he felt, wae not in the mood for large scale 
recruiting at that time and any working men who were parsuaded to 
coma forward would be subjected to pressures in their own communitiee 
which in time might weaken their resolve. To attempt to recruit and 
fail could have disastrous consequences. He reminded his colleagu.a 
that "the large majority of recruits would inevitably b. from claes.e 
other than manual workers" end that to have such an organisstion in 
being over a long period would polaris. public opinion as many would 
regard it as "a mere strikebreaking organisation". "It is quit. 
likely" Steel Maitland pointed out, "that it would b. so regarded 
42 
even by our own supporters". While Spacial Constables might be 
enrolled and the OMS allowed to continua independently it was important 
to stick to the principles of the STO and avoid over elaboration or 
unneceesary provocation. 
Tha idea that the period of the subsidy saw a united Cabinet proceeding 
along an agreed path to an inevitable conclusion is further weakened 
by looking at the debate about possible Ilgal changss that went on 
during these months. Th. Lord Chancellor, Lord Ca~e, srgued for 
immediate legal measures to be takan to weaken the position of trade 
union.. Not only did Cave wish to rsnder genersl strikes i118gal, 
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but to outlaw all sympathetic strikes, to strengthen the law on 
picketing, to make all strikes subject to compulsory secret bellots 
and to introduce 'contracting in' for the political levy. The Lord 
Chancellor even felt that the tort immunity of trade unions should 
43 be repealed. 
Thus it is clear that it was not inevitable that the more expedient 
line would prevail during the period of the subsidy. The Government 
had gained the political initiative with the awerd of the subeidy, 
but its advantage was not abeolute. A number of things could be done 
after the subsidy which could not hsve been undertakln before, yet 
openly partisan actions, such as those suggested by the Lord Chancellor, 
could quickly destroy much that had been gained. That the initiative 
was preserved and the attacks on trade unionism postponed was not the 
result of some agreed common strategy but the outcome of s continuoue 
argument in Cabinet. 
The conduct of the Samuel Commission was csntral to the political 
manoeuvres of these nine months. By beginning with the apparent 
concession of the subsidy the Government bought itself a considerable 
advantage in the matter of the apPOintment of commissioners and the 
writing of their terms of reference. The Government was thue able 
to substantially predetermine the outcome without indulging in the 
sort of open manipulation that would have weakened the authority of 
the commiseioners' findings. In this respect the contrast between 
Samuel and Sankey is most striking. Sankey in ita broad composition 
and open terme of reference reflected the strength of the miner. and 
the Government's weakness whereas Samuel clearly reflected the advan-
tage of the Government. The Cabinet had no doubts about what they 
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wanted from Samuel. The scope of the inquiry: "Should be sufficiently 
wide not only to provide for an investigation of the pointe proposed 
by the miners • • • but also to enable the public to derive from the 
report full information as to the position of the coal industry in 
44 
all its aspects." The Cabinet's understanding of "full information" 
was somewhat partial for they firmly rejected the minera' objection 
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to "a commission which did not include persons with technical knowledge". 
Experts of that type were to be kept out of the way and only, as they 
put it, lunbiased persons' allowed onto the Commisaion. The Govern-
ment did not need to convince the miners of the 'fairness' of the 
construction of the Commiasion nor were they concerned that the 
miners would be unlikely to accept the findings of an inquiry so 
organised. Samuel was designed to set the Government right with 
public opinion and if possible weaken the bond between the minere 
and the other trade unions. 
Even Joynson-Hicks saw the extreme sensitivity of the issue of the 
Commission. He conceded; "Any arrangements involving publicity 
should be postponed until after the announcement of the composition 
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and terms of reference of the Royal Commission.~ It would clesrly 
bs unwise to publicly anticipate the feilure of the Commieion before 
it was constituted. Yet in private, nobody on the Government side 
expressed any expectation that Samuel could reconcile owners end 
miners. The Minister of Mines argued that the only purpose of the 
inquiry was that, "the public, who on July 31st had not realised the 
imminence of the crisis might be better informed as to the true 
47 facts of the situation by means of the Report of the Royal Commission". 
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In the event Samuel went in more deeply than the Cabinet had intended 
and came up with proposals for the nationalisation of royaltias and 
municipal trading, although he wae firm on the need for wage cute. 
The report produced another fierce debate in Cabinet with a number 
of ministers prepared to reject the whole report and thus dissipate 
the advantage which the Government had built up, and this, in spite 
of the fact that it was almost inconceivable that the miners would 
accept Samuel's findings. Thus it was in the ta.th of their oppoaition 
that Baldwin was able to secure majority aupport for tha official 
statement that "the Government is prepared to accept the Report and 
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the whole Report if other parties will do so". The Government, how-
ever, would have been in a difficult position had the owners and 
miners accepted. 
"An Act of Community Self-Defence" 
The manipulation of the Samuel Commission accurately epitomises the 
whole Government operation. The key to the Cabinet's stratagy wae to 
present the Supply and Transport organisation as a mere co-ordinating 
agency for a community engaged in a collective and voluntary act of 
self-defence against a dissident minority. In .ffect the Government 
initiated and controlled most of the meaaures. While, in reality, 
the liberal use of the coercive powers available to the state wa. 
deemed essential, the Government assiduously foatered the illusion 
of private individuals springing to the defence of the 'constitution' 
out of simple patriotism. Yet while the Government waa pre.enting 
itself and its allies al acting only in defence of this ill-defined 
constitutional principle, the Cabinet wa., in reality, 10 worried 
about the effect the mine owners were having on public opinion that 
they sent round the Prime ~inister to advise them on how to pre •• nt 
49 their final offer. 
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The volunteer labour organisations also provida a clear example of the 
working principles of the operation, for whila the Government always 
insisted that they were totally indspendent, tha main organisations were 
actually subject to direct and effective government influence. In 
explaining such organisations to the Prime ~inistar Joynaon Hicks made it 
quite clear that from ths earliest days they had state approval and 
encouragement and, indeed, access to the highest political circles: 
"There exist the rascists, the Crusadars, and tha Organisation for the 
Supply of ~aterial Services (sic). One need say nothing about the first 
two - they are well known and, I think, to ba depended upon. I have seen 
50' their leaders several times • • ." It is also clear that the Home 
Secretary was able to exercise something greater than a general control: 
"The O~S are delaying their propaganda at my urgent requeet until after 
51 the announcement of the Royal Commission." In the sensitive situation 
which then existed it was clearly possible for the Government to control 
tha OMS as effectively as if it had been an arm of the state. In practice 
of coursa it was batter than that for it enabled the Home Secretary to 
hava the best of both worlds: "I have explained to all these organisa-
tiona that though I cannot be responsible for them they must be prepared 
to work under my directions and to hand over their volunteers to the 
52 Government when. needed." The OMS could whip up the righteoue faelings 
of the patriots and draw the attention of labour spokesmen while the 
government could still preserve its pretsnce of neutrality. In such a 
situation it waa understandable that onl group of O~S organisers should 
so forget themselves as to giva the addresa of Hampstead Town Hall as a 
recruiting centre. On this occasion the Home Secrstary dealt with the 
indiscretion by claiming it was a local government matter. 53 
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The whole of the emergency operation was deeigned to fit in with 
this strategy. In the various schemee oparated by private organisa-
tions and local government ths guiding principle wae that of the 
appearance of private initiative b~t the mality of Government control. 
The Government obtained a scheme which waa politically attractiv., 
relatively efficient and, in practic., amenable to such cov.rt con-
trol ae they would want to exerciae. At the .nd of the strike the 
Cabinet could state; "His ~ajeatyts Government hava no power to 
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compel employers to take back every man who has be.n on strik.", 
while at the same time seeking to persuade employers to k.ep on the 
strike breakers instead of taking back the regular workera. While 
the Government was publicly proclaiming the independence of industry 
the Railway Companies were submitting, for Cabinet approval, the 
notices of dismissal before they ware issued to their striking 
employees. Companies who failed to raspond enthueiastically to the 
crisis were stimulated to 'voluntary' action. During the Strike 
the President of the Board of Trade rsported to the STC that the 
!'Ianchester Ship Canal Company had proved "somewhat supin.", and 
refused to use volunteer lebour to maintain their op.ration. Th. 
Chief Civil Commissioner authorised the loca~ Civil Commis.ioner to 
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exert pressure on them. As the caS8 of the importation of coel 
illustratee, the Government wae always an hand when privata initiative 
failed or faltered, but always under the cover of the pret.nc. that 
such organisations were acting indepsndently. The Trade Unione, 
however, were to ba the exception to the rule of independence. One 
Government pronouncement made short work of their autonomy: "Every man 
who does his duty by the country and remains at work during the present 
crisie will be protected by the State from the los. of trsde union 
benefits, superannuation aliowance. or pansion.,,56 
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The hollowness of the claim that the emergency measures were an ect 
of 'community self-defence' may also be demonstrated by the fact that 
the Government retained the right to determine who was 'community' 
and who not. Trade unions wsre specifically sxcludsd. At nstionsl 
level the offer of the TUC General Council to halp with ths msin-
tensnce of essential services was peremptorily dismissed' "Ths 
general opinion of the Cabinst was that it should not be answered 
57 
at all or else a very stiff reply should be sent." During the striks 
the Government went to greet lengths to snsura that trade unions wars 
effectively excluded from every level of the antistrike operation. 
To this end the STC carefully monitorsd all reports from the regions 
and all attempts by trade unions to institute permit schemee for the 
movement of essential supplies wers discussed at the highest lavel 
and every effort used to defeat them. For example the Civil Commis.ioner 
for the West ~idlands reported: "The Emergency Committee of the 
Birmingham Trades and Labour Council was trying to arrogate to itaelf 
the right to issue permits for the movement of foodstuffs. lise The STC 
were pleased that the Civil Commissioner understood the matter and 
flatly rejected such a scheme. The Committ.e later recorded their 
belisf that the refusal of the Commiasioner for the North We.t to 
allow ths unions to operate a permits scheme for the movement of 
flour hed actually resulted in more rather than less flour bsing 
59 moved. Glasgow argued that a contributory factor in the Government'. 
victory in Liverpool was a plan whereby the Government printed its 
own permits which the pickets could not distinguiah from tho.e issued 
by the Council of Acti~n~OIn the cass of the London slectricity 
supply the Government was prepared to riak a complete break in the 
serv~ce rather than compromiae with the uniona. The unions had 
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offered to maintain en adequate supply of power for domestic use 
and emergency services but the Government would accapt no compromisa. 
The STC decided, "that the maintenanca of the alectricity supply aa 
a whole should be regarded as an essential service and that any 
attempt to distinguish, for example, between the supply of power and 
61 
lighting should be frustrated forthwith". After checking that the 
private supply system for the House of Commons was functioning and 
sending additional forces to protect the generatar which .upplied the 
wireless service the Government sent naval ratings into, ths powar 
stations and appealed to regular workers to ignore the instructions 
issued by their unions. The scheme was partially lucce.sful and the 
reduced demand for electric power was met without the us. of moet of tha 
available naval and volunteer labour. Thare was however, ana minor 
problem. The power statione in London wera municipally owned and a 
number of Labour controlled Local Authoritiee, among them Satterse., 
Bermondsey, Poplar, Stepney, West Ham and Willeedan, were reluctant 
to allow power to be produced at the normal rata, yat all but Stepnay 
were producing sufficient power for lighting and for hospitale. In 
spite of the fact thet t~ings were running smoothly the Governmant 
wae prepared to Jeopardise the whole scheme by forcing the.e Local 
Authoritiee into line. 62 On May 10th the STC raported, "that the 
Willesden Urban District Council, owing to prsssura which had baen 
brought upon them, had passed a ~esolution that full suppliee of 
63 power should be given for all purpoees". Evidently the functions 
of the STO went beyond its publicly statad purpose of the provision 
of emergency or essential services. The manner in which this 
victory was secured and the way in which other Lebour attempts to 
'become involved in emergency services were systematicslly dafestad 
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indicates that the STO was sometimes used for the exprees purpoee of 
isolating the trade unions. Had the Government ne.ded anything more 
from organised labour than pasaiva acquiescence soma compromi.. might 
have proved neceasary, but the Government was so well organised that 
the labour leaders had nothing to bargain with. 
The question of, publicity underlay Government &ratagy from beginning 
to end, but with the beginning of the Strike it antered an especially 
dramatic stage. The three aime of the Government's information policy 
might be defined aa to maintain secrecy concerning senaitive aspect. 
of the preparatione, to create the impression of the Strike aa a 
struggle between a politically motivated minority and tha majority 
of rthe community', and to keep the issus at the constitutionsl 
level, avoiding above all discussion of the conditions of life of 
the miners. During the Strike the Cabinet was rssolved that available 
media should serve these, and only theae, ands. A central featUre of 
the publicity policy was its centralisation. Ministers ware forbidden 
64 to give interviewe to the British or foreign pra.s and on~y the Prime 
65 Minister was allowed to broadcast. Only tha mast carefully con-
sidered statements of policy were allowed to become public and the 
66 Cabinet attempted to prevent impromptu Common's debates an the issues. 
Above all the Cabinet sought to eliminate the propagation of all 
independent statements about the Strike, no mattar how mild or well-
intentioned. The success of the strategy depended on this for 
Baldwin put himself forward aa a national rather than a political 
figure; as a man serving community rather than partisan ende. Any 
independent perspective, no matter how ill conceived or 1n.ffactual, 
would tend to remove Baldwin from his pedeetal and bring hie state-
ments back into the everyday world of party politics. The personality 
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of the Prime Minister was clearly an important part of Government 
policy, and he sought to present himself as a man of peace and 
national unity. His most famous utterance to that effect was on 
March 5th 1925 when. he spoke against a proposal by a Conservative 
backbencher to reintroduce 'contracting in' for the political levy 
in pursuit of the broader social unity and had appealed; "Give ua 
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peace in our time 0 Lord~" While a knowledge of later avanta and 
the changing rhetorical fashionmakathe speech now raad .e ao much 
humbug it does appear that he made a great impresaion on both aidaa 
S8 
of the House of Commons. It is difficult to know what affact the 
speech had outside the House; those in Perliament frequently fail 
to make adequate allowance for the scepticism or sheer indiffarence 
of those outside, but nonetheless it is clear that the Cabinet came 
to view the public persona of the Prime Minister as a major aeaet. 
In the aftermath of General Strike the Cabinet praised the role 
played by Baldwin in terms which suggested a mascot rather than an 
69 
active participant. If this contained a hint that Baldwin's contri-
but ions lacked substance it might be judged correct fer in the end 
there was no more to his industrial reconciliation than that labour 
should accept 'economic reality' as defined by the Government and 
the employers, no more to industrial peace than the passivity of 
the workers. 
Throughout the whole campaign the Government strategy placed a high 
reliance on publicity and propaganda and ita efforts in this reapect 
were intensified. during the actual dispute. Some mambars of the 
Cabinet set great store by the 'British Gazette' .eeing it in haroic 
terme as: "The main means by which the Government had been enabled 
70 
to frustrate the attempt of the TUe to stifle information." 
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Churchill devoted his considerabls ensrgie. to running the pap.r and 
71 demanding adequate resourcee for the op.ration, though hi •• fforts 
were not always fully appreciated by hil coll.agu... J C C aavid.on 
complained, "He thinks he is Napoleon"' "Of cour •• h. wa. anxiou., 
but it was unfortunate !nat he tried so persiat.ntly to forc. a ek.leton 
.taff beyond its capacity. So long a. he do.s not com. to the ~orning 
Post offices tonight the staff will be able to do what it ia th.re to 
do."72 Certainly a great deal of .ffort went into the pap.r but it 
wae surely too much a government creation to carry any r.al authority. 
Its status as a newspaper is well illustrated by the sugg.stion of 
the STC that the staff of the 'Gazette' "should be asked b.tore pub-
lishing reports received other than from official sourc.a, to v.rify 
the facts by enquiring of the appropriate Govsrnment Oepartment?3 
The fact that it did, in spite of all intention. "to the contrary, 
manage to upset one Civil Commissioner muat be attribut.d to extrema 
sensitivity on one part and incompetence on the oth.r. The pap.r 
wae so obviously a propaganda sheet that it could only manage to 
rally such of the faithful as managad to g.t hold of a copy. Tha 
Government might have had mars succass by the plan to offar the 
ser'Jices of the RAF to help with distribution to the '" "T!m •• I or 
any other reputable paper" should th.y manage to produce an adition. 
In-moat studies of the General Strike it has b.an accepted that it wa. 
the BBC which proved to be the most important medium of communication. 
Ralph Oeemarais, for example, has cited tha "brillianc. of the Gov.rnm.nt's 
handling of the BBC ae an important contributory factor to it. ov.r.ll 
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victory. In a recent study Jeffries and H.nn •••• y have qu •• tion.d the 
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conventional view an the grounds that only a quart.r of Britiah house-
holds were aquipped to receive broadcasts in 1926. 75 However while the 
paint is interesting it is by no means conclusive as it may ba supposed 
that access to the news as broadcast by the BBC wae a good"deal wider 
than the number of wireless sets might suggeet, particulsrly at a time 
when ather sources of information were acarce. 
~any studies have noted that the influence which the BBC brought to bear 
on popular opinion restsd not only on its near monopoly poeition but also 
on the degres of authority which the company posaessed as a reault of ita 
reputation for independence. Aaa Brigg8 haa argued that the occaaion of 
the strike and the resistance Reith offered to the politicians' attempte 
76 to control his broadcasts actually reinforc.d this authority. Th ••• 
incidents have became so much a part of the folklore of •• tablishment lib.r-
alism that they deserve further investigation. The issu. ~as first raiaed 
at a meeting of the STC on ~ay 5th. It was reported that the BBC 
had broadcast "a somewhat alarming report of disturbancaa at Poplar", 
and this, according to J C C Davidson, was sufficient resson for the 
Govarnment to taks 'complete control' of ths Company. At the 
Cabinet of May 7th complaints were made about the "quality and 
nature of the news that was bsing sent out". The matter was serious 
bacause, "the importance of the BBC in informing Public Opinion ha. 
been greatly enhanced owing to the collapse of the prese". Th. 
Cabinet discusssd control but came to no immediate conclusion but 
those in favour of control continusd to raise the mattsr. 79 The 
fact that this debate took place is mol'. important than ite outcome 
for it demonstrates that government policy was far les8 cohesive than 
hae sometimes been assumed. It must also ba noted that lama accounts 
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which make a great deal of Reith'. reeistance to formal political 
control take no account of the all important point that the Company 
broadcast nothing that was critical of the position which the Government 
had adopted. There were a faw inconvenient, though accurate, newa 
reports which upsat the more timorous Cabinet Ministars but nothing to 
challenge the Government's definition of tha conflict. Informal preaaure 
had secured a high degree of Govarnment control and a formal annaxation 
would only have succeeded in destroying the illuaion of independenca. 
As the situation stood the Cabinet had no difficulty in persuading 
the BBC to refuae to let Lloyd George or Ramaay Macdonald broadcaat. 
Eventually the Cabinet 'suggested' to the BBC "that thera would ba 
no objection to a broadcast announcement (which the Parliamantary 
Secretary to the Admiralty informed them wae in contemplation) by 
the General Manager of the BBC on his own responaibility of 
Mr Juetice Astbury's judgment regarding the illegality of the Ganeral 
Strike, coupled with a statement that, in thee. circumatancea tha 
Company felt bound to desist from making or permitting any statement 
in support of the course of ths striker."~O Vet Aatbury was no mora 
than a pretsxt for not doing what the Company did not want to do~ 
and what the Government would not have allowed it to do,in any case. 
The only remarkable aspect of the affair was tha fact that 10 many 
Cabinet Ministers should have wanted to destroy the authority of the 
BBC in pursuit of a control which they already subatantially pOlaea.ed. 
In effect the Government already had that moat attractive of pol~tic.l 
aasets, power without responsibility. 
3B4 
Any judgment on the success of the Government'. policy with regard 
to publicity and propaganda must take account of the broader policy 
towards the Strike. The very consistency on which the line depended 
could only be maintained because the material arrangemants were such 
as to remove uncertainty or the need for compromise. Beyond this the 
policy had a number of additional qualities. In the first place tha.Cabinei 
presented a united front. Restrictione on ministera were effectively en-
forced and the serioue divisions within the Cabinet never became public. 
Secondly the Government came to enjoy, partly by good fortune, a 
virtual monopoly of mass communication during the criail. rinally 
the policy wae successful becauee it managed to exploit, and perhaps 
distort, beliefs which were already part of the broader political 
culture. An important part of that culture wers popular belief. 
about the law and the constitution. 
3B5 
Law and Order 
The Government's victory in the General Strike restsd in no small 
measure on its ability to manipulate the law to its own purposes. 
To attempt an explanation of how the Government achieved its ends 
in this area may appear contentious, or even unnecessery, for a 
number of accounta, either specifically or impliCitly, deny the pos-
aibility of an autonomous role for the law. Hence thera is no nesd 
to explain how the ruling elite managed to manipulate the law as law 
is seen as a superstructural phenomenon, responding directly to thsir 
will. Even were this trus at some level it would still make a poor 
basis for historical reconstruction. Such rsconstruction must take 
account of the subjective views of participants and it is quite clear 
that most of those who took part in the Strike didn't regard the law 
in so simple a light. That the law maintained a measurs of authority, 
that it remained a viable political currency must in the end be re-
lated to the fact that it was widely regarded as possessing some 
degree of autonomy. In order to appear in this light, it is here 
argued, that the law did in fact enjoy a measure of relative autonomy. 
Such autonomy meant that the political elite had to work to make the 
law serve their purposes. ~oreover they could not have gained the 
advantage they did from a law which responded automatically to thsir 
will. This is emphatically not an argument for eome metaphysical 
'independence' of law. Such concepts may beet be classified ae part 
of the legitimating ideology of legal and political syatems. Vat it 
is important to stress that while, in this event, tha law cama to 
almoet exactly mirror the ideas of the governing elite, it did not 
come to do so inevitably or automatically. The legel victory we. 
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part of the broader political victory. While the law in its statutes, 
structures and administrators leaned in interpretation, procedure, 
intellectual inclination and plain prejudice to the side of the statue 
quo it was not inevitably the exclusive property of the political 
elite.81 
The Legality of the General Strike 
To what extent were the Government justified in their contention 
that the General Strike was illegel? The question has often become 
obscured in the more interesting one of how the Govsrnment managad 
so successfully to create the impression that it was illegal, but 
it is still worth investigating for the answer reveals the fragile 
basis of the Government's case. That case was thst because the Strike 
was an attempt to use extra Parliamentary pressure to influencs s 
legally elected government it was both unconstitutional and illegal. 
It was not the Government's main concern that its view in thia matter 
should be precise, but statements on thie point were more than nor-
mally obscurs. The question of whether the strike was unconatitutional 
is not susceptible to a precise answer. Thera is no statute or con-
vention relevant to the issue and hence arguments about the consti-
tutionality of such actions soon become involved in a debate about 
their political desirability. However two points can be made which 
do tend to weaken the Government's caae. If the General Strike was 
held to be unconstitutional on the grounde that it was an attempt to 
exert extra parliamentary pressure on a government a large number of 
other organisations had. been guilty of similar Qffences, moat per-
tinently perhaps a number of Conservative politicians on the Ulster 
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issus in 1914. Secondly it could be claimsd that the General Strike 
was not an attempt to persuade Government to intervene where it had not 
done so. before but rather an attempt to act to maintain a situation 
it hsd previously guaranteed and played a considerable part in creat~ 
ing. The Government was not msrely an innocent byetander involved 
in the issue only on the level of constitutional principle. It had 
been materially involved in the conflict over a long period and was 
as such, an active party to the dispute. 
The·question of the legality of the General Strike wae investigated 
82 by Professor Goodhart. In spite of a careful perueal of a wide range 
of grounds on which the strike might have been aupposed to be illegal, 
among them the law relating to treaaon and to seditious and criminal 
conspiracy, Goodhart could find no grounds for the alligation of 
illegality. His findings are given a meaeure of additional authority 
by the fact that he f~lt such strikes were undesirable and should be 
made illegal. As the law stood however, he argued they couldn't be regarded 
as criminal acts on the part of trade union leadera unless such 
leaders called them for criminal purposes. It was quite clear that 
the leaders of the General Strike had no motive other than that of 
offering assistance to the miners. In any caee, Goodhart argued, 
Parliament had assumed thet large sympathetic strikes were legal in 
passing the Emergency Powers Act in 1920. If such strikee were 
illegal this type of legislation would not have bean neclesary. 
Goodhart also investigated the status of the Strike in the light of 
the civil law. The view that the leaders of the General Strike were 
liable to civil action was confidently asserted by Sir John Simon 
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during the course of the dispute in two speechea which greatly 
assisted the Government. In the first Simon warned that, for 
instance, every railwayman who went on strika randared himself liable 
to action in the county courts and, "avary trada union laader who 
has advised and promoted that course of action ie liable in damagea 
to the uttermost farthing of his own posaeesiona"P3 In addition ha 
asaerted that no trade union could diacipline a member who refused 
to obey instructions to join such a strike. Simon's opinion was 
evidently much affected by the size and novelty of the action. "We 
have had serious strikes before • • • but the genaral strike pro-
claimed by leaders of organiaed labour whiCh diaregarda all contracta 
of employment is a wholly different mattar." Whatever the truth of 
this assertion it still would not inevitably follow that the strike 
waa illegal. This part of Simon's case had to rest on hia contention 
that the strike was not called "in furtharanca of a trada dispute" 
but was "a strike against the genaral public, to maka the public, 
Parliament and the Govarnment do something", and as auch was denied 
tha immunities offered by the 1906 Act. But on what ground. could 
it be claimed that the General Strike was not in furtharance of a 
trade dispute? The Act of 1906 and subasquent interpretation aup-
ported the vi~w that sympathetic atrikes cama within the law and the 
General Strike waa nothing more than a large sympathetic strike. A 
trade dispute did undoubtedly ex1st and the laadere of the Ganaral 
Strike could only,tharefore,ba liable to civil actions if it could 
be demonstrated that they held 80me ulterior motive. The only 
evidence of an ulterior motiva came from the wilder ehoree of the 
84 Government's propaganda. 
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On ~ay 10th Sir Henry Slesser challenged Simon'e opinion in the 
, 85 
House of Commons. He pointed out that breach of contract, as Simon 
had implied, was insufficient grounds for declaring the strika 
illegal. The Trade Disputes Act of 1906 expressly grantsd immunity 
to anyone who procured a breach of contract provided that that 
action was in "contemplation or furtherance" of a trade dispute and 
the question of whether this was such a dispute could only bs 
decided in a court of law. The Attorney General sprang to Simon'. 
defence, praising "the great public service which was rendared by 
~ him". He was evidently deeply anxioua that Simon's warnings should 
not be tempered by contrary opinion but he could advance nothing in 
Simon's defence save praise for his legal reputation. When, on the 
next day, Simon rose in his own defence he had altered hia ground 
significantly. He pleaded that hie caee be regarded, "not aa a 
matter of narrow law, but as a matter of broad fundamental consittu-
tional principle, that once you get a General Strika euch aa this, 
87 
it is not, properly understood, a strike at all". This svident 
weakening was less serious to the Government's cause than it might 
heve been becauee Mr Justice Astbury hed that morning pronounced on 
the legality of the strike in delivering judgment involving the 
Nationel Sailors' and firemen's Union. That union, which had not 
taken part in the General Strike, was granted an injunction r •• train-
ing the officials of one of its branches from calling out it. 
members without the authority of the Executive Council of the Union 
on the grounds that a, the General Strike was illegal, and b, the 
defendents were acting againat the rulee of their union. Thi. 
, 
judgment had a considerable 'impact on the participants in the con-
flict yet it was essentially superficial. Goodhart commenteda "Wa 
• 
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must rsmember however, that this was an offhand Judgment given in a 
case whare the defendents were not represented by couneel. Not a 
single source is cited to support a view which would revolutionise 
the law relating to strikes if carried to its logical extent."BB 
~oreover another contemporary legal authority pointed out that 
Astbury's pronouncement on the legality of the strike wae extra-
judicial in that it was quite unneceesary to take this factor into 
account as the actions of the defsndenta were clearly illegal in 
terms of their being in breach of the rules of their union. Thera 
were no more grounds for Astbury's judgment than there were for 
Simon's assertion. There is, moreover, coneiderable evidenca to 
euggest that the Government itself did not believe that the etrike 
waa illegal. In the first place there is the opinion of the 
Attorney General to that effect, solicited by tha Cabinet before 
89 
the strike began, in the second there is the fact that tha Cabinet 
was preparing a measure to render general strikes illigal before ~ay 
1926, thirdly there are the doubts of the Lord Chancellor and other 
legally qualified members of the Cabinet as to whethar the A.tbury 
90 Judgment would stand up on appeal, and finally there i. the decision 
to go ahead, in the 1927 Act, with thoee provisions pertaining to 
political and sympathetic strikes. Thia laat muat imply, at laaat, 
eome ambiguity in the law ae it stood, in spite of the face laving 
sophistries which some ministers advanced to prove the contrary. 
In spite of their fragility the pronouncements of Simon and Aatbury 
brought much advantage for the Government. That thie ehould have 
been so must, to a large extent, be explained by the absence of 
opposition. In the conditions created by the Strike it was not 
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possible to effectively propagate a challenge to the statements. 
However their impact cannot be fully accounted for without reference 
to he general respect which was accorded to law and legal Judgments. 
While supporters of the Strike might not be entirely converted by 
Simon or Astbury, their Judgments could have the effect of weakening 
morale. Such judgments could also have the important effect of re-
inforcing those on the Labour side who were already uneasy ebout the 
Strike.91 
All in all the Government got a good deal more than it might decently 
have hoped for from the question of the legality of the General Strike. 
It managed to exploit to the full this, apparently, independent 
support. In this context the fact that the opinions themeelvas 
would not bear close scrutiny mattered very little, for by the time 
such scrutiny was possible the substance of the matter was won and 
lost. In such disputes the short term impreesion is everything, and 
victories of those in power have a finality about them. It is a 
painfully difficult matter to assemble the forces of organised labour 
for such an action, but to re-assemble them after a defeat, no matter 
how that defeat has come about, is almost impossible. Here, as on 
so many other occasions, ansssentially tenuous legal decision provad 
a critical factor in the weakening of a strike. 
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The Question of Legislation 
The possibility of legislating to make General Strikea illegel wal 
raised in Cabinet as early as 5 August 1925. A committee was set up 
under the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cave, and a draft bill present ad in 
~arch 1926. However in order to understand ths significance of the.e 
events and the 1927 Act it is necessary to go bsck further. It ie no 
exaggeration to identify trade union legislation as the Cons.rvative 
obsession from 1922 onwards. The vast majority within the Party had 
clearly never accepted the settlement as represented by the Acts of 1906 
and 1913. While different aspects of these matters were discu •• ed at 
different times there can be no doubt that what was at iasua wae tha whole 
question of the functions and powers of ths trads unions. Tha agitation 
surfaced as soon as the Party was free of the constraint. of coalition. 
The issue was first raised in the guise of the dsbate about tha 
ncontracting out n clause on trade union political funde. Colonal ~ay.ey 
Thompson, a backbencher, produced a draft bill to imposs "contracting in". 
This provoked Montague Barlow, tha Minister of Labour to send a detailed 
warning to the Prime Minister. He argued that the wideapread feeling 
within the Party on the issue waa bassd on mistaken and insdequate infor-
mation. Contrary to Party myth, the ncontracting out" system did work 
as twenty-five per cent of those entitled to do this had alrsady doni 10. 
~orsover the system had produced very few appeals to the Chilf Registrar 
of Friendly Societies. He wae sceptical about complainta that the 
existing system resulted in the intimidation of 'non labour' trade 
unionists but pointed out that a "contracting in" syatem was Just ee 
opan to that type of abuse. Montague Barlow falt that whils there wee 
little evidence to eupport the fears of conservative partieana there 
was every reason to ensure thst actions in tha labour araa ehould be 
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"tactful and circumspect". Intemperate action would harm induatrial 
relations and incur "damaging electoral conaequencea". 
After the brief interlude of Labour Government the debate continued. 
The new ~inister of Labour, Steel Maitland was Just ae act iva end ebla a 
proponent of the ~inistry view as had been hia predeceeeor. In a mamo-
randum to the Prime ~inister he conceded that there wae coneiderable back-
bench and grassroots Party preesure for le9ielation of ona lort or 
another but he insisted that any measura must meet three conditione. It 
muet, he argued, be "watertight", in that it should ba "aa likaly aa 
poasible to attain in actual practice the objects it eete out to achieva". 
It must also be "got through quickly" so that by the time of the next 
election the benefits it might bring would be clearly damonltratad snd 
"the row created by its passing" would have died down. finally Steel 
~aitland insisted that whatever happened he did not wish to blcome 
93 involved. He clearly shared in his ~inistry's view that ita ability 
to contribute constructively in the induatrial relationa field would be 
removed by association with such a meaaure. Steel Maitland'. lack of 
enthusiasm could not have been made more spparent yet the pr •• eura con-
tinued to rise. Pembroke Wicks continusd to bring to the Prima ~ini.tar'l 
attention the predictable viewa of party activiats and in particular thoee 
of the "Labour Advisory Committees" attached to constituency aa.ociationa. 
Central Office continued to collect and propagate evidenca of allagad 
94 
victimisations and abusss of the 1913 Act. The backbench induetry 
group was unanimously in favour of legislation a. apparantly wara tha 
bulk of conservative backbenchers. However Steel ~aitland found aoma 
support for his view from John Gretton, a member well informed on 
industrial matters and from the Engineering and Allied Employara 
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National federation, which conveyed its view to the Prime Ministar that 
such legislation was "likely to create a very embarraeaing situation in 
95 the maintenance of industrial peace". The Party activists howevar 
were unlikely to be deflected by such considerations for they had come 
to see their cause in a aimple heroic light. Cuthbert Headlam warned 
the Prime Minister that any failure to legislate would be to let down 
the embattled Tory working men and moderation would appear sa nothing 
short of cowardice. He assured the Prime Minister that there would be 
little difficulty associated with doing away with the politicsl levy 
96 
altogether as it was even unpopular among Labour aupporter.. Younger 
warned Birkenhead that the Tory working men of Lancaahira would be, 
"antagonised fatally if the liberty they demand in this matter be not 
97 granted to them". 
The debate had by now come to centre On the Private Member's Bill spon-
sored by Albert Macquisten and dealing only with the political levy. 
This left many activists dissatisfied. The Central Council of the 
" National Union, while agreeing in principle with the Bill introduced 
by Mr Macquisten, is of the opinion that legielation should be introduced 
controlling the political activity of Trade Unione".98 John Gretton 
continued to worry about the electoral effecte of auch legislation On 
wavering trade unionists but advised Steel Maitland that it was impoa-
eible to avoid some such legislation as so many people wara in favour. 
By the end of January 1926 Steel Maitland conceded that soma lagislation 
would have to be introduced but concentrated instead on minimising the 
amount of damage it would do. He proposed a "non-minuted" committee 
including backbenchers of "good judgment and influence" to diecuee 
various proposals. In the meantime he suggeeted that the Macquisten 
Bill should be killed and the whips used to restrain the Party until 
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some mature decision was arrived at. Again he pleaded to the Prime 
~iniater to keep him out of it. 99 
~any of the conservative partisans were upset by Baldwin's intervention. 
~acquisten himself wes singularly unimpressed by the consensus it had 
aroused: "The enthusiasm with which your speech was received on our 
side was exceeded by that on the side of Labour and Liberal which seamed 
100 to me a bad sign." 
After the defeat of ~acquisten's Bill conservative hostility to the 
trade unions did not diminish but the question of legislating against 
general strikes came to replace the political levy aa the leading isaue. 
The primary object of the Cabinet's legislation committee, eet up on 5 
August 1925 was to propose measures which would render such a strike 
illegal. 101 The committee presented a draft bill in ~arch 1926. As 
well ae dealing with political strikes the Lord Chancellor and his col-
leagues also took the opportunity to bring forward additional proposals 
to alter the legal position of trade unions. They suggested that ths 
~inister of Labour should have the power to insist on compulsory arbitra-
tion for any dispute in a service induetry and that stricter legal 
provisions should be introduced ~n reapect of sedition and incitement to 
violence. The Lord Chancellor argued that the law as it stood failed to 
provide that swift and stringent punishment for offenders which he 
believed to be necessary. Even the system of trial by Jury wae thought 
to be inadequate for theee purposes. The Lord Chancellor argued that; 
"the preeence on the jury of one person who is in sympathy with his (the 
defendant's) views or is terrorised by hie aasociates may render the 
102 trial abortive". The style and form of these propoaals were so alian 
to the contemporary practice of industrial relations that the committee 
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was justified in its view that ths msasurss should be kept secrat sa 
their publication "might precipitate an industrial crisia". This memo-
randum prompted Austin Chamberlain to offer his full support to Baldwin 
who, he assumed, would wish to fight such proposals: "You may count on 
me to follow your lead and to give you any help I can".103 Chamberlain 
answered the Prime Ministsr that he was prepared to back his judgment on 
such issues and would support any line ha decided to taka. However tha 
Cabinet did instruct Cave's committee to go ahead and produce a further 
draft. 
While there were thosa who wishad to proceed immediately with such 
legislation thay were prevailed upon t~ support a tsmporary delay, 
, 
in lin a with the general policy, until industrial action wa. underway, 
so it was not until 8 May 1926 that the matter'was again raised in 
Cabinet. 104 The main provision of the draft bill discue.ed then 
was a clause to render illegal and outside of ths immunities of the 
1906 Act, "any strike which has any other object than the maintenance 
or improvement of conditions of labour in the industry or branch of 
the industry in which the strikers are engaged, and which is intended 
or calculated to intimidate or coerce the Governmant or the community". 
The bill also declared that it was a misdemeanour to take part in such 
an action and attached penalties to the offence. It was also to ba 
made possible for an action to be institutad in the High Court re.train-
ing a union from applying its funds to any such action. Similarly, the 
bill made provision to protect any members of a trade union who defied 
their union leaders and refused to take part in strike. called for 
such ends. This discussion took place two daye after Simon's pronounce-
ment in the House of Commons. In spite of the fact that Simon had 
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declared that under existing law the General Strike was illegal, that 
those who took part in it were liable to legal penalties and that any 
union member who defied his leader's call to strike could be protected, 
the Cabinet still decided to proceed with the bill. It waa clearly 
the intention that the bill should be applied to the existing dispute 
for the Cabinet were advised of the especial need for secrecy for the 
financial clauses so that the unions should not be able to anticipate 
the measures and protect their funds. It is difficult to identify 
the source of the first doubts aa to the wisdom of this legialstionJ05 
but by ~ay 10 there was conaiderable oppoaition. Even Government back 
benchers had got wind of the bill and were said to be opposed to it, 
, 
though in view of what had gone on before this may be thought unlikely. 
Sir John Simon, by now firmly in the Government's confidence, had been 
shown the proposed measure and while favourable had recommended, under-
standably in view of his public declaration, that it should be made 
clear that the object of the bill was to declare rather then amend 
the law. However opposition to the measure was sufficient to delay 
ita progress. 
Yet the matter was only allowed to rest for a brief period, for with 
the General Strike scarcely cold the Lord Chancellor is.ued another 
memorandum. He argued that the Aetbury judgment wae not an adequate 
baais on which to let the question of the legality of general strike. 
rest and that, moreover, the immediata victory gave the Government 
the opportunity to go a good deal further in trade union legi.lation. 
The Lord Chancellor believed that in addition to meaaures which would 
render all sympathetic strikes illegal and ineffectivs the Government 
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should legislate to make all strikee illegal which had not baen pre-
ceded by a aecret ballot. Disputes affecting eesential services 
should be subject to compulsory arbitration, additional protection 
should be provided for those who chose to work against the instruction 
of the union, end the political levy should bs put onto a 'contrscting 
in' basis. ~ost dramatically, the Lord Chancellor also proposed that 
the Government legislate to remove the Tort immunity guaranteed by 
the 1906 Act. 
When the proposals came before the Legislation Committee of the Cabinet 
they attracted some opposition. The Committee advised against the 
removal of the tort immunity. While such a course of action might ba 
juetifiable in principle, "it would be construed as an attack on trads 
unions generally and might only result at the next election of a 
106 Government pledged to restore it". The Committee did not wish to 
dismiss the idea of secret ballots out of hand but warned that "the 
surest way of diminishing the number of strikes is to strsngthen the 
Executive of the unions by giving them responsibility for decisions,,:07 
The idsa of legislation was popular in the Conservative Psrty as a 
whole. The 1922 Committee supported all the proposed altsrations 
except that concerning the tort immunity arguing, with a certain degree 
of optimism, that it was necsssary "to avoid sven an eppearsnce of an 
attack upon trade unions".10a The constituency parties Wire, predictably, 
against 'repreesive legislation' but firmly in favour of 'sound reform'. 
A survey of constituency opinion rsvealed what 'sound reform' involved. 
On the queetion of a secrst ballot before any strike the constituency 
parties consulted were unanimously in favour. They wers similarly in 
support of measures to restrict picketing and the amsndment of the law 
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on political levies. They believed trade unions were inadequately 
managed and that they failed to sufficiently protect the righte of 
individuals. However there wae nothing new in all of this. Party 
activists as well as a majority of backbenchers had always held such 
viswa. The General Strike and the Government's crushing victory had 
whipped them up, and they clearly felt thsir case had become irrssistable. 
Yet tha lesson of the Strike waa by no means as unsmbiguous as they 
pretended. Was it not possible for Steel Maitland snd thos8 who thought 
like him to argue that as it had proved poaeible under existing law for 
the Government to secure so satisfactory a victory further legislation 
wae unneceseary? However it would appear that the eUbetance of the 
matter was beyond rational argument and Steel Maitland was committad 
to minimising the damage which Party enthuaiaem would do. He forwarded 
to the Prime Minister the view of the Editor of ths Yorkshira Poet that 
the timing of such legislation would adversely affect the conflict in 
the trade unions between "moderates and communists" but prepared for a 
managed retrsat. He argued that it was inevitable that some political 
strikes would have to be rendered illegal and that protection would 
have to be afforded to workers who refused to take part in illegal 
strikee. He conceded that some adjustment in the law on picketing would 
have to come. However in the matter of the secret ballot he argued, 
"the trouble of course is that such a proposal is very attractive until 
the question has been studied. The moment the queetion has be.n etudied 
it loees the whole of its attraction".110 Naturally enough St.al 
Maitland was very worried about the forthcoming Scarborough Party 
Conference. He urged the Prime Minister to stage manage the debate and 
put up speakers who had studied the queetion so that, "there will b. a 
little cold breath of reason coming in to mingle with the hot air of 
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other delegatea". He later tried a more direct appeal to the Prime 
~inister's self regard. He reported that while there was grest sus-
picion of figures like Joynson Hicks and Birkenhead in labour circles, 
"responsible trade unionists still believe in the Prime Minister". If 
legislation was really necessary they should seek to proceed in consul-
tation with the trade unions. Above all, he argued legislation should 
be seen in the broader context of the relationships between employers 
and workers. While Steel Maitland was not unique in being able to see 
union legislation in the broad political and industrial context: Robert 
Cecil for example also warned the Prime Minister, "Unless we couple this 
(legislation) with a policy of reconciliation on partnership lin.s we 
may easily leave things worse and not better": 111 he was clearly standing 
against a strong tide. Yet perhaps the worst blow to the Ministry's line 
was the defection of the employers organisations. Whereaa in 1924 they 
had been firmly opposed to legislative initiatives they wers, by the 
middle of 1926 more partisan than the local party committees. The 
National Confederation of Employers Organisations were in favour of a 
repeal of substantial sections of both the 1906 and 1913 Acts. The 
political levy should be put onto a "contracting in" basis and the right 
to picket should be removed. The "tort immunity" guaranteed under the 
1906 Act should be removed and unions should be made liable for actione 
for breach of contract. All trade union funds, evsn provident funds, 
should be open to such actions. The Engineers and Allied Employers 
National federation also supported the withdrawal of the tort immunity and 
the meaeure on breach of contract. They wiahed to ses a considerable res-
triction on the right to picket and in addition wished to see a ban on 
112 
strikes in public utilities and a compulsory secret ballot before ell strikes. 
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The various expressions of concern for the interests of the working 
man and the professions of quixotic intention eventually bscame too much 
for the Minister of Labour. Steel Maitland was usually inclined to taka 
a more realistic view than his colleagues and on this occasion ha 
suggeeted that the matter was really a good deal simpler then his 
colleagues were pretending. The real question he suggestsd was, "Do 
113 
we wish to attack the Trade Unions ae such or do we not?" Hs also 
dstected a note of hypocrisy in the discussion of the political lsvy. 
He questioned whether the Party's desire for change was "motivated by 
a burning indignation for the trede unionist who is forced to subscribe 
to the furtherance of political principles which he abhors", or was 
simply based "on a desire to hit the Socialist Party through thsir 
pocket". Steel Maitland argued that the small number of caees of 
injustice . which arose from the operation of the levy were being ueed 
to conceal the Government's real motivations and intentions. It would 
be highly unrealistic to expect trade unionists to begin to visw their 
unions as organs of reprsssion. The ordinary trade union member knew 
that, "he would now and in the future be far worse off with no or 
with weak trade unions than under the present regime". Ministers 
were deceiving themselvee if they believed that trads unionists would 
ever accept that Conservative and Liberal politicians were sincerely 
solicitors for the health of their unions. The only way to avoid 
harmful electoral consequences was to proceed in the knowledge of 
these deep-seated beliefs and avoid coercion wherever possible. 
The legislation which emerged from the debate was ths Trade Disputes 
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and Trade Union Act 1927. It declared illegal both general and 
sympathetiC strikes and gave power to the appropriate Law Officsrs 
to sue to restrain trade union leaders from using funds for such pur-
poses. It strengthened the provisions of the 1675 Conspiracy and 
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Protection of Property Act with regard to picketing, it established 
the system of 'contracting in' for the political levy and it impo.ed 
further restrictions on union membership by civil servants. There ie 
no contradiction in allowing that while this lsgislation wae narrowly 
partisan and intentionally vindictive it was less so than many leading 
politicians and a horde of lesser onea would have wanted it to be. The 
Cabinet stopped short of repealing the 1906 Act and eventually rejected 
proposals to prohibit strikes in 'key' industries, to introduce secret 
bsllots in union elections and to ban closed shops.115 Vet still the 
fact that ths carefully orchestrated and ruthlessly effected victory was 
used as an opportunity to indulge party prejudice stands in marked con-
trast to Baldwin's talk of peace and compromise in the mont he before the 
strike. 
Victory in the General Strike was allowed to usher in a calabration of 
party superiority which must, in any broader sense, be sean .s politically 
unproductive. Alan Anderson has convincingly argued that, while the Act 
of 1927 did impose soma material constraints on the Trads Unions and 
the Labour Party, its true significance is to be found in ita symbolic 
116 
effect on political and social relationships. Other hiatorian. have 
tended to play down the importance of the Act on the grounds that one of 
its main provisions, on sympathetic strikss, was navsr used and that 
union sscretaries found ways of limiting the politically damaging affect 
of "contracting in". Middlemae and Barnes, for example, claim that the 
Act was an empty threat rather than the crippling blow depicted by the 
117 Labour Party. Yet while such claims are rea80nabl. they must inevi-
tably tend to caet the decision to legislate in an evan more unfavourable 
light. It may be justifiable to antagonise a section of the political 
community in order to procure a law which i. believed to be a nece.eary 
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constraint on thsir future activitiee and it might even seem reasonable 
to do this in pursuit of a concrete partisan advantage. Yet to allow the 
matter to proceed only to symbolically demonstrate a political ascendency 
and to temporarily satisfy the prejudices of one's immediate supporters 
must be seen as constituting a serious failure of leadership. 
The months following the General Strike were to prove a testing time for 
the Prime Minister. Subsequent judgmenta of his achievement muet rest 
substantially on his conduct at this tims. What wae at stake was hie 
much stated commitment to social hsrmony. Its preasrvation clearly 
depended on his willingness and ability to maintain this outlook in the 
face of the partisan inclinations of hie own supportsrs. Aa Middlemae 
and Barnes have convincingly argued G M Young was mistaken in hie suggest-
ion that Baldwin collapaed exhausted once the General Strike wae brought 
118 to a successful conclusion. On the contrary the period saw a good 
deal of political activity much of it involving the Prime Minister. Yet 
while it is clear that the Prime Minister did not lack anergy it wae 
surely the case that his energy was allocated in s highly selective wey. 
In pursuit of the Prime Minister'e pledge to "loyal worksre" hs was 
unremitting. The number of cases of sllegsd victimisation was small and 
the bulk of theee were easily settlsd as most union officials wers willing 
to reinstate or rsmit the files of thoss msmbsrs who had ignored executive 
dirsctione. Ths few outstanding casss wers pursusd slmost beyond their 
119 logical conclusions at great expense of time and money. Yet no luch 
energy was expendsd on ths vastly grsatsr number of casea where those 
who had been on strike were punished by their employers on their return 
to work. 120 The Government knew of such cases and must hsve realised 
the importance of such matters for the future pattern of industrial 
relations yet they chose to do nothing. 
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In the matter of the continuing coal dispute the same diatinctions were 
made. ~iddlemas and Barnes offer a sympathetic view of th~ Baldwin 
Government: "Buffetted by the demands of owners and workers, possessing 
no artillery of its own, it had a hard time.,,121 But when it was willing 
the Government proved itself quite capable of action. It was undoubtedly 
the case that the coal owners were a difficult and even unpleasant group 
to deal with. Expressions of distaste for them, such aa that uttered by 
Birkenhead were no doubt sincere, yet in practice tha Government were 
always ready to bow to their intransigence. In the case of the ~inera' 
federation it was an sntirsly different matter. Hers the Government dis-
covered that it did have "ertillery" to deal with oppoaition. In tha 
face of a contrary recommendation by the Samuel Communion the Government 
imposed the Eight Hour day. Any miner who wished to break with hia union 
was offered encouragement and protection irrespective of coat. Boarda of 
Guardians who attempted to offer reasonable maintenance to striking miners' 
wivea and children were rapidly brought into line. 122 In theee matters 
there was no inactivity, no pleas about the powerlesanass of the state, 
no backing away from political difficulty. 
These three matters, the question of trade union legislation, the genaral 
handling of the aftermath of the General Strike and the Government's 
conduct of the coal dispute must cast Baldwin in an unflattering light. 
Ha must appear hypocritical, in that his talk of social peace waa never 
sincers, weak, in thet he was unable to Join with those who would have 
supported him in sustaining a policy of conciliation, or, at best, 
unimaginative, in that he failed to comprehend the longterm significance 
123 
of these matters. 
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While one of the aims of this account of the General Strike is to 
take issue with those who seek to explain the Government's victory 
"exclusively in terms of its coercive activities, it is not argued 
that the influence of these was negligible. During the strikes of 
1926 the Government recruited a large Civil Constabulary Reeerve 
and drew heavily on the vast military reserves in the country in 
124 
order to supplement the work of the regular police forcee. 8~ttle-
ships were sent to the major ports and throughout the campaign the 
Cabin~t sought to secure as many prosecutions of its opponents as was 
possible. Even on the last day of the General Strike the Attorney 
General was busying himself with the question of whether the Aetbury 
judgment gavs him an opportunity to institute criminal procesdings 
against strikers under the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 
of 1875. During the General Strike and the stoppage in the coal in-
dustry around eight thousand arrests were made for offencee directly 
related to the disputes. Opinion in the Cabinet may not have been 
united on the efficacy of arrests nor on the general deeirability 
of coercive measures, yet nobody seeme to have argued that the balance 
of the actual policy was wrong. 
However, while the coercive measures should be taken into account, 
the circumstances of their operation must not be ignored. Coercive 
measures applied at a place, a time, or in a mannar widely ragardad 
ae inappropriate will produce more harm than benefit for the sida using 
them. Their successful use during 1926 was dependent, a8 was the re.t 
of the Government's policy, on the political victory which preceded 
the General Strike. Only when the Government's definition of the 
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conflict was widely accepted, only when the issue had besn shiftsd 
from the concrete miseries of mining life to ths abstract of ths con-
stitution, could force be used without ths risk that it would anta-
gonise popular opinion. 
In Government discussions of the arrangements ~or 'protsction services' 
between 'Red rriday' and the General Strike there was an optimism which 
had not been present for any previous post war labour conflict. There were 
fi~e~times as many troope available as in the coal strike of 1921. 125 
The Army Council used the availability of such reservee to counter 
Church!ll's proposal for the formation of a Defence rorce. 80th the 
War Office and the Chief Constables remained highly sceptical about 
the benefits to be gained from an irregular force of this nature and 
worried about the disorder which untrained men could provoke. When 
it ~as decided that additional forcea were needed these were provided 
under the title of the Civil Conetabulary Reeerve.126 Although this was 
nominally a ·force of civilian volunteers it was actually subltsnt~ally 
raised by the enlistment of such units of the Territorial Army al hea not 
previouely been called to service. These'unite wsre eworn in ae Spaciel 
Conetablee and organised as a special section of the police forces. 
The men were to be kept in their units but to wear plain clothes and 
be supplied with brassards, steel helmets and truncheons. In spite 
of their police status the administration of the force rested exclu-
sively with the War Offics!~7The Government was aware of the diffi-
culties which flamboyant elements in such units might cause and 
insisted that only ex-military men, known and trusted at territorial 
headquarters, could be recruited to supplement euch units. The rais-
ing of this force was never absolutsly necsssary as the Government 
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always had more than an adequate supply of force at its disposal. 
The Civil Constabulary Reserve was, however, useful in that it 
enabled the Government to reetrict its use of regular army units. 
The use of Territorial units in this guise sarved the general policy 
well in that it sustained the myth that the counter meas~res were a 
community engaged in self-preservstion. The Reserve was disbanded 
soon after the end ot the General Strika:but it was evidently judged 
to have been a success for its reconstitution was proposed in June 
in order to protect those miners who were drifting back to work~2B 
If adverse public reaction were to be avoided the timing of coercive 
measures was critical. The Government took care that the extent of 
its measures should not become"public until the unions were" fully 
committed to strike action. As late as April 2Bthe Cabinet maintained 
this policy, deciding: "That no movements of troops should taks placa 
129 before the occurrence of a strike". Even after 'zero hour' all troop 
movements were to be as unobtrusive as possible. It wae only when 
he believed that the TUC had put itself beyond general opinion that 
Baldwin iesued his order to the troops: "All ranka of the armed forcea 
are hereby notified that any action which they may find it nacessary 
to take in an honest endeavour to aid the civil power will receiva, 
both now and afterwards, the full support of His ~aJestY'8 Govarnment.u 
From this moment the Government required thet its monopoly of force 
waa paraded wherever disorders seemed likely to occur. The desire 
to maintain secrecy until the very last moment actually hampered the 
effective deployment of forces. A subsequent report by the Inspectora 
of Constabulary argued: "It is probable that in some districts mora 
decided action in the early stages would have sho~tened public 
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131 inconvenience and would have saved the actual use of force later." 
Yet if the Cabinet had started slowly their efforts did not flag and 
the end of the General Strike brought no diminution of activity. If 
political considerations had forced the Government to act circumspectly 
at the onset of the strikes, such consideratione soon lost their 
potency and the end of the major dispute found the Government actively 
persuading companies to keep on blackleg workers at the expenae of 
their regular employees and far more eager in general to exploit ita 
new political advantage and indulge its moet partisan supporters than 
to take any lead in conciliation. Oncs the political victory was 
secured force became, and remained, the central theme of Government 
policy. The Home Secretary kept up a conetant preseurs for the main-
tenance of the State of Emergency. In July he argued that it wae 
necessary to recall Parliament in order to maintain, in particular, 
Regulations 20 and 21, relating respectively to injury to property 
and acts likely to Cauee sedition, and Regulation 33 which permitted 
arrsst without warrant: "The omiseion of these Regulations would 
seriously hamper the work of the Police and diecourage their efforts 
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and would encourage the agitators and mischief makers." Jaynaon Hicks 
pointed .out that there had been 28 prosecutions under Rsgulation 20 
and 40 under Regulation 21 during the month of June alone. The Hom. 
Secretary was a firm believer in the efficacy of proeecutions for 
securing public order. He argued, on one occaeion, that the relatively 
peaceful situation at Ammonford in Carmarthen was the result of a 
hundred cases of imprisonment which had been secured ths previous ysar~33 
While the level of coercive activity remained high throughout ths 
coal strike the emphasis changsd from ths maintenance of order and 
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protection of property to the protection of those miners who had 
returned to work. The Home Secrstary sent specific instructions to 
this effect to Chief Constables: "It is the distinct wish of His 
~ajesty's Government that the utmost protection be afforded to every 
man who desires to work in the coalfields of this country.,,134The 
Nottinghamshire coalfield was liable to be critical in weakening the 
strike and the Chief Constable reported in detail on the campaign 
being waged by Cook and other ~rGB officials in the area. Aa the 
drift back to work continued the Cabinet recognised that their main 
task was to counter the attempt by the ~fGB to renew the strike in 
those areas where miners wers working in considerable numbers. The 
Attorney General, with full Cabinet approval, saw to it that Cook'a 
speeches were sent to the Director of Public Prosecutione with a view 
to securing a prosecution. The Cabinet also agreed that in mining 
districts, "a sufficient force of police should be visibls ••• to 
reassure those men who were anxious to remsin at work that they would 
135 be protected". In view of these attitudes it may appear surprising 
that there were not a greater number of arrests and considerable dis-
order. Emil Burns felt that this had not been the case because of 
the reluctance of a number of local police forces to pursue the 
136 
militant line which the Government requested. Yet if this was the 
case it was exceptional for the forces at the disposal of the state 
acted in most respects with a remarkable cohesiveness. Whsn the 
report by the Inspector of Constabulary drew attention to the fact: 
"In no case so far as I have heard, has any court come to the con-
clusion that force used by the police was grsatsr thsn the circum-
137 
stances demanded", they were perhaps praising the loyalty of the 
courts rather than the actions of the police. 
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The courts were kept busy during the strikes. 7,960 people were 
prosecuted for offences connected with the general and coal stoppages. 
4,556 of these prosecutions were for breachss of ordinary laws and 
3,304 for offences against the Emergency Regulatione~38The great 
majority of theee prosecutions were for non-indictable offences and 
most were dealt with summarily. It is, of course, by no means inevitable 
that the seriousness of an industrial conflict will be reflected in the 
criminal Statistics. Hermann Mannheim commented that in Britain very 
large strikes could be conducted in such a way "as to leave behind but 
comparatively ineignificant traces in the criminal statistics". 139 One 
account of the London Dockers' Strike of 1884 estimated that it gave 
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rise to fewer than twenty cases in the Police Courts. Yet evan allow-
ing for this there would seem to be little evidence to support the 
Government's statements about the seriousness of the lsw and order 
situation during 1926. The number of offences does not seem excessiva 
in view of the nature and length of the strikes and, moreovar, the bulk 
of prosecutions were for minor offences. Even the smell number of mora 
serioua offences were not thought to be that grave. The compiler of the 
official criminal statistics commented on the more serious offences: 
"Few of those who committed indictable offencee directly or indirectly 
connected with the coal stoppage were thought proper subjects for 
141 
placing under supervision." There was the distinct impression on the 
Labour side that the courts were over enthueiaetic in their desire to 
support the Government cause and there is some statistical support 
for this. The bulk of offences were dealt with in the magietratas' 
courts, but where defendants did appeal it appears that they had a 
far better chance than normal of having their sentencee reduced or 
their cases dismissed. Of 317 persons who, in 1926, appealed to 
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Quarter Sessions in csses not related to the strikes, 69 had sentences 
modereted and ten had convictions quashed; yet out of a group of 165 
other defendants who appealed, 158 of whom were prosscuted under the 
Emergency Regulations, 93 had sentencea moderated and 25 had con-
victiona quashed. This would seem to indicate that some magistrates, 
at least, got carried away on the mood of the moment. 
1926 proved an unusual year in terme of other offencee. Where the 
yssrly avsrage of offences for the years 1921-1925 was 39,937, there 
wsrs 57,462 recordsd offences in 1926. Ths great bulk of the increaae 
came under the heading 'simple and minor larcenies': "In the mining 
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districts many of the larceniea were thefts of coal or other fuel." 
Other increases are more difficult to explain as for instance the fact 
that prosecutions for malicious damage to "l:ree8, shrubs etc·1 more 
than doubled whereas malicious damage to 'Fences etc' rose only slightly. 
Prosecutions for offences against the Poor Law regulations rose though 
this is perhaps to be accounted for by the larger numbers seeking its 
dubious protection rather than an increaeed propensity for the poor 
to misbehave. ~alicious wounding prosecutiona rose from 18 to 500, 
though maybe the most telling account of the year is suggested by the 
fivefold rise in prosecutions of attempted suicides. 
It is notoriously dangerous to draw general conclusions from criminal 
statistics but it would appear that the strikes made a considerable 
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impact on the administration of criminal law. The official account, 
in recording that around 8,000 offences were directly attributabls to 
the stoppages conceded that that might not be an adequate figure: 
"Doubtless many other offences were connected, less directly with the 
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same events." It is also necessary to consider the possibility that 
the steep rise in prosecutions represents, in part or in total, no 
more than an incraased rate of detection consequent upon the increase 
in police activity in mining and other areas. How far the figures 
may be made to signify a campaign of repression is open to question. 
The Cabinet certainly believed in uaing the criminal law to rid itself 
of its most tiresome opponents and in prosecuting where it was thought 
convenient and possible. Yet the bulk of the prosecutions were for 
trivial offencas and liable to dislocate and inconvenience the oppo-
sition rather than eliminate them or even permanently deter them from 
future political action. Similarly while the number of prosecutions 
may seem high initially it must be set in the context of the huge 
number of men involved on both sides, the seriousness of the issues 
and the bitterness and longevity of the coal dispute. 
What does emerge clearly is the Government's ability to secure the 
close co-operation of thosa who administered the system of law even 
though many of them were nominally outwith its direct control. This 
might be explained by a number of factors. There is that undeniable 
tendency for those who exercise power within a community to view 
metters in a similar light and the fact that common social and edu-
cational backgrounds tend to reinforce such perceptions. In addition, 
in Britain, the cohesiveneas of elites over regional and interest 
boundaries has been reinforced by the even development of the political 
system and its structure. So just as in the STa, where ths government 
could trust in the Lords Lieutenant and others to act on their own it 
could rely on the unaided initiative of the majority of those who 
administered the system of law. 
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Yet such generalities, while important, should not deflect attention 
from the direct measures which the Government was prepared to take to 
enaure the public respect for, and the cohesive operation of, the 
eyetem of law. The case of Tom Richards provides an example. Richarde 
had described a ~udge's summing up, in a case related to the strikes, 
aa ~alicious lies t and the case itself as ta travesty of British 
Juatice". In this he was probably only giving voice to what a large 
number of people in the labour movement were feeling, yet the fact 
that Richards' opinion carried some weight because he was a Privy 
Councillor stimulated the Cabinet to take up the case on behalf of 
-British justicet~ The Attorney General aeked tha Cabinet if there 
were any political considerations why he ahould not go ahead with a 
prosecution. The Cabinet's first reaction was to prosecute but to let 
him off lightly in view of his rank, if he was prepared to make a 
public apology. As it happened Richards did publish an expression of 
regret and the case did not proceed, but the Cabinet had won the 
political point. 
However while the vast majority of magistratas could be relied upon 
to err only in favour of the government the Lord Chancellor left little 
to chance. At the end of the stoppages Lord Cave reported that hs had 
received complaints about the activitiee of fifty 'Labour magistrates '. 
He reluctantly pardoned fourteen who had only been accused of joining 
in or encouraging others to join in the strikes. Six men he actually 
removed from the bench although only one of theee had been found guilty 
of an offence. The others he judged were accused of conduct "of such a 
nature as wholly to unfit them,-from exercising magisterial functions".144 
Nine men were severely censured. The toffencea' of these 'Labour 
. 
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magistrates' included being involved in trade union permit schemes, 
attempting to interfere with the distribution of food, making statements 
hostile to the authorities and, in one case, saying that voluntser motor 
drivers 'ought to be shot '. In a number of cases the Lord Chancellor 
acted only on the word of a Lord Lieutenant. The Cabinet, when it sew 
Cavs's 'most secret memorandum I on this issue~ approved it in its 
entirity. Similar motivations inspired the Cabinet to introduce the 
Board of Guardiane (Default) Act of 1926 by which means the government 
penalised those Labour guardians who had sought to provide what they 
regarded as adequate relief for the increased numbers in their care 
because of the strikes. The Cabinet was unwilling to tolsrate any weak 
links in the state machine, 
Many contemporary commentators and a number of subsequent historians have 
emphasised the restrained and peaceable way in which the General Strike 
was conducted by both sides. Many admiring comparisons have been made 
between the British way of conducting such affairs and the disorders they 
. th t· 145 give rise to ~n 0 er coun r1ee. Perhape the most widely propagated 
image of the conflict is that of strikers and policemen playing football 
together in Plymouth. It must however be open to question wheth.r such an 
attractive picture of British social relationships reasonably epitomisss 
the strike. There are, after all, many harsher images available; of 
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striking men in Northumberland throwing stonee at passing treins, of 
others derailing the 'rlying Scotsman I , of erstwhile respectable Justice. 
of the Peace driven to furious outbursts by the activities of "volunteer" 
labour, of men in Ruthven "having a go" at members of tha Civil Constabulary 
147 Reserve. Local stUdies abound with instances of disorder which make it 
difficult to maintain that comfortable myth of the strike as a minor ripple 
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148 in a millpond of consensus. War Office and Police files indicate that 
the confrontation between strikers and the forces of order could not 
always be contained within the rules of Association rootball. 149 The 
Government itself was not above creating an image or two of coercion and 
confrontation. The decision to drive an armed convoy from the London 
docks through the East End was clearly not motivated by considerations of 
supply and the presence of battleships in some home ports was scarcely 
calculated to underline the consensual nature of British society. If a 
point.is to be made of the relative peacefulness of the conflict it must 
be strictly set in comparative terms. Moreover it must not be assumed 
that this relative peacefulness inevitably indicates maes contentment 
with exieting order or that thoee on strike lacked seriousness of purpose. 
The relative calm might Just as easily be held to indicate a widespread 
feeling of ineffectuality; a recognition that the structures.ofordsr 
were unassailable. 
In a sense there were two General Strikes. The first, as seen by the 
TUC, an essentially symbolic demonstration of solidarity with the miners, 
designed to cause limited dislocation and inconvenience in order to per-
suade the Government to continue the subsidy: the second, as propagated 
by the Cabinet, and even believed by a few of them, an attempt to under-
mine constitutionsl government by any means available. It was the 
Cabinet's adoption of this definition of the conflict which made it 
almost impossible for the unions to draw any concessions. Middlemaa and 
Barnee have argued that once the Government had defined the issue in this 
way all that the unions could do was take on the conflict at that level, 
which was politically impossible, or capitulate. 150 This argumant haa a 
strong element of truth but it is not entirely satiefactory as it waa 
still open to the uniona to persuade the Government to change its mind. 
416 
It is often the case that original definitions become softened during 
the course of political conflict. Vet what gave the Government its 
strength in this instance was not only the decision to fight on the con-
stitutional issue but also its posssssion of the material and organisa-
tional strength to enable it to stick by the original definition. Its 
victory can never be explained by material or ideational factors alone 
but always by tha way they were combinad. The unions had no dasirs to 
"starve the country into submission" or to use physical means to weaken 
the state. On the contrary they uaed all their efforta, aa one participant 
11 d Itt k th k t d and qUiet".151 Th i h d t reca e, 0 eep e wor ers s ea y ey w s e 0 
maintain all vital supplies, to produce and supply under TUC permits, all 
basic foodstuffs and to make sure that emergency services continued to 
function. By such means the unions hoped to demonstrate their goodwill 
and extract concessions from the Government. Vet the Government needed 
none of this. It was in a position to reject all offers of assistance 
and was, as such, above compromise. No doubt it could not havs hsld on 
for long on such a basis but these arrangements were always liable to 
endure longer than the trade union alliancs. 
Those many stUdies of the strike which have criticised the Ganeral 
Council for its inadequate preparations are reasonabls anough but thsy 
tend to miss this central point. 152 The problem for the trade union 
leaders was eventually a strategic one. No amount of material or organi-
sational preparation would be of assistance if they were unable to define 
a ground on which to fight. 
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CONCLUSION 
While most of those who have previously discussed these issues have 
presented their findings in terms of, and as if derived from the factual 
record, their works display contrasting styles of selection and inter-
pretation which seem more related to disagreements about the nature of 
social systems themselves rather than events taking place within them. 
The most important disagreement would seem to be related to a conflict 
identified by Ralph Oahrendorf. He argued that studies of society fell 
into one of two basic camps. On the one hand there were studies which 
saw social structures: "in terms of a functionally integrated system 
held in equilibrium by certain patterned and recurrent processes". On 
the other there were those in which society was assumed to be, "a form 
of organisation held together by force and constraint". 1 These con-
trasting images of society have a particular relevance to any study of 
tha role of state systems in the maintenance of political order. Those 
who approach the question on the basis of the integration model must 
inevitably begin with the assumption that it is possible for states to 
root themselves in a social consensus. They can maintain themselves by 
discovering and expressing the deeper agreements on which societies are 
seen as being founded. Any disagreements and conflicts which do arise 
will be resolvable by procedures which themselves can be founded in 
mutual agreement. It is possible for governments and their activities 
to acquire authority on the basis of the consent of the governed. Order 
is seen as a virtually natural state of affairs and while disorders may 
arise from time to time they can be eradicated by the development or 
adjustment of state and legal institutions so that they more properly 
represent the shared values and common interests of society. In con-
trast the second image of society, in emphasising the roles of force 
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and constraint, must assume a model of state activity which is the 
exact reverse of the above. Conflict will be seen ae an inevitable and 
permanent feature of society and there will be no general agreements and 
common understandings on which institutions can be based. Institutions 
will, of necessity, be partial, capable only of representing a section 
of society at the expense of other sections. State and legal insti-
tutions will be seen as originating in, and continuing by, the use of 
force and fraud. If societies appear to be ordered at any particular 
time this will be analysed as an artificial and temporary phenomenon 
brought about by particular circumetances or contrived by rUling groups. 
Social disorder is the proper expression,of inherent social conflict 
and its absence provokes a 'conflict based' historian, not to a recon-
siderationafhis theory, but to a study of the unnatural factors which 
have muted it or an investigation of the ability of the state and its 
associates to coerce or confine those who should be giving expression 
to the conflict. From this perspective the claims of state insti-
tutions to express common social purposes are seen as no more than 
additional devices for confusion, and spurious justifications for the 
coercion of dissenters. 
Disagreements of this nature must inevitably create great differences 
in the way in which historical material is selected. Disputes about 
the nature of the post war unrest for example, often seem to be based 
not so much on divisions about the factual record but rather on pre-
viously formulated assumptions about the general significance of such 
events. The respective accounts of Charles Mowat and Allen Hutt 
provide an illustration of views which could not be reconciled on a 
factual basis. Mowat views the crisis as arising out of particular 
circumstances, "alarming only on ths surfaca" and as having died away 
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"harmlessly" after 1921. Hutt, in contrast views the ssme events in 
the context of a capitalist system "in the throes of a mortal crisis", 
the strikers as "battles fought by the trade union movement ••• of 
unexampled scope " which declined into "a series of rearguard actions" 
only in the face of the "employers attack". The hiatoriane of the 
integrative camp come to the crisis as if it were an aberration, albeit 
a serious one, arising out of unique circumstances and, perhaps exacer-
2 bated by the mistakes of the government and its agents, whereae the 
conflict camp assume these same events must be interpreted as the 
active expreesion of conflicts permanently preeent at the core of 
. t 3 SOC1e y. In the former camp the activities of ths state will bs seen 
, 
as attempts to come to terms with new realities but in the latter they 
will be viewed in an entirely different light: attempts at amelioration 
become "bribes w and effortst~"incorporate" labour leaders are aeen as 
devices to isolate and repress the militant sectiona of the labour 
movement. Within the forme~ interpretation it is possible for the state to 
work towards an anduring stability, even though this might be dependent 
on continuous activity and adjustment, but in the conflict model the 
state's activities are seen as more or less desperate attempts to post-
pone the inevitable. All they can achieve is a temporary peace; while 
it may be possible to seal over surface fissures, the volcanic activity 
underneath can never be quenched. 
On application both models reveal a number of weaknesses and ambiguities. 
While they are too deeply rooted for anyone to entirely avoid presuppo-
sit ions associated with one or the other an awareness of the most 
obvious difficultiee might help to alleviate some of the possible die-
tortione. for example, although integrative mcdslsstresstha possibility 
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of consent in the relationship between government and governed they 
usually fail to deal with the issue in terms of quality and quantity.4 
The practical question is always one of degree: how much consent ie 
necessary for survival? It is quite clearly possible, even normal for 
states to prosper without attracting the conaent of all citizens though 
no state could survive without attracting the support of some. A second 
practical difficulty with such models is that they tend to imply that 
where consent is absent or where over time it diminishes to a point at 
which the system ceases to be viable, the replacement of the existing 
state by a new one is an almoet automatic matter. "The people" can 
somehow come together and instigate a new order. 5 In practice such 
operations can prove so difficult that some reassessment of the theory 
might be required. Successful revolt requires organisation on a scale 
which the situation of subjects renders exceptionally difficult. Mass 
support can remove some of the difficulties but this will only be 
present, in most cases, by the final stage of a successful rebellion. 
The early moves against an existing state are usually dependent on 
chance and circumatance, and the riskg which a few individuals ars 
prepared to take. A final practical problem of history on the integra-
tion model is that it can lead to a considerable undsrestimation of the 
extent to which apparently voluntary acquiescence may in fact have been 
artificially manufactured or manipulated. Those in power always have 
access to some machinery for adjusting the ideas and moral orientations 
of their subjects and in practice it can prove difficult to distinguish 
between support freely given and support offered in the face of actual 
or anticipated sanctions. Opinions as to what is right msy also be 
adjusted in the light of what is thought to be possible. Quiescsnce 
can owe as much to a belisf that improvement is impossible 8e to any 
genuine rscognition of the authority of the ruler. 
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The application of a conflict model of society to historicsl snalysis 
can also produce difficulties. The first and most obvious one ie that 
while such a model assumes that conflict ia at the heart of societiee 
and their political processes, actual open conflict tends, in moet 
times and in most places, to be the exception rather than the rule. 
Proponents of the conflict model need have no immediate difficulty over 
this objection. They could, for example point to the considsrable 
coervice powers which states can employ to conceal or contain conflict. 
If it is objected that in many societies overt coercive activity by 
state forces is rare, they can point to controls operated away from the 
centres of political power, for example in the schools and factories, 
which could be argued to ssrve the statets purposes equally well, as 
ideological apparatuses retarding the development of a popular recog-
nition of the real bases of society. The difficulty here is not that 
such explanations fail to cope with the initial objection but rather 
that they dispose of it rather too completely. Nairn, for instance 
provides a model which adequately accounts for the development of the 
6 
most "numbed and docile" working classes in Europe within a conflict 
model yet he leaves himself little room for explaining why some indi-
viduals escape the prevailing influences to mount fundamental attacks 
on the system. If these mechanisms of control or confusion are as 
effective as is sometimes claimed, how can it be that anyone escapes 
their influence? The fact that some escepe should surely suggest that 
the actual processes whereby individuals acquire their capacitiee to 
understand political issuee are more complicated than such analysea 
might suggest. This point can be related to a wider difficulty which 
arises out of the application of the conflict model, for in emphasiaing 
conflicts not visibly present, attention can be drawn awey from the 
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confusion and complexity of immediate political events. The focus of 
debate is shifted from the explanation of what happened to an explanation 
of why what should have happened, didnlt-happen. It is at this point 
that the agents of the state and their allies come to be awarded a 
reputation for foresight and manipulative competence which they can 
7 
rarely be seen to have deserved. 
In the face of such fundamental differencea it can never be possible 
to write an account of the activities of a state which would be uni-
versally acceptable. No tide of empirical evidence could submerge 
conflicts of this nature. Thus, while much of what is presented here 
might usefully illustrate the conflicting theories it could never con-
clusively prove one theory or another. There is, of course much ,here 
that could be ueed in support ofa basic marxist view of the state in 
capitalist society; that is as an instrument for furthering and pro-
tecting the interests of the owning class. Clearly there is much which 
must undermine the more optimistic liberal accounts of the exercise of 
state power. There is little evidence of even-handedness, much less 
neutrality towards competing groups of citizens. There is sufficient 
evidence of their subjective concern for the interests of capital to 
suggest that many politicians would have been content with a job des-
cription that mentioned "the management of the common affairs of the 
bourgeoisie". In matters of dispute between capital and labour the 
vast majority of politicians and officials were willing and active 
partisans of capital. They maintained contacts at all levels with 
representatives of the industrial and financial sectors and they often 
manipulated the forces at their disposal so that they might more 
directly serve what was regarded as the common purpoee. Vet while the 
available evidence must indicate t~at the state apparatus was biased 
towards capital it cannot prove that this was inevitably the case. 
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A number of recent writers in the marxist tradition have been interested 
in this problem but have specifically rejected analyses of the state in 
capitalist society which rely on the presentation of empirical evidence 
, 
of contacts and connections between state functionaries, politicians 
and representatives of capital. It has been suggested that even if 
there were no evidence of collusion nor no discernable pattern of direct 
influence there would be no reason to reject marxist assumptions about 
the nature of the state for, it is argued thst it is in the structural 
constraints imposed by the sconomic order that the direction of state 
activity is determined. 8 The state is not driven in a certain dirsction 
in response to the intersessions of particular intereets but rather 
operates in a situation of which the simple logic of events drawe it 
on. To serve the interests of capital is to do no more than accept the 
obvious constraints imposed by the situation and to follow the dictates 
of common sense. This type of view clearly takes the debate about the 
nature of the state well beyond the confines of this type of investigation. 
In a mors obvious sense it could also be argued that the material 
presented here fails to impinge on the debate about the ultimate nature 
of the state-as the partisan use of state institutions illustrated here 
was no more than a proper reflection of the openly displayed political 
orientations of the elected ministers. They favoured capital yet they 
always maintained that this, in their view, was the best way to further 
community interests. While it might appear that the formation of a 
Labour Government could add a further dimansion to the debate, as the 
Labour men were not the partisans of capital that their Conservative 
opponents were, the central question in reality, remsins as open 8S 
before. Though the evidence from 1924 suggests, at the least, that 
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a reforming government would have found it difficult to bend the state 
machine to radical purposes, the determination of the Labour adminis-
tration was never strong enough nor its broader political position 
sufficiently unambiguous for it to bring the issue to the test. 
Obviously the state machine was not the insipid purposeless body ordained 
by the strictest versions of constitutional theory: senior civil 
servants were politically engaged and were expected to argue for policies 
which they favoured, and established practices of consultation and die-
cussion were geared to assist ~ertsin groups and exclude others, but 
labour ministers were naver sufficiently secure to attsmpt to find out 
how resilient ingrained procedures and attitudes really were. 
Clearly the dominant issue of post war politics wss the rise and devel-
opment of the trade union movement. The sheer size of the movement meant 
that some new relationship between the state and labour would have to bs 
developed. One contemporary observer felt that a "vast shift" had 
already been made: "The famous moment of history has come whsn a nation 
9 
ushers in 'another class to power". Gerald Gould was slightly more 
circumspect but he believed that any failure on the part of the existing 
state to offer sUbstantial concessions would lead to widesprsad social 
. d 10 d~sor ere Later observers, in the knowledge that the existing state 
did survive, and moreover without making subetantial concessions, have 
developed more sanguine theses. John roster, in an account of those 
events deeply rooted in the conflict theory of society, has suggested 
that the response of the state to the development of organised labour 
was, "a set of bribes that bypaesed the market and went direct from 
state or employers to (or through) trade union lsaders and politicians. 
They were thus able to reach all organised workers • • 
" • roster 
434 
argued that "the establishmentts solution seems to have been worked 
out in three stages lt • Before 1922 they attempted to prevent the rise 
of labour as a political identity, but after the Labour Party's success 
in the General Election of that year their attention became Itfocused on 
'educating' Labour, using various forms of ideological persuasion to 
turn the new political identity into constitutional reformist channels lt : 
itA climate of opinion would be created by a growing battery or mass 
influence - newspapers, radio, the church, education and government 
itself •. The Labour leadership would be persuaded to adopt a courss of 
action that would enable it to Itwin this Public Opinion lt • Only after 
Itthe shock of Red fridaylt did the Itestablishment lt turn to Itmore 
drastically coercive methods lt • 
The central weakness of this analyeis is that it considerably over-
estimates the competence and cohesiveness of the Iteetabliahment lt • 
Politicians are credited with an ability to manipUlate evente and foresee 
consequences which finds little support in the available records. If we 
take the Conservative Party as the politicsl arm of this Itestablishmsnt", 
it is very difficult in their records of debate and discussion to find 
any such clear pattern of change. There were clear divisions on the 
issue of how labour might bsst bs dsalt with. Ths Itdishards lt associated 
British labour with Russian Bolshevism and interpreted all emanations 
of unrest as evidence of subversive intentions. They became and 
remained spiritual crusaders against labour and opposed all concessions. 
There were others, Lord Salisbury for one, who, while they did not 
regard labour as revolutionary threat in ths comic opera sense that 
the Duke of Northumberland did, did believe that the measurea of 
nationalisation which a successful Labour Party might introduce would 
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inflict p~rmanent damage on the interests they were pledged to defend. 
On the other wing of the party there were those such as Steel Maitland 
who consistently recognised the constitutional intentions of Labour 
leaders and moreover understood the fragility of labour alliancee. 
There is no evidence of any authoritative synthesis of thess ideas. 
The different positions attracted additional support and exercised 
influence when they appeared to provide the most appropriate reaction 
to the circumstances of any given time. ror example, the 'hard liners' 
were defeated over the political levy question in 1925 but when the 
changed circumstances of 1927 appeared to afford a greater credibility 
to their position they managed to gain that and a good deal more. 
roster is however, undoubtedly correct in pointing out that many leading 
Conservative politicians were not precipitated into panic by the electoral 
advances of the Labour Party in 1922 and 1923. In confirming this 
impression Maurice Cowling has suggested two alternative reasons why 
this might have been so: "Whether theee judgments were made becauee 
Labour had arrived and it was uselesa to argue with a steam roller, or 
becauae the Labour Party was an easy party to beat there can be no doubt 
that they reflected very little fear".12 The arrival of Labour as the 
second party was not something that the coneervativas had, or could 
have planned, but a fact which they had to accommodste themselves to. 
If the Labour Party rather than other available parties had managed to 
attract the support of sUbstantial numbers of working class voters the 
fact must be primarily attributed to the ability of that Party and its 
leaders to reflect and represent the aspirations and ideas of these 
voters. If because of this some long term advantage accrued to the 
defenders of existing order it must be recognised that the advantage 
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was gratuitously acquired. Nor wae it necessery, ae Foster argues, for 
the conservatives to "educate" labour leaders. Labour was firmly and 
publicly committed to a policy based on moderation and adherence to 
constitutional propriety. Within the Party this was widely assumed to 
be the only available basis on which to compete for electoral support. 
Even many advocates of 'direct action' felt it wae an additional weapon 
rather than an alternative strategy in itself. 
The attempt to discover in the actions of conservative politicians some 
master plan for the containment and manipulation of labour seems un-
likely to succeed for tactics appear to have been determined in a rather 
haphazard and opportunistic way. Behind their actions there were baaic 
agreements, frequently unspoken and rarely developed, that they were in 
politics to defend constitutional government and private ownership and 
to protect landowners and employers against the encroachments of trade 
unions or the state. Yet there was much disagreement as to how the 
defence should be conducted and how such concerns might best be related 
to immediate political issues. There wss certainly no attempt to divide 
and rule, no concsrted effort to detach moderate labour from the left in 
order to secure long term goals. Instead, in the belief that it would 
secure for their Party the immediate electoral advantage, the conserva-
tives' propaganda consistently ignored divisions and sought to colour 
the whole of the labour movement with the material provided by the few. 
While there is no material evidence to support the claim that coneerva-
tive politicians developed coherent long term strategies to contain 
labour the conduct of the state in the shorter period of the General 
Strike must suggest some firm central direction. Yet, as argued abovs, 
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such consistency as Baldwin was able to maintain even in this short 
period was achieved in the teeth of internal opposition. Moreover the 
"strategy", on closer examination amounted to little more than the 
mobilisation of ths natural ellies of the government by the aroussl of 
traditional prejudices. In the event Baldwin's achievement was to deter 
his more militant colleagues from dissipating the opportunity which 
the Labour movement presented them with. The absence of any grand 
design was only emphasised by the events which followed the strike. The 
hard liners were able to gain the ascendency by arguing that the events 
of 1926 vindicated their opinions. Arguments for prudence and mode-
ration had lost their force with the defeat of organised labour. 
A contrasting theory of the changing relationship between the state and 
labour has been offered by Keith Middlemas. Middlemas argues that 
during the course of 1917 a number of influential politicians came to 
believe that existing institutions of government were incapable of deal-
ing with conflicts which were arising in industry. In order to stem 
this source of social disruption these politicians began to develop 
communicetions between the state, organised labour and employsrs 
organisations, in particular the TUC and the NCED. By means of.such 
contacts ths state was able to exert influence in areas which it could 
not otherwise reach: "Schematically the process may be described as a 
ssries of interactione of declining importance: first the triangular 
co-operation betwsen government and govsrning inetitutions (in this cass 
employers and trade unions), secondly between those institutions and 
their constituents (TUe and unions, BEC or rBI and federations of parti-
cular industries), thirdly between individual members (federations and 
firms, unions and branch officials or shop stewards).,,13 rhe state is 
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therefore seen as using employers and trade unions as agents of 
influence: "To put it simply, what had been merely interest groupe 
14 
crossed the political threshhold and became part of the extended state." 
However ~iddlemas argues that it would not be justifiable to see this 
as the development of a corporate state. It was rather a system with a 
"corporate bias": "Progress towards institutional collaboration and the 
avoidance of economic competition and class conflict is a tendency and 
not an irreversible trend."15 ~oreover the system had no formal basis: 
"What was created was never precise, nor contractural in the sense 
ascribed by ~aine or Dicey to the law of the constitution, but existsd 
as a code among those groupe admitted to the process of government - a 
sort of outillage mental acquired by the leaders of inetitutions BS part 
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of their political apprenticeship, or a passport into the state domain." 
This triangular relationship is thus the new "efficient secret" and, 
+ike 8agehot's earlier version, it legitimated itself by reference to 
dignified, but obaolete institutions: "Governing inetitutions and 
parties combined to take issue with the excluded, not on ths question 
of their threat to their own role in the composition of the state, but 
of the threat to the already obsolescent parliamentary system - forcing 
thsm, almost by definition, to attack from outside the confines of what 
the great mass of the electorate st~ll accspted as the legitimate centre 
17 
of political activity." The outsiders, for example those who crsated 
the Shop Stewerds' Movement, who formed the Councils of Action, who 
forced the General Council into the General Strike, thus wers made to 
appear as "dinosaurs", as romantic remnants of a past age. 
While ~iddlemas' analysis does possess a number of merits, not the 
least of which is to deal in terms of options which were understood snd 
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contemplated by some of those who took part in these events, it fails 
to deal adequately with important questions. In common with other 
corporatist analysea of political power it tends to concentrate on the 
processes of bargaining rather than on the queationa of how the parti-
cipants were selected, what was the real etatua of each participant, 
and who determined what was to be on the agenda. Middlemaa' claim that 
this process was the new 'efficient secret' can only be conceded if it 
can be demonstrated that questions of resl sUbstance were raised and 
disposed of at this point. 
~ichael Ointenfaes has conceded that meetings between the stats and 
representatives of employers and trade unions did take place but has 
suggested that the parties were only allowed to diseuse a restricted 
range of topica. 18 The effective parameters of the debate were predeter-
mined by others who were not party to these discussions. Dintenfass 
argues that industrialists and trade unionists had to confine their 
suggestions within an overall economic policy which owed much to the 
influence of financial intereets. Rodney Lowe has made a similar point 
19 in his studies of the Ministry of Labour during these years. Lowe 
argues that while there were agents and apoatles of the corporatist 
tendency within the ~inistry and thst they successfully propagated 
knowledge of industrial and labour matters within the system of govern-
ment they were always subject to the constraints of Treasury orthodoxy. 
The decision to return to the Gold Standard in 1929 while it had a 
major influence on moat sectors of industry wss takan in rssponse to 
thia financially orientated orthodoxy. That many industrialiets were 
prepared to go along with the decieion must be related to the fact that 
they were conditioned to acquieace in such matters rather than to any 
20 
calculation of their own interests. 
440 
Proponents of the 'corporate tendency' thesis must also demonstrate that 
contacts between the groups went beyond normal consultations. They must 
produce evidence of mutual understanding about the permanent status of 
groups end their unchallenged right to act as representatives of their 
members. Some employers do not seem to have viewed mat tars in thia light. 
Middlemas himsalf points out that the mine owners used the government to 
impose the eight hour day on union members and then refused to keep thsir 
side of the bargain. rar from enforcing the original agreement the 
Government then advised the owners how best to present their subsequent 
defence. Yet even if, as Middlemas suggeets, the mining industry can be 
discsrded as anachronistic, thsre is evidence to suggest that othsr 
employers could act in a similar way. The NCED was certainly in frequent 
contact with government but even on Middlsmas' evidence its main concern 
was to defend its members' immediate interests. It devoted much energy 
to resisting the forty-eight hour week which had been agreed under the 
Washington Convention, and to opposing the introduction of employers' 
contributions to the national insurance scheme. When its private repre-
sentations in the matter of the forty-eight hour week appeared to have 
failed and the Government seemed to be about to ratify the Washington 
Convention, the NCED went public and inatituted a campaign of press 
advertising. They even attempted to mobiliss sympathetic backbenchers 
in opposition to the policy. Such evidence is not conclusive but it 
does suggest a reluctance on the part of employsrs to compromise on 
matters of direct interest or to confine their opposition to the inner 
councils. This is an indication that employers tended to regard nego-
tiations with government as an opportunity to pursue an interest rather 
than a forum in which interests could be readjusted and redefined. 
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In respect of trade unions there are more serious problems. In order 
to sustain the corporatist tendency thesis it is not necessary to demon-
strate that the government afforded the trade unions an equal ahare 
with employers in the bargaining process~ but it is essential to show 
that they had a role which was permanent and relatively conetant. 
~iddlemas argues that the tendency to incorporate union leaders originated 
in 1917, disappeared in ths post war crisis and was gradually to re-emerge 
as orthodoxy by 1926. As illustrated elsewhere there are good reasons 
to be sceptical about ths conversions of 1917. It is not sufficient to 
identify political figures who believed that a corporatist solution was 
desirable. What is necessary is to demonstrate that governments wers 
prepared to devote significant resourcea to the establishment and main-
tenance of trade union leaders at the centre of the system. Ae 
illustrated above, governments were frequently unable to adequatsly 
protect and recompense labour leaders for their co-operation. In the 
immediate post war period many conservative politiciana became obaessed 
with what they saw as the subversive potential of trade unions and 
viewed all developments with hostility. No scheme for industrial recon-
ciliation stood much chance in this atmosphsre. The National Industrial 
Conference was never really a corporatist scheme being baaed rather on 
the view that capital and labour should bs brought together and then 
left to settle their differences. Howe~er it foundered on govsrnment 
attitudes as few politicians wers prepared to leave such matters alone. 
As James Cronin has argued, the central aim of governmsnt appeared to 
be to downgrade both the labour and employer sides of industry in order 
to return to traditional policies. 21 Viswe of the positivs contributions 
which the state might maks were in effect more restricted thsn they had 
been in the prewar period. 
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The events of 1926 and 1927 would tend to confirm that no sUbstantial 
change of outlook had taken place. The passage of the Trade Disputes 
Act is particularly difficult to reconcile with the corporatist tendency 
theeis. A central feature of corporatism must be the accsptance by the 
state of the right of group leaders to speak on behalf of their members 
and to regulate the internal affairs of their own organisation. The 
Trade Disputes Act was firmly baaed on the assumption that the state had 
the right to regulate the affairs of trade unions and to appeal over the 
heads of union leaders directly to their members. There is moreover 
something in the very character of this legislation which i. directly 
antithetical to the spirit of corporatism. While some clausss sought to 
place specific restrictions on the activities of the labour movement 
others, as Alan Anderson has convincingly argued, were more concerned 
with the symbolic downgrading of labour. It is this indulgence in the 
politics of symbolism which is most clearly outside a corporatist freme 
of rsference. 
While ~iddlemas is correct in pointing out that a number of trede union 
leaders were prepared to become involved in longterm discussions with 
employers after 1927, it is going too far to ses some new 'efficient 
secret' of government in the discussions between what were the leaders 
of a defeated and demoralised trsde union movement and the representatives 
of a downgraded industrial sector. 
A centrel theme of this study has baen the chan gee which took plece 
within the Special Branch, the Supply and Transport Organisation and 
other state agencies designed to contain and oppose groups who wish ad to 
readjust power relationships within society. As so many accounts of 
such agencies from both the left and the right have tsnded to surround 
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such agencies with an air of mystery it is important always to 
emphasiss the political context within which their activities took 
place. This is not to deny that such agencies breached constitutional 
rules, as strictly and publicly defined, nor that they did so regularly 
as to suggest that some irregularities became part of their normal 
operating procedures. Agents interceptsd the private communications 
of many individuals who could not be, in any ssnse, regardsd as being 
involved in illegal activities. The Watson case suggests that, in 
addition, attempts were made to corrupt political activists. There ie 
evidence to suggeet a network of secret contacts in labour and socialist 
organisations. The brief history of the OMS providee evidence that the 
state was, at least on occasion, prepared to allow public inetitutions 
to be used by private political organisatione, and the contacts between 
state agencies and National Propaganda and the like indicates a partisan-
ship which went beyond the limits of constitutional propristy. 
Yet notwithstanding these and many othsr breaches of the formal rules 
it is important to emphasise the considerable quantitative and qualitative 
diffsrences between this situation and anything which might realistically 
be describsd as a police state. Brian Chapman suggests that a modern 
police state comes into existence: '~hen the police apparat is immuns 
to control by the Civil Service, the judiciary and the army, and is an 
independent leading state institution in its own right • • • While 
the actual rules governing the conduct of the Special Branch were at 
variance with the official rules, they were rules nonethelees. The 
power exercised by police officers and other state agents was never 
arbitrary. While officials may have been able to avoid direct political 
control in matters of detail, their activities were in all essentials 
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subject to supervision by senior civil servants and ministers. They 
had to give frequent account of their work and on occasion Justify their 
existence. The interchanges between Macdonald, ss Prime Minister, and 
Childs show that while they could deny politicians access to their 
files they had to tolerate irreverent intrusions into their activities. 
There are indications that they bridled at the constraints placed upon 
them but recognised, as with other senior civil servants, that their 
ability to remove or alter such constraints depended on their ability to 
convince others. The Thomson diemissal indicated clearly that Directors 
of Intelligence had no independent power base. Senior politicians could 
remove them at a whim without fear of the consequences. 
Although governments went to considerable lengths to conceal the extra 
constitutional elements of their activities it would not seem likely 
that they would have encountered much difficulty had the sUbstance of the 
matter become public knowledge. Except for a brief moment after the War 
most of the actions which infringed on the libertiee of individuals were 
directed at those who were already politically isolated. Evidence of 
partisanship towards mineowners and the use of the OMS in 1926 might 
have proved embarrassing had it become public, yet it is useful to remem-
ber that those who opposed government policy at this time suspected such 
things were going on and thosa who supported it would, undoubtedly, hava 
been prepared to swallow a defence of such activities based on 'the 
necessities of the Law,.23 Thus while the state operated outaide the 
formal rules it was always well within the limits of its politicsl 
legitimacy. 
Yet while there were restrictions on what the police could do and while 
such restrictions were in line wi~h popular idees and the political 
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principles of many senior politicians it would be misleading to present 
them as if they were not subject to change according to political cir-
cumstance. The powers available to political policement tend to increase 
in inverse proportion to the confidence of politicians. Indeed it is 
not unheard of for the police to attempt to undermine the confidence of 
their nominal masters in order to increase their influence. When regimes 
are on the brink of losing control considerable power can accrue to the 
police. Only a regime in decay, such ae the Tsarist autocracy could 
have afforded Zubatov a stage for his imaginative and arbitrary experi-
ments in social control. The fact that Britain did not develop .uch a 
system must be related not so much to cultural predisposition or the 
principles of the political elite as to the political circumstance. of 
the time. In dealing with the British state at this time it ia important 
to emphaaise that, in spite of the odd diversion, one is not dealing 
with a situation in which the defenders of order are desperately squaring 
up to the proponents of revolution for some decisive encounter. Poli-
ticians could, at all times, still muster considerable eupport for their 
general aims and their right to operate and thus the introduction of an 
arbitrary element would have been unneceseary, out of place and counter-
productive. There was far more to be gained by operating within the 
political rulee than by breaking them. 
If in the end it was conventional measuree which were pursued this ehould 
not obscure the fact that some politicians were prepared to contemplate 
more exotic strategies. Lloyd George suggested on a number of occasions 
that an ambitious scheme of social reforme would provide a cheap and 
effective guard againet revolution. Some politiciane did feel that trads 
union leaders might be permanently incorporated into the state and others 
advocated the development of more authoritarian forma of rule. All auch 
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schemes had thair supporters and all were, in this sense at least, 
possibilities. Yet in the end there is no evidence of anyone being 
prepared to contemplate the political costs involved in such radical 
departures. Such changes as did take plsce were within ths confines 
of established prejudices and the potentialities of the existing state. 
The state continued to ground its claim to legitimacy in traditional 
liberal propositions about the proper relationship between government 
and society. A few politicians did rscognise that this formula left 
certain groups excluded yet they made no consistent attempt to alter 
the eituation. After 1919 the greater part of the state's political 
energy seems to have been devoted to extricating itaelf from recently 
acquired responsibilities and to propagating the idea that, in general, 
its field of competence was necessarily restricted and that, in parti-
cular, economic conditions and their consequences were beyond the scope 
of political activity. 
While it appears likely that this policy was arrived at ss much by 
default as by rational foresight, it was not, given the resources of the 
state and the expectations of the broader society, an unintelligent way 
to proceed. At the most obvious level, by restricting its activities the 
state minimised the number of things which could go wrong. The exper-
iences of the war years had emphasised the pitfalls associated with new 
administrative structures and had demonstrated that it was all too easy 
to become involved in a spiral of rising expectations. During the war 
each new responsibility accepted seemed only to generate further demands. 
In the post war period politicians such 8S Baldwin and Geddes came to 
recognise that the policy that the government was drifting into was not 
only convenient and comfortable but that within its confines it was 
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possible to achieve an entirely satisfactory level of security. At one 
level they recognised that working class opinion was not as disaffected 
as some of their colleagues had assumed. While a large number of working 
people were newly organised and even to an extent radicalised it did not 
automatically follow that they were immune to more traditional appeals. 
In contrast to many of their colleagues who tended to define the post war 
problem in the same way as Gramscias being, "How to reconstruct the 
hegemonic apparatus of the ruling group, an apparatus which disintegrated 
as a result of the war in every state throughout the world",24 Geddes 
and Baldwin recognised that in Britain at least, astute political leaders 
could rejuvenate existing authority structures. Providing they were 
modernised and applied with sensitivity the existing liberal forms could 
provide an effective system of rule. On the basis of a restricted range 
of functions it was possible for such a state to achieve a high level of 
acceptability, even popularity. The authority of the liberal state 
rested on its claim to provide, for the benefit of the community ae a 
whole the basic conditions of order under which private individuals and 
groups might pursue their legal enterprises. The more perceptive poli-
ticians recognised that the pursuit of such goals actually afforded them 
considerable opportunities to influence events. 
The main difficulty for the liberal state surrounded the contradiction 
between this claim to pursue community ends, which clearly required the 
state to demonstrate some impartiality between competing groups, and 
that other requirement of a liberal state, to achieve some alignment with 
the predominant economic groups within society. Only in this way can 
the liberal state guarantee that basic level of material prosperity on 
which ultimately all claims to authority muet reet. This is not, 
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however, to imply that such an alignment was automatically or psrfsctly 
achieved. Between such groups, and sven sometimes within them, there 
existed both conflicts of interests and disagreements as to how common 
interests might best be pursued. Perceptions of interest were also 
affected by the passage of time and changing circumstances. Thus poli-
ticians had a measure of flexibility in thair dealings with such groups. 
On occasion circumstances could afford them the opportunity to define 
and explain some common interest. Yst thsr~ were always limits on the 
independence of politicians because they ultimately dependsd on the 
functioning of private industry and finance. Governmente overcame the 
contradiction between the need for public impartiality and the require-
ment to respond to private capital in three ways. The most obvioue 
device was secrecy. The neceeeary contacte and negotiations took place 
within the administrative structures of government. However secrecy 
alone could never have been adequate for in the first place it can never 
be absolute and in the second it can only conceal the fact of contact 
and not its outcome. The second device was for politicians to claim, 
without admitting precise details, that the constraints on policy imposed 
by powerful interests were in effect part of the natural order of affairs 
and as such both inevitable and even desirable. Such arguments can have 
a broad appeal for within a restricted framework of argument, it will 
often appear to be the case that the best way to achieve general proa-
perity is to follow the wishes of those who dominate ths economy. The 
third factor easing the state over the contradiction was the fact that 
existing major interests, by their very nature, only rarely required 
direct action by government and were for the most part content with 
inactivity. Inaction will usually serve to maintain a status quo 
already favourable to those who own and direct and it is relatively 
eaey in a restricted commonsensical way to pass off such passivity as 
impartiality. 
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Baldwin and Geddes instinctively rscognised that extending the field of 
state activity could do more harm than good. The state could best 
secure its position by removing itself, wherever possible, from conten-
tious areas and leaving the production of social order on a day to day 
basis to the "dull compulsion of economic relations".25 At best the 
activities of such bodies as National Propaganda could only exercise a 
marginally beneficial influence on beliefe and expectations which were 
essentially moulded by the experience of the material universe se struc-
tured by the private enterprise system. The liberal state should offer 
no more than a gentle support and reinforcement of the ideas generated 
by this system when the opportunity arose. It could also in a crisis 
drsw on this fund of widsom and apply it to the particular circumstances 
of the time. However a more abstract or principled defence of the econ-
omic system could raise difficulties. It would inevitably call into 
question the "impartiality" of the state but, more importantly, it would 
appear to invite debats at that level and suggest the availability of 
some alternative. The objective was not to defend a particular order but 
to reinforce the view, by word and deed, that the existing state of 
affairs was, in some sense, natural. Here, as in other matters the state 
should accept a restricted role. Only at moments of acute conflict 
should the state assume wider responsibilitiee and even then it should 
seek to act as a co-ordinator, marshalling the resources of its more 
vigorous allies and exploiting its carefully constructed eminence to 
encourage friends and isolate opponents. 
Those who favoured the development of a more authoritarian form of state 
failed to recognise that this would inevitably require a reconstruction 
of the means whereby the legitimacy of the political and economic systsms 
were secured26 Thers might be immediate gains in direct cont~ol but 
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these could only be secured at the price of longer term difficulties. 
At the very minimum the state would have to become involved in the 
ideological defence of the economic order. Oevelopments in a corporatiat 
direction would have inevitably raised similar difficulties. Even if 
corporatism enabled the state to carry its authority into new araas it 
would have been at the expense of, what haa been termed, the "isolation 
27 
effect", that capacity of the liberal state to deal with its subjects 
as individuated citizens rather than as component parts of groups. Cor-
poratism would have legitimated thoae group identities which conservative 
politicians were most anxious to diffuse. 
Any assessment of the state which did emerge soon encounters a paradox 
of strength and weakness. The new libersl state was weak in the sense 
that it was dependent for the performance of a number of basic functions, 
on groups and individuals over whom it had little formal authority. The 
machinery at its immediate disposal was inadequate for many of the tasks 
which it might be required to perform. In this context the nervoueness 
of conservatives in 1919 is easy to understand. The new dominsnce of 
trade unions in vital industries was only one aspect of the developing 
interdependence within modern industrial societies and they were correct 
in recognising that a number of groups had acquired the phyaical capacity 
to disrupt the operations of the whole social system. However tha mis-
take which these conservatives made wae to believe that the only way of 
achieving a tolerable degree of security was for the state to take to 
itself similar physical powers and thus rendsr itself immune to prsssurs. 
Given the growing interdependence such a solution was scarcely a practical 
possibility, yet neither was it neceesary, for the libersl state, with 
its cspacity for developing informal alliances and its freedom of 
political manoeuvres, could operate more successfully without such 
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encumbrances. Its partiality could be concealed within appeale to 
commonsense, controversial activities could be passed on to private 
organisations or performed by volunteers, repressive measuree could be 
presented as acts in defence of basic order or the public interest, and 
the grievances of organised groups of citizens deflected to the indi-
vidual level and redefined as private issues. 
from the point of view of those who sought to mobilise opposition to 
existing social structures such a state presented a formidable obstacle, 
not least because of its determination to avoid direct confrontation. 
When the state did become involved it usually managed to Justify its 
intervention in terme of the need to defend abetract or community enda. 
Its whole inclination was to minimise the recognisably political content 
of its actions and thus avoid that principled defence which might offer 
greater coherence and credibility to the claims of its radical opponents. 
When matters were handled properly the spokesmen for such a state were 
free to concentrate their attack on the methods of the radicals and to 
point out the threat which such methods represented to existing social 
values. Those who sought to offer a principled opposition to such a 
state were thus faced with an eternal uphill struggle. They were always 
at least one stage removed from the central issue. Before they could 
begin their own argument about the iniquity of existing social arrange-
ments they had to demonstrate that there was an issue worth arguing 
about. Attempts at political or industrial action had to be publicly 
discussed in terms of its propensity to dierupt the affairs of the 
community or offend against its laws rather than in terms of its own 
intrinsic merits. 
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While the functions of the liberal state were, by definition and design, 
restricted, they were nonetheless vital to the maintenance of the eocial 
order. While that society itself provided the necessary supports and 
sresources that political core was still required for mobilisation, co-
ordination and, above all the creation of the climate of opinion in 
which actions would be most effective. While the world of production 
could provide a structure within which social beliefs would be shaped 
there was still a necessary role for the state in reinforcing, refining 
and propagating such beliefs, in action ae much as words, and on occasion, 
directing them to particular ends. Thus the survival of the economic 
and social order rested on the performance of the political state and as 
such the state represented a point of vulnerability. Yet in normal 
circumstancee the operations of that etate could be performed without 
great hazard or difficulty. 
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NOTES TO CONCLUSION 
1 R Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (1964) 
pp158-165 
2 See for example C L mowat's characterisation of· the period 
immediately following the post war crisis as "coming to rsst", or 
his comment "Thus harmlessly did the acute industrial unrest which 
followed the war die away, without bringing either the reconstruction 
of society or the nationalisation of industry", C L Mowat, Britain 
Between the Wars (1968) p43 
Graves and Hodge were even more explicit: "In spite of the 
Bolshevik bogey that they manipulated, it was correctly assumed that 
the country was 'sound at heart'. The elder members of the working 
clasa for the most part resented the identification of their trade 
unions with socialism ••• 'They knew their place'. The younger 
members were socialistically inclined but even the few who picked up 
the marxian catchwords had no ambition to overthrow and displace the 
capitalist class." R Graves and A Hodge, The Long Weekend (1941) 
A J P Taylor, English History 1914-1945 also stresses an underlying 
stability. "In Glasgow a general strike was called to secure the 
forty hour week. The red flag was hoisted on the town hall. Troope 
were sent, though the police managed to restore order without them. 
Gallacher, a future communist: Shinwell, a future Minister of 
Defence and Kirkwood, a future Peer were imprisoned. Then the danger 
died away." p187 
3 Gallacher was later to see 1919 as a wasted opportunity. "We were 
carrying on a strike when we ought to have been making a revolution." 
W Gallachar, Revolt on the Clyde, p221. Allan Hutt's account clearly 
reflects the "conflict model" (Allan Hutt, British Trade Unionism, A 
Short History 1800-1961 (1962» "Capitalism in Britain, as throughout 
Europe was in the throes of mortal crisis" p84 "Battles fought by 
the trade union movement were of unexampled scope" p90 Hutt also has 
an appropriate account of the "coming to rest", which identifies the 
continuing conflict: "After Black Friday there remained nothing but 
a series of rearguard actions,' stubbornly contested but unable to hold 
the employers' attack, which was pressed home throughout industry" p97 
Even those who disagree on the interpretation of 1919 can find some 
agreement on the fundamental presence of conflict. "By 1921 the 
Government had succeeded in resolving this dilemme. While avoiding 
a general strike they managed to abandon most of the reconstruction 
programme, dismantle most of the apparatus of control, and go far to 
depoliticising the sectional strikee and lockouts that accompanied 
the employers' counter attack or inflated wartims wage rates." 
J Hinton, Labour and Socialism, A History of the British Labour 
Movement 1867-1974 (1983) p110 But see also recent articlee by 
Richard Price and Patrick Joyce which have made an interesting addi-
tion to this debate. Price in two recent articles has bsen concerned 
to argue against what he sees as the prevailing tendency of marxist 
writing to underestimate the importance of actual workplace resistance 
to the powsr of capital: "Marx did not foresee, therefore, that 
resistance to capitalist control of the labour process could make 
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much of an impact. Rather, he envisaged that the powerlessness of 
the working clasa at the productive process would force them into 
tha separate realm of revolutionary political activity." (Richard 
Price, 'Rethinking Labour History: The Importance of Work', in James 
E Cronin, and Jonathan Schneer (Eds), Social Conflict and the 
Political Order in ~odern Britain (1982) p205) See also Richard 
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